CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61

Appeal from: CQR17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 627
File number: NSD 940 of 2018
Judges: REEVES, JAGOT AND DERRINGTON JJ
Date of judgment: 15 April 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – where the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – where the Authority not given all the material in possession or control of the delegate when the decision referred to the Authority – whether delegate failed to identify relevant documents – whether it was unreasonable to consider certain documents irrelevant to the review – whether breach material to outcome of review under Pt 7AA such that jurisdictional error was established – appeal dismissed

MIGRATION – Decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Secretary failed to provide all relevant information  to Immigration Assessment Authority – whether information was “relevant to the review” – whether failure to provide relevant material resulted in jurisdictional error – whether any non-compliance with the requirements to provide relevant information resulted in a jurisdictional error by Authority – whether error realistically denied the appellant of the opportunity of a different outcome 

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 418, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corporations (1985) 1 NSWLR 561

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245

Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408

Carltona Ltd v Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560

EMJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890

Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 92 ALJR 780; (2018) 359 ALR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 (2017) 254 FCR 534

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 93 ALJR 252

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36; (2018) 92 ALJR 806; (2018) 359 ALR 31

Parker v Paton (1941) 41…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal is from an order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) but this was refused. The decision was referred to the IAA for review under s 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant then sought to appeal the IAA’s decision to the Federal Circuit Court. However, the appellant failed to file a Notice of Appeal within the time permitted by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Nonetheless, on 13 November 2018, an extension of time in which to appeal was granted under r 36.05 and a Notice of Appeal was duly filed.

The central issue before the court was whether the Secretary failed to provide all the material in possession or control of the delegate to the IAA, as required by s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act, and if so, whether that constituted a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Secretary failed to identify relevant documents and unreasonably considered certain documents irrelevant to the review. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the Secretary did not breach the statutory obligation because the Secretary had not failed to consider relevant documents and the view that the documents were not relevant was legally reasonable.

The court found that there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision. The court considered that the Secretary’s view as to relevance must be formed in a reasonable manner and on a correct understanding of the law. The court also found that even if the Secretary had breached the statutory obligation, the contravention did not amount to jurisdictional error because it could not have made any difference to the result. The court held that the IAA was not prevented from conducting the review which Part 7AA contemplated and jurisdictional error was not established.

The court dismissed the notice of appeal filed on 7 December 2018 and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of appeal filed 7 December 2018 is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant failed to file a Notice of Appeal in respect of the decision of the FCC within the time permitted by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). However, after the making of the appropriate application, on 13 November 2018 an extension of time in which to appeal was granted under r 36.05 and a Notice of Appeal was duly filed.The facts The appellant is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity from the Batticaloa area. On 3 November 2012, he arrived in Australia by boat as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”. At some time prior to early 2016 he was given permission to lodge an application for a protection visa and on 16 February 2016 he applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. There is no dispute the appellant was assisted with the making of his visa application by a migration agent appointed under the “Primary Application Information Service” (PAIS). The PAIS is a government funded scheme established to assist certain unauthorised maritime arrivals to apply for visas. It is uncontroversial that government policy is that assistance under the PAIS scheme is only available to a small portion of protection visa applicants and certain eligibility requirements limit the type of persons who might be afforded such services. It is plain from the government guidelines that persons who suffer from cognitive impairment and who might be regarded as exceptionally vulnerable can be provided with the PAIS assistance. Such cognitive impairment may have resulted from brain injury, mental illness, incapacitating illness or torture and trauma. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) assesses PAIS eligibility based on information held on its systems which may have been derived from a variety of different sources. In a statement supporting his application for a protection visa the appellant claimed that in Sri Lanka he had worked in jewellery shops which were owned or controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and that he collected gold from members of the community for the LTTE. He later said that he was not a member of the LTTE. In addition, he claimed that he and his family were displaced on several occasions during the Sri Lankan civil war. Specifically, he said he travelled from an LTTE controlled territory to the town of Vavuniya, which was in a government controlled area, and that he became the victim of a round up, transported to a government camp, accused of being a member of the LTTE and beaten by the police or by members of the army in civilian dress. His claims of internment were two-fold. First he claimed that he was taken to a camp called Joseph Camp. It was there he was detained for about six days and, he claims, beaten on a number of occasions while being questioned about whether he was a member of the LTTE. He also said that after the war he and his family were sent to 74 Rehabilitation Camp. He did not claim to have suffered beatings or torture there. He said that he was released after a bribe was paid.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Under the Act the appellant was a “fast track applicant” with the consequence that, by the operation of s 473CA, the delegate’s decision was automatically referred to the IAA for review. Pursuant to s 473CB the Secretary is obliged to give to the IAA for the purposes of the review certain identified material. Although the evidence reveals the Secretary performed that statutory obligation to some extent by forwarding some material, the central question is whether the obligation was fully performed and, in particular, whether there was compliance with the obligation in s 473CB(1)(c). Relevantly, at the time of the referral the Secretary had possession of a number of documents relating to the appellant and his circumstances which were not given to the IAA. They are referred to in greater detail below but include documents relating to the severe car accident in which the appellant was involved in April 2014, documents relating to the provision to the appellant of six torture and trauma counselling sessions and documents relating to the affording of assistance to the appellant under the PAIS scheme.The decision of the IAA The appellant sought to advance some new claims before the IAA. One was to the effect that he was, in fact, a member of the LTTE and, in support of that, he sought to provide information about his role in that organisation. He provided a statement to the IAA in which he asserted that during the visa application process he feared that if he mentioned or admitted his involvement with the LTTE he would have been detained indefinitely, jailed or handed over to the Sri Lankan authorities. It was said on his behalf that, given the context of his fear for his life and being unaccustomed to sharing information with government authorities, he had provided a reasonable explanation as to why he had not earlier disclosed this new claim. The IAA held it ought not consider the new information provided by the appellant in support of his new claim. It reasoned that, whilst it might be accepted he had some initial reluctance to disclose his alleged involvement with the LTTE, that did not adequately explain his failure to disclose it until after he was informed of the delegate’s decision and the referral of his application to the IAA. The IAA also considered the circumstances of the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa interview which was conducted between the delegate and the appellant with the support of his migration agent. It found the circumstances of that interview reinforced its conclusion that there was no reason why he could not have disclosed his claimed involvement with the LTTE earlier. It was also concerned that he had given evidence under oath in his entry interview which was directly contradictory to the claims then being made to it. The IAA also considered the appellant’s submission that he had been involved in a significant car accident on 13 April 2014, the result of which was he had suffered a brain injury and this accounted for his failure to mention his actual involvement with the LTTE earlier. It was, however, not satisfied that this circumstance accounted for his omission to provide the relevant information at his initial SHEV interview which had occurred prior to the injury. In the result, it concluded there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant the consideration of “new information”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister’s case may be discussed more conveniently as part of the overall consideration of the appellant’s arguments. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the Minister denied any contravention of s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act by the Secretary on the basis that it had not been proved that the Secretary failed to consider the relevant documents and the view that the documents were not relevant was legally reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. Further, if there had been any contravention by the Secretary then, in any event, the contravention did not amount to jurisdictional error because the contravention could not have made any difference to the result. Consideration In EMJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462 Thawley J provided a convenient summary of principles in these terms:41. As a matter of principle, it was at least arguable that a breach of s 473CB(1)(c) by the Secretary could, in an appropriate case, have the consequence that the Authority’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error:(1) Section 473CB(1)(c) requires the Secretary to form a view as to which documents are relevant to the review to be conducted by the Authority – see, in a different context: WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 151 FCR 413 at [64]. (2) The view so formed is the subjective view of the Secretary as to relevance: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 (2017) 254 FCR 534 at [73] (Griffiths J).(3) The Secretary’s view as to relevance must be formed in a reasonable manner and on a correct understanding of the law – see, albeit in a different context: Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; Te Puia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890 at [57]; NACA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 551 at [41] (Tamberlin J).(4) An unreasonable failure or refusal to identify documents which might be relevant might arguably also constitute a breach of s 473CB(1)(c).(5) A breach of s 473CB(1) by the Secretary might arguably establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority if it could be shown that the breach had the consequence that the review conducted by the Authority was not a “review” of the kind authorised by Part 7AA. It not a question of whether the Authority is to blame. The question is the effect of the anterior breach on the Authority’s decision-making process – cf: SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 at [47]. The anterior breach might be such as to have the consequence, for example, that the Authority’s jurisdiction is, through no fault of its own, “constructively unexercised”: SZFDE at [52].42. In amplification of the last proposition:(1) If, for example, in breach of s 473CB(1)(b) the Secretary failed to give to the Authority material provided to the delegate by the visa applicant before the delegate made his or her decision, the Authority might well be prevented from conducting the very “review” which Part 7AA contemplated and jurisdictional error might, accordingly, be established. (2) A breach of s 473CB(1)(c) might also have that consequence. The statutory scheme contemplates limited merits review on the “review material” provided by the Secretary to the Authority. The “review material” must include material which the Secretary considers to be relevant: s 473CB(1)(c). It is implicit that the statute contemplates that the Secretary’s view as to relevance be reasonably formed on a correct understanding of the law – see: Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 (Brennan CJ); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). If a critical piece of relevant information were unreasonably treated as irrelevant, it is possible that jurisdictional error could be established because of the effect of that error on the Authority’s decision-making process and whether it conducts a “review” of the kind authorised.(3) The reasoning in cases such as WAGP at [62]-[64], in relation to a breach of s 418(3) (found in Part 7), does not easily translate to a breach of s 473CB(1) in light of the quite different scheme contemplated by Part 7AA; see also: SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123 and BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159. A Part 7 review is triggered by the making of a valid application by the applicant, not by the receipt of material under s 418(3). The review body is not prevented from receiving new material. By contrast, under Part 7AA, the review is automatic: the Secretary “must refer a fast track reviewable decision” to the Authority: s 473CA. Subject to the terms of Part 7AA, the Authority must (s 473CC(1)) conduct its review “by considering the review material” and “without accepting or requesting new information” or “interviewing the referred applicant”: s 473DB(1). Part 7AA does not contemplate the Authority affording procedural fairness in a manner equivalent to Part 7. The s 473CB(1) “review material” is, accordingly, a critical part of the process and errors under that provision are not as likely to be corrected or rendered immaterial by reason of an opportunity to be heard being provided in the review, as may occur under Part 7.