EKE17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

EKE17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 867

File number(s): SYG 3033 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE LAING
Date of judgment: 28 September 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) affirming a decision not to grant Temporary Protection (Class XD) (Subclass 785) visas – where the Applicant was told that she had 7 days in which to submit further material, but the delegate’s decision was made before that time expired – where the Applicant did submit further material prior to the referral to the IAA under s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), but that material was not referred to the IAA – whether the Secretary’s referral of material under s 473CB of the Act was affected by legal unreasonableness or other error – materiality – whether the IAA failed to consider exercising its discretion to obtain documents or new information – application succeeds
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ARM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3326

AUF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCAFC 222; (2019) 274 FCR 82

CJD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 212

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; (2019) 269 FCR 367

EIH18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 460

EMJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462

EMS18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 174; (2020) 280 FCR 381

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 59
Date of last submission: 14 July 2023
Date of hearing: 14 November 2022, 4 May 2023
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr M Jones of Michael Jones Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent Mills Oakley
Second Respondent Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 3033 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

EKE17

First Applicant

EKG17

Second Applicant

EKH17

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE LAING

DATE OF ORDER:

28 SEPTEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing the decision of the second respondent dated 27 July 2017 into this Court and quashing it.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to re-determine the review according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 867
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves the applicants, EKE17 and her family, who sought protection from the Australian Government, contending that they would face persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) had previously affirmed the Delegate’s decision to deny their application for protection visas. The applicants challenged this decision in court, arguing that the IAA made several errors in its review of the Delegate's decision, including failing to consider certain material, not exercising its discretion to obtain new information, and not engaging intellectually with the evidence before it. The central legal issues in this case were whether the IAA constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction, failed to consider whether to exercise its discretion to obtain documents or new information, and failed to engage intellectually with the evidence before it.

The court examined the statutory framework governing the review process by the IAA, particularly section 473CB, which mandates that the Secretary must provide all relevant material to the IAA. The court highlighted that this obligation requires the Secretary to take reasonable steps to locate potentially relevant documents. The court found that the Secretary had failed to provide certain material to the IAA, which affected the fairness and correctness of the review process. Additionally, the court determined that the IAA should have exercised its discretion to obtain new information regarding the applicants’ claims of detention and mistreatment, and it failed to engage intellectually with the evidence, particularly in relation to the applicants' children.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favour of the applicants, finding that the IAA’s decision was affected by jurisdictional and procedural errors. The court's decision necessitated a re-evaluation of the applicants' protection visa application, considering the material and information that was previously not provided to the IAA. The court ordered that the matter be remitted to the IAA for reconsideration in light of the new material and the court's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 27 July 2017, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.THE IAA’S DECISION The IAA accepted that:(a)the Applicant lived in an LTTE controlled area in Sri Lanka and was internally displaced prior to moving to India (at [22]);(b)the Applicant may have undergone compulsory basic training with the LTTE (at [23]);(c)the Applicant and her husband were arrested and mistreated the year that they were married (at [23]);(d)the Applicant’s older brother was killed in the 1990s (at [23]); and(e)the Applicant’s husband was subsequently arrested (at [23]). However, the IAA considered these incidents to be remote in time and, in the case of the Applicant and her husband’s arrests, “relatively minor”. The IAA was not satisfied that they would be sufficient to cause the Applicant to be a person of concern to the Sri Lankan authorities (at [23]). The IAA did not accept that:(a)the Applicant’s husband disappeared in Sri Lanka in August or September 2013. The IAA considered that Facebook posts obtained by the Department suggested interactions between the Applicant, her husband, and the second applicant. The IAA considered that the Applicant had “fabricated her claims o[f] her husband's disappearance so as to create a basis for her protection claims” (at [17]);(b)the Applicant was detained for a period of time and mistreated. The IAA had regard to what it considered were “significant discrepancies in the accounts given by her” (at [18]). On account of this, the IAA considered that the Applicant had “fabricated her claims of detention and mistreatment so as to create a basis for her protection claims” (at [18]);(c)the Applicant’s husband had any role with the LTTE. The IAA observed that at the visa interview, the Applicant claimed that her husband’s role was to provide food and information to the LTTE, whereas at the entry interview she had stated that her husband was in the intelligence group of the LTTE (at [21]);(d)the Applicant faced a real chance of relevant harm from the Sri Lankan authorities due to an imputed pro-LTTE or anti-Sri Lankan government political opinion (at [27]);(e)the Applicant would be subjected to discrimination, economic hardship or other harm amounting to serious or significant harm on the basis of her Tamil ethnicity and/or her gender as a woman (at [28]-[31] and [40]-[43]); or(f)the applicants would face a real chance of such harm from the Sri Lankan authorities as failed asylum seekers or for any other reason (at [32]-[36] and [40]-[42]).PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT The applicants commenced proceedings before this Court on 3 October 2017. The applicants ultimately relied upon a further amended application filed on 5 May 2023 containing the following grounds:1.The Authority constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate.ParticularsThe delegate had denied the Applicant procedural fairness by telling her that she would give her 7 days after the interview to provide further submissions or evidence, but then made her decision 4 days after the interview. The Applicant in fact sent further submissions and evidence to the delegate within the 7-day period which were received on the same day that the decision was referred to the Authority. The Secretary did not provide the submissions and evidence to the Authority, or advise the Applicant that it had not provided the submissions and evidence to the Authority so that she could do so. Had the Authority been told of or provided with the submissions it could have considered whether they contained new information which should have been considered under s 473DD.As a result the Authority's decision was affected by the delegate's denial of procedural fairness to the Applicant, even if the Authority was not aware of that denial.The Authority's decision was further affected by jurisdictional error because a statutory precondition for the exercise of its review obligations under ss 473CC(1) and 473DB(1) had not been met, in that the Secretary to the Minister's Department had not included in the material given to the Authority under s 473CB(1) the material in pages 1 to 15 of the Court Book despite that material having been in the Secretary's possession or control and the Secretary not having taken reasonable steps to locate potentially relevant documents in the Department’s possession or control for the purposes of considering whether the documents were relevant to the review to be conducted by the Authority, and as a consequence not having considered or formed a view on the relevance of that material before the decision of the delegate was referred to the Authority.2.The Authority failed to consider whether to exercise its discretion to obtain documents or new information.Particulars(a)The Applicant had said at her entry interview that she was detained for six or seven days in 1998. At the interview with the delegate, she said that she had been detained in 1997 for three days and sexually assaulted. The Authority should reasonably have asked itself whether there were two separate occasions on which the Applicant had been detained, and used its discretion under s 473DC(3) to request new information from the Applicant.(b)The Applicant had not been shown, or given the opportunity to comment on, all of the screenshots that were given to the Authority (see Supplementary Court Book), in contravention of ss 57 and 58 of the Act. The Authority should have used its discretion under s 473DC(3) to request new information from the Applicant in respect of the screenshots.3. The Authority failed to engage intellectually with the evidence before it.ParticularsThe Authority formed the view that the First Applicant would not suffer serious or significant harm as a result of being detained on return to Sri Lanka, and assumed that the Second and Third Applicants would therefore also not face harm, without turning its mind to the fact that they were children.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 473CB relevantly provided:Material to be provided to Immigration Assessment Authority(1)The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material (review material) in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:(a) a statement that:(i)sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and(ii)refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and(iii)gives the reasons for the decision;(b)material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;(c)any other material that is in the Secretary's possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review; … The question of relevance is to be determined by the Secretary or their delegates. However, that opinion must be formed reasonably and on a correct understanding of the law: see CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76 (CNY17) at [6] per Kiefel CJ and Gageler J. A number of cases have found relevant error to have been established on account of what has been held to have been an unreasonable failure by the Secretary, through delegates, to provide or consider providing “other material” within the contemplation of s 473CB(1)(c). The applicants relied upon cases such as AUF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCAFC 222; (2019) 274 FCR 82 (AUF18) per Allsop CJ, and Jagot and Moshinsky JJ; EIH18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 460 per Judge Egan and CJD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 212 per Judge Humphreys, in which error has been found on this basis. In AUF18, the Full Court reasoned:66.The nature of the review to be carried out by the Authority underlines the importance of the Authority being provided with all relevant documents, whether or not they were before the person who made the decision on the visa application: see CQR17 at [105] per Derrington J…70.… it is also not the case, and the Minister does not suggest, that s 473CB(1)(c) only requires the Secretary (or his or her delegate) to consider documents of which he or she is aware. In order to give the provision a sensible operation, it is necessary for some process to be put in place to bring to the attention of the Secretary (or his or her delegate) potentially relevant documents. Unless there is such a process, and it involves the taking of reasonable steps to identify potentially relevant documents, the provision cannot achieve its purpose. Thus, the provision should be construed to impose upon the Secretary an obligation to take reasonable steps to locate potentially relevant documents in the Department’s possession or control (for the purposes of considering whether the documents are relevant to the review to be conducted by the Authority). This is consistent with the principle expressed by Thawley J in EMJ17 at [41(4)]: “An unreasonable failure or refusal to identify documents which might be relevant might arguably also constitute a breach of s 473CB(1)(c).” That proposition was approved by all members of the Full Court in CQR17: see at [28] per Jagot J (with whom Reeves J agreed at [4]); and at [80] per Derrington J.