CCM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1619

Appeal from: CCM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 720
File number: VID 558 of 2022
Judgment of: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 19 December 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – determination by Immigration Assessment Authority not to grant Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether material error arising from erroneous application of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473DD – whether Authority conducted de novo review to extent required in circumstances where appellant relied on claims made by uncle in separate visa application – consideration of principles regarding scope of de novo review to be conducted by Authority – whether Secretary of Department of Immigration and Border Protection gave all relevant “review material” to Authority as required by s 473CB – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439

AUF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2019) 274 FCR 82

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494

AXV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 121

BVC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 565

BXT17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2021) 283 FCR 248

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 367

DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and MulticulturalAffairs (2022) 294 FCR 1

EMJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 299

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 (2019) 268 FCR 379

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li (2000) 176 ALR 66

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 (2021) 285 FCR 381

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 96 ALJR 737

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 126
Date of hearing: 9 November 2023
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth
Solicitor for the Appellant: Bardo Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Hoiberg
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 558 of 2022
BETWEEN:

CCM17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DERRINGTON J

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1619
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, sought review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority not to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The appellant claimed that he and his brother had been subjected to search and round up operations by the police in Colombo and had experienced harsh treatment at checkpoints. The Authority rejected the appellant's claims, finding that the new information was not credible and could have been provided earlier. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia, arguing that the Authority had erred in its application of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to decide whether the Authority's decision contained a material error arising from the erroneous application of s 473DD and whether the Authority conducted a de novo review to the extent required in the circumstances.

The court found that the appellants had failed to show that the primary judge was incorrect to find that there was no material error in the manner in which the Authority determined the appellants’ applications. The court held that the Authority had correctly applied s 473DD and that the appellants had not satisfied the criteria for considering new information. The court also found that the Authority had conducted a de novo review of the appellants’ claims, and that the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection had given all relevant “review material” to the Authority as required by s 473CB. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court held that none of the grounds advanced on appeal had been established, and that the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application for review of the Authority’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the outset, it bears mentioning that, although the appeal to this Court was by way of rehearing, it was nonetheless necessary for the appellants to show that the judgments from which they appealed were infected by error: SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129 [11]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541, 555 – 556 [30]. It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that the appellants had not demonstrated any appellable error on the part of the primary judge, such that they were, in effect, merely asking this Court to reconsider the applications for judicial review that were made to the lower court. Whilst there is perhaps some force in that submission, a closer consideration of the primary judge’s reasoning does reveal certain points of concern, and it is appropriate to proceed on the basis that an appellable error has at least been alleged as part of each ground of appeal. Background The appellant and his brother, CCL17, are Sri Lankan citizens of Tamil ethnicity. They arrived in Australia as undocumented and unauthorised maritime arrivals on 10 September 2012, having travelled to the country in the company of their uncle. On 30 September 2015, the appellant applied for a SHEV. CCL17 was listed as a secondary applicant on the appellant’s application and made no protection claim of his own. The appellant claimed that he and his brother had been raised by their uncle in Sri Lanka. He asserted that, one day in August 2012, his uncle returned to their home and told them that they needed to leave Sri Lanka immediately, and that arrangements for their departure had already been made. At and prior to that time, the appellants had been living in Colombo, where they were born. They had lived there with, and under the care of, their uncle and grandmother. Each had attended school until halfway through year 10, when they left to come to Australia. Prior to their departure, in 2007, the appellants’ uncle travelled to Saudi Arabia for two and a half years and then to Qatar. It was said that he worked in those countries so as to be able to send money back to their grandmother. It was further claimed that, after returning to Sri Lanka, their uncle never stayed at home for more than a few days or a week at a time, and that this behaviour continued until they all left the country. The appellant said that he did not know where his uncle was during these absences. In his SHEV application, he stated that, since his departure, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had attended at the family home and questioned his grandmother about his whereabouts and that of his uncle, brother and cousin. The appellant claimed that it was not until he and his brother had arrived in Australia and met with their lawyers in August 2013 that they learned of their uncle’s problems with the Sri Lankan Government and the CID, and his involvement with the LTTE. According to information provided in the appellant’s SHEV application, his uncle was not an LTTE fighter, but had associations with people within that organisation. He had allegedly engaged in some low-level work for it, which involved transporting vehicles to different parts of the country.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants have failed to show that the primary judge was incorrect to find that there was no material error in the manner in which the Authority determined the appellants’ applications on the materials given or not given to it. The third ground of appeal cannot succeed.Conclusion None of the grounds advanced on appeal has been established. For the reasons identified above, the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application for review of the Authority’s decision. The appeal should be dismissed. There is no reason why the ordinary rule as to costs should not apply. The appellant should pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no need to address in detail the primary judge’s decision at this point. It suffices to say that the appellants’ claim on appeal is, essentially, that the primary judge failed to engage properly with, and to accept, their submissions as to the defects in the Authority’s decision as to their case. The issues for consideration Three grounds of appeal were relied upon, the first and third of which were closely related. During the hearing, the parties considered it most appropriate to address the second ground first, followed by the first and third grounds. The same order is adopted in these reasons.Ground 2 – materiality of the Authority’s misapplication of s 473DD of the Act The substance of the second ground was that the Authority erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act by failing to consider whether certain “new information” met the criteria stated in s 473DD(b)(ii), and that error had a material effect on the outcome of the review. Relevantly, s 473DD of the Act provides:473DDConsidering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. The issue in relation to the “new information” arose as a consequence of the Authority having invited the appellants to comment on the 2017 DFAT Report that it had obtained, as noted earlier in these reasons. That report concerned, inter alia, the socio-political conditions in Sri Lanka — including, specifically, the treatment of Tamils. The appellants’ submissions in response to the Authority’s invitation included a new claim that, as young Tamils living in Colombo, they had been subjected to search and round up operations conducted by the police and were always subject to harsh treatment at checkpoints, where they were asked to produce their ID cards and were interrogated about their movements. In an attempt to explain their failure to raise this new claim at an earlier time, the appellants pointed to a number of factors. Essentially, it was said that they had lacked capacity and had been too timid or afraid to raise the issue of their alleged mistreatment in Colombo when they first arrived in Australia. The Authority’s conclusion as to whether or not it ought to consider this claim, applying s 473DD of the Act, was stated as follows at [18] of its decision:I do not consider that this information was provided by way of a response to or comment on the information in the 2017 DFAT Report, and I am not satisfied that this new information about the applicants’ claimed circumstances prior to their departure from Sri Lanka could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made. Even accepting that their circumstances at the time of the entry interviews were as claimed in the submission and prevented the applicants from providing this information, they were legally represented in relation to their SHEV application which was made three years after their arrival in Australia, and I am satisfied that they had every opportunity to put these claims forward when completing that application, and at the SHEV interview, at which they were accompanied by their representative and were specifically asked about any problems they had experienced in Colombo. I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the information and I have not done so.