DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 148

Appeal from: DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 20
File number: VID 91 of 2022
Judgment of: BROMBERG, MOSHINSKY AND HESPE JJ
Date of judgment: 1 September 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from an order of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where the primary judge upheld a decision of the Second Respondent to affirm a decision made by a delegate of the First Respondent to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa to the Appellant – where failure to comply with s 473CB(1)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was conceded because the Secretary of the First Respondent failed to provide the Authority with the Appellant’s residential address – whether the Secretary’s statutory duty to provide the Authority with details of the Appellant’s address was a precondition to the valid exercise of the Authority’s decision‑making power – whether the Secretary’s error in failing to notify the Authority of the Appellant’s residential address was material.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 116, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473EA, 473FC, 473HG

Corrections Act 1986 (Vic), s 112

Corrections Regulations 2019 (Vic), reg 65(1)(o)

Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34

BRH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 74

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 299; [2019] FCAFC 20

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34

Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 157 FCR 321; [2007] FCAFC 20

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2020) 385 ALR 212; [2020] HCA 46

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 (2021) 285 FCR 381; [2021] FCAFC 58

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16

Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22; [2015] HCA 51

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 48
Date of hearing: 18 July 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Horan QC with Mr M Guo
Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood SC with Mr J Barrington
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 91 of 2022
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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant contested the Minister's decision to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, which was reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Authority). The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision was flawed due to the Secretary's failure to provide the Authority with his residential address, a statutory requirement. The Circuit Court initially upheld the decision, but the appellant appealed to the Federal Court. The central legal issues were whether the Secretary's statutory duty to provide the Authority with the appellant's address was a precondition to the Authority's jurisdiction to conduct a review, and whether the Secretary's failure to comply with this requirement resulted in a decision lacking statutory force.

The court examined whether the statutory requirement constituted a precondition to the Authority's jurisdiction to conduct a review. This required considering whether the duty imposed on the Secretary under s 473CB(1)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was a precondition that the statute required to be observed for the decision-maker to embark on the decision-making process. The court concluded that the statutory requirement was indeed a precondition. The second issue was whether the non-compliance with this precondition resulted in a decision lacking statutory force. The court determined that the non-compliance could realistically have made a difference to the decision, thus resulting in a jurisdictional error.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The orders of the Circuit Court were set aside, and a writ of certiorari was issued to quash the decision of the Second Respondent dated 9 July 2020. Additionally, a writ of mandamus was issued to the Second Respondent, directing it to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent made on 23 May 2017 according to law. The First Respondent was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made on 24 January 2022 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 9 July 2020.

(b) A writ of mandamus directed to the Second Respondent be issued requiring it to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent made on 23 May 2017 according to law.

(c) The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding.

3. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 19 June 2020, the Authority attempted to send a letter addressed to the Appellant, by email, to Mr Pena‑Rees at his Armour Legal email address in relation to the remittal. The Authority also sent a copy to the Appellant at a Hotmail email address. The letter noted that the matter had been remitted to the Authority for reconsideration and stated, in part (emphasis in original):It is important that you:•use your new reference number IAA20/08495 whenever you contact us;•advise us in writing if you want us to send correspondence to you instead of Michael Pena‑Rees (to do this, visit and obtain form F5);•advise us in writing if you wish to change the person who receives correspondence on your behalf or acts as your representative (to do this, visit and obtain form F2);•tell us immediately if you change your contact details such as your email address, residential address, mailing address or telephone number; and•act quickly in your dealings with us, as a decision may be made at any time.In reconsidering your case, the [Authority] will proceed to make a decision on the basis of the information sent to us by the Department of Home Affairs (the Department), including any documents you provided to the Department in connection with your protection visa application, unless we decide to consider new information. We can only consider new information in limited circumstances, which are explained in the attached Practice Direction. You can also obtain a copy of this Practice Direction at do not need to provide further copies of any documents or information you have already given to the [Authority]. If there is any new information you want us to consider, which has not already been provided, please note there are specific requirements in the Practice Direction which should be complied with and we may not accept new information that does not comply.The Practice Direction also specifies that you can provide written submissions on why you disagree with the Department’s decision and on any claim or matter you presented to the Department that was not considered. The Authority did not receive any further correspondence from or on behalf of the Appellant. The Appellant did not receive the email sent to him by the Authority because he was in prison and was not permitted to use or access the internet: Corrections Regulations 2019 (Vic) reg 65(1)(o), made pursuant to the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) s 112. On 9 July 2020, the Authority again purported to affirm the Minister’s decision to refuse the visa application.PROCEEDING IN THE CIRCUIT COURT By amended application dated 1 September 2020, the Appellant applied to the Circuit Court for review of the Authority’s decision on three grounds, only two of which are presently relevant:(1)The Authority wrongly relied on the Appellant’s appointment of Mr Pena‑Rees as representative and authorised recipient when such appointment had been spent, had otherwise ceased to be valid, or had become stale, by the time the matter was remitted to the Authority for reconsideration, resulting in a process of decision‑making which was unreasonable.(2)The Authority was disabled from performing its review because of the Secretary’s failure to comply with his obligation under s 473CB(1)(d) of the Act to provide the Authority with the Appellant’s residential address.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The effect of s 473HG(1) is that, if a referred applicant gives the Authority written notice of the name and address of another person who is authorised by that applicant to receive documents in connection with the review, the Authority must give that other person, instead of the referred applicant, any documents that the Authority would otherwise have given to the referred applicant. Under s 473HG(3), the referred applicant may vary or withdraw such a notice. Under s 473HG(2), if the Authority gives a document to such an authorised recipient, the Authority is taken to have given the document to the referred applicant, although the Authority is not prevented from giving the referred applicant a copy of the document. The intended effect of s 473HG is to eliminate uncertainty as to whether a document has been given to a referred applicant: see Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 157 FCR 321 at 326 [25]; [2007] FCAFC 20, which considered equivalent provisions in s 494D of the Act.CONSIDERATION OF GROUND 2Concession As referred to above, it was conceded below that the Secretary failed to comply with s 473CB(1)(d) by failing to provide the Authority with details of the Appellant’s residential address (see the primary judgment at [39]). The concession relates to the time following the remittal of the matter to the Authority for reconsideration. There was no suggestion that the Secretary had failed to provide the Appellant’s residential address when the Minister first referred the matter to the Authority for review. The concession recognised that upon remittal, the Secretary’s obligation under s 473CB was re‑enlivened because, after making its written statement, the Authority returned the documents to the Secretary pursuant to s 473EA(4).Did the Secretary’s failure result in jurisdictional error? In its most generic sense, jurisdictional error refers to a failure to comply with one or more statutory preconditions or conditions to an extent which results in a decision lacking the characteristics necessary for the decision to be given effect by the statute pursuant to which it was purportedly made: Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123 at 133 [24] (per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ); [2018] HCA 34. The issue for determination in the present case concerns the Secretary’s non‑compliance with s 473CB(1)(d) which may be considered to be a “precondition” to the exercise of the Authority’s jurisdiction to conduct a review. Whether non‐compliance with an antecedent statutory requirement results in an invalid exercise of decision‑making power requires consideration of two questions:(1)First, was the antecedent requirement a precondition which the statute requires to be observed in order for the decision‑maker to embark on the decision‑making process: see Hossain 264 CLR at 132 [23], [27] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ. The issue here is whether, as a matter of statutory construction, the duty of the Secretary to give the Authority the details provided for in s 473CB(1)(d) was a “precondition” to the Authority’s jurisdiction to conduct a review; and(2)Second, if the statutory requirement was a precondition to the exercise of power, did the non‑compliance result in a decision lacking statutory force? Ordinarily, the failure of the condition precedent will result in jurisdictional error only if the non‑compliance could realistically have made a difference to the decision that the Authority in fact went on to make. This is a factual inquiry involving a counterfactual analysis: CNY17 268 CLR at 95–6 [46]–[47] per Kiefel CJ and Gageler J.