FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 104
Appeal from: DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFam2G 1182 File number(s): NSD 39 of 2024 Judgment of: COLLIER, THAWLEY AND STEWART JJ Date of judgment: 20 AUGUST 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from a decision answering “no” to a separate question – where Minister referred a fast track reviewable decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority – where Authority’s decision quashed and remitted to the Authority – where Authority made a second decision – where new country information had come into the possession of the Secretary after the original referral to the Authority – whether the Minister’s duty in ss 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refer a fast track reviewable decision to the Authority must be re-performed after a decision of the Authority is quashed – whether the Secretary’s duty in s 473CB to give review material to the Authority must be re-performed after a decision of the Authority is quashed – meaning of ‘at the time of the referral’ in s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act – held:
(a) by majority (Thawley J, Stewart J agreeing): that, after the Authority’s decision was quashed, the Minister was required to re-perform the duty under s 473CA, which would then have required the Secretary to re-perform the duty under s 473CB(1);
(b) by majority (Collier J and Thawley J, for separate reasons): that the word “referred” in s 473CB(1)(c) is not to be construed as including a reference to a remittal of a matter to the Authority by a Court.
leave to appeal granted – appeal allowed
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 473BA, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA(2), 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473DF, 473EA(4), 473EB(1), 473EC(2), 473GB, 473HA(1), 473HG
Cases cited: ABT17v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; 269 CLR 439
AUF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs and Another [2019] FCAFC 222; 274 FCR 82
BAK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 83; 274 FCR 268
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76
CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; 269 FCR 367
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCAFC 844; 33 FCR 397
DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 148
DST18 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 1813; 354 FLR 459
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- Case
- [2024] FCAFC 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court encompassed whether the Minister was required to re-perform his duty to refer the fast-track reviewable decision to the Authority after a decision of the Authority was quashed, and if the Secretary's duty to provide review material to the Authority also needed to be re-performed post-quash. Additionally, the court had to interpret the phrase "at the time of the referral" in section 473CB(1)(c) of the Act to determine if it included a remittal of a matter by a Court to the Authority.
The court, by a majority, held that after the Authority's decision was quashed, the Minister was indeed required to re-perform the duty under section 473CA, which would necessitate the Secretary to re-perform the duty under section 473CB(1). This interpretation was based on ensuring that the Authority had all relevant material to conduct an efficient and fair review, especially in the context of remittal. The majority also concluded that the word "referred" in section 473CB(1)(c) should not be construed to include a reference to a remittal of a matter to the Authority by a Court, thus preserving the distinction between the initial referral and a subsequent remittal.
The outcome of the appeal was that leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. The court set aside the primary judge's order and answered the separate question posed by the applicant in the affirmative, ruling that the Secretary must consider and provide any new material that had come into their possession after the initial referral, including any material obtained after the remittal. The Minister was ordered to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. Order 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made on 14 December 2023 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that the separate question be answered “yes”.
4. The first respondent pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A proposed notice of appeal was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Farid Varess affirmed 15 January 2024. The proposed notice set out one ground of appeal, as follows:1.The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) erred in failing to find that, on the proper construction of s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) and/or s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), following the making of the orders of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 August 2020 in DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 1813, material that had come into the possession or control of the Secretary of the Department after the initial referral to the second respondent (Authority) by the first respondent (Minister) on 14 November 2017 was capable of being material that the Secretary was obliged to give the Authority under s 473CB(l)(c) of the Migration Act in respect of the fast track reviewable decision made in respect of the appellant. The appellant sought orders that the appeal be allowed with costs, that the orders made by the primary judge be set aside, and that the separate question originally before the primary judge be answered “yes”.SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES IN THE APPEAL In summary the appellant submitted:·When re-exercising the task under s 473CB of the Act, the Secretary must also consider material that came into the Secretary’s possession or control after the time of the initial referral.·The Secretary failed to re-perform the s 473CB duty, and the error was material as it is realistic that had the duty been re-performed, the Secretary would have provided country information to the Authority that came into the Secretary’s possession or control after 14 November 2017, and such information could have resulted in a different outcome for the applicant before the Authority.·Leave to appeal should be granted because the primary judge failed to address key submissions made by either side.·Part 7AA of the Act requires the Minister to refer fast track reviewable decisions to the Authority as soon as reasonably practicable after such a decision is made (s 473CA), and in performing its review the Authority is required to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick and fair. The Authority may get new information, but has no duty to get, request or accept any new information, and the Authority’s ability to consider that new information is limited: ss 473DC and 473DD.·In the event of remittal by a court to the Authority, the Secretary must again provide review material to the Authority.·Section 473CB seeks to ensure that the Authority is provided with all documents that are relevant when the Authority commences its task to allow it to conduct an efficient and fair review.·The decisions in the CNY17 litigation and DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 148 support the proposition that the Authority must, after remittal by a Court, again provide review material to the Authority. Implicit in the reasoning of Nettle and Gordon JJ (at [106]), and Edelman J (at [143]), in CNY17 was that that, following the remittal, the Secretary would again have to provide review material to the Authority, and in doing so would not simply provide the same review material that had been provided previously. Similarly following remittal, Jagot J in the Federal Court in CNY17 (Jagot J) at [40]-[41] found that the Secretary was obliged to exercise anew the duty under s 473CB(1).·In re-performing the duty under ss 473CB(1)(c) and 473CB(1)(d) following remittal, the Secretary is accordingly required to have regard to material that came into the Secretary’s possession after the initial s 473CA referral.·The primary judge failed to engage with the Minister’s submissions concerning s 33(1) Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (AI Act) and relevant steps required by s 473CB. In any event upon remittal, because the Act requires the Authority to have returned the review material to the Secretary, there is a need for review material to again be provided to the Authority. ·A statutory provision is to be interpreted by reference to its text while, at the same time, having regard to its context and purpose. Where a remittal to the Authority occurs, the word “referred” in the phrase “the decision is referred to the Authority” in ss 473CB(1)(c), (d)(iv) and (2) may be read to refer to the remittal. Courts have used the words “refer” and “remit” interchangeably, describing the relevant power as “the power to remit”.·The phrase “the decision is referred to the Authority” in ss 473CB(1)(c), (d)(iv) and (2) can be read so as to capture not only the initial referral under s 473CA, but also a later referral, such as remittal or referral back to the Authority by a court. There is good reason to construe the words in this manner. Doing so ensures that the Secretary is obliged, following a remittal, to again provide review material to the Authority, including material coming into the Secretary’s possession or control up until the time of the remittal. The absurd result that, following a remittal, the Authority would be unable to perform its review for a lack of review material is thereby avoided.