Workers' Compensation (Q.)—Injury—Statutory definition including disease contracted in course of employment to which employment a contributing factor—Autogenous disease manifested in course of employment—Subarachnoid haemorrhage—Whether injury within statutory definition—Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), s. 3(1)"Injury". Certiorari—Error of law on face of record—What constitutes record—Determinations of medical boards "final and conclusive"—Whether review by certiorari for error of law on face of record excluded—Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.),s. 14c.

Decisions

GIBBS C.J. On 12 May 1982 the appellant, a labourer, submitted an application for workers' compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended ("the Act"). In his application form he described the nature of the injury as "strain to neck" and that the injury occurred on 6 April 1982. He described the manner in which the injury occurred as follows:

"I was carring (sic) 2 Bricks &some mortar up a
flight of stairs &I slipped because of the feeling

I had in my neck".

Subsequently it appeared that the appellant had, on 6 April 1982, suffered a cerebral haemorrhage and on 23 February 1983 the General Manager of the Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland referred the appellant's claim to the Neurology Board pursuant to s.14C(4) of the Act. The reference bore the number 3/81-106479/2, and was in the following terms:

"CHARLES HENRY HOCKEY

The abovenamed, aged 55 years, claimed

compensation on 12th May, 1982 in respect of a condition certified as 'Cerebral haemorhage i.e. subarachnoid haemorhage' (sic) which he attributed to an incident sustained on 6th April, 1982 whilst employed as a Labourer by Costain Australia Ltd. Photostat copies of Medical Certificates

Forms 5 dated 14th April, 1982 and 7th December, 1982 and the Claimant's Application for Compensation Form 4 dated 12th May, 1982 are attached. The claim has not been accepted up to the

present date. The claim is now referred to the Board in

accordance with Sub-Section 14C(4) to determine in terms of Sub-Section 14C(6):

A (1) Whether or not the matters alleged by the Claimant constitute an injury within the meaning of the Act, and, if so;

(2) The nature of the injury; and

(3) The extent of the incapacity for work in the employment in which the Claimant alleges he was engaged at the time of the injury; and

(4) Whether the incapacity is permanent or temporary."

The medical certificates mentioned in the reference, both given by Dr G.S. Merry, certified respectively that the appellant "is suffering from Cerebral Haemorrhage - i.e. Subarachnoid Haemorrhage which he states is caused by carrying bricks &a bucket of cement 6.4.82 at 11.30 am", and that the appellant "is suffering from ruptured cerebral aneurysm which he states is caused by lifting &carrying at work 6.4.82". Each certificate states that "the signs and symptoms were consistent with the stated cause" and that the appellant would be totally incapacitated for work for a stated period. The Board sat on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hockey v Yelland

Details

AGLC: Hockey v Yelland [1984] HCA 72
Case: [1984] HCA 72
Decision Date: 22 November 1984

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning a dispute between the appellant, Mr. Hockey, and the respondent, Mr. Yelland, regarding a contract for the sale of land. The core of the disagreement revolved around the interpretation of a clause within the contract that stipulated the sale was subject to the purchaser obtaining finance on satisfactory terms.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the purchaser, Mr. Yelland, had acted in good faith in his efforts to obtain finance. Specifically, the court had to determine if Mr. Yelland had taken all reasonable steps to secure finance on satisfactory terms, or if his conduct amounted to a repudiation of the contract. This involved an examination of the objective standard of reasonableness in fulfilling contractual obligations.

The High Court, in its joint judgment, held that the purchaser was not bound to accept any offer of finance, but was entitled to exercise a genuine and honest judgment as to whether the terms offered were satisfactory. The court found that Mr. Yelland had not acted unreasonably or in bad faith in his pursuit of finance, and therefore the condition precedent to the contract had not been fulfilled by the vendor. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders