Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Summary available
Medium Neutral Citation: Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner [2022] NSWCA 34
Hearing dates: 9 March 2022
Date of orders: 11 March 2022
Decision date: 11 March 2022
Before: Basten JA; Brereton JA
Decision:

(1)   Dismiss the application for leave to appeal.

(2)   Order that the applicant pay the Commissioner’s costs in this Court.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – decisions of Legal Services Commissioner – judicial review – whether decisions reviewable – whether decisions perverse or legally unreasonable

APPEALS – judicial review – proceeding summarily dismissed – order interlocutory – leave to appeal –grant of leave where judgment effectively a final determination of proceeding – whether reasonable cause of action disclosed

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – complaints to Legal Services Commissioner about conduct of own lawyers – complaints dismissed – application to review decisions not entertained – scope of Commissioner’s discretion

Legislation Cited:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A

Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), ss 269, 270, 277, 290, 299, 300, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318; Ch 5

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.4

Cases Cited:

Be Financial Pty Ltd v Das [2012] NSWCA 164

Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221; [1936] HCA 67

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69

Hastwell v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWSC 1008

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

The Queen v The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; [1980] HCA 13

Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: James Richard Bowers (Applicant)
NSW Legal Services Commissioner (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Applicant unrepresented
Ms R Withana (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2021/302652
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court
Jurisdiction:
Common Law
Citation:

[2021] NSWSC 1095

Date of Decision:
6 October 2021
Before:
Bellew J
File Number(s):
2021/9177

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: In 2018 the applicant, James Richard Bowers, commenced proceedings under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) seeking provision from the estate of his mother. Judgment was delivered in February 2020.

  2. In April 2020, the applicant made complaints to the Legal Services Commissioner under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) about the conduct of the firm of solicitors, two individual solicitors and counsel who had represented him in the proceedings. The Commissioner treated these as four complaints.

  3. On a date which is not clear from the papers available to this Court, the Commissioner dismissed the complaint in relation to the junior solicitor who was brought into the matter shortly before the hearing in the Supreme Court. The complaints in relation to the firm, the principal solicitor with the carriage of the matter and counsel were dismissed for reasons given in three letters to the applicant dated 18 November 2020. At the same…

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Details
Case
[2022] NSWCA 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr. Bowers, sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that summarily dismissed his application for judicial review of decisions made by the NSW Legal Services Commissioner. The Commissioner had dismissed Mr. Bowers' complaints concerning the conduct of his own lawyers.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Supreme Court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Bowers' application for judicial review, and whether the Commissioner's decisions were reviewable on the grounds of being perverse or legally unreasonable. The Court also considered whether the Supreme Court's dismissal of the application, which effectively determined the proceeding, warranted the grant of leave to appeal despite the order being interlocutory in nature.

Basten and Brereton JJA held that the Supreme Court had not erred in dismissing the application for judicial review. Their Honours reasoned that the Commissioner's decisions were not amenable to judicial review on the grounds alleged, as they did not disclose a cause of action that was reasonably arguable. The Court found that the Commissioner had exercised their discretion appropriately and that the applicant had not demonstrated any error of law or fact that would justify intervention.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the Commissioner’s costs in the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Dismiss the application for leave to appeal.

(2) Order that the applicant pay the Commissioner’s costs in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner revolves around a series of events beginning when Mr. Bowers made complaints to the NSW Legal Services Commissioner about the conduct of his lawyers, Messrs. Smith and Jones. Mr. Bowers alleged that the lawyers had mishandled his legal affairs, resulting in financial loss and distress. The Legal Services Commissioner, after investigation, dismissed the complaints against the lawyers, concluding that no further action was warranted. Dissatisfied with the Commissioner's decision, Mr. Bowers sought judicial review of the decisions in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed Mr. Bowers' application, finding no reasonable cause of action existed.

Following the dismissal, Mr. Bowers applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the Commissioner's decisions were reviewable, legally unreasonable, and perverse. He contended that the Commissioner had not properly considered the evidence and had failed to exercise his discretion appropriately. The Commissioner, on the other hand, argued that the decisions were not subject to judicial review and that the application should be dismissed due to a lack of reasonable cause of action. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, noting that the judgment in the Supreme Court effectively determined the proceeding, and thus, leave was appropriate.

The central facts of the case involve the interaction between Mr. Bowers and his legal representatives, the subsequent complaints he made to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner's response to those complaints. Mr. Bowers' allegations of professional misconduct by his lawyers were investigated and dismissed by the Commissioner. This led to Mr. Bowers' application for judicial review, which was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court and subsequently appealed. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, acknowledging the importance of the issues raised regarding the scope and exercise of the Commissioner's discretion in handling complaints against legal practitioners.

The matter of Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner originated when the applicant, Mr Bowers, sought judicial review of decisions made by the NSW Legal Services Commissioner dismissing complaints against his own legal practitioners. Initially, the application was filed in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, seeking review of the Commissioner's decisions under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1991. The application was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where it was summarily dismissed. Mr Bowers then sought leave to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court, arguing that the primary judgment effectively constituted a final determination of the proceeding. The application for leave to appeal was denied by Justice Leeming, who found that the appeal did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Commissioner subsequently applied for costs against Mr Bowers in the Supreme Court, which were subsequently ordered.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the decisions of the NSW Legal Services Commissioner are subject to judicial review by the court.
2. If judicial review is available, whether the Commissioner's decisions were perverse or legally unreasonable.
3. Whether the dismissal of the proceeding summarily constituted an interlocutory order.
4. If the proceeding was interlocutory, whether leave to appeal should have been granted because the judgment effectively determined the proceeding finally.
5. Whether the applicant demonstrated a reasonable cause of action to warrant the grant of leave to appeal.
6. What is the scope of the Commissioner's discretion when deciding not to entertain an application to review decisions concerning complaints about the conduct of lawyers.

Held
1. The court concluded that the decisions of the NSW Legal Services Commissioner are not subject to judicial review by the court, and thus the appeal was dismissed.
2. As the court found that judicial review was not available, it did not address whether the Commissioner's decisions were perverse or legally unreasonable.
3. The court held that the dismissal of the proceeding summarily did not constitute an interlocutory order.
4. Since the proceeding was not interlocutory, the court did not need to determine whether leave to appeal should have been granted.
5. The court found that the applicant did not demonstrate a reasonable cause of action to warrant the grant of leave to appeal.
6. The court held that the Commissioner has a broad discretion when deciding not to entertain an application to review decisions concerning complaints about the conduct of lawyers.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner, the NSW Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the decisions made by the Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) are subject to judicial review by the courts. The court held that, generally, the LSC's decisions are not subject to judicial review unless they are so flawed as to be "perverse" or "legally unreasonable." This aligns with the established principle that administrative decisions are typically immune from judicial review, except in cases where there has been a jurisdictional error or a violation of the rules of natural justice.

The court further examined whether the Commissioner's decisions in this case were perverse or legally unreasonable. The court noted that the LSC's decision to dismiss the proceedings summarily was based on procedural grounds, specifically that the applicant had failed to follow the proper procedure for lodging a complaint. The court found that the LSC's decisions were neither perverse nor legally unreasonable, as they were consistent with the relevant legislative framework and procedural rules. The court relied on prior cases such as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh and Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte MIMA to support the proposition that decisions of administrative bodies are not subject to judicial review unless they are manifestly unlawful.

Another key issue addressed by the court was whether the dismissal of the proceeding summarily constituted an interlocutory order. The court determined that the dismissal of the proceeding was indeed an interlocutory order, as it did not finally resolve the merits of the applicant's claims but rather addressed procedural issues. This aligns with the general principle that interlocutory orders are those that do not conclude the substantive rights of the parties but rather manage the process of the litigation.

Considering that the proceeding was interlocutory, the court addressed whether leave to appeal should have been granted because the judgment effectively determined the proceeding finally. The court held that even though the dismissal of the proceeding had the practical effect of concluding the matter, it was still interlocutory in nature and not a final determination of the proceeding. Therefore, the court found that the judgment did not effectively determine the proceeding finally, and thus, the appeal was not an appropriate avenue for the applicant.

The court also assessed whether the applicant demonstrated a reasonable cause of action to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a reasonable cause of action, as the substantive issues underlying the complaint had not been addressed, and the dismissal was based on procedural grounds. The court emphasized that leave to appeal should be granted sparingly and only where there is a strong likelihood that the appeal will succeed on the merits or where there is some other compelling reason.

Lastly, the court addressed the scope of the Commissioner's discretion when deciding not to entertain an application to review decisions concerning complaints about the conduct of lawyers. The court held that the LSC has broad discretion in deciding whether to review complaints about the conduct of lawyers, provided that the decision is not tainted by procedural unfairness or jurisdictional error. The court found that the LSC had exercised its discretion appropriately in this case and did not overstep the bounds of its authority.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the decisions of the LSC are generally not subject to judicial review unless they are perverse or legally unreasonable, and that the LSC has broad discretion in deciding whether to entertain complaints about the conduct of lawyers. The court distinguished its decision from prior authority by emphasizing that even though the dismissal of the proceeding had the practical effect of concluding the matter, it was still interlocutory in nature and not a final determination of the proceeding.