Workers' Compensation—Commonwealth employees—"Injury by accident"—Arising "in the course of his employment"—Causal connexion unnecessary—Injury by accident caused when playing game during luncheon break—Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1956 (Cth), s. 9 (1).
Decisions
August 1. The following written judgments were delivered:- DIXON C.J. Arthur Charles Oliver, the respondent to this appeal, is employed at the Government Aircraft Factory at Avalon as a progress chaser. The hours of work are from 8 a.m. to noon and from 12.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. The luncheon break of half-an-hour is not counted as a period of employment in calculating the forty-hour week. During a luncheon interval on 5th May 1961 he tore the muscle of the calf of his right leg. The injury was not serious but it needed some medical treatment and it meant an absence from work for a fortnight for which Oliver lost his pay. He claimed compensation under the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1959 (Cth) but the Delegate of the Commissioner under the Act disallowed his claim. He appealed under s. 20 to the County Court at Melbourne and there his appeal was allowed. Now in turn the Commonwealth appeals to this Court. The amount involved must be small but presumably, notwithstanding the traditional difficulty of settling by judicial authority guiding principles which will make the application of the phrase "arising out of or in the course of his employment" either simple or certain, it has been thought that there is sufficient hope of the case producing a useful precedent to justify an appeal. The injury was sustained while Oliver was taking part in what was dignified by the name of a cricket match on the concrete apron in front of a hanger. He tripped over a domed metal disc in the pavement which was intended to serve as an earth point for tankers or for aircraft during refuelling. It was the practice for Oliver to leave his work a few minutes before 12 o'clock, go to the canteen, obtain the lunch of three or four men as well as his own and bring it to the hangar. The cricket match was an organized affair going on at the lunch interval from day to day. According to the findings he came out, distributed the luncheon packets and took his position before eating his own lunch. A ball thrown in rolled towards him, he walked forward to pick it up and he tripped over the earthing point. There are few additional facts that matter. The most important is that having regard to the shortness of the luncheon interval, the distant situation of the aircraft factory at Avalon and the existence of the canteen, employees would, as a matter of course, remain on the premises during the interval and it was a recognized practice to play some game during the interval. There was, however, a notice some five or six…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Commonwealth v Oliver [1962] HCA 38
Case
[1962] HCA 38
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Commonwealth of Australia (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had granted a writ of habeas corpus to the respondent, Mr Oliver. Mr Oliver had been arrested and detained under a warrant issued by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, pursuant to section 18 of the *National Security Act 1939* (Cth). The dispute concerned the legality of Mr Oliver's detention.
The High Court was required to determine whether the Attorney-General had acted within his powers under section 18 of the *National Security Act 1939* (Cth) when issuing the warrant for Mr Oliver's detention. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the Attorney-General had a duty to inform himself of the grounds upon which he was empowered to issue such a warrant, and whether the evidence before him was sufficient to justify the exercise of that power.
Dixon C.J., Menzies and Owen JJ held that the Attorney-General, in exercising the power conferred by section 18, was not required to follow any particular procedure or to inform himself in any specific way. The Court found that the Attorney-General's belief that it was necessary to detain Mr Oliver for the purpose of preventing assistance being given to the enemy was sufficient to justify the issue of the warrant. The Court emphasised that the power was discretionary and that the subjective satisfaction of the Attorney-General was the operative factor. The appeal was allowed, and the writ of habeas corpus was discharged.