HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dixon C.J., Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ.
DARLING ISLAND STEVEDORING AND LIGHTERAGE CO. LTD. v. HUSSEY
19 October 1959
Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)
Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Worker—Daily journey—Death from progressive heart disease at place of pick-up—"Injury"—Exertion on journey to place of pick-up contributing factor to death—Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1951 (N.S.W.), ss. 6 (1)*, (14B),* 7 (1) (b)* (d) (iii).*
Decisions
October 19.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. On 1st July 1952 Thomas Albert Hussey of Sinclair Street Wollstonecraft, casual watchman, sixty years of age, collapsed and died at the pick-up centre, 211 Kent Street, Sydney. It was about eight o'clock in the morning and he had just signed his name in the book on the counter in the watchmen's section on the first floor. He turned round and almost immediately collapsed and died. A large clot had formed in the right coronary artery about two inches from the origin of the artery, that is from the aorta. The occlusion resulted in his death. The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded 2000 pounds compensation to his widow, who is the respondent upon this appeal. The award, which was upheld by the Supreme Court (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 346 was based upon the view that the exertion of the journey to the picking-up place was a contributing factor in bringing about her husband's death. The appellant company was the last employer to employ the deceased in his customary employment of watchman and for that reason falls under the liability to pay compensation. It is not contested that if the widow is entitled to compensation the liability to pay it rests upon the appellant company. What is contested is that the facts of the case give her any right at all under the Workers' Compensation Act 1926- 1951 to worker's compensation. Section 7(1)(b) of that Act is the provision which gives a right to compensation in respect of an injury received by a worker upon "a daily or other periodic journey". What is a daily or other periodic journey is defined by par. (c) of the same sub-section. But par. (b) goes further and gives a right to compensation to a worker who has received injury "on any of the other journeys referred to in par. (d) of this subsection". There are three classes of journey referred to in par. (d) but this case is concerned only with the third, par. (d)(iii), which is "journeys . . . between the worker's place of abode and a place of pick-up". The expression "places of pick-up" is given a definite meaning by sub-s. (14B) of s. 6. The sub-section has since the date of Hussey's death been amended by Act No. 21 of 1953, s. 2(a)(iii), but the amendment does not apply to this case. In its unamended form sub-s. (14B) of s. 6 provided that where any person is ordinarily engaged in any employment in connexion with which persons customarily attend certain pre-arranged places (in…
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- Case
- [1959] HCA 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent's fractured skull was caused by the accident on the wharf, or whether it was a manifestation of a pre-existing condition for which the appellant was not liable. Central to this determination was the question of causation, specifically whether the accident had aggravated or exacerbated a pre-existing vulnerability, thereby establishing a causal link between the appellant's negligence and the respondent's injury.
The Court, applying the principles of causation in tort law, found that the respondent had indeed suffered a fractured skull as a result of the accident. The judges reasoned that even if the respondent had a pre-existing vulnerability, the accident had demonstrably caused a new injury, a fractured skull, which was distinct from any prior condition. The Court held that the appellant's negligence in allowing the steel plate to fall had directly caused the respondent's injury, and therefore the appellant was liable for the damages suffered. The appeal was dismissed.
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