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Hume Steel Ltd v Peart

Hume Steel Ltd v Peart

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Case Copied 30 September 1947 37 min read

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75 CLR 242

HUME STEEL LIMITED

RESPONDENT, PEART

RESPONDENT. APPLICANT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES. Workers' Compensation-" Injury "--Daily or periodic journey-Death caused by

coronary occlusion-Death due to disease and worker's exertion-Not caused or contributed to by employment--Workers Compensation Act 1926-1946 (N.S.W.) SYDNEY,

(No. 15 of 1926-No. 41 of 1946), 88. 6 (1) 7 (1) (b). Aug. 15, 18.

Section 7 (1) (b) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1946 (N.S.W.) so far as material, provides: Where a worker has received injury without his MELBOURNE,

own default or wilful act on any of the daily or other periodic journeys Sept. 30.

between his place of abode and place of employment, " the worker (and in the case of the death of the worker, his dependants), shall receive compensation from the employer in accordance with this Act." Accordingly where a worker died while on a journey to his place of employment from his place of abode as a result of a coronary occlusion to the occurrence of which effort upon the journey was found to have contributed :-

Held, that it was open to the Workers' Compensation Commission to find as it did that the worker received injury within the meaning of S. 7 (I) (b) of

Held, further, by Latham C.J., Dixon and McTiernan JJ. that the definition of injury " in S. 6 (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act is not applicable to the word injury" appearing in S. 7 (1) (b) of that Act.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court) Peart V. Hume Steel Ltd. (1947) 47 S.R. (N.S.W.) 384: 64 W.N. (N.S.W.) 118, * Section 6 (1) of the Workers' Com-

at or away from his place of employ- pensation Act 1926-1946 provides :-

ment and to which the employment In this Act, unless the context or

was a contributing factor but does not, subject-matter otherwise indicates or

save in the case of a worker employed requires Injury means personal

in or about a mine to which the Coal injury arising out of or in the course

Mines Regulation Act, 1912-1941, of employment and includes a disease

applies, include a disease caused by which is contracted by the worker in the course of his employment whether

75 CLR 243

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

On 11th June 1945, about 6.45 a.m., Robert James Peart, aged about forty-one years, who was a worker within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1946 (N.S.W.) and was the husband of Ellen May Peart, whilst journeying in rain by pedal- bicycle on his daily journey between his place of abode at 34 Ander- son Avenue, Ryde, and his place of employment with Hume Steel Ltd. at Rydalmere suffered a coronary occlusion as a result of which he died on the same day.

In an application made by her under the Workers' Compensation Act the widow claimed on behalf of herself and Alan Peart, her adopted son, as total…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1947] HCA 34
Decision Date: 30 September 1947

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hume Steel Ltd. appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a claim for workers' compensation. The deceased, Robert James Peart, a worker employed by Hume Steel Ltd., died from a coronary occlusion while cycling to work. His widow claimed compensation on behalf of herself and their adopted son, arguing that the death was an injury sustained on a daily journey between home and work, as provided for under section 7(1)(b) of the *Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1946* (N.S.W.). The employer denied liability, contending that the coronary occlusion was a disease unrelated to employment and that the definition of "injury" in section 6(1) of the Act, which includes disease contracted in the course of employment, should not apply to the "injury" referred to in section 7(1)(b).

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Workers' Compensation Commission had sufficient evidence to find that the deceased had received an "injury" within the meaning of section 7(1)(b) of the Act, and consequently, whether his dependants were entitled to compensation. The Commission had found that the physical effort of cycling uphill contributed to the coronary occlusion, which was the inevitable end result of an advanced state of atheroma. Crucially, the Commission also found that the disease itself was not due to the nature of the deceased's employment, nor was it contracted in the course of employment, and that employment was not a contributing factor.

The High Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. The majority held that the definition of "injury" in section 6(1) of the Act was not applicable to the word "injury" as used in section 7(1)(b). They reasoned that if the section 6(1) definition were applied, section 7(1)(b) would be rendered inoperative, as it would require the injury to arise out of or in the course of employment, which is contrary to the purpose of section 7(1)(b) which specifically addresses injuries sustained on daily journeys. The Court found that the detachment of a piece of the artery lining, leading to the occlusion, constituted a physiological injury. Furthermore, section 7(1)(b) only required that the injury occur "on" the journey, not that it be causally connected to the journey itself, although in this case, the effort of the journey was found to have precipitated the occlusion. The Court acknowledged that this interpretation had significant consequences, effectively providing a form of life insurance for workers during their daily commutes, irrespective of the cause of death on the journey.

Orders