Trustees of the Society of St Vincent de Paul (NSW) v Maxwell James Kear as administrator of the estate of Anthony John Kear - [2014] NSWWCCPD 47

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:	Trustees of the Society of St Vincent de Paul (NSW) v Maxwell James Kear as administrator of the estate of Anthony John Kear [2014] NSWWCCPD 47
APPELLANT:	Trustees of the Society of St Vincent de Paul (NSW)
RESPONDENT:	Maxwell James Kear as administrator of the estate of Anthony John Kear
INSURER:	Catholic Church Insurance Ltd
FILE NUMBER:	A1-16642/12
ARBITRATOR:	Mr R Foggo
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:	14 April 2014
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	28 July 2014
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION:	Subarachnoid haemorrhage suffered at work after “near miss” riding a motor scooter to work; whether worker received a personal injury on a journey to which s 10 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 applies; meaning of “personal injury”; whether “shock” is a personal injury; whether elevated blood pressure is a personal injury; absence of evidence
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Bill Roche
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:	Astridge & Murray
Respondent:	Firths – The Compensation Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. Leave to appeal is granted. 2. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Arbitrator’s determination of 14 April 2014 are confirmed. 3. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Arbitrator’s determination of 14 April 2014 are revoked and the following orders are made in their place: “3. The worker, Anthony Kear, did not receive a personal injury on a journey to which s 10 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 applies and there is an award for the respondent. 4. Save for a certification that the matter is complex and that there be an uplift in the respondent’s costs of 30 per cent for complexity, each side is to pay his or its own costs.” 4. Each party is to pay his or its own costs of the appeal.

INTRODUCTION

Section 10(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) provides:
“A personal injury received by a worker on any journey to which this section applies is, for the purposes of this Act, an injury arising out of or in the course of employment, and compensation is payable accordingly.”
The present appeal concerns the meaning of “personal injury” in s 10(1). Specifically, it concerns whether the worker received such an injury when he nearly collided with a motor vehicle while riding his motor scooter from his usual place of abode to his place of employment.

BACKGROUND

On 8 February 2009, the worker, Anthony Kear, was riding his Vespa motor scooter to his place of employment with the appellant at the Matthew Talbot Hostel when a car suddenly pulled out in front of him. Though he managed to avoid a collision, and did not fall from his motor scooter, he said that he was “in a state of shock and [was] very upset”, thinking that he may have been killed. For convenience, I will refer to this incident as “the near miss”.
Mr Kear continued on his journey to work, where he was rostered to work the night shift, which commenced at 10 pm. It is not clear exactly what time he arrived at work, but it has been assumed that it was at or about 10 pm. Shortly after he arrived, his boss noticed that he was upset and called him into his office. Though Mr Kear had no further recollection of events after that time, it is accepted that he collapsed in his boss’s office and was taken by ambulance to hospital.
It is accepted that Mr Kear suffered an aneurysmal subarachnoid haemorrhage (the haemorrhage) at work on the evening of 8 February 2009. It has not been argued that the haemorrhage occurred while Mr Kear was on his journey to work.
The accident report form dated 9 February 2009, completed by Mr Kear’s supervisor, Brett Macklin, described the events at work on 8 February 2009 as follows:
“Came to work after nearly being hit by a car, he was (appeared to be in shock)[.] He became faint and fell and became unconscious.”
Under “Details of Incident” the time “2130” is recorded. It appears to have been assumed at the arbitration that this was the time when Mr Kear collapsed, rather than the time of the near miss.
Another witness, Anne Brown, one of Mr Kear’s work colleagues, said that she spoke to Mr Kear when she was about to finish her shift and he was about to start the night shift. While he was sitting on a stool in the reception area, he told her that he was nearly hit by a car on his way to work. He may have said that it occurred in the Five Dock area (I note that the Matthew Talbot Hostel is at Woolloomooloo). She said that Mr Kear “really seemed freaked out” and she thought that he had “stressed himself out”. She knew that he was upset about the incident.
In an Application to Resolve a Dispute (the Application) filed in the Commission on 12 December 2012, a claim having been previously made on 28 September 2012, Mr Kear claimed lump sum compensation of $35,750 in respect of a 22 per cent whole person impairment for impairments that resulted from the haemorrhage, plus $33,000 for pain and suffering. The appellant’s insurer disputed liability on various grounds, most of which were misconceived.
The Application described the injury as “neurological” and as having occurred as follows:
“[Mr Kear] was involved in a ‘near miss’ accident on his way to work when a car turned out in front of him. There was no impact but [Mr Kear] was in a state of shock and upset. He arrived at work and suffered a subarachnoid haemorrhage.”
The appellant did not dispute that, at the time of the near miss, Mr Kear was on a journey to which s 10 applies. That is, it did not dispute that Mr Kear was on a daily or other periodic journey between his place of abode and place of employment (s 10(3)(a)). It disputed whether he had received a personal injury while on that journey.
Mr Kear died on 3 June 2013 and his brother, Maxwell Kear, as administrator of his estate, has been substituted as the applicant under Pt 18 r 18.4 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2011. References to “the claimant” in this decision are therefore to Maxwell Kear.
The Commission listed the matter for conciliation and arbitration on 10 April 2014. It was agreed at the arbitration that, to establish that he had received a personal injury on a journey, Mr Kear had to establish that he suffered a sudden identifiable pathological change on his journey to work (North Coast Area Health Service v Felstead [2011] NSWWCCPD 51 (Felstead) at [80]–[81], applying Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska [2000] HCA 45; 200 CLR 286 (Petkoska) per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [39]).
The Arbitrator delivered an extempore decision in which he found that Mr Kear established that he suffered a personal injury because he “suffered shock and upset causing an elevation in his blood pressure” (T41.13), which satisfied the test of a sudden identifiable pathological change. The Arbitrator further identified the injury, at the request of counsel for the appellant, (at T42.29) as:
“The elevation of blood pressure as a result of the near miss which caused shock - which caused a medical condition of shock.”
The Commission issued a Certificate of Determination on 14 April 2014 in the following terms:
“1. The executor of the applicant's estate, Maxwell James Kear, is substituted as applicant in these proceedings in accordance with Rule 18.4 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2006.
2.   The name of the respondent is amended to Trustees of the Society of St Vincent De Paul (NSW).
3. The applicant has received a ‘personal injury’ on a journey to which section 10 of the 1987 Act applies.
4.   This matter is remitted to the Registrar for referral to an Approved Medical Specialist to assess the degree of whole person impairment of the neurological system of Anthony Kear.
5. The documents to be forwarded to the Approved Medical Specialist are those admitted in these proceedings, namely the Application to Resolve a Dispute, the Reply, Applications to Admit Late Documents dated for March 2013, 26 November 2013 [,] 27 November 2013 and 8 April 2014 (2), together with all the attachments to such documents.
6.   The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs as agreed or assessed and I specify an uplift of 30% for complexity to be available to both parties for the reasons delivered orally.
7.   The transcript of the arbitration hearing and ex tempore reasons is to be made available to the parties.”
The appellant has challenged the Arbitrator’s finding that Mr Kear received a personal injury on a journey to work on 8 February 2009. For the reasons explained below, the appeal is successful and the Arbitrator’s determination is revoked.

PRELIMINARY

Interlocutory

Both parties have incorrectly asserted that the appeal is not an appeal against interlocutory orders.
As the Commission has not made any formal orders finally determining the parties’ rights, the Arbitrator’s orders are interlocutory (Licul v Corney [1976] HCA 6; 180 CLR 213 at 443–4) and the appellant requires leave to appeal (s 352(3A) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act)).
If the appeal is successful, there will be no need for a referral to an Approved Medical Specialist (AMS) for assessment of the claim for whole person impairment. It is therefore desirable for the proper and effective determination of the dispute that the issue of whether Mr Kear received a personal injury on a journey be determined before the matter is referred to an AMS. I therefore grant leave to appeal.

On the papers

Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(6) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Nos 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’ without holding any conference or formal hearing and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The issues in dispute in the appeal are whether the Arbitrator erred in:
(a) finding that Mr Kear suffered a personal injury on a journey to which s 10(1) applies in the form of “a medical condition of shock”;
(b) determining that the evidence permitted a finding that the worker’s blood pressure was raised following the near miss, and
(c) finding that Mr Kear suffered a personal injury because of the “considerably elevated blood pressure as shown in the clinical notes”.

SUBMISSIONS

Counsel for the appellant, Mr Saul, submitted that there was no proper basis upon which the Arbitrator could conclude that Mr Kear suffered a personal injury by way of “a medical condition of shock”, such as to satisfy the test of a sudden identifiable pathological change.
Mr Saul contended that the Arbitrator agreed with a submission made at the arbitration that the terms “shock and upset” had “no real medical meaning” (T41.5). Notwithstanding that agreement, the Arbitrator found that the circumstances of the case went “well beyond the general terms of shock and upset” (T41.3) and added that he was “easily persuaded that [Mr Kear] suffered shock and upset causing elevation in his blood pressure” (T41.13).
Mr Saul submitted that there was no evidence to support a finding of a personal injury of “a medical condition of shock” (emphasis included in original submission). He said that the Arbitrator had elevated observations and perceptions of lay witnesses of Mr Kear’s state upon his arrival at work from “shock, upset or a mere emotional impulse” into “a medical condition of shock” when a lay person cannot identify a pathological change and without expert evidence to support such a finding.
Mr Saul said that neither Professor Fearnside, neurological surgeon qualified on behalf of Mr Kear, nor Professor Kiernan, neurologist qualified by the appellant, provided any medical evidence regarding this finding. Therefore, the Arbitrator erred in finding that Mr Kear suffered a personal injury in the form of a medical condition of shock.
Turning to the Arbitrator’s reference to the elevated blood pressure in the clinical notes, Mr Saul submitted that the notes did not support the conclusion expressed. They recorded Mr Kear’s blood pressure to be 160/100 on 13 November 2008, 130/100 on 12 December 2008 and 144/100 on 23 March 2009. Thus, the notes demonstrated fluctuating blood pressure before the injury: higher in November 2008, before the haemorrhage, than in March 2009, after the haemorrhage. The notes did not establish an increase in blood pressure immediately following the near miss and prior to the haemorrhage on 8 February 2009 and do not support the Arbitrator’s conclusion that he was “easily persuaded” that Mr Kear’s “shock and upset” caused “an elevation in his blood pressure” following the near miss on that day.
In the alternative, if the Arbitrator’s decision were interpreted as a finding that Mr Kear’s personal injury was in the nature of raised or elevated blood pressure, Mr Saul submitted that raised blood pressure does not amount to a personal injury within the meaning of s 10 (Castro v State Transit Authority(NSW) [2000] NSWCC 12; 19 NSWCCR 496 (Castro)).
Counsel for the claimant, Mr Goodrich, conceded at the arbitration that, to succeed under s 10, he had to establish that Mr Kear “received [a] personal injury, that is, a sudden identifiable pathological change brought about by an internal or external process” (Yum Restaurants Australia Pty Ltd t/as Pizza Hut Restaurants v Watters [2010] NSWWCCPD 31 at [66], quoted in Felstead at [71]).
On appeal Mr Goodrich conceded that it was not alleged that the “subsequent subarachnoid haemorrhage itself was a personal injury that occurred on a journey”. Rather, he contended that the haemorrhage was a result of the personal injury Mr Kear received during the journey. He said that that was a question of fact determined by the Arbitrator in the claimant’s favour based rationally upon evidence capable of supporting such a finding.
Mr Goodrich contended that many words in common language have both a medical and non-medical meaning. Such words include “numb”, “dizzy”, “fit”, “shock”, “chronic” and “depressed”. Whether such words should be ascribed their medical or non-medical meaning is a matter of context.
It was Mr Goodrich’s case that, during the journey to work on 8 February 2009, Mr Kear suffered “shock” within the medical meaning of that term. Mr Goodrich contended that shock, within its medical meaning, is “a psychological condition in response to terrifying events, an acute stress reaction” (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4^th ed, American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV)). It is also known as “mental shock”, “psychological shock” and “acute stress reaction”. It was not suggested that the acute stress reaction (in this case) progressed to an acute stress disorder, as defined in DSM-IV.
Mr Goodrich submitted that Mr Kear:
“qualified as having suffered medical shock (acute stress reaction) as he was a participant in qualifying traumatic events which were experienced directly so as to satisfy the DSM – 4 [sic] criterion regarding subjective reaction to a traumatic event e.g. ‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror’.”
Mr Kear’s shock was, so it was argued, “of such an extent that [it] could be observed by fellow workers”. This was a reference to the evidence in the accident report form and in Ms Brown’s statement. Professor Fearnside correctly recorded in his history that Mr Kear suffered shock. Professor Kiernan correctly appreciated that the acute stress reaction was sufficient to raise blood pressure through that mechanism and that shock was a factor which could have led to an aneurysm. However, he wrongly believed that a period of one hour and 45 minutes had passed between the event and the aneurysm and therefore ultimately concluded that the chain of causation was broken by reason of lapse of time.
Mr Goodrich concluded that the Arbitrator’s reasoning was a finding of fact that was available on the evidence and was rationally based.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

For the following reasons, the Arbitrator erred in his approach and conclusion.
Having agreed with the submission that the terms “shock and upset” have no real medical meaning, it was not open to the Arbitrator to find, in the absence of appropriate evidence, that Mr Kear received a personal injury in the nature of “a medical condition of shock”.
The authorities establish that a “personal injury” is “a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state” (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J in Petkoska at [39]). In other words, as stated at [81] in Felstead, it is “a sudden identifiable pathological change”. While the Arbitrator purported to apply this test in the present case, his conclusion was not open on the evidence.
The nature of a personal injury is well illustrated in the authorities, where the following have been held to be personal injuries: a sudden rupture of blood vessels and consequent cerebral haemorrhage arising from a congenital weakness (Accident Compensation Commission v McIntosh [1991] 2 VR 253); a coronary occlusion caused by a piece of lining of an artery having loosened (Hume Steel Ltd v Peart [1947] HCA 34; 75 CLR 242 (Peart)); the rupture of an aneurysm (Clover, Clayton & Co Ltd v Hughes (1910) AC 242), and the rupture of the oesophagus (which was held to be a personal injury by accident) (Kavanagh v The Commonwealth [1960] HCA 25; 103 CLR 547).
Consistent with these authorities, where the alleged condition is “shock”, for a worker to have received a personal injury, it is necessary that the event or events complained of had a physiological effect, not a mere emotional impulse (Yates v South Kirkby Collieries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 538; Anderson Meat Packing Co Pty Ltd v Giacomantonio [1973] 47 WCR 3; Thazine-Aye v WorkCover Authority(NSW) (1995) 12 NSWCCR 304; Zinc Corporation Ltd v Scarce (1995) 12 NSWCCR 566). Whether a worker has suffered a physiological effect will depend on the nature and severity of his or her symptoms.
In the present case, there is no evidence that comes close to establishing that Mr Kear received a personal injury, in the sense of a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change, on his journey to work on 8 February 2009. Mr Goodrich’s reference to the definition of “shock” in DSM-IV does not assist. As Mr Goodrich properly conceded, “shock” is a medical diagnosis. As such, it will usually (but not always) require appropriate expert evidence before such a diagnosis can be made. There is no such expert evidence in the present case and no lay evidence from which to infer the existence of such a condition.
In addition to Mr Kear saying that he was “in a state of shock and [was] very upset”, the evidence from the lay witnesses was that, very shortly after he arrived at work on the evening of 8 February 2009, Mr Kear “appeared to be in shock”, “really seemed freaked out” and had “stressed himself out”. Mr Kear gave no evidence of the physical manifestations of his “shock”. The evidence suggests that, notwithstanding the near miss, Mr Kear continued on his journey to work in the usual way.
There is no evidence explaining what it was about Mr Kear’s appearance that led Mr Macklin and Ms Brown to conclude that he was in shock. As the observations by Mr Macklin and Ms Brown were made immediately before Mr Kear collapsed, it is possible that, rather than describing the effects of “shock”, they were describing the early effects of the subarachnoid haemorrhage. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr Macklin or Ms Brown have any medical qualifications or training and their opinions do not support a finding the Mr Kear suffered from “shock”, in the medical sense of that word, on his journey to work.

Ms Brown’s opinion seems to be based her observation that Mr Kear “really seemed freaked out”, that he had “stressed himself out”, that he “wasn’t himself”, and that she “knew that he was upset about the incident”. Without evidence of the symptoms Mr Kear displayed, Ms Brown’s opinions provided no proper basis for a conclusion that Mr Kear was suffering from the medical condition of shock. There is therefore no evidence that the near miss had a relevant physiological effect on Mr Kear such that the Arbitrator could conclude on the balance of probabilities that Mr Kear received a personal injury on his journey to work.
Thus, there was no satisfactory evidence that, as a result of the near miss, Mr Kear suffered from “shock”, in the medical sense of that term. The evidence goes no higher than establishing that Mr Kear was stressed and upset. That is evidence of an emotional impulse, not of “shock” in the medical sense. It falls well short of establishing that the near miss caused a physiological effect of the kind necessary to establish a personal injury.
Mr Goodrich’s reliance on Professor Fearnside’s history, which was to the effect that Mr Kear was “shocked and upset” by the near miss, does not advance the claimant’s position. It was merely a history, not the Professor’s opinion. Professor Fearnside added that when Mr Kear arrived at work, his boss noticed that he was upset and called him into the office. This did not come close to establishing that Mr Kear received a personal injury on a journey and did not support the Arbitrator’s findings.
Professor Fearnside’s conclusion was that Mr Kear suffered a subarachnoid haemorrhage on 8 February 2009 “following the incident on [Mr Kear’s] way to work”. He concluded:
“The incident [the haemorrhage] occurred immediately [Mr Kear] had arrived at work and shortly after the ‘near miss’. This was a stressful experience and if the experience was sufficient to raise his blood pressure, raised blood pressure can be a causal factor in an aneurysmal subarachnoid haemorrhage. This was on the background of treated hypertension.
It is likely, on the balance of probabilities, that [Mr Kear’s] employment is a substantial contributing factor, noting that the incident occurred on the way to work.”
This evidence does not support the Arbitrator’s conclusion that Mr Kear suffered a personal injury of shock. Professor Fearnside was addressing whether the haemorrhage, which occurred at work, resulted from the near miss. That is a different question to the one posed in s 10(1). The test in s 10(1) is whether the worker received a personal injury “on” any journey to which the section applies.
The point made in the preceding paragraph is well illustrated in Peart. In that case, the worker suffered a coronary occlusion from the physical effort of riding a bicycle up an incline on his way home from work. Latham CJ observed (at 253) that the breaking of an artery or the lining of an artery was as much an injury to the body as the breaking of a limb (Fullagar J made a similar observation in The Commonwealth v Hornsby [1960] HCA 27; 103 CLR 588 at 596–597). The critical point was that the injury (the coronary occlusion) in Peart occurred “on a daily journey” (Latham CJ at 253) (emphasis added).
The only physiological event that satisfied the test of a personal injury in the present case was the subarachnoid haemorrhage. That occurred at work, not while Mr Kear was “on” a journey. It follows that, if the “shock” was not a personal injury, and there is no evidence that it was, the Arbitrator’s decision cannot stand and the claim cannot succeed.
There are other problems with the Arbitrator’s decision.
The Arbitrator approached the issue on a completely wrong basis. He said that the “overall impression” (T40.10) was that the claim form was “completed almost contemporaneously with the event in question” (T40.11). There are two problems with this statement. First, as the claim form is dated 9 February 2009, the day after Mr Kear collapsed, it cannot be described having been completed “almost contemporaneously with the event in question”. Second, the Arbitrator’s statement suggests that he thought the “event in question” was the collapse at work. The “event in question” was the near miss that occurred when Mr Kear was riding from his home to his place of employment. The issue was whether Mr Kear received a personal injury on that journey.
The Arbitrator said (T40.30) that he believed the test of whether Mr Kear had received a personal injury was satisfied:
“because of [Mr Kear’s] own description of the events; the history of considerably elevated blood pressure as shown in the clinical notes; and [Mr Kear’s] state as recorded in the report of injury form, but also, the state of his agitation was such that it was clearly recollected by Ms Brown some five years after the event. It would seem to me that clearly it goes well beyond the general terms of shock and upset which Mr Saul correctly submitted had no real medical meaning, but in the circumstances here the appearance of the worker was so vivid and so memorable that Ms Brown could remember his behaviour and the way he looked as outlined in her statement at para 10, ‘Really seemed freaked out. I thought that he had stressed himself out.’” (emphasis added)
The Arbitrator added that he was “easily persuaded that [Mr Kear] suffered shock and upset causing an elevation in his blood pressure” and that satisfied the test of a “sudden identifiable pathological change”.
There are a number of difficulties with these statements.
First, Mr Kear’s description of the events was particularly brief and consisted only of him saying that he was in a state of shock, that he was very upset and that he thought he could have been killed. There is nothing in that description that supports a finding that Mr Kear received a personal injury on the journey.
Second, the history of considerably elevated blood pressure in the clinical notes only established that Mr Kear had high blood pressure, both before and after the near miss. It did not establish that the near miss caused an increase in his blood pressure.
Professor Fearnside merely said that “if the experience was sufficient to raise [Mr Kear’s] blood pressure”, raised blood pressure can be a causal factor in a subarachnoid haemorrhage. Similarly, Professor Kiernan noted that an aneurysm may burst “due to high blood pressure”. Neither statement supported the Arbitrator’s conclusions.
There may well be cases where the Commission can infer that, because of a stressful event, there has been an increase in blood pressure. However, given the limited and generally unhelpful evidence tendered before the Arbitrator, the present case is not one of them.
In any event, the authorities do not support the proposition that, on its own, an elevation in blood pressure is a personal injury. That is because, without more, it is not a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state. It is no more than a temporary physiological change in the body’s functioning, similar to the atrial fibrillation that occurred in Castro, without any accompanying lesion or pathological change (Castro at [138]).
Moreover, as explained above, even if, because of the near miss, Mr Kear suffered an increase in blood pressure that contributed to the haemorrhage, that does not establish that he received a personal injury on a journey. That is because the haemorrhage (which may be described as a personal injury) occurred at work and was not received “on” a journey to work.
Third, for the reasons discussed earlier in this decision, neither Mr Kear’s “state”, as recorded in the accident report form, nor Ms Brown’s description of his condition, established that he had received a personal injury on a journey.
Last, there was no evidence that Mr Kear’s condition went “well beyond the general terms of shock and upset” and the basis for this statement by the Arbitrator was not explained.

CONCLUSION

It follows that the Arbitrator erred in concluding that Mr Kear received a personal injury on his journey to work on 8 February 2009 and his decision must be and is revoked. The only finding open on the evidence is that the claimant failed to establish that Mr Kear received a personal injury on a journey to which s 10 applies and there must be an award for the appellant.

DECISION

Leave to appeal is granted.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Arbitrator’s determination of 14 April 2014 are confirmed.
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Arbitrator’s determination of 14 April 2014 are revoked and the following orders are made in their place:
“3. The worker, Anthony Kear, did not receive a personal injury on a journey to which s 10 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 applies and there is an award for the respondent.
4. Save for a certification that the matter is complex and that there be an uplift in the respondent’s costs of 30 per cent for complexity, each side is to pay his or its own costs.”

COSTS

Each party is to pay his or its own costs of the appeal.

Bill Roche
Deputy President

28 July 2014

I, JACQUELINE HAGGER, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE