Workers' Compensation (W.A.)—Entitlement—Personal injury while travelling on journey—Injury suffered during long journey between temporary residence and permanent residence—Whether journey undertaken in accordance with terms and conditions of employment—Whether reasonable to undertake journey—Day's preparation for journey—Whether substantial interruption—Workers' Compensation and Assistance Act 1981 (W.A.), ss. 19(1)(a)(iii), 5(c).
Decisions
BRENNAN J. Section 19(1)(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Assistance Act 1981 (W.A.) deems a worker who suffers a personal injury in the circumstances therein set out "to have suffered personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment" and, on that account, to be entitled to compensation under the Act: s.18 and the definitions of "worker" and "disability" in s.5. Paragraph (a) of s.19(1) relates to injuries suffered while travelling on the journeys therein specified. Its operation is not restricted to injuries suffered while travelling on a journey where the travel is or is in the course of the employment. The journeys to which par.(a) relates are described by reference to their termini. Sub-paragraph (i) relates to journeys between the worker's "place of residence and place of employment"; sub-par.(ii) is presently immaterial; sub-par.(iii) relates to journeys between the worker's camp or place of temporary residence and his place of residence when not in temporary residence. The first question that arises on this appeal is whether, in the circumstances described in the majority judgment, the appellant's parents' home in Perth is properly to be described as his "place of residence" for the purposes of sub-par.(i) or his "place of residence when not so temporarily residing" for the purposes of sub-par.(iii).
2. The "place of residence" mentioned in sub-par.(i) must include indifferently a permanent or a temporary place of residence, else some of a worker's "regular, daily, or periodic journey(s)" to and from the place of employment would not be covered, and that is an unlikely construction of the Act. However, whether the worker's place of residence be temporary or permanent, for the purposes of sub-par.(i) it must be a place in which the worker resides while he is going to or from his place of employment, including the occasion when, on termination of his employment, he is returning to his then place of residence: Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. Hunt (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 240, at p 242. But sub-par.(i) does not contemplate a journey between a place of employment to one of the places of residence mentioned in sub-par.(iii) and thence to the other of those places of residence: the latter leg of such a journey is expressly covered by sub-par.(iii). It follows that sub-par.(i) relates to a journey between the place of employment and the place where, at the time of the journey, the worker is residing whether that place of residence be temporary or permanent. In the present case, the appellant's place of residence for the purpose of sub-par.(i) was the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Walker v Wilson [1991] HCA 8
Case
[1991] HCA 8
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Walker v Wilson*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Walker, and the respondent, Wilson, concerning the validity of a will. The primary issue revolved around whether the will had been properly executed in accordance with the requirements of the relevant legislation.
The court was required to determine whether the will satisfied the formal requirements for execution as stipulated by the *Wills Act 1968* (ACT). Specifically, the court had to consider whether the testator's signature was affixed in the presence of two witnesses, and whether those witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator.
The High Court held that the will was not validly executed. Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ reasoned that the statutory requirements for the presence of witnesses during the signing of a will were not met. The court emphasised the importance of strict compliance with the formalities prescribed by the *Wills Act*, noting that any deviation could render the will invalid. The principles applied underscored the legislative intent to prevent fraud and ensure certainty in testamentary dispositions.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the grant of probate of the will be revoked.