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Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)

Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)

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Case Copied 12 December 1969 27 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

DANVERS v. COMMISSIONER FOR RAILWAYS (N.S.W.)

(1969) 122 CLR 529

12 December 1969

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Compensable injury—Injury "arising out of or in the course of employment"—Employee living on employer's premises during working week—Premises used as store for employer's goods—Itinerant employment—Places of work in remote areas and substantial distance from employee's own residence—No express direction that employee live on employer's premises—Employee's injury and death by fire destroying premises—Fire occurred at night hours after employee ceased daily work—Whether injury and death compensable—Workers' Compensation Act, 1926-1966 (N.S.W.), s. 6 (1) "injury"*.

Decisions

December 12.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. James Francis Danvers was employed by the respondent Commissioner for Railways over a period of about eighteen years before his death on 20th April 1967. Originally a fettler, he became a carpenter, or as it was said, a "rough carpenter". His duties as such in the employ of the respondent took him "up and down the line from Cootamundra" on the New South Wales railway system doing maintenance and repair work. His daily hours of duty were from 7.30 a.m. to 4.15 p.m. Apparently he would travel up or down the railway line by "trike" to the point where his particular place of work at the time was situated. These places were not necessarily, and mostly were not, adjacent to any centre of population and apparently were never so conveniently placed in relation to his home that he could return there at evening during the working week. Thus, since he began to work in this fashion, he had not returned daily to his home near Adelong. He left for work on Monday morning and came home on Friday evening. (at p532)

2. The respondent provided what is described in the evidence as a van, which was an old meat waggon converted by the respondent to provide living accommodation for two people. It contained a stove, sink, table, a Tilley pressure lamp and a kerosene refrigerator, as well as beds and a chest of drawers for holding clothing. "Rubber mattresses and all the necessities for the workmen to live in the van, other than their own linen and food" were all provided by the respondent. Though the matter was not exhaustively pursued in the evidence, it appeared that there was "some industrial agreement between the Department", i.e. the respondent, "and the union as to the minimum requirements of civilization" in a van such as that in question and the respondent kept a schedule of what the union required to be in this van. The van, besides its use as a dormitory, was used to store paint and tools, the property of the respondent, and apparently of a kind likely to be needed by the deceased and those working with him in maintenance and repair work along the railway line. (at p532)

3. It was the practice of the respondent to take the van to a spot…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1969] HCA 64
Decision Date: 12 December 1969

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Danvers, had suffered injuries and sought damages from the respondent, the Commissioner for Railways (NSW), alleging negligence. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the Commissioner owed a duty of care to Danvers in the circumstances of the incident that led to his injuries, and if so, whether that duty had been breached.

The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the Commissioner owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, Danvers, in relation to the circumstances that caused his injury. Secondly, if such a duty was owed, whether the Commissioner had breached that duty of care through its actions or omissions. This involved an examination of the relationship between the parties and the foreseeability of the harm that occurred.

The Court's reasoning focused on the established principles of negligence. It was held that the Commissioner, as the operator of a railway system, owed a duty of care to persons who might foreseeably be injured by its operations. The Court considered the specific facts of the case, including the nature of the railway operations and the plaintiff's presence in proximity to them, to assess whether the harm suffered by Danvers was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Commissioner's conduct. The Court applied the test of reasonable foreseeability to both the existence of the duty and its breach, considering what a reasonable employer or operator would have done in the circumstances to prevent such harm.

The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Orders