Wheeler v State of South Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

WHEELER v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2012] SASCFC 111

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Sulan, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

25 September 2012

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE - ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE - JOURNEY INJURIES - GENERALLY

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - POINTS AND OBJECTIONS NOT TAKEN BELOW - WHEN ALLOWED TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL - OTHER MATTERS - LEGAL GROUND APPEARING ON EVIDENCE

Appellant succeeded on judicial determination by single member of Tribunal of his claim for compensation - that decision overturned on appeal by Full Bench of Tribunal - appellant now appeals to Full Court of this Court against that decision - appeal to Full Bench and to this Court available only on a question of law.

Whether Full Bench of Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by making its own factual determinations - whether, on facts as found at first instance, appellant's claim to be determined by reference to s 30(5) of Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) - whether s 30(5) constitutes a code in relation to journey injuries - whether now open to respondent to rely upon s 30(5) having previously disclaimed reliance on that provision - whether, on facts as found at first instance, appellant's disability came within s 30(5) - whether, in any event, appellant's disability came within s 30(2).

Held: appeal dismissed - Full Bench of Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction and did not make its own factual determinations - appellant's claim is to be determined by reference to s 30(5) - s 30(5) states exhaustively the circumstances in which a journey injury will arise from employment - respondent permitted to rely upon s 30(5) on appeal despite having previously disclaimed reliance on that provision - appellant's disability did not come within s 30(5) - appellant's disability did not come within s 30(2).

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 30, s 86, s 86A, referred to.
Chadburn v Queen Elizabeth Hospital [1999] SAWCT 47; Connecticut Fire Insurance Co v Kavanagh [1892] AC 473; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1969) 122 CLR 529; Patterson v WorkCover Corporation [2007] SAWCT 11; Peet v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (1966) 66 SASR 474; State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 68 SASR 97; State of South Australia v Wheeler [2012] SAWCT 13; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418; TransAdelaide v Karanicos [1996] SASC 5536; University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481; Wheeler v South Australia Police [2011] SAWCT 30, considered.

WHEELER v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2012] SASCFC 111

Full Court:  Sulan, White and Nicholson JJ

  1. SULAN J: I would dismiss the appeal.  I agree with the reasons…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal by the appellant against a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal. The appellant had initially succeeded in a claim for workers' compensation before a single member of the Tribunal, but this decision was overturned on appeal by the Full Bench. The appeal to the Full Court was limited to questions of law.

The central legal issues before the Full Court were whether the Full Bench had exceeded its jurisdiction by making its own factual determinations, and whether the appellant's claim should have been determined by reference to s 30(5) of the *Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986* (SA). Further questions arose as to whether s 30(5) constituted an exhaustive code for journey injuries, whether the respondent was permitted to rely on s 30(5) on appeal despite having previously disclaimed reliance, and whether, on the facts found at first instance, the appellant's disability fell within s 30(5) or, alternatively, s 30(2).

The Full Court held that the Full Bench had not exceeded its jurisdiction or made its own factual determinations. It found that the appellant's claim was to be determined by reference to s 30(5), which exhaustively stated the circumstances in which a journey injury would arise from employment. The Court also permitted the respondent to rely on s 30(5) on appeal. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the appellant's disability did not come within the scope of s 30(5) and also did not fall within s 30(2). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J (dissent) NICHOLSON J (dissent)
Mr Blunn entered the pizza bar while the appellant and Mr Quigg remained outside. While they were waiting, a verbal altercation developed between two other persons near the pizza bar. What followed is a little unclear, but when Mr Blunn emerged with the pizza, one of these persons kicked the box from his hands. The appellant then made some comment which attracted attention to him. It appears that the second participant in the altercation then struck the appellant with some force to the back of his head, rendering him unconscious. These injuries gave rise to his compensation claim.The Decision of Hannon DP For reasons to be outlined shortly, Hannon DP considered the worker’s claim by reference to s 30(2) and (4). He rejected the appellant’s claim that he had been engaged in one period or episode of work throughout the whole of his time in Mount Isa.[11][11] [2011] SAWCT 30 at [42]. Hannon DP considered that the appellant’s daily periods of work between Monday and Thursday had comprised the whole of the time between his leaving of the motel at about 7.00 am until his return at about 4.00 or 5.00 pm.[12] He then reasoned that the work period on Friday 3 April should be characterised in the same way, with the effect that the appellant would not have completed his daily period of work until he had returned to the motel in the way that he had planned at the time of the assault, sometime after 11.00 pm. Hannon DP’s reasoning appears in the following passages:[50]… The characterisation of the daily periods of work as encompassing each day of the worker’s participation in the NCTC course from the time of leaving the accommodation for training activities until the return from those activities to the accommodation after completion of work related activities for the day applies also to the employment on Friday 3 April 2009, despite the difference in the routine.[51]… A liberal and practical approach requires that the collective nature of the participation in the NCTC course by the worker and others be recognised. Members of the course were transported to a remote regional centre. They were allocated the same accommodation. They travelled together to and from training venues. In the circumstances, the entire activity of the worker between the daily departure from and return to the common accommodation is properly characterised as activity in the course of employment. The variation in routine on Friday 3 April 2009 was not such as to break the connection between the employment and the activity of returning to the accommodation, particularly given that this activity was necessitated by the NCTC having transported the worker away from his accommodation at the conclusion of the training activities in order to participate in the debrief without making arrangements for his return.[52]My conclusion that the journey back to the accommodation on 3 April 2009 was an activity in the course of employment is not premised upon a finding that the worker’s attendance at the social function was an activity in the course of his employment, or that it was undertaken pursuant to an express or implied expectation held either by the NCTC or SA Police. … I find [the worker’s attendance at the social function] can properly be characterised as an interlude or interval in the course of the daily period of work. The disability did not occur during that interlude or interval, but after the worker had embarked upon the activity of returning to his accommodation.[53]In this context, I do not consider that it makes any difference that the worker’s departure for the motel was delayed for a substantial period of time by his attendance at the social event. Whilst it delayed the worker’s return, it had no influence on the events which occurred, apart from giving rise to the making of a relatively insignificant deviation from a direct route back to the accommodation in order to purchase pizza.[12] Ibid at [43].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: