The State of South Australia v Roberts

Link copied
Case Copied 56 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v ROBERTS

[2018] SASCFC 25

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Parker)

17 April 2018

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE - ARISING IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

This is an appeal by the State of South Australia against a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal.

The respondent was employed as a full-time lecturer in hairdressing by TAFE SA. She was bitten by mosquitoes while staying in accommodation provided during a teaching placement in Oodnadatta. She sought compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the mosquito bites.

The question of law raised by the appeal is whether the Full Bench erred in concluding that the respondent’s employment was “a significant contributing cause” of her injury such that her injury “[arose] from employment” within the meaning of s 7(2) of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA).

Held, by Parker J (Kourakis CJ and Blue J agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1. When a question of causation is considered in the context of a statutory compensation regime, the issue must be decided by reference to the statutory text construed and applied in a manner which best effects its statutory purpose, at [96].

2.  The additional requirement in the second limb of s 7(2)(a) that “employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” is intended to exclude entitlement to compensation where employment was not a cause but merely the occasion for the injury, or where employment was not in any real or meaningful sense responsible for the injury, at [89] and [111].

3.  Employment will be a significant cause of an injury if it is an important or influential cause.  This necessitates an evaluative judgement on the part of the decision-maker and careful identification and consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the injury and the employment of the worker, at [101] and [106].

4. A “but for” test cannot be the sole determinant of causation under the second limb of s 7(2)(a). However, it can be applied as part of the reasoning process, at [107].

5. The second limb of s 7(2)(a) does not require that a worker’s employment must have exposed them to a greater risk of injury, at [105].

6.  The Deputy President and the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal did not err in concluding that the respondent’s employment was a significant contributing cause of her injury, at [113] and [121].

Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467; Comcare v PVYW (2013) 250 CLR 246; Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1969) 122 CLR 529; Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science v Auld [2000] SAWCT 155; Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1960) 103 CLR 547; March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506; Travel Compensation Fund…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read The State of South Australia v Roberts and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] SASCFC 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of South Australia appealed to the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal against a decision of a Deputy President who had found in favour of the respondent, Ms Roberts. Ms Roberts, a full-time lecturer in hairdressing for TAFE SA, had lodged three workers' compensation claims alleging injuries of arthritis, chronic fatigue, and psychiatric sequelae resulting from mosquito bites sustained in accommodation provided and paid for by her employer during a teaching placement in Oodnadatta. The appellant rejected these claims, asserting that Ms Roberts had not established that her injuries arose from her employment as required by section 7(1) of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA).

The central legal issue before the Full Bench was whether the Deputy President had erred in law by finding that Ms Roberts' employment with TAFE SA was a "significant contributing cause" of her injuries, as stipulated by section 7(2)(a) of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA). This section requires that for a non-psychiatric injury to arise from employment, it must occur out of or in the course of employment, and the employment must be a significant contributing cause. The appeal was limited to questions of law.

The court reasoned that the Deputy President had correctly applied the statutory test. The medical evidence, which was not challenged on appeal, established that Ms Roberts suffered from inflammatory polyarthritis and psychiatric sequelae, both caused by mosquito bites. These bites occurred while Ms Roberts was residing in substandard accommodation in a remote location, which was arranged and paid for by her employer. She was in Oodnadatta solely for the purpose of fulfilling her employment duties. The court found that the Deputy President's conclusion that the employment was a significant contributing cause was supported by these facts, as Ms Roberts' presence in that specific environment, due to her employment, led to the mosquito bites and subsequent injuries.

The Full Bench dismissed the appeal, finding that the Deputy President had not erred in law. The court noted that even if the appeal had involved questions of fact, it would have reached the same conclusion, affirming that the respondent's employment was a significant contributing cause of her injuries.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.Background The respondent was employed as a full-time lecturer in hairdressing by TAFE SA. In October 2015, she was bitten by mosquitoes while staying in accommodation provided during a teaching placement in Oodnadatta. TAFE SA authorised and paid for this accommodation. In the period between November 2016 and May 2016, the respondent lodged three workers compensation claims alleging injuries of arthritis, chronic fatigue and psychiatric sequelae resulting from the mosquito bites. The appellant rejected all claims on the basis that the respondent had failed to establish that her injuries arose from her employment within the meaning of s 7(1) of the RTW Act. The respondent then filed three Applications for Review in the Tribunal relating to each alleged injury. The applications were heard by a Deputy President. His Honour found in favour of the respondent and set aside the decisions with respect to the arthritis and psychiatric sequelae claims. However, the decision to reject the chronic fatigue claim was upheld because the respondent had not been diagnosed with that condition. The appellant appealed to the Full Bench of the Tribunal. In accordance with s 26I of the SAET Act the appeal was limited to a question of law. In essence, the appellant challenged the finding by the Deputy President that the respondent’s employment with TAFE SA was “a significant contributing cause” of her injuries. The Full Bench dismissed the appeal. The evidence Counsel for the respondent called three witnesses in the trial before the Deputy President. They were the respondent, Dr Herriot and Dr Khanom. The appellant did not call any witnesses. A number of reports provided by other medical practitioners were also admitted into evidence.The evidence of the respondent The respondent produced a statement, which was adopted in her oral evidence. She was 59 years old at the time the relevant injuries occurred. She had been employed as a full-time lecturer in hairdressing by TAFE SA since 2000. Prior to that, she had worked as a hairdresser from the age of 14. During 2015, the respondent volunteered to teach hairdressing to Aboriginal women in Coober Pedy and Oodnadatta. The project commenced on 1 June 2015 and involved a 10 week teaching placement. Her accommodation during this period was authorised and paid for by TAFE SA. For the first few weeks of her placement, the respondent stayed in what she described as a “nice” two-bedroom cabin at the Pink Road House Caravan Park in Oodnadatta. During her last week she stayed in a metal site cabin at the same Caravan Park. She described the conditions in the metal cabin as “appalling”. The air-conditioning unit was broken and the fly screens were torn and contained holes. The respondent completed her last day of teaching on Wednesday, 26 October 2015. It was a particularly hot day. After teaching finished, she returned to the metal cabin. She could not walk on the cabin floor with bare feet as it was too hot. She opened the windows to obtain relief from the heat. Later in the night she saw mosquitoes on the wall near her bed, squashed the largest one and noticed that it contained blood.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent was subsequently diagnosed as having either reactive arthritis or inflammatory polyarthritis. She gave evidence with respect to her medical history. She reported good physical and mental health prior to the teaching placement, despite some issues with her mental health in the past. The Deputy President accepted the respondent’s evidence and found her to be straightforward, candid and not prone to exaggeration. His Honour considered that certain omissions with respect to her medical history were innocently made. Furthermore, key matters of history concerning her stay in Oodnadatta and the deficiencies in the accommodation were corroborated by uncontested evidence contained in a witness statement of a fellow employee. Medical evidence Extensive medical evidence was tendered during the trial. The factual findings about the medical aspects of the respondent’s injuries were not challenged before the Full Bench or on this appeal. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to repeat the medical evidence in detail. In summary, the Deputy President accepted the evidence of Dr Champion that the respondent suffered from inflammatory polyarthritis. His Honour found that:[56]In my view it is very likely that the cause of Ms Roberts’ injury was a mosquito bite. As Dr Champion noted, there is a strong temporal association between the bite and the development of her symptoms. I accept Dr Champion’s evidence about the aetiology of the injury. His Honour also accepted the medical evidence with respect to the respondent’s psychiatric sequelae resulting from the mosquito bites:[96] … Dr Herriot and Mr Clarke agree on the diagnosis of the mental injury and also agree it incapacitates her for work. I accept their views. … It was only after being bitten by mosquitos that she ceased being able to work. In my view the sequence of events supports a finding that her physical and psychiatric incapacity arose as a result of the physical injury and the consequential psychiatric injury. The legislative scheme An overarching object of the RTW Act is to establish a scheme that supports workers who suffer injuries at work.[3] The term “injury” in relation to a worker is defined in s 3(1) of the RTW Act to include a disease. The term “disease” is defined to include “any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition, whether of sudden or gradual development”.[3] Return to Work Act 2014 (SA), s 3(1). Section 7(1) provides that the RTW Act applies to an injury if (and only if) it “arises from employment”. The phrase “arises from employment” must be read subject to s 7(2) which provides:(2) Subject to this section, an injury arises from employment if— (a) in the case of an injury other than a psychiatric injury—the injury arises out of or in the course of employment and the employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury; and (b) in the case of a psychiatric injury— (i)the psychiatric injury arises out of or in the course of employment and the employment was the significant contributing cause of the injury; and (ii)the injury did not arise wholly or predominantly from any action or decision designated under subsection (4).(underlining added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

As this is an appeal on a question of law, the finding that the Full Bench correctly applied the statute is enough to decide the matter. Nevertheless, I take the opportunity to note that if this appeal had extended to questions of fact, I would have concluded that the Deputy President did not err in concluding that the respondent’s employment was a significant contributing cause of her injury. The medical evidence establishes that the respondent’s illness was caused by mosquito bites. Those bites occurred because she was housed in unsatisfactory accommodation in an extremely remote location that was arranged or paid for by her employer. She was present in that location for the sole purpose of carrying out her duties as an employee. In those circumstances, whether or not she might have been bitten by disease carrying mosquitoes at her home or workplace in Adelaide is not to the point. Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Lastly, the respondent submits that it was unnecessary to show that the respondent was exposed to any greater risk or special danger. The second limb should not be construed as requiring an increased risk. Nevertheless, the respondent contends that she was exposed to a greater risk of injury in Oodnadatta. The evidence before the Deputy President on that point was clear. No error has been demonstrated. Consideration of the alleged error of law This appeal on a question of law is concerned with the operation of the second limb of the test in s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act. The issue is whether the Full Bench was correct in its conclusion that the Deputy President had not erred in finding that the employment of the respondent was a significant contributing cause of her injury. Interstate authorities I accept the correctness of the appellant’s submission that the proper construction of the phrase “employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” cannot be derived by transposing the reasoning in cases that considered a different form of words and arose in a different statutory context. For that reason, care must be taken in considering the various cases referred to in argument that have been decided by the Courts of Appeal in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland.[42] [42] See for example, Mercer v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 740; Badawi v Nexon Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 503; Zlateska v Consolidated Cleaning Services Pty Ltd and Anor [2006] VSCA 141; Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] QCA 48. It is important to note that the relevance of the New South Wales authorities is affected by the fact that the operation of the phrase “employment was a substantial contributing factor” in s 9A(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) is subject to subsections (2) and (3) of s 9A. Subsection (2) lists a series of matters that must be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether a worker’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury, but without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for the purposes of such a determination. Subsection (3) provides that a worker’s employment is not to be regarded as a substantial contributing factor to their injury merely because the injury arose out of or in the course of their employment, nor is it to be so regarded merely because the worker’s incapacity for work arose from the injury.Section 7(2)(a) The inclusion of the words “and the employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” to s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act added an additional requirement that must be satisfied before it can be established that an injury “arose from employment”. Under s 30 of the Repealed Act, and leaving aside the special provisions in that Act covering a “secondary injury or a disease”[43] and psychiatric injuries,[44] an injury was regarded as arising from employment if it either arose out of or, alternatively, occurred in the course of employment. An injury was compensable if one or the other of those two alternative qualifications was satisfied.[45] The first limb of s 7(2)(a) is still expressed in those terms. [43] See s 30(2)(b) of the Repealed Act.[44] See s 30A of the Repealed Act.[45] Until the mid-20th Century in most jurisdictions, these requirements were expressed to be cumulative rather than in the alternative – see discussion in Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1960) 103 CLR 547 at 558, Fullagar J.