SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v ROBERTS
[2018] SASCFC 25
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Parker)
17 April 2018
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE - ARISING IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
This is an appeal by the State of South Australia against a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal.
The respondent was employed as a full-time lecturer in hairdressing by TAFE SA. She was bitten by mosquitoes while staying in accommodation provided during a teaching placement in Oodnadatta. She sought compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the mosquito bites.
The question of law raised by the appeal is whether the Full Bench erred in concluding that the respondent’s employment was “a significant contributing cause” of her injury such that her injury “[arose] from employment” within the meaning of s 7(2) of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA).
Held, by Parker J (Kourakis CJ and Blue J agreeing), dismissing the appeal:
1. When a question of causation is considered in the context of a statutory compensation regime, the issue must be decided by reference to the statutory text construed and applied in a manner which best effects its statutory purpose, at [96].
2. The additional requirement in the second limb of s 7(2)(a) that “employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” is intended to exclude entitlement to compensation where employment was not a cause but merely the occasion for the injury, or where employment was not in any real or meaningful sense responsible for the injury, at [89] and [111].
3. Employment will be a significant cause of an injury if it is an important or influential cause. This necessitates an evaluative judgement on the part of the decision-maker and careful identification and consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the injury and the employment of the worker, at [101] and [106].
4. A “but for” test cannot be the sole determinant of causation under the second limb of s 7(2)(a). However, it can be applied as part of the reasoning process, at [107].
5. The second limb of s 7(2)(a) does not require that a worker’s employment must have exposed them to a greater risk of injury, at [105].
6. The Deputy President and the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal did not err in concluding that the respondent’s employment was a significant contributing cause of her injury, at [113] and [121].
Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467; Comcare v PVYW (2013) 250 CLR 246; Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1969) 122 CLR 529; Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science v Auld [2000] SAWCT 155; Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1960) 103 CLR 547; March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506; Travel Compensation Fund…
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- Case
- [2018] SASCFC 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Bench was whether the Deputy President had erred in law by finding that Ms Roberts' employment with TAFE SA was a "significant contributing cause" of her injuries, as stipulated by section 7(2)(a) of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA). This section requires that for a non-psychiatric injury to arise from employment, it must occur out of or in the course of employment, and the employment must be a significant contributing cause. The appeal was limited to questions of law.
The court reasoned that the Deputy President had correctly applied the statutory test. The medical evidence, which was not challenged on appeal, established that Ms Roberts suffered from inflammatory polyarthritis and psychiatric sequelae, both caused by mosquito bites. These bites occurred while Ms Roberts was residing in substandard accommodation in a remote location, which was arranged and paid for by her employer. She was in Oodnadatta solely for the purpose of fulfilling her employment duties. The court found that the Deputy President's conclusion that the employment was a significant contributing cause was supported by these facts, as Ms Roberts' presence in that specific environment, due to her employment, led to the mosquito bites and subsequent injuries.
The Full Bench dismissed the appeal, finding that the Deputy President had not erred in law. The court noted that even if the appeal had involved questions of fact, it would have reached the same conclusion, affirming that the respondent's employment was a significant contributing cause of her injuries.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Lastly, the respondent submits that it was unnecessary to show that the respondent was exposed to any greater risk or special danger. The second limb should not be construed as requiring an increased risk. Nevertheless, the respondent contends that she was exposed to a greater risk of injury in Oodnadatta. The evidence before the Deputy President on that point was clear. No error has been demonstrated. Consideration of the alleged error of law This appeal on a question of law is concerned with the operation of the second limb of the test in s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act. The issue is whether the Full Bench was correct in its conclusion that the Deputy President had not erred in finding that the employment of the respondent was a significant contributing cause of her injury. Interstate authorities I accept the correctness of the appellant’s submission that the proper construction of the phrase “employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” cannot be derived by transposing the reasoning in cases that considered a different form of words and arose in a different statutory context. For that reason, care must be taken in considering the various cases referred to in argument that have been decided by the Courts of Appeal in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland.[42] [42] See for example, Mercer v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 740; Badawi v Nexon Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 503; Zlateska v Consolidated Cleaning Services Pty Ltd and Anor [2006] VSCA 141; Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] QCA 48. It is important to note that the relevance of the New South Wales authorities is affected by the fact that the operation of the phrase “employment was a substantial contributing factor” in s 9A(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) is subject to subsections (2) and (3) of s 9A. Subsection (2) lists a series of matters that must be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether a worker’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury, but without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for the purposes of such a determination. Subsection (3) provides that a worker’s employment is not to be regarded as a substantial contributing factor to their injury merely because the injury arose out of or in the course of their employment, nor is it to be so regarded merely because the worker’s incapacity for work arose from the injury.Section 7(2)(a) The inclusion of the words “and the employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury” to s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act added an additional requirement that must be satisfied before it can be established that an injury “arose from employment”. Under s 30 of the Repealed Act, and leaving aside the special provisions in that Act covering a “secondary injury or a disease”[43] and psychiatric injuries,[44] an injury was regarded as arising from employment if it either arose out of or, alternatively, occurred in the course of employment. An injury was compensable if one or the other of those two alternative qualifications was satisfied.[45] The first limb of s 7(2)(a) is still expressed in those terms. [43] See s 30(2)(b) of the Repealed Act.[44] See s 30A of the Repealed Act.[45] Until the mid-20th Century in most jurisdictions, these requirements were expressed to be cumulative rather than in the alternative – see discussion in Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1960) 103 CLR 547 at 558, Fullagar J.