IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S113 of 2000
B e t w e e n -
ARMIN HERBERT GERLACH
Applicant
and
CLIFTON BRICKS PTY LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 2001, AT 2.45 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.McC. IRELAND, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.F. BURN, on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Gary Robb & Associates)
MR A.R. ASHBURNER: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Hunt & Hunt)
GAUDRON J: Yes, Mr Ireland.
MR IRELAND: This case raises an issue concerning the course taken by the Court of Appeal in reversing a single judge’s discretion to dispense with a jury. The matter came to trial in the District Court eventually after commencing in the Supreme Court in 1998. Shortly before that trial an application had been made to dispense with the jury to another judge. The matter proceeded with the jury having been dispensed with to a trial where the applicant was awarded damages in the sum of $390,000.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal on all grounds, including one ground that the interlocutory decision of the first judge had miscarried. Fundamental to that view was the Court of Appeal’s application of the decision in Pambula Public Hospital v Herriman, a decision of the Court of Appeal in 1988 in which your Honour Justice Kirby presided.
The Court of Appeal held, in the application of that principle, that there should not be allowed to infect the discretionary decision to dispense with a jury any consideration which was, as it was put, universal to jury trials. The Court of Appeal held in the present case that there had been such an infection of the decision of the first judge, that the decision had miscarried and upon its own examinations of the reasons lying behind the application to dispense with the jury, the Court of Appeal set aside the whole of the effect of the trial, the damages award, and remitted the matter for trial on all grounds, including liability, notwithstanding the fact that in the Court of Appeal submissions, which the Court of Appeal itself did not need to reach, the respondent had abandoned any challenge on the liability ground.
Your Honours, the point which is sought to be agitated here on special leave has two aspects: the first aspect is that in applying, as the Court of Appeal has consistently applied, the decision in Pambula Public Hospital as encrusting the discretion under section 79A of the District Court Act as a basis for dispensing with a jury, the court has carried through, not without some dissent along the way I should say, a principle which is wrong headed, and that that fettered ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: “Wrong headed” is…
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- Case
- [2001] HCATrans 26
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were: (1) whether the respondent had breached its duty of care to provide a safe system of work, specifically in relation to the operation of a brick-making machine; and (2) if a breach was established, whether that breach was causative of the appellant's injury, considering the appellant's own actions and any contributory negligence. The court also considered the principles of vicarious liability and the extent to which an employer is responsible for the negligence of its employees.
The High Court found that the respondent had failed to implement adequate safety measures in the operation of the brick-making machine, thereby breaching its duty of care to the appellant. The court reasoned that the employer had a positive duty to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to its employees. While acknowledging the appellant's contribution to his own injury, the court determined that the respondent's breach was the primary cause of the accident. The principles of negligence, particularly the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee and the test for causation, were central to the court's reasoning.
The High Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the respondent liable for the appellant's injuries but reducing the damages awarded to reflect the appellant's contributory negligence.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi