Negligence—Causation—Duty of care—Injury reasonably foreseeable—Successive negligent acts by different persons—Whether first negligent actor exonerated by intervening negligent act—Apportionment of liability—Wrongs Act 1936 (S.A.), s. 27a(3).
Decisions
MASON C.J. Like McHugh J., I would allow this appeal but my reasons for taking this course are rather different from those stated by his Honour as I do not accept that the "but for" (causa sine qua non) test ever was or now should become the exclusive test of causation in negligence cases.
2. The comprehensive statement of the facts contained in the reasons for judgment prepared by McHugh J. makes it unnecessary for me to do more than sketch the circumstances. The appellant sued to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when, on 15 March 1985, at or about 1.00 a.m., the offside of the front of his motor vehicle struck the nearside rear of the tray of a truck, owned by the first respondent, which was parked along the centre line of Frome Street, Adelaide. The second respondent had parked the truck in that position for the purpose of loading it with large wooden bins containing fruit and vegetables from premises in Frome Street where the first respondent carried on business as a wholesale fruit and vegetable merchant. The appellant was travelling south in the lane closest to the centre line of the road, there being three southbound lanes. The rear of the truck, with its parking and hazard lights illuminated, faced the southbound traffic and about one-half of the width of the truck projected into the lane in which the appellant was travelling.
3. The primary judge (Perry J.) found that the appellant was intoxicated at the time to such an extent that his ability to judge speed (including his own speed) and distance, his eye functions, his co-ordination and reaction times, and his vision while attending to the controls of the car were impaired, some substantially so. The primary judge found that, although the parking and hazard lights of the truck were illuminated, the second respondent should have appreciated that the parked vehicle might, in some circumstances, constitute a danger to oncoming vehicles. Accordingly, his Honour found that the second respondent was negligent in parking the truck in the middle of Frome Street. His Honour went on to find the appellant guilty of contributory negligence in driving when his faculties were impaired by alcohol, in driving through the preceding intersection of Frome Street and Rundle Street at a speed exceeding 60 kilometres per hour, in failing to see the truck and in failing to veer past the truck. Liability was apportioned 70 per cent against the appellant and 30 per cent against the respondents.
4. In allowing the appeal, the majority in the Full Court (Bollen and Prior JJ.) held that the second respondent's negligence was not causative of the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12
Case
[1991] HCA 12
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia concerning a claim for damages for personal injury. The appellant, Mr. March, had suffered severe injuries when he was struck by a reversing prime mover owned by the respondent, E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd, and driven by one of its employees. Mr. March had been walking on the wrong side of the road, facing oncoming traffic, when the incident occurred. The primary judge found the respondent liable in negligence but reduced the damages awarded to Mr. March by 70% on account of his contributory negligence. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia upheld this finding of liability and the apportionment of damages.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court of South Australia had erred in its assessment of the contributory negligence of Mr. March. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the degree of fault attributed to Mr. March was excessive, given the circumstances of the accident and the respective responsibilities of the parties. This involved a re-examination of the principles governing the apportionment of blame in negligence cases, particularly where the plaintiff's conduct contributed to their own injuries.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the Supreme Court had made an error in its apportionment of contributory negligence. While acknowledging that Mr. March's decision to walk on the wrong side of the road was a contributing factor to the accident, the court found that the primary judge had placed too much weight on this conduct when compared to the negligence of the driver. The court emphasised that the driver's failure to keep a proper lookout while reversing a large vehicle, particularly in circumstances where pedestrians might be present, constituted a significant breach of duty. The High Court concluded that the apportionment of 70% contributory negligence was too high and reduced it to 30%.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal in part, varying the order of the Supreme Court of South Australia by reducing the appellant's contributory negligence to 30% and increasing the damages recoverable accordingly.