Workers' Compensation—Commonwealth Employees—Accident arising out of or in the course of employment—Worker required to live in camp—Exposure to additional risk—Injury by scalding while obtaining hot water for washing—Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1964 (Cth), s. 9 (1).*

Decisions

December 21.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
McTIERNAN J. This is an appeal by special leave under s. 39 (2) (c) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1919. The appeal is brought from a decision of the magistrate of a local court of Perth. The decision involves less than $100 - consequently an appeal against the decision could not be brought in the Supreme Court of Western Australia without its leave, by reason of s. 107 of the Local Courts Act of the State. Special leave to appeal was sought on the footing that par. (c) of s. 39 (2) of the Judiciary Act applied to the decision in question. The application for such leave was not opposed by the respondent. The appeal was opposed. It was said by counsel for the respondent that the application for special leave to appeal was not opposed because it was a matter of importance to the respondent whether an employee who sustains personal injury by accident outside hours of labour in a camp provided by the Commonwealth for employees who are required to camp out for the performance of their duties has a right to compensation under the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1964. In the present case, the employee sustained injury to his leg by scalding when hot water he was taking with a bucket from a copper in a camp provided by the postal department as lodgings for a working party of linemen, of which the employee was a member, split on his leg. He needed the hot water to prepare a warm bath to wash himself after the day's work. The bath-tub was in the camp, the copper and bucket were some of the utensils provided by the employer, the Postmaster-General, for use by the men in the camp, all of whom were his employees. During the day on which the accident happened they had been digging trenches in which to put conduit for telephone wires: this involved blasting operations. The work was not dirty but dusty and they returned to the camp covered with dust. In the Act the fundamental condition of the liability of the Commonwealth to pay compensation is that personal injury by accident arises to an employee out of or in the course of his employment by the Commonwealth (s. 9 (1.)). In the present case the employee was not incapacitated for work. He claimed by way of compensation the cost of medical treatment of the injury, which was but a small amount. The Commonwealth is liable under s. 11 to pay the cost of medical treatment of an injury, whether or not it incapacitates the employee for work,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading O'Brien v Commonwealth

Details

AGLC: O'Brien v Commonwealth [1967] HCA 49
Case: [1967] HCA 49
Decision Date: 21 December 1967

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between O'Brien and the Commonwealth of Australia. The case concerned the validity of certain regulations made under the *Defence Act 1903* (Cth) and their application to the appellant.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the regulations, which purported to confer certain powers on the Minister for Defence, were within the scope of the legislative authority granted by the *Defence Act*. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the regulations were a valid exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth, or if they trespassed upon the legislative domain.

The Court reasoned that the *Defence Act* conferred broad powers upon the Executive to make regulations for the efficient prosecution of the war. However, the Court found that the regulations in question went beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the Act, as they sought to create new offences and impose penalties that were not authorised by the Parliament. The Court applied the principle that executive power, even in wartime, is limited by the enabling legislation and cannot be exercised in a manner that effectively usurts the legislative function of Parliament.

The Court held that the regulations were invalid and made orders accordingly.

Orders