FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission v Roberts
[2007] FCA 1WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – Commonwealth employees’ entitlement to compensation – employment related injury, disability or disease – arising out of employment – meaning of s 6(1)(a) of Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
DEFENCE AND WAR – defence forces – compensation for injuries and other civil actions
Held: the respondent’s injury arose out of her employment by virtue of the ‘but for’ test mandated by s 6(1)(a) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
‘Injury arising out of employee’s employment’
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 4, s 6(1)(a)
Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370 followed
Esso v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 511 followed
Kennedy v Telstra Corporation (1995) 61 FCR 160 discussedRoncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115 distinguished and applied
Schmid v Comcare (2004) 77 ALD 782 discussedMILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION v MICHELLE ROBERTS
ACD 1 OF 2006MADGWICK J
8 JANUARY 2007
SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 1 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY A SENIOR MEMBER
BETWEEN:
MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
ApplicantAND:
MICHELLE ROBERTS
Respondent
JUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JANUARY 2007
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA))
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed with costs.
THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:
2.Pursuant to Order 3 rule 3, Order 52 rule 15 be varied to extend the time for filing an application to appeal to 29 January 2007.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 1 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY A SENIOR MEMBER
BETWEEN:
MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
ApplicantAND:
MICHELLE ROBERTS
Respondent
JUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE:
8 JANUARY 2007
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR:
On 15 December 2006 I delivered judgment in the matter, dismissing the application with costs. I now provide reasons for that decision.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) setting aside a decision of the applicant. In lieu of that decision, the Tribunal determined that pursuant to s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the Act’), the respondent, Ms Roberts, was entitled to compensation in respect of post-traumatic stress disorder suffered in May 2000. That Tribunal decision was based on and applied an earlier decision of the Tribunal holding that an assault suffered by the respondent in May 2000 was an injury which arose out of her employment by the Royal Australian Air Force (‘RAAF’).
This case concerns the meaning of the expression ‘arising out of … the employee’s employment’ in the definition of ‘injury’ in s 4 of the Act, the construction and operation of s…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Robert... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2007] FCA 1
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the respondent pointed to the decision of Cowdroy J in Coward v Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Service [2006] FCA 840, in which his Honour took an expansive view of the scope of military service in the context of living in barracks. The Court found that the requirement asserted by the applicant that the employee must show some elevation of the risk of the injury sustained, which elevation must result from the employment, was mistaken. Instead, it is enough that there can be shown, as a matter of common sense, some substantial link or connection with the employment which is causal and not merely temporal. The Court also found that s 6(1)(a) compelled the rejection of the applicant's case. The Court dismissed the application with costs and varied the time for filing an application to appeal to 29 January 2007.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:
2. Pursuant to Order 3 rule 3, Order 52 rule 15 be varied to extend the time for filing an application to appeal to 29 January 2007.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MADGWICK J
The respondent pointed, after the close of submissions, to the decision of Cowdroy J in Coward v Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Service [2006] FCA 840 in which, in obiter dicta, his Honour took an expansive view of the scope of military service in the context of living in barracks.CONSIDERATIONQuestion of law It is a question of law whether there is any evidence sufficient to find that a statutory test of the kind here in question has been complied with. This is not a case of ordinary words with a plain meaning but of a compound statutory concept employing what have become terms of legal art, or something close to them: Roncevich at 123. The revised questions of law are adequate to engage the Court’s jurisdiction. Had my conclusion been different, I would have reformulated them a little before answering them.‘Arising out of …’ Counsel for the applicant ably made a respectable argument as to the meaning of the phrase ‘injury … arising out of … the employee’s employment’. In the view I take it is neither necessary nor desirable that I resolve that question to finality. I am however inclined, on a tentative basis, to think that the requirement asserted by the applicant that the employee must show some elevation of the risk of the injury sustained, which elevation must result from the employment, is mistaken and that it is enough that there can be shown, as a matter of common sense, some substantial link or connection with the employment which is causal and not merely temporal. Among other things, some of the matters regarded by the High Court in Roncevich as relevant to the ‘arising out of … test’ were not, it would seem, of any notable relevance to a restricted view of causation, such as that urged by the applicant, but were relevant to the less restrictive view I am inclined to favour. Questions might, however, possibly arise as to whether the test so stated could, as a matter of law, be satisfied by the matters to which the Senior Member referred. Roncevich is, as the applicants argued, clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The ‘in the course of the employment’ test was not available in that case. It might be thought that its facts would readily fit within such a conception. Such a factor may well assist to provide evidence also of a causal, as well as a temporal link. It must be acknowledged that, on the scant known facts, this case would, if it fits at all within the meaning of ‘arising out of ….’, without its s 6(1)(a) extension, sit at the very margins of the concept. It is unnecessary to proceed further down that track because, in my view, for the reasons I give below, s 6(1)(a) compels the rejection of the applicant’s case. It is undesirable to do so because many potentially relevant facts appear not to have been elucidated, for example: How long was Ms Roberts’ posting in Canberra? To what extent was there any real advantage to the military in having her quartered where she was? What was the extent of any encouragement by the RAAF for her to live on the Base as distinct from elsewhere? Had her assailant become drunk at the Base ‘Club’? Was the ‘Club’ organised by the Air Force? Were personnel smiled on, as in Roncevich, for drinking heartily or even more than that? Was the assailant, on that account, affected by liquor? Did disinhibition by liquor account for his behaviour? Was the respondent, on account of a RAAF-tolerated drinking culture, so affected? If so, did the influence of alcohol lead to any lack of care by her as to providing, unwittingly, the opportunity for her assailant to intrude upon her by leaving her window open on a May night in Canberra? Was she, at the time, subject to military discipline? Why was the matter solely investigated in a military context without calling in the civilian police? The answers to questions like these may have assisted one party or the other notwithstanding that, apparently, they were not forensically elucidated by either party for the Tribunal’s benefit. Section 6(1)(a)