IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S365 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Applicant
and
BARRY WALL
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GLEESON CJ
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2005, AT 10.03 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS E. FORD, for the applicant. (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
MR M.G. VINCENT: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Bale Boshev)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR BENNETT: Your Honours, this case involves a different question to that which came before this Court in Roncevich because the legislation here, the workplace safety legislation, unlike the legislation in Roncevich, specifically refers to the condition arising out of the duties of employment. Roncevich of course involved a totally different language.
GLEESON CJ: I was not in Roncevich. What was the difference?
MR BENNETT: Roncevich was a case about drinking, this is about smoking, but it is the same sort of thing as the excise cases demonstrate. Roncevich involved a person who was introduced in the course of military service to various matters on the base which caused him to start drinking, and that caused effects in later life. This case involves someone who, during his national service, took up smoking and that caused effects in later life. I only say that because Roncevich is a recent case involving this sort of issue.
GLEESON CJ: What is the point of departure between the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court and the minority?
MR BENNETT: Your Honour, the majority took the view that when the decision-maker talked about military service the decision-maker was talking about the duties of military service, and the majority sort took of a Wu Shan Liang approach of saying the decision-maker may have used the wrong phrase, but so what?
GLEESON CJ: So what would be the question for us, a question of construction of the decision-maker’s reasons?
MR BENNETT: Your Honour, we say it goes a little further than that, that is certainly part of it, but we say it is quite apparent when one looks at the decision that the decision-maker did not ask the most important question and simply asked the wrong question and, as a result, did not consider a number of matters which needed to be considered, namely the extent to which the duties of national service were what led the respondent to start smoking.
GLEESON CJ: Justice Hely at first instance took the view that the decision‑maker did consider the right question, is that so?
MR BENNETT: Yes.
GLEESON CJ: The majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court said they did, and Justice Gyles in dissent said, “Even making the appropriate…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 960
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Act provided for compensation for an "aggravation" of a pre-existing condition that was not itself service-related. The Court had to determine the scope of the MRCC's liability and the circumstances under which an injury, arising from the worsening of a pre-existing condition, could be considered a "personal injury" for which compensation was payable under the Act. This involved an analysis of the definition of "personal injury" and the relationship between service and the aggravation of a condition.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the Act did not require the aggravation of a pre-existing condition to be caused by service for it to be compensable. Rather, the Court found that if a member of the Australian Defence Force suffers a personal injury, and that injury is an aggravation of a pre-existing condition, then compensation is payable under the Act, provided the aggravation itself is a consequence of service. The Court reasoned that the statutory language did not impose a requirement that the aggravation must be the *sole* or *primary* cause of the worsening of the condition, nor that the pre-existing condition itself must have been service-related. The focus was on whether the aggravation was a consequence of service, irrespective of the origin of the underlying condition.
The High Court set aside the decision of the Full Federal Court and remitted the matter to the Federal Court for determination in accordance with the High Court's reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi