Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Clark

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission v Clark [2006] FCA 306

COMMONWEALTH COMPENSATION – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – respondent naval rating injured while travelling to residence from naval base after attending function – whether function work-related – whether function had ceased to be work-related at time respondent departed – whether at that time base was “place of work” – whether findings open to Tribunal

WORDS AND PHRASES – “place of work”

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 4, 6(b)(ii)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 43(2B), 44

Maunder v Commonwealth (1983) 51 ALR 44 at 49 cited
Gregory v Comcare Australia (1997) 72 FCR 196 at 202 cited
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 218 ALR 733 at [23] applied
Hatzimanolis v ANI Corporation Limited (1992) 173 CLR 473 distinguished

MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION v DAVID ANDREW CLARK
NO. TAD 19 OF 2005

HEEREY J
28 MARCH 2006

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN HOBART)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

TAD 19 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID ANDREW CLARK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN HOBART)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

TAD 19 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID ANDREW CLARK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY

DATE:

28 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN HOBART)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 26 February 1999 the respondent, an Able Seaman Clearance Diver (ABCD) in the Royal Australian Navy, suffered serious injuries in a motor cycle accident at HMAS Stirling, a Naval Base at Garden Island in Western Australia. The respondent claimed compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act). That claim was rejected at Departmental level but the Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by the Honourable R J Groom (Deputy President) set aside that decision and remitted the matter to the respondent with a direction that it was liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act and that the amount of that compensation should be assessed: Clark v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2005] AATA 436. The respondent appeals to this court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act).

    The Act

  2. The respondent had to show that he had suffered an “injury” within the definition of s 4 of the Act that is to say a “physical … injury arising out of, or in the course of, (his) employment”. The only basis on which the Tribunal dealt with the matter was on the extension of “course of employment” provided for in s 6(b)(ii), namely that the respondent was travelling between his place of work and place of residence. “Place of work” is…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Clark and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCA 306
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Clark, the issue before the court was whether the respondent was entitled to compensation for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident after leaving a work-related function held at Camp Markham. The respondent had attended the function and had remained until the clean-up, which was considered part of the work function. The Tribunal found that the function remained work-related until the clean-up, and that Camp Markham, therefore, was the respondent’s place of work until he departed on his motorcycle. The critical issue was whether Camp Markham was the respondent’s place of work at the time he left on his motorcycle. Both parties accepted that if the respondent was required to be at Camp Markham when he left, then his travel was covered by the statutory definition of "place of work."

The court examined the definition of "place of work" in s 4(1) of the relevant Act, which was found to be satisfied by Camp Markham under the special circumstances of the case. The court acknowledged the respondent's alcohol consumption but found that this did not affect his entitlement to compensation, as he had suffered serious and permanent employment-related injuries. The Tribunal’s findings that the function remained work-related until the clean-up, and that Camp Markham was therefore the respondent’s place of work at the time he departed, were considered factual and were not successfully challenged by the applicant.

The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs. The court upheld the Tribunal’s determination that the respondent was entitled to compensation for his injuries.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY J
Shortly after 6.00 pm the respondent left Camp Markham on his motor cycle to ride directly to his residence. He turned left into Dampier Road and headed south towards the main gate of the base. The motor cycle veered onto the wrong side of the road and collided with a light pole. The respondent’s helmet flew off and he was thrown about twenty metres in the air. He sustained serious injuries including significant impairment of brain function.Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal repeated its finding that attendance by the respondent at Camp Markham was for the purpose of his employment. There was a general understanding within the diving team that members were required to attend, attendance was required and the purpose was plainly work related. The Tribunal found at [58] that the function commenced as a work function and “it remained a work function until the clean-up at about 5.30 pm”. Although the numbers of naval personnel in attendance were fewer its essential character remained. It was still an officially approved function at a place of work attended by work colleagues. It is reasonable to infer that work issues were still being discussed towards the end of the function, although those then present were affected by alcohol. After discussing some authorities referred to by counsel the Tribunal referred to the definition of “place of work” in s 4(1) of the Act and found that “in the special circumstances of this application”, Camp Markham satisfied that definition. Having found that the true nature of the work related function at Camp Markham did not change until it concluded after the clean-up it followed that it was the applicant’s place of work until he departed on his motorcycle. The Tribunal noted that although the respondent was under the influence of alcohol and was thus guilty of “serious and wilful misconduct” because he had suffered “serious and permanent employment” he remains entitled to receive compensation: ss 14(3), 4(13).Travelling between place of work and place of employment By the end of oral argument it became clear that the critical issue for the Tribunal was whether, at the time the respondent commenced his journey to his home, Camp Markham was his “place of work” for the purposes of s 6(1)(b)(ii), that is to say, in terms of the definition in s 4, whether Camp Markham at that time was a place at which the respondent was “required to attend for the purpose of carrying out the duties of his … employment”. Both sides finally accepted that the interruption exclusion (s 6(2)(b)) was not relevant. If at the time the respondent set off on his motor cycle he was not required to be in attendance at Camp Markham then his travel was not within the terms of s 6(1)(b)(ii). On the other hand, if he was so required to be in attendance then the travel started at that point in time, unarguably he was travelling towards his place of residence, and no interruption of any kind occurred before the accident. Counsel for the applicant attacked the Tribunal’s findings that the essential character of the function remained and that it continued to be an officially-approved function at a place of work attended by the respondent and his work colleagues. However, this was a matter of fact and degree: Maunder vCommonwealth (1983) 51 ALR 44 at 49, Gregory v Comcare Australia (1997) 72 FCR 196 at 202.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY J