Ford v Forestry Commission of New South Wales - [2023] NSWPICPD 24

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY A MEMBER
CITATION:	Ford v Forestry Commission of New South Wales [2023] NSWPICPD 24
APPELLANT:	Kristen Ford
RESPONDENT:	Forestry Commission of New South Wales
INSURER:	QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd
FILE NUMBER:	A1-W6252/21
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Michael Snell
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	3 May 2023
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. Leave is granted to the appellant pursuant to section 352(3A) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 to bring the appeal against an interlocutory decision. 2. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on its submissions in reply. 3. The Member’s decision dated 10 May 2022 is confirmed. 4. The matter is remitted to a Member to deal with remaining matters relating to outstanding arrears of compensation and interest, consistent with these reasons.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION – section 352(3A) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 – leave to appeal an interlocutory decision, Licul v Corney [1976] HCA 6; 180 CLR 213 applied – section 38A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 – operation of the transitional provisions introduced by Schedule 6, Part 19H of the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 and Schedule 6, Part 19I of the Workers Compensation Amendment Act 2015, and the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016; application of Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd [1987] HCA 19; 163 CLR 1 – the duty to give reasons: Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430, 442–444, Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110, [56]–[67]
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:
Mr L Robison, counsel
Santone Lawyers
Respondent:
Mr B McLean, solicitor
Bartier Perry Lawyers

DECISION UNDER APPEAL
MEMBER:	Mr M Perry
DATE OF Member’s DECISION:	10 May 2022

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Kristen Ford (the appellant) was employed by the Forestry Commission of NSW (the respondent). He was concurrently employed on a part-time basis by the NSW Fire Brigade on a ‘call out’ basis. On 18 November 1987, in the course of his employment with the respondent, he was using a chain saw when he was struck by a log and pinned beneath it. He suffered multiple injuries, including to his internal organs, back and pelvis. The respondent’s insurer accepted liability to pay workers compensation benefits on a voluntary basis. The respondent terminated his employment. In October 1988 the appellant underwent unsuccessful surgery to realign his pelvis. In late 1988 he started work as a bus driver, at one point getting on to full-time hours, which he was later forced to reduce. In 1995 he underwent surgery at Royal Adelaide Hospital, including fusion and decompression at L5/S1.[1]
[1] Ford v Forestry Commission of NSW [2022] NSWPIC 206 (the reasons), [1]; appellant’s statement 30/11/21, [1]–[19], Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD), pp 1–3.
On 8 August 1991, the appellant and the respondent settled a claim for lump sum compensation (pursuant to the previous ‘Table of Disabilities’) on the basis of permanent losses and impairments involving 38 per cent of the left leg, 18 per cent of the right leg, 100 per cent of the pelvis, 25 per cent of the lumbar spine and 10 per cent of the sexual organs. There was an additional sum of $30,000 in respect of ‘pain and suffering’.[2] It was common ground before the Member that the appellant was a ‘worker with highest needs’ within the meaning of s 32A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). The appellant contended that, from the introduction of the Workers Compensation Amendment Act 2015 (the 2015 amendments), he should have been paid weekly compensation under s 38A of the 1987 Act. The respondent argued that s 38A did not apply to the appellant or to his weekly entitlement.[3]
[2] ARD, p 7.
[3] Reasons, [2]–[4].
The ARD in the current proceedings claims weekly payments at a rate of $1,220.72 from 1 January 2009 on a continuing basis. The respondent has not declined liability to make weekly payments, but there have been difficulties over the years regarding the rate at which such payments have been made. The ARD includes copies of multiple items of correspondence between the parties dealing with alleged underpayments and overpayments. The Member’s reasons noted agreement “that there has been underpayment of weekly compensation to the [appellant] in the past, in the sum of at least about $25,000”. The Member declined to order payment of the sum outstanding by way of previous underpayments (“not by reason of s 38A”) immediately. He noted the respondent’s submission that “a precise recalculation of back pay will have to be made” and accepted that it would be appropriate that this occur when the issue regarding s 38A was decided. He noted that interest on outstanding payments had been claimed. The Member said the “only essential issue remaining is whether s 38A [of the 1987 Act] applies to the [appellant’s] circumstances”.[4]
[4] Reasons, [5]–[6].
The matter was heard on 7 March 2022. Mr Robison, barrister, appeared for the appellant and Mr McLean, solicitor, appeared for the respondent. Both parties addressed and the Member reserved his decision. The Commission issued a Certificate of Determination dated 10 May 2022, accompanied by ten pages of reasons. The findings and orders provided as follows:
“The Commission finds:
1. That section 38A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 does not apply to any weekly compensation payable to the [appellant] under that Act.
The Commission orders:
2. The parties are to confer for the purpose of lodging short minutes of orders to reflect the attached reasons.
3. The parties are to communicate with the Personal Injury Commission in the event they are unable to agree about any such orders with a view to seeking a further teleconference.”

ON THE PAPERS

Section 52(3) of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 provides:
“(3) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act and enabling legislation without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Procedural Directions PIC2 and WC3; the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’ without holding any conference or formal hearing and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

THRESHOLD MATTERS

There is no dispute between the parties that the threshold requirements as to quantum and time pursuant to ss 352(3) and 352(4) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) have been met.

WAS THE DECISION INTERLOCUTORY?

Section 352(3A) of the 1998 Act provides:
“There is no appeal under this section against an interlocutory decision except with the leave of the Commission. The Commission is not to grant leave unless of the opinion that determining the appeal is necessary or desirable for the proper and effective determination of the dispute.”
Both parties indicated in their submissions that the appeal was not against an interlocutory decision. The Commission issued a Direction dated 22 March 2023. The Direction referred the parties to s 352(3A) and to the decisions in Licul v Corney[5] and P & O Ports Ltd v Hawkins.[6] The Direction provided:
“1. The appellant is directed to lodge and serve submissions dealing with whether the appeal is interlocutory, and whether (if the Commission considers the appeal to be interlocutory) leave is sought to bring the appeal pursuant to s 352(3A) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 and reasons in support of any such application. These submissions should be lodged and served by 4.30 pm on 29 March 2023.
2. By 4.30 pm on 5 April 2023, the respondent is to lodge and serve submissions in response to the appellant’s submissions received in accordance with the above.”
[5] [1976] HCA 6; 180 CLR 213 (Licul).
[6] [2007] NSWWCCPD 87; 6 DDCR 12 (Hawkins).
The appellant lodged submissions dated 27 March 2023. It submitted that the decision was not interlocutory as the decision related to “the only serious question of rights in the proceedings”, being the applicability of s 38A. It submitted, in the alternative, that there was a significant legal issue, a significant amount of compensation involved and the issue was of “general importance”. It submitted that leave should be granted pursuant to s 352(3A). The respondent did not make submissions in response to those of the appellant on this issue.
The Member, when describing the issues at the commencement of the hearing, said there was a “primary aspect of the case”, which was “whether s 38A of the 1987 Act is applicable … to the [appellant’s] circumstance or the circumstances of his case”. The Member described “a couple of sub-issues”. These involved past underpayments due to the appellant of “approximately $25,000”, even if s 38A was not applicable to his circumstances. The second sub-issue related to interest on that $25,000.[7] The Member’s orders provided for the parties to lodge short minutes of order to reflect the weekly compensation payable to the appellant. There was provision for the parties to approach the Commission with a view to seeking a further telephone conference if they were unable to agree. The Member noted he had not heard the parties in any detail in relation to interest on arrears of weekly compensation. He said, “I presently see no reason why the respondent should not pay the [appellant] interest on all such arrears and would need to be persuaded otherwise”.[8] Those issues relating to arrears and interest remain outstanding.[9]
[7] Transcript of hearing 7/3/22 (T), T 2.1–24.
[8] Reasons, [48]–[49].
[9] Reasons, [5].
In Licul v Corney Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) said:
“The distinction between final and interlocutory judgments is not always easy to draw and there has been disagreement as to the test by which the question whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is to be determined. One view - which was preferred by the Court of Appeal in Salter Rex and Co. v. Ghosh - is that the test depends on the nature of the application made to the Court. The other view which, since Hall v. Nominal Defendant, should, I think, be regarded as established in Australia, depends on the nature of the order made; the test is: Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties?”[10] (footnotes omitted)
[10] Licul, 225.
The above passage has been frequently applied in matters involving the application of s 352(3A) of the 1998 Act, Hawkins is an example. I cannot see that the Member’s decision dated 10 May 2022 finally disposed of the rights of the parties. It follows that the appeal requires leave pursuant to s 352(3A).
The determination of the remaining matters, in particular the outstanding weekly entitlements, will depend significantly on whether the Member’s construction of s 38A is confirmed on appeal. It is appropriate that the issue regarding the potential application of s 38A is dealt with on appeal before the Commission and the parties seek to calculate such entitlements. I accept that determination of the appeal is necessary and desirable for the proper and effective determination of the dispute. Leave is granted pursuant to s 352(3A) to bring the appeal.

THE MEMBER’S REASONS

The Member noted there were “no essential facts in dispute” and that the issue was “mainly a matter of statutory construction”.[11] He set out the relevant statutory provisions and parts of the Regulation.[12] He summarised the parties’ submissions.
[11] Reasons, [8].
[12] Reasons, [9].
The Member noted the appellant submitted the legislation was beneficial. It was to be construed beneficially although not every provision had a beneficial purpose or was to be construed that way (reference was made to ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel[13]). It was submitted that s 38A was beneficial, it conferred a benefit that was described as a “windfall” or a “bonus”. The appellant submitted the reading of s 38A for which the respondent argued was “perverse” – a worker who earned more than the transitional amount at the time of injury would “not qualify” for the s 38A benefit whereas a “low-income earner would”.[14]
[13] [2014] HCA 18; 254 CLR 1.
[14] Reasons, [11]–[12].
The appellant submitted that Hee v State Transit Authority of NSW[15] was “squarely on point”. It was “relevant to the issue of whether a worker is entitled to the minimum payment even when the true loss is lower”, now “part of orthodox practice in the Commission”.[16]
[15] [2019] NSWCA 175; 100 NSWLR 274 (Hee).
[16] Reasons, [13].
The appellant relied on Vostek Industries Pty Ltd v White.[17] The facts were submitted to be similar to the current matter. The worker in Vostek was injured in 2005, prior to the amendments in 2012 and 2015. In 2010 he was assessed to suffer 32 per cent whole person impairment, there was no dispute that his impairment was greater than 30 per cent. Keating P described the effect of the legislation as “anomalous”, but applied it, upholding an arbitral award. The appellant said there was no basis for distinguishing Vostek. He submitted that Vostek and Hee were binding on a member of the Commission.[18]
[17] [2018] NSWWCCPD 47 (Vostek).
[18] Reasons, [14]–[16].
The appellant also submitted that the respondent had not produced evidence of the appellant’s correct rate of pay, it could not demonstrate the appellant earned more than the transitional amount.[19]
[19] Reasons, [17].
The Member summarised the respondent’s submissions. The appellant was transitioned on 17 September 2012 pursuant to the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (the 2012 amendments). The respondent stated that the appellant, as at 1 October 2012, was an ‘existing recipient of weekly payments’ and was also a ‘seriously injured worker’. Seriously injured workers were subject to “special arrangements” and were transitioned with immediate effect from 17 September 2012. The ‘transitional rate’ was “deemed to be their PIAWE” (preinjury average weekly earnings). Such workers were subject to a “no disadvantage rule”. If application of the amendments and the deemed transitional PIAWE resulted in a reduction in the worker’s weekly entitlement, he or she continued to be entitled to the old rate. This was provided in the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (the 2016 Regulation) at Sch 8, Pt 1, cl 2.[20]
[20] Reasons, [18], [20], [22]–[23].
The 2015 legislative amendments resulted in ‘seriously injured workers’ becoming known as ‘workers with highest needs’ (Sch 6, Pt 19I, cl 6 of the 1987 Act). Section 38A was inserted at this time. It created a minimum payment to which a worker with highest needs would be entitled. At the date of enactment the figure was $788.32 and the amount was indexed. The transitional provisions in the 1987 Act provided that s 38A applied to any period of incapacity prior to commencement of the section but this was subject to the regulations (Sch 6, Pt 19I, cl 9(2)). The 2016 Regulation provided that s 38A did not apply to any period of incapacity prior to 17 September 2012. Section 38A did not apply to a worker whose PIAWE was determined to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of either cl 9 or cl 10 of Pt 19H of Sch 6. The respondent submitted that because he was a ‘seriously injured worker’ the appellant’s PIAWE was determined to be equal to the transitional amount: Sch 6, Pt 19H, cl 10. Therefore, s 38A did not apply to the appellant’s weekly entitlement.[21]
[21] Reasons, [24]–[28].
The respondent submitted that Hee and Vostek were not relevant. Hee dealt with an issue regarding whether a worker with highest needs was entitled to s 38A payments although his entitlement pursuant to s 37 was nil. Vostek dealt with whether the word ‘amount’ when used for the second and third times in s 38A was a reference to the amount of weekly compensation payments only, or a reference to the combined total of weekly compensation payments, earnings or deemed earnings and the value of any non-pecuniary benefits received. In the proceedings in Vostek, at first instance, the parties agreed the only issue in dispute was quantification of weekly entitlement under s 38A. That is, there was no issue raised regarding whether s 38A applied in the circumstances of the case. It was submitted there was no discussion in Vostek of the principles and arguments raised in the present case.[22]
[22] Reasons, [29]–[30].
The respondent’s submissions noted the appellant was “always entitled to the protection of the no disadvantage rule”. His entitlement (if partially incapacitated) could not be less than under the former s 40 of the 1987 Act that applied prior to the 2012 amendments.[23]
[23] Reasons, [31]–[32].
The Member said that he agreed with “the essence of the submissions for the respondent”. The 2012 amendments applied to the appellant, as a worker with highest needs, from 17 September 2012 (cl 2(1)(a) of the 2016 Regulation). Clause 35(2) of the 2016 Regulation states that s 38A does not apply to a worker whose PIAWE has been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application under cl 9 or 10 of Pt 19H of Sch 6 to the 1987 Act of the weekly payments to the worker. Clause 35(2) applies to the worker because Pt 19H, cl 10 applies to him, as he was a seriously injured worker and an ‘existing recipient’. Pt 19H, cl 10(2) provides that “for the purposes of the application under this clause of the weekly payments amendments to a seriously injured worker, the worker’s (PIAWE) are deemed to be equal to the transitional amount”.[24]
[24] Reasons, [33]–[35].
The Member said that the factual position was different to that in Hee. In Hee the worker’s injury post-dated the commencement of the 2012 amendments and he was not an ‘existing recipient’. He was not caught by the “special provision for seriously injured workers” in Sch 6, Pt 19H, cl 10. It followed that he was not affected by cl 35(2) of the 2016 Regulation. The Member said that the appellant’s submissions did not adequately engage with the respondent’s submissions in this regard. The appellant made no “express or clear submission” to provide an alternative construction of the relevant transitional provisions. The Member said he was still obliged to determine the issue.[25] He described the Court of Appeal in Hee as identifying two issues. The first went to the Commission’s finding that the worker was able to return to his pre-injury employment, which was relevant to the application of s 37 of the 1987 Act. The second was whether there was error in the construction and application of s 38A. The Court held that s 38A only applied where there was an entitlement to an amount of weekly compensation determined in accordance with ss 36, 37 or 38, although such amount can be zero. The Member accepted the appellant’s submission that the issue in Hee was different to that in the current matter.[26]
[25] Reasons, [36]–[38]. In this regard see the reasons in this appeal decision at [75] to [76] and [81] below.
[26] Reasons, [40].
The Member referred to the appellant’s reliance on Vostek. He noted the statement by Keating P in Vostek that “the only issue in dispute on this appeal is whether the senior arbitrator erred by … misconstruing s 38A of the 1987 Act by finding that it authorises the payment of weekly compensation of $788.32 … to a worker with highest needs without taking into account the worker’s earnings …”. The Member referred to the appellant’s submission that Vostek was “clearly very much on point in relation to the construction of s 38A”, describing this submission as “clearly wrong”. The Member said that the issue in the current matter, whether s 38 applies to the appellant at all, “did not arise in Vostek”.[27]
[27] Reasons, [41]–[42].

The Member described the 2016 Regulation, including cll 2 and 35 of Sch 8, as “intra vires the 1987 Act, in particular, the 2012 and 2015 amendments”.[28]
[28] Reasons, [43].
The Member concluded “s 38A does not apply to the [appellant], because his PIAWE [has] been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application of cl 10 of Part 19H of Schedule 6 to the 1987 Act”. The Member quoted from Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue.[29] He said he had adopted a literal construction, which was consistent with the second reading speech of the Workers Compensation Amendment Bill 2015 from which he quoted:
“[The] Bill will ensure the workers with the highest needs will receive a minimum amount of $788 each week, which will comprise the benefit paid for by their insurer and any post-injury earnings of the worker … will assist those workers with over 30% permanent impairment who were on very low pre-injury average weekly earnings and who may receive weekly payments for many years.”
[29] [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27 (Alcan), [47].
To similar effect he referred to the explanatory note to the Bill which stated the amount of $788.32 per week was “a combined total of compensation and earnings”. The Member described the extrinsic material as “an aid to the construction by noting that there is a consistency between the speech and the explanatory note and the ultimate statute and regulation”. He said there was also “contextual consistency” when regard is had to “the protection or … safety net … of the … no disadvantage rule”.[30]
[30] Reasons, [44]–[47].

LEGISLATION

Schedule 6, Part 19H of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2012 amendments, commenced on 17 September 2012. Clause 6 of that Part provides:
“6 Application of weekly payments amendments to existing claimants
An existing recipient of weekly payments remains entitled to compensation under Division 2 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act as if the weekly payments amendments had not been made, but only until the weekly payments amendments apply to the compensation payable to the person as provided by this Division.”
Schedule 6, Part 19H, clause 8 of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2012 amendments, relevantly provides:
“8      Work capacity assessment of existing recipients of weekly payments
(1)     A work capacity assessment of an existing recipient of weekly payments is to be conducted as provided by this clause for the purposes of facilitating the application of the weekly payments amendments to the worker.
(2)     The insurer who is liable to make weekly payments of compensation to an existing recipient of weekly payments must conduct a work capacity assessment of the worker no later than 12 months (or such longer period as may be prescribed by the regulations) after the commencement of the weekly payments amendments.
(3)     If an existing recipient of weekly payments is a seriously injured worker, the insurer is not to conduct a work capacity assessment of the worker under this clause.”
Schedule 6, Part 19H, clause 10 of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2012 amendments, provides:
“10    Special provision for seriously injured workers
(1)     The weekly payments amendments apply from the commencement of those amendments to the compensation payable under Division 2 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act to an existing recipient of weekly payments who is a seriously injured worker.
(2)     For the purposes of the application under this clause of the weekly payments amendments to a seriously injured worker, the worker’s pre-injury average weekly earnings are deemed to be equal to the transitional amount.
Note—
The transitional amount is initially $906.25 and is indexed annually.”
Section 38A and Schedule 6, Part 19I of the 1987 Act were inserted by the Workers Compensation Amendment Act 2015 (the 2015 amendments) and commenced on 4 December 2015. Section 38A provides:
“38A Special provision for workers with highest needs
(1) If the determination of the amount of weekly payments of compensation payable to a worker with highest needs in accordance with this Subdivision results in an amount that is less than $788.32, the amount is to be treated as $788.32.
(2) If the amount specified in subsection (1) is varied by operation of Division 6A, a weekly payment of compensation payable to a worker with highest needs before the date on which the variation takes effect is, for any period of incapacity occurring on and after that date, to be determined by reference to that amount as so varied.”
Schedule 6, Part 19I, clause 2 of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2015 amendments, provides:
“2      Application of amendments generally
(1)     Except as provided by this Part or the regulations, an amendment made by the 2015 amending Act extends to—
(a) an injury received before the commencement of the amendment, and
(b) a claim for compensation made before the commencement of the amendment, and
(c) proceedings pending in the Commission or a court immediately before the commencement of the amendment.
(2)     An amendment made by the 2015 amending Act does not apply to compensation paid or payable in respect of any period before the commencement of the amendment, except as otherwise provided by this Part.”
Schedule 6, Part 19I, clause 9 of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2015 amendments, provides:
“9 Weekly payments
(1) Section 38A of the 1987 Act extends to the determination of the compensation payable in respect of any period of incapacity occurring before the commencement of that section.
(2) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the adjustment of the amount of weekly payments of compensation payable to an injured worker as a result of the operation of section 38A of the 1987 Act and this clause.
(3) Without limiting subclause (2), the regulations may prescribe the period within which any additional amount payable to an injured worker as a result of the adjustment is to be paid.”
The Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (the 2016 Regulation) commenced on 1 September 2016. Schedule 8, Part 1, clause 2 of the 2016 Regulation provides:
“2      Weekly payments amendments—workers with highest needs
(1)    If a worker is a worker with highest needs and a claim for compensation in respect of the worker’s injury was made before 17 September 2012, the following provisions apply—
(a) the weekly payments amendments apply to the compensation payable to the worker in respect of the injury (while the worker is a worker with highest needs) on and from 17 September 2012,
(b) the amount of the weekly payments of compensation payable to the worker pursuant to the weekly payments amendments is not to be less than the amount of the weekly payments of compensation that would have been payable to the worker had the weekly payments amendments not applied to the worker (having regard to the period for which the worker has been entitled to weekly payments and the effect this has on entitlement to weekly payments or the amount of weekly payments),
(c) the adjustment of the transitional amount (which the worker’s pre-injury average weekly earnings are deemed to equal) under section 80 of the 1987 Act that occurs on 1 October 2012 is backdated to have effect on and from 17 September 2012 in respect of the compensation payable to the worker on and from 17 September 2012,
(d) the amount of the weekly payments of compensation that would have been payable to the worker had the weekly payments amendments not applied to the worker is to be determined as if the adjustment of any relevant amount under Division 6 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act that occurs on 1 October 2012 were backdated to have effect on and from 17 September 2012 in respect of the compensation payable to the worker on and from 17 September 2012.
(2)     For the purposes of the application of the weekly payments amendments to a worker with highest needs whose claim for compensation was made before 1 October 2012, the worker’s pre-injury average weekly earnings are deemed to be equal to the transitional amount whether or not the worker is an existing recipient of weekly payments.”
Schedule 8, Part 3, clause 35 of the 2016 Regulation, provides:
“35 Weekly payments—workers with highest needs
(1) Section 38A of the 1987 Act does not apply to the determination of the compensation payable in respect of any period of incapacity occurring before 17 September 2012.
(2) Section 38A of the 1987 Act does not apply to a worker whose pre-injury average weekly earnings have been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application under clause 9 or 10 of Part 19H of Schedule 6 to the 1987 Act of the weekly payments amendments (within the meaning of that Part) to the worker.”

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The appellant raises the following grounds of appeal:
(a) The Member failed to exercise jurisdiction to determine the transitional provisions for seriously injured workers in relation to s 38A rights. (Ground No. 1)
(b) In the alternative to Ground 1, the Member incorrectly interpreted the transitional provisions for seriously injured workers in relation to s 38A rights. (Ground No. 2)
(c) The Member failed to apply authority including Vostek Industries Pty Ltd v White. (Ground No. 3)
(d) The Member failed to give adequate reasons. (Ground No. 4)

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS

Grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 3

The appellant submits the Member was “bound to follow Vostek” which was “relevantly indistinguishable” from the current matter. It was unnecessary to “delve into the minutiae as to the construction of the legislation”. The legislation was before Keating P in Vostek, which involved “essentially identical facts”.
The appellant disputes the Member’s statement that it did not “contend for any particular construction of the transitional provisions as implied by the Member at [38]”. The submission at [9] of the appellant’s submissions is not easy to follow. It appears to submit that the Member was obliged “to determine an argument about Workers Compensation legislation which was relevant to the arbitration before him”.[31]
[31] Appellant’s submissions, [8]–[9].
The appellant refers to the reasons at [38] as “curious”. It submits that “on the one hand the [M]ember considered himself relieved from deciding the point, but then went onto decide it”. It submits it is unclear if the balance of the reasons are intended to be “mere obiter” or whether they form “part of the ratio of the decision”. It submits “[f]or this reason, it is necessary to agitate ground 2 in the alternative”.[32]
[32] Appellant’s submissions, [10].
The appellant submits that both the current matter, and the facts at issue in Vostek, involved a worker who claimed before 1 October 2012, with 31 per cent or greater permanent impairment, and some loss. Keating P was “alive to the Regulation” which his Honour referred to at [12] and [24] of his judgment. One would assume his Honour was “relevantly acquainted with the whole of the Regulation” although his Honour’s reasons did not refer to “precisely the same clauses” as the Member in the current matter. The appellant submits the “underlaying issues are indistinguishable”. It “was not open to the Member to embark upon an analysis of the Regulation ab initio in circumstances where there was Presidential Authority on relevantly identical circumstances”. The appellant submits it was not argued before the Member that Vostek was wrongly decided and should not be followed.[33]
[33] Appellant’s submissions, [11]–[12].
The appellant states that he repeats his submissions before the Member, found at [8] of his written submissions dated 5 March 2022. For convenience that paragraph of the appellant’s submissions at first instance is here reproduced:
“The decision of Vostek is clearly very much on point in relation to the construction of s.38A and indeed the opening paragraph of the judgement of President Judge Keating says ‘this appeal concerns the construction of s 38A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.’ The facts of that case are somewhat similar in so far as the worker in that case was injured quite some time ago (in that case on 20 July 2005). On 23 August 2010 an Approved Medical Specialist of the then Workers Compensation Commission assessed the worker to have suffered 32% whole person impairment by reason of the injury in 2005. Then, as here, there was no dispute that the definition of worker with highest needs as defined by section 32A was satisfied. Another similarity between the two matters is that the solicitors acting for the workers in each case corresponded with the insurer requesting that the weekly payments be adjusted to reflect the minimum guarantee amount provided in s.38A. In the Vostek matter the insurer issued a declinature notice advising of its opinion that s.38A could not operate to entitle the worker to more than what would be permissible by way of weekly benefits in accordance with the Act otherwise (that is they said that the worker would not be entitled to weekly benefits as calculable for workers who sustain 30% or less WPI. It took the view that clause 35 (1) of part 3 of schedule 6 of Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 had the effect that section 38A did not apply in respect of compensation payable in the period prior to the commencement of s.38A which was 17 September 2012.”[34]
[34] Appellant worker’s submissions, 5 March 2022, [8].
For completeness, I note the appellant, in its submissions before the Member, submitted that although Keating P described the effect of the legislation as “potentially anomalous”, his Honour upheld the award in the worker’s favour. The appellant at first instance submitted there was “no basis for distinguishing Vostek”.[35]
[35] Appellant worker’s submissions, 5 March 2022, [9]–10].
The appellant submits that its submissions dealing with Grounds nos. 1 and 2 also make out Ground No. 3.[36]
[36] Appellant’s submissions, [14].

Ground No. 4

The appellant submits the reasons at [38] leave the reader in “great doubt as to whether the Member actually intended to, or did, decide the construction argument before him regarding the applicability of s 38A”. The appellant submits the losing party cannot comprehend the reasons why he lost and a failure to give adequate reasons is made out.[37]

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

[37] Appellant’s submissions, [15]–[16].

Ground No. 1

The respondent submits the Member correctly identified the issue as whether s 38A applied in the circumstances, mainly a matter of statutory construction, and set out the relevant statutory provisions. He considered the submissions and interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. It could not be validly argued that he failed to properly apply his mind or misunderstood the issue. There was no constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.[38]
[38] Respondent’s submissions, [7]–[11].
The respondent refers to the appellant’s submission that it was unnecessary to “delve into the minutiae” in construing the legislation, because of the appellant’s reliance on Vostek. It is submitted the appellant had an opportunity to submit on the construction of the legislation and “essentially relied” on Vostek and Hee as having authoritatively determined the issue of the application of s 38A. The respondent submitted that Vostek and Hee did not determine the issue and this was plain from the respondent’s submissions, to which the appellant had the opportunity to reply. There was no misunderstanding regarding the issue to be decided, the issue having been agreed by the parties. It is submitted that Ground No. 1 fails.[39]
[39] Respondent’s submissions, [12]–[15].

Ground No. 2

The respondent submits there is no submission from the appellant supporting this ground of appeal. The appellant’s submission is described as being “essentially that Vostek is binding authority” which the Member should have followed, rather than embarking on his own analysis. The Member decided, the respondent submits correctly, that these decisions were not binding authority on the issue to be determined by the Member. The Member determined the issue on the basis of the parties’ submissions and his own analysis. The respondent submits the appellant’s reference to its submission dated 5 March 2022 simply restates the submission that Vostek is determinative.[40]
[40] Respondent’s submissions, [16]–[19].

Ground No. 3

The respondent submits the Member found that Vostek and Hee were not binding authority on the issue requiring determination. The Member described the submission that Vostek was “very much on point in relation to the construction of s 38A” as “clearly wrong”. The respondent says the appellant has not submitted why the Member’s determination, that Vostek and Hee were not binding on the issue to be determined, was erroneous. The respondent submits neither Hee nor Vostek involved “any ratio decidendi binding on the Member” regarding the issue of the application of s 38A to a person in the appellant’s circumstances.[41]
[41] Respondent’s submissions, [21]–[25].

Ground No. 4

The respondent refers to r 78 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021. Its submissions refer to the appellant’s focus on the reasons at [38]. It submits the reasons must be read as a whole. The focus on three lines of the decision does not adequately support the ground of appeal. The respondent submits the reasons more than adequately set out the issue agreed by the parties and the applicable law. The reasons demonstrated that the submissions were understood and considered. Read as a whole they explained the reasoning process that led to the conclusion. They could have left the appellant “in no reasonable doubt why he lost”.[42]
[42] Respondent’s submissions, [26]–[35].

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS IN REPLY

The Commission issued a timetable dated 8 June 2022 which provided for the appellant to file and serve any submissions in reply by 3 August 2022. This date of 3 August 2022 was confirmed in an email from the Commission to the appellant’s solicitors dated 18 July 2022. The appellant did not lodge submissions in reply in compliance with the timetable. The appellant, on 28 March 2023, submitted that it had not been provided with an opportunity to file submissions in reply. The Commission brought the earlier timetable to the solicitors’ attention and advised that an application for leave to extend time and appropriate submissions would be necessary. The appellant’s solicitors made an application by email dated 28 March 2023, seeking to extend the time to file submissions in reply to 7 April 2023.
The appellant’s submissions, in support of the application for leave, stated that the solicitor with carriage had originally failed to diarise the date for submissions in reply or to notify counsel. It submitted the solicitor commenced maternity leave shortly thereafter and subsequently resigned her employment. The appellant submitted there would be no prejudice and minimal delay if an extension were granted. The respondent’s solicitors sought time to take instructions but did not ultimately respond to this application to extend time.
Submissions dated 3 April 2023 were lodged, over the hand of the appellant’s counsel. These stated that the respondent’s written submissions dated 18 July 2022 were “overlooked” until the Commission’s Direction dated 22 March 2023 (which went to whether the decision the subject of the appeal was ‘interlocutory’). The appellant submitted the oversight was “clerical”, there was no prejudice and no associated delay.[43]
[43] Appellant’s submissions to vary timetable, 3/4/23, [1]–[4].
The explanation of delay is barely adequate. It is not challenged by the respondent, which has not opposed the application and has not asserted prejudice. The preferable course is to grant leave so that the appellant’s submissions in reply are considered.
In relation to Ground No. 1, the appellant submits the Member failed to exercise jurisdiction because the award made did not reflect the “correct construction” of s 38A. It submits the Member did not regard the construction point as a matter requiring determination. In this regard the appellant refers to the reasons at [38] (quoted at [75] below) where the Member refers to being relieved of “the duty to independently determine the issue”. The appellant states that it refers to Ground No. 4 (which deals with the adequacy of the reasons) generally, regarding the meaning of this comment. It refers to the respondent’s submissions at [13]. It submits it was not complaining of a lack of procedural fairness. Its point was that it relied on binding authority and it did not need to submit on why that authority was correct.[44]
[44] Appellant’s submissions in reply, [4]–[6].

The appellant submits the facts were relevantly the same (presumably referring to Vostek and the current matter) and the ratio was binding unless distinguished. It submits the respondent could not distinguish the facts.[45]

CONSIDERATION

[45] Appellant’s submissions in reply, [7].

Grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 3

The appellant was an ‘existing recipient of weekly compensation’ within the definition in Sch 6, Pt 19H, cl 1 of the 1987 Act, following commencement of the 2012 amendments. It was conceded by the respondent that he was a ‘seriously injured worker’, later known as a ‘worker with highest needs’ following the 2015 amendments.[46] The relevant legislative provisions and regulations are quoted above. The Member’s reasons, particularly at [34], [35] and [44] set out succinctly the operation of the transitional provisions that led him to the conclusion that s 38A did not apply in the appellant’s circumstances:
“34. Clause 35(1) of the Regulation states that s 38A does not apply to the determination of the compensation payable in respect of any period of incapacity occurring before 17 September 2012. But it is cl 35(2) that is particularly relevant. It states that s 38A ‘does not apply to a worker whose (PIAWE) ha[s] been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application under cl 9 or 10 of Part 19H of Schedule 6 to the 1987 Act of the weekly payments amendments … to the worker’.
35. Clause 35 (2) applies to the [appellant] because Part 19H cl 10 applies to him. He was a seriously injured worker and an existing recipient from the commencement of the 2012 amendments. In those circumstances, Part 19H cl 10(2) provides that ‘for the purposes of the application under this clause of the weekly payments amendments to a seriously injured worker, the worker’s (PIAWE) are deemed to be equal to the transitional amount’.
…
44. My interpretation of the relevant provisions referred to above lead me to the conclusion that s 38A does not apply to the [appellant], because his PIAWE have been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application of cl 10 of Part 19H of Schedule 6 to the 1987 Act.”
[46] T 8.30–9.3, 10.17–22.
The appellant does not concede the correctness of the above argument[47] but he does not proffer a competing construction based on the relevant provisions. The Member’s literal construction of the relevant provisions is consistent with the text,[48] the appellant does not make any developed argument to the contrary.
[47] Appellant’s submissions, [9].
[48] The Member quotes from Alcan at [47].
The appellant’s primary argument on these issues before the Member was that the Member was bound to apply the decisions of Hee and Vostek. On appeal the appellant appropriately notes that Hee was a case in which the worker was injured between the 2012 and 2015 amendments and in a footnote states that it refers to Hee “[f]or completeness”.[49] The issue in the current appeal is quite different to that in Hee. The appellant’s arguments on this appeal depend essentially on the argument that the Member should have applied the decision in Vostek.
[49] Appellant’s submissions, footnote [1].
There are substantial factual similarities between the current matter and Vostek. The worker in Vostek was injured on 20 July 2005. He was assessed by an Approved Medical Specialist, on 23 August 2010, to have permanent impairment of 32 per cent. It was accepted that he was a worker with highest needs. The worker engaged in post-injury employment and his weekly wage loss during the period claimed ranged from $342.97 to $652.44. Senior Arbitrator Capel (as he then was) determined in Vostek that the worker’s situation satisfied the requirements, consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hee, for the payment of compensation at the rate prescribed by s 38A of $788.32 as adjusted. The entitlement was not restricted to a figure equivalent to the worker’s PIAWE.[50] It was accepted by the parties, both before the Senior Arbitrator and on the Presidential appeal that s 38A had application, the President Keating P, saying:
“The only issue in dispute on this appeal is whether the Senior Arbitrator erred by:
(a) misconstruing s 38A of the 1987 Act by finding that it authorises the payment of weekly compensation of $788.32 (as adjusted) to a worker with highest needs, without taking into account the worker’s earnings.”[51]
[50] Vostek, [3]–[5], [27]–[30].
[51] Vostek, [33].
The President’s reasons in Vostek did not deal with the threshold issue of whether s 38A applied at all, having regard to the transitional provisions. This was not raised as an issue. It has been very clearly raised in the current matter.
In the current matter the Member found that, giving a literal construction to the clear words of the applicable statutory provisions and regulations, s 38A did not apply in the appellant’s circumstances. The Member’s reasons for forming that view are compelling and I accept them. The appellant has not, in its submissions, identified an alternate construction that it argues, as a matter of statutory construction, should apply. The issue is whether in the current matter, the application of s 38A in the context of the transitional provisions having been squarely raised, the Commission was in any event bound to follow the result in Vostek. The Member dealt with this in his reasons at [41] to [42]. He considered the appellant’s submission that Vostek was “very much on point” was “clearly wrong”. He said the issue in the current matter “did not arise in Vostek at all”.
In Jacob v Utah Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd Barwick CJ (with the agreement of three other members of the Court) said:
“… I should refer to a judgment of this Court which decided precisely that reg. 73 (2) did prescribe with adequate certainty a safeguard or measure of the appropriate kind and that it was valid. That is the case of Australian Iron and Steel Ltd. v. Ryan. Unless this case was overruled by the Privy Council, it was binding upon the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and that Court ought not to have held that reg. 73 (2) was invalid. It is not, in my opinion, for a Supreme Court of a State to decide that a decision of this Court precisely in point ought now to be decided differently because it appears to the Supreme Court to be inconsistent with reasoning of the Judicial Committee in a subsequent case. If the decision of this Court is to be overruled, it must be by the Judicial Committee, or by this Court itself. It cannot be treated by a Supreme Court as if it were overruled. The matter is, of course, different where this Court's decision is not precisely in point and comparison has to be made merely between two lines of reasoning …”.[52] (emphasis added)
[52] [1966] HCA 67; 116 CLR 200 (Jacob), [7].
The above was applied in Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd.[53]
[53] [1984] 1 NSWLR 166, 180.
In Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd[54] Wilson and Dawson JJ quoted the following passage from the speech of Earl Loreburn in Hanau v Ehrlich:
“ ... I agree with Vaughan Williams L.J. that it is not right for even this House to reopen points of construction upon ambiguous language which have been settled for a long period of years; and I advise your Lordships to decide this case upon that ground. To my mind, when doubtful words in a statute have for a long period been decided in a particular sense, we ought not to reopen the matter if we can help it.”[55] (emphasis added)
[54] [1987] HCA 19; 163 CLR 1 (Babaniaris).
[55] [1912] A.C. 39, 41, quoted in Babaniaris at 23.
Their Honours continued:
“Other maxims - stare decisis and communis error facit jus - have been called in aid of this approach. But one thing about it is clear. It has no application where the meaning of a statute is plain and free from ambiguity. If it were otherwise, it would be an invitation to perpetuate an obvious misconstruction of a statute and to disregard the evident intention of the legislature. No line of authority, however longstanding, could justify such a course.”[56] (omitting references)
[56] Babaniaris, 23.
In the same case Mason J (as his Honour then was) said:
“There are, however, countervailing considerations which have special force in cases of statutory construction. The fundamental responsibility of a court when it interprets a statute is to give effect to the legislative intention as it is expressed in the statute. If an appellate court, particularly an ultimate appellate court, is convinced that a previous interpretation is plainly erroneous then it cannot allow previous error to stand in the way of declaring the true intent of the statute. It is no part of a court's function to perpetuate error and to insist on an interpretation which, it is convinced, does not give effect to the legislative intention as it is expressed in the statute. If an appellate court, particularly an ultimate appellate court, is convinced that a previous interpretation is plainly erroneous then it cannot allow previous error to stand in the way of declaring the true intent of the statute. It is no part of a court’s function to perpetuate error and to insist on an interpretation which, it is convinced, does not give effect to the legislative intention … nor is it in any case sound to misconstrue a statute for fear that in particular circumstances some hardship may result.”[57] (omitting references)
[57] Babaniaris, 13.
In Dean v Pope[58] it was noted by Ward P that this statement by Mason J “was endorsed by McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ” in McNamara (McGrath) v Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal.[59]
[58] [2022] NSWCA 260, [230]–[231].
[59] [2005] HCA 55; 221 CLR 646, [42].
The language from the transitional provisions which was under discussion could not be described as ambiguous. Clause 10(2) of Sch 6, Pt 19H of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2012 amendments, specifically provided that a seriously injured worker’s pre-injury average weekly earnings were “deemed to be equal to the transitional amount”. Clause 35(2) of the 2016 Regulation provided that s 38A of the 1987 Act did “not apply to a worker whose pre-injury average weekly earnings have been deemed to be equal to the transitional amount for the purposes of the application under clause 9 or 10 of Part 19H of Schedule 6 to the 1987 Act”.
The Member, dealing with the application of the decision in Vostek, distinguished the earlier decision on the basis that the issue was “different”. He said the issue in the current matter “did not arise in Vostek at all”.[60] This was true. Consistent with the passage from Jacob quoted above, the decision in Vostek should not, in the circumstances of the current matter, be regarded as binding, as the Member correctly held. The reasons in Vostek did not, in the current matter, offer an alternative line of reasoning. It did not offer any relevant line of reasoning because the issue raised in the current proceedings was not raised in Vostek. It would have been erroneous for the Member to apply the decision in Vostek as supportive of the appellant’s position, having formed the view that such an approach would be inconsistent with the transitional provisions in the 1987 Act and the 2016 Regulation. This is consistent with the passages from Babaniaris quoted above, particularly the statement of principle from Mason J.
[60] See the reasons at [41]–[42].
Contrary to Grounds Nos. 1 and 2, the Member determined the issue of the application of the transitional provisions relevant to the appellant’s factual position. Contrary to Ground No. 3, the Member’s reasons for not applying Vostek were set out and are referred to above. The Member did not err in the approach he took to the issues raised in these grounds. Grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 3 fail.

Ground No. 4

Section 294 of the 1998 Act provides:
“294 Certificate of Commission’s determination
(1) If a dispute is determined by the Commission, the Commission must as soon as practicable after the determination of the dispute issue the parties to the dispute with a certificate as to the determination.
(2) A brief statement is to be attached to the certificate setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.”
Rule 78 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 provides:
“78    Statement of reasons for decision
(1)     This rule applies only in relation to the following applicable proceedings—
(a) Commission proceedings,
(b) merit review proceedings.
(2)     A determination of the appropriate decision-maker in applicable proceedings to which this rule applies is to be accompanied by a brief statement of the appropriate decision-maker’s reasons for the determination that includes the following—
(a) the appropriate decision-maker’s findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based,
(b) the appropriate decision-maker’s understanding of the applicable law,
(c) the reasoning processes that led the appropriate decision-maker to the conclusions made.”
The appellant submits there is doubt regarding whether the Member decided the construction argument before him and that the appellant cannot comprehend why it lost. The appellant specifically refers to the reasons at [38], which read:
“This means that there is no express or clear submission for the [appellant] to provide an alternative construction or meaning of the relevant transitional provisions. But this does relieve me of the duty to independently determine the issue.”
The respondent submits that the reasons should be read as a whole, which is clearly true.[61] The word “not” appears to have been omitted from the Member’s reasons in the concluding sentence of paragraph [38]. There were no significant factual issues.
[61] Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430, 444.
In Brambles Industries Ltd v Bell Hodgson JA (Tobias and McColl JJA agreeing) said “the obligation to give reasons has to be considered in the light of the issues raised for consideration by the parties”.[62] The issues raised in the current matter fell within a small compass. The first involved consideration of the relevant transitional provisions in the factual situation (which was not contentious) applying to the appellant. The second involved the appellant’s argument that the Member was required to apply the decision in Vostek, which involved similar facts.
[62] [2010] NSWCA 162, [22].
The respondent’s submissions dealing with the transitional provisions were set out in detail at [18] to [28] of the Member’s reasons. Having summarised this material, the Member at [33] stated that he agreed with the essence of those submissions. In his reasons at [33] to [35] the Member set out the fundamental provisions which supported the result he reached. In particular, he referred to the interplay between Pt 19H, cl 10(2) of the 1987 Act, inserted by the 2012 amendments and cl 35(2) of the 2016 Regulation. This amply explained the Member’s conclusion on the operation of the transitional provisions.
The Member’s reasons at [36] and [40] responded to the appellant’s submissions at first instance relying on Hee. They explained that the transitional regime applying to the appellant was different to that in Hee. The worker in Hee was not an ‘existing recipient of weekly payments’ (his injury post-dated the commencement of the 2012 amendments) and thus was not subject to cl 10 of Pt 19H of Sch 6 to the 1987 Act. Consequently, the worker in Hee was not caught by cl 35(2) of the 2016 Regulation. I note the appellant’s arguments on appeal now reflect this distinction.
The reasons at [41] to [42] dealt with the appellant’s reliance on Vostek. The Member said the issue in the current matter was “whether or not s 38A applies to the [appellant] at all” having regard to the transitional provisions. He said “[t]hat issue did not arise in Vostek”.
The appellant’s submission that the reasons at [38] leave the reader in “great doubt” regarding whether the Member decided the construction argument is unhelpful. It is abundantly clear, when the decision is read as a whole, that the Member decided the construction argument and gave appropriate reasons explaining his decision. This is inconsistent with the argument raised in the appellant’s submissions in reply, that the Member did not regard the construction point as a matter for determination and thus failed to exercise jurisdiction.[63] His reasons satisfied the requirements of the Act and Rules referred to above. The reasons satisfied the requirements described in decisions such as Beale and Pollard.[64]
[63] Appellant’s submissions in reply, [4].
[64] See Beale at 442–444, Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110, [56]–[67].
Ground No. 4 fails.

CONCLUSION

All of the grounds have failed. The decision was not affected by relevant error within the meaning of s 352(5) of the 1998 Act.

OTHER MATTERS

It is common ground that the appellant is a ‘worker with highest needs’. He suffered serious injuries in the respondent’s employ when he was 21 years of age, he is now aged 57. The material attached to the ARD is consistent with a history of difficulties, on the part of those responsible, in correctly assessing and paying weekly compensation to him from time to time over the years. The Member’s reasons indicated there was agreement that underpayments in the past (not associated with the issue about s 38A of the 1987 Act) were “in the sum of at least about $25,000”.[65] It is desirable that the respondent’s insurer expeditiously deal with the calculation and payment of outstanding arrears of weekly compensation.
[65] Reasons, [5].

DECISION

The Member’s decision dated 10 May 2022 is confirmed.
That matter is remitted to a Member to deal with any remaining matters relating to outstanding arrears of compensation and interest, consistent with these reasons.

Michael Snell
Deputy President

3 May 2023