Hurley and Collector of Customs

Link copied
Case Copied 62 min read

Hurley and Collector of Customs [2021] AATA 3381 (21 September 2021)

Division:                  TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Numbers:         2017/7050, 2017/7566, 2017/7568, 2017/7569

Re:Laurence Hurley

APPLICANT

AndCollector of Customs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Boyle

Date:21 September 2021

Place:Perth

Application 2017/7566: The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $1,090,499.27 is set aside and in substitution for that decision there is a decision to make demand for payment of an amount of $424,712.30.

Application 2017/7050: The decision of the Collector dated 3 November 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount $83,027.54 is affirmed.

Application 2017/7568: The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $505,374.41 is set aside and in substitution for that decision there is a decision not to make a demand.

Application 2017/7569: The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $690,481.38 is affirmed.

...[SGD].....................................................................

Deputy President Boyle

CATCHWORDS

CUSTOMS – decisions of the Collector to issue statutory demands for payment of duty – alcohol as a dutiable good – whether there was a failure to keep the dutiable goods safely pursuant to s 35A(1)(a) of the Customs Act – periodic settlement permission (PSP) to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without payment of duty applied – Caltex principles applied – Applicant failed to keep the dutiable goods safely pursuant to s 35A(1)(a)

LEGISLATION

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 26, 37, 43(1), 43(1)(c), 43(1)(c)(i), 43(1)(c)(ii)

Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 4, 4(1), 30, 30(1)(a)(vi), 30(1B)(b), 35A, 35A(1), 35A(1)(a), 35A(1)(b), 35A(4)(a), 37, 68(3A), 69, 69(1), 69(5), 69(8)(h), 79, 99(2), 132AA(1), 132AA(4) item 1, 165, 273GA

Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) ss 15, 16, 19AA, Sch 3 ch 22

Excise Act 1901 (Cth) s 60, 60(1), 60(1)(a), 60(1)(b), 61C

CASES

Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 173 FCR 359; [2008] FCA 1951

Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Tony Longo Pty Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 458; [2001] NSWCA 147

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Company Limited (1962) 107 CLR 279; [1962] HCA 20

Comptroller General of Customs v Zappia (2018) 265 CLR 416; [2018] HCA 54

Drew v Dibb (2008) 169 FCR 320; [2008] FCA 1057

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22

Moama Refinery Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2001) 115 FCR 205; [2001] FCA 1287

Nowicka v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (2008) 176 FCR 1; [2008] FCAFC 191

Pearce v Coynes Freight Management Group Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 540; [2010] FCA 320

Ramsay v Sunbuild Pty Ltd (2014) 221 FCR 315; [2014] FCA

R v Lyon (1906) 3 CLR 770 at 784

Sidebottom v Giuliano (2000) 98 FCR 579; [2000] FCA 607

Sogo Duty Free Pty Ltd…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hurley and Collector of Customs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] AATA 3381
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned statutory demands issued by the Collector of Customs to the applicant, Mr Hurley, for payment of duty on alcoholic beverages. The dutiable goods were imported by Liquor Traders Australia Pty Ltd (LTA), of which Mr Hurley was the sole director. LTA held a periodic settlement permission (PSP) allowing it to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without immediate payment of duty, provided the duty was paid by a specified later date. LTA delivered the goods but failed to pay the duty within the stipulated timeframe. Mr Hurley conceded that he had possession, custody, or control of the goods and that the demands were issued to him in his circumstances, and he did not pursue issues relating to LTA’s deed of company arrangement or past payments. The central dispute revolved around whether Mr Hurley had failed to keep the dutiable goods safely, as required by section 35A(1)(a) of the *Customs Act 1901* (Cth).

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was required to determine whether Mr Hurley had failed to keep the dutiable goods safely within the meaning of section 35A(1)(a) of the *Customs Act*. This involved considering whether the PSP constituted an express statutory exception to the general duty to keep goods safely, and whether the goods remained subject to customs control at the time of the alleged failure. The Tribunal also had to consider the temporal relationship between the delivery of goods into home consumption and the subsequent obligation to pay duty, and how this impacted the applicant's liability under section 35A.

The Tribunal found that the purpose of section 35A is to protect customs revenue, and a failure to keep dutiable goods safely includes failing to prevent their delivery into home consumption without payment of duty. It held that the PSP did not operate as an express statutory exception to section 35A, as liability under section 35A is collateral to, and not substitutional for, the primary liability to pay duty. The Tribunal reasoned that LTA’s failure to pay duty by the specified time meant the goods were delivered into home consumption by "irregular means," constituting a failure to keep them safely. Furthermore, the Tribunal determined that the goods did not cease to be subject to customs control merely by being delivered into home consumption under a PSP, as this delivery was not "in accordance with" the permission due to the non-payment of duty. Therefore, Mr Hurley, as a person entrusted with the goods, had failed to keep them safely.

The Tribunal set aside the Collector's decision regarding Demand 1 and substituted a decision to make a demand for a reduced amount of $424,712.30. The decision regarding Demand 2 for $83,027.54 was affirmed. The decision regarding Demand 3 was set aside, with a decision not to make a demand. The decision regarding Demand 4 for $690,481.38 was affirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The parties filed a statement of agreed facts. The material facts as agreed, where relevant, are identified in these reasons for decision.THE ISSUES Paragraph 44 of the Respondent’s Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 27 August 2020 (RASFIC) identified four relevant issues for determination by the Tribunal. They were:Issue 1: was the Applicant a person who had or had been entrusted with the possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods?Issue 2: did the Applicant fail to keep safely the dutiable goods that are the subject of the s 35A demands made to the Applicant?Issue 3: can a demand under s 35A be issued to the Applicant in his circumstances (including, in circumstances where demands were issued to the corporate warehouse licensee, Liquor Traders Australia Pty Ltd (LTA), for the same underlying debts, and where the Applicant is the sole director of LTA)?Issue 4: what relevance does the LTA DOCA (deed of company arrangement) and any past payments by LTA have on the demands issued to the Applicant? The Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 25 September 2020 (ASFIC) included:36. [44] of the [RASFIC] states 4 issues. The Applicant only pursues Issue 2.37.The Applicant formally concedes Issue 1, in light of the decision in Zappia. The Applicant accepts the Respondent’s contentions as to Issue 3 and Issue 4. While issue 2 as identified by the Respondent is stated in simple terms, the determination of that issue does require the resolution of a number of sub-issues. These become apparent in these reasons for decision. THE HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE The application was heard on 31 May 2021. The Applicant was represented by Mr J Cook and the Respondent was represented by Mr J Slack-Smith. I had before me the documents lodged by the Respondent in accordance with s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) (T documents) and the statement of agreed facts. The parties also filed various Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions and outlines of submissions.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONSThe Respondent The Respondent provided an outline of submissions on 24 May 2021 (ROS) which was to the following effect:(a)The facts relied on are taken from the statement of agreed facts. (b)LTA imported alcoholic beverages, which were dutiable goods, into Australia. The Applicant was the sole director of LTA and had sole control of, and responsibility for, its business. Accordingly, he had, or had been entrusted with, the possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods imported by LTA. (c)LTA had permission (called a “periodic settlement permission” (PSP)) to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the prior payment of duty on the condition that it would pay the duty by a specific time afterwards. It delivered alcoholic beverages into home consumption but did not pay the duty within time or at all. (d)The issue is whether the Applicant “fail[ed] to keep those [alcoholic beverages] safely” within the meaning of s 35A(1)(a) of the Act.(e)The purpose of s 35A is the protection of the revenue. (f)A “fail[ure] to keep… goods safely” includes delivering goods into home consumption but failing to pay duty on those goods, irrespective of when the duty was payable. (g)It is unnecessary for the dutiable goods to be subject to customs control when the “fail[ure]” occurred. (h)The proposition in (f) and (g) is supported by Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.[11][11] (2008) 173 FCR 359; [2008] FCA 1951.(i)In the alternative to (g), the alcoholic beverages delivered into home consumption by LTA continued to be subject to customs control.(j)The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of s 35A(1)(a) of the Act is its text, but regard is to be had to its context and purpose.[12] In interpreting the provision, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose and object of the Act is to be preferred to each other interpretation.[13][12] Citing SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).[13] Citing Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA.(k)Section 35A has a close analogue in s 60 of the Excise Act 1901 (Cth) (Excise Act), which was considered by the High Court in Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Company Limited.[14][14] (1962) 107 CLR 279; [1962] HCA 20.(l)In Southern Shipping Taylor J explained that the obvious purpose and object of s 60 of the Excise Act was to ensure that the excise revenue shall not suffer if excisable goods, by some irregular means, find their way into home consumption.[15][15] Citing Southern Shipping at 295 (Taylor J); (m)In Zappia the plurality said that s 35A must be read in light of the statutory purpose of subjecting dutiable goods to customs control, namely, to ensure that customs duty is paid before delivery of those goods into home consumption.[16][16] Citing Zappia at [5], [28] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ).(n)Nettle J, delivering a separate judgment in Zappia, said that the evident object of s 35A is the practical one of motivating persons with the ability de facto to keep dutiable goods safely, to account therefor to the satisfaction of the Collector and to ensure that, if such persons fail to do so, a Collector may recover from them the duty for home consumption payable in respect of the goods.[17][17] Citing Zappia at [46] (Nettle J).(o)The second reading speech supports that interpretation. The provision was seen as an alternative to the provision of security by such a person.[18][18] Citing Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 May 1957 (Frederick Osborne); Pearce v Coynes Freight Management Group Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 540; [2010] FCA 320 at [63]–[68](p)Sections 35A (and s 60 of the Excise Act) have historically been construed in a broad fashion, notwithstanding that the provisions may sometimes produce what might be thought to be unfair results.[19][19] Citing Drew v Dibb (2008) 169 FCR 320; [2008] FCA 1057 at [25] (Finkelstein J).(q)It is established by authority that the obligation to keep goods safely is essentially absolute.[20] The only qualification is that a person is not required to avoid the unavoidable.[20] Citing Caltex at [157]; noting “[t]his passage was obiter dicta but is a useful statement of the principle.”(r)Accordingly, while “fail” in s 35A does not simply mean “does not”, there is almost no scope for a person who does not keep dutiable goods safely to have not “fail[ed]” to keep them safely in the relevant sense.[21][21] Citing cf. Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 25 September 2020 at [52].(s)In the present matter, there is no suggestion that the alcoholic beverages were delivered into home consumption due to an unavoidable occurrence. Consequently, the delivery of them into home consumption without the payment of duty constitutes a “fail[ure]” under s 35A.[22][22] Citing cf. Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 25 September 2020 at [47]–[48].(t)However, LTA was permitted to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the payment of duty pursuant to its PSP. Accordingly, the question that arises is whether there can be a “fail[ure]” by reason of the duty not being paid by the time specified in the PSP.(u)The permission under s 69(5) was subject to conditions set out in the Act, including that, at the time when each return is given to the Collector, the person pay any duty at the rate applicable when the goods were delivered into home consumption.[23][23] Citing the Act s 69(8)(h).(v)The PSP required LTA to pay customs duty in respect of goods delivered into home consumption in the period of seven days commencing each Monday and concluding at the close of business the following Sunday, by 4:00pm on the next business day following that Sunday.(w)The Applicant contends that the PSP operates as an express statutory exception to s 35A(1) relying on s 132AA(4), item 1 of the Act, which confirms that s 69(8)(h) (which provides when duty is payable by the holder of a PSP) is an exception to the general rule that duty is payable when goods are entered for home consumption.[24][24] Citing the Act s 132AA(1).(x)Section 35A(1) does not affect the liability of a person arising under or by virtue of any other provision of the Act or a security given under the Act.[25] Further, s 35A(1) does not impose duty; it imposes an amount equal to the duty that would be payable if the goods were entered for home consumption on the day on which the demand was made.[26][25] The Act s 35A(4)(a).[26] The Act s 35A(1); Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Tony Longo Pty Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 458; [2001] NSWCA 147 at [99] (Heydon JA, Mason P and Rolfe AJA).(y)Therefore, liability under s 35A(1) is collateral and not substitutional for the liability to pay duty that may be incurred under other provisions.[27][27] Citing Southern Shipping at 288 (Dixon CJ, Windeyer J agreed); Caltex at [147] (Sundberg J); Pearce at [171] (Dodds-Streeton J).(z)Accordingly, the PSP is not an express statutory exception to s 35A(1) of the Act. The Act does not state that s 35A(1) does not apply when there is a PSP. Nor does s 132AA(4), item 1 of the Act require that operation. Instead, liability under s 35A(1) is collateral to and not substitutional for the liability to pay duty under other provisions, such as s 132AA(1) of the Act. Put another way, s 35A(1) provides an alternate source of liability.(aa)It would undermine the purpose of s 35A if a person in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of dutiable goods could allow them to be delivered into home consumption and, when duty is not paid, escape liability on the basis that the goods had already been delivered into home consumption when the duty was payable.(bb)LTA had permission to deliver the alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the prior payment of duty on the condition that it would pay the duty by a specific time afterwards. Because LTA did not comply with that condition, the alcoholic beverages found their way into home consumption by “irregular means”, to adopt the language used by Taylor J in Southern Shipping.[28][28] Citing Southern Shipping at 295 (Taylor J).(cc)Accordingly, the purpose of s 35A supports its application to the present circumstances.(dd)In Caltex Sundberg J stated that, on its proper construction, s 60 can be relied upon even where the goods have been delivered for home consumption where such delivery is not accompanied by the payment of duty.[29] Section 60 applied where (1) a person has or has had possession of excisable goods; (2) the excisable goods are subject to the Commissioner’s control (i.e. had not been delivered into home consumption); and (3) there is a failure to keep them safely. Importantly, Sundberg J concluded the second requirement is referrable to the time when the person has possession of the excisable goods, not when the failure occurs.[30][29] Citing Caltex at [148] (Sundberg J).[30] Citing Caltex at [155], [157] (Sundberg J).(ee)It was, accordingly, found, obiter dictum, that Caltex’s delivery into home consumption of the oil without the payment of duty, notwithstanding the permission, was a failure under s 60 of the Excise Act.(ff)Accordingly, “fail[ing to] keep… goods safely” includes failing to prevent the goods being delivered into home consumption without the payment of duty, irrespective of when the duty was payable.(gg)“[F]ail[ing] to keep… goods safely” includes a failure to ensure that duty is paid on goods delivered into home consumption. In circumstances where duty has not been paid when goods are delivered into home consumption, the person must have ensured, come what may, that the duty will be paid.(hh)A related question is whether the dutiable goods must be subject to customs control at the time when there is a failure to keep them safely. The question only arises if the relevant failure occurred when the Applicant was no longer in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. It is while that person is in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods that they must ensure, come what may, that duty will be paid.(ii)In the alternative to [17(hh)], the Respondent contends that a person can fail to keep goods safely under s 35A(1)(a) notwithstanding that the dutiable goods are no longer subject to customs control.(jj)The meaning of “fails to keep those goods safely” in s 35A(1)(a) must be ascertained having regard to its context.[31] That context includes the chapeau in s 35A(1), which required that there be “dutiable goods which are subject to customs control”.[31] Citing as an example SZTAL at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).(kk)“Home consumption” means consumption somewhere in Australia.[32] There is a distinction between the delivery of goods into home consumption (used in s 30(1B)(b)) and the entry of goods for home consumption (used in s 35A(1)).[33] The former refers to the time at which goods are physically released into home consumption,[34] whereas the latter refers to the time at which liability to pay duty crystallises.[35][32] Citing Moama Refinery Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2001) 115 FCR 205; [2001] FCA 1287 at [20] (Ryan J).[33] Citing the Act ss 69(1), 69(5), 99(2), 132AA(4) item 1.[34] Citing the Act ss 30(1)(a)(vi), 30(1B)(b), 69(1), 69(5), 99(2).[35] Citing the Act ss 68(3A), 132(1), 132AA(1) item 1; citing also Drew at [3] (Finkelstein J).(ll)The chapeau in s 35A(1) is followed by two alternatives: (a) “fails to keep those goods safely”; or (b) “when so requested by a Collector, does not account for those goods to the satisfaction of a Collector in accordance with section 37”. In this matter, the Respondent only relies upon the first alternative. If either alternative is present, the Collector may issue a demand in writing to the person.(mm)For two reasons, the Respondent submits there can be a “fail[ure] to keep… goods safely” even if the goods are no longer “subject to customs control”.(i)First, a failure to keep goods safely includes a failure to pay duty on goods delivered into home consumption, irrespective of when that duty was payable. Such a failure occurs after the goods are delivered into home consumption (i.e. after the person ceases to have, or be entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods).(ii)Second, the context of s 35A(1)(a) is inconsistent with such a timing requirement. Instead, a harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires that there is no such timing requirement. The only timing requirement is that the Applicant had possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods at a time when they were subject to customs control. The obligation to ensure the goods do not find their way into home consumption without the payment of duty was placed upon the Applicant at that time.(nn)It would render s 35A(1)(b) virtually meaningless if a Collector had no power to request an account when the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. Instead, the provision must be read as empowering the Collector to request an account even though the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods.(oo)A harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires consistency as to the two alternatives. Because an account under s 35A(1)(b) can be requested after the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods, it follows that a failure to keep goods safely can occur even though the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. Consequently, a harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires that there is no timing requirement.(pp)Alternatively, dutiable goods delivered into home consumption pursuant to a PSP continue to be subject to customs control until duty is paid. Accordingly, any person that had, or had been entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods can be issued a demand under s 35A(1) at any time until the duty is paid.(qq)Sub-sections 30(1)(a)(vi) and (1B)(b) of the Act provide to the effect that goods shall be subject to customs control until delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69”. In the present matter, the dutiable goods were not delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69” because LTA did not comply with the condition of the PSP that required the payment of duty.(rr)After imported goods go into circulation, it becomes almost impossible, from a practical perspective, to trace them.[36] Contrary to the Applicant’s contention, it does not follow from the difficulty in tracing goods after they are delivered into home consumption that customs control necessarily ceases. Instead, that difficulty supports a broad reading of s 35A(1). It is only when goods are delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69” that customs control ceases.(ss)This construction of s 30(1B)(b) of the Act is supported by the meaning that is ordinarily given to the expression “in accordance with”, being “in conformity with” or “consistently with”.[37] Dutiable goods do not cease to be under customs control merely because a person with a PSP causes them to be delivered into home consumption. Instead, that delivery into home consumption must be in conformity with, or consistent with, the permission. If the person does not comply with the condition on the permission requiring payment of duty, then there has not been a delivery into home consumption in conformity with, or consistent with, the permission.(tt)Consequently, contrary to the Applicant’s contentions, customs control did not cease merely when the dutiable goods were delivered into home consumption.[36] Citing R v Lyon (1906) 3 CLR 770 at 784 (O’Connor J); Caltex at [143].[37] Citing Walker v Wilson (1991) 172 CLR 195 at 208 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ); Ramsay v Sunbuild Pty Ltd (2014) 221 FCR 315; [2014] FCA at [95] (Reeves J).The Applicant

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While issue 2 as identified by the Respondent is stated in simple terms, the determination of that issue does require the resolution of a number of sub-issues. These become apparent in these reasons for decision. THE HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE The application was heard on 31 May 2021. The Applicant was represented by Mr J Cook and the Respondent was represented by Mr J Slack-Smith. I had before me the documents lodged by the Respondent in accordance with s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) (T documents) and the statement of agreed facts. The parties also filed various Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions and outlines of submissions.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONSThe Respondent The Respondent provided an outline of submissions on 24 May 2021 (ROS) which was to the following effect:(a)The facts relied on are taken from the statement of agreed facts. (b)LTA imported alcoholic beverages, which were dutiable goods, into Australia. The Applicant was the sole director of LTA and had sole control of, and responsibility for, its business. Accordingly, he had, or had been entrusted with, the possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods imported by LTA. (c)LTA had permission (called a “periodic settlement permission” (PSP)) to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the prior payment of duty on the condition that it would pay the duty by a specific time afterwards. It delivered alcoholic beverages into home consumption but did not pay the duty within time or at all. (d)The issue is whether the Applicant “fail[ed] to keep those [alcoholic beverages] safely” within the meaning of s 35A(1)(a) of the Act.(e)The purpose of s 35A is the protection of the revenue. (f)A “fail[ure] to keep… goods safely” includes delivering goods into home consumption but failing to pay duty on those goods, irrespective of when the duty was payable. (g)It is unnecessary for the dutiable goods to be subject to customs control when the “fail[ure]” occurred. (h)The proposition in (f) and (g) is supported by Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.[11][11] (2008) 173 FCR 359; [2008] FCA 1951.(i)In the alternative to (g), the alcoholic beverages delivered into home consumption by LTA continued to be subject to customs control.(j)The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of s 35A(1)(a) of the Act is its text, but regard is to be had to its context and purpose.[12] In interpreting the provision, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose and object of the Act is to be preferred to each other interpretation.[13][12] Citing SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).[13] Citing Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA.(k)Section 35A has a close analogue in s 60 of the Excise Act 1901 (Cth) (Excise Act), which was considered by the High Court in Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Company Limited.[14][14] (1962) 107 CLR 279; [1962] HCA 20.(l)In Southern Shipping Taylor J explained that the obvious purpose and object of s 60 of the Excise Act was to ensure that the excise revenue shall not suffer if excisable goods, by some irregular means, find their way into home consumption.[15][15] Citing Southern Shipping at 295 (Taylor J); (m)In Zappia the plurality said that s 35A must be read in light of the statutory purpose of subjecting dutiable goods to customs control, namely, to ensure that customs duty is paid before delivery of those goods into home consumption.[16][16] Citing Zappia at [5], [28] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ).(n)Nettle J, delivering a separate judgment in Zappia, said that the evident object of s 35A is the practical one of motivating persons with the ability de facto to keep dutiable goods safely, to account therefor to the satisfaction of the Collector and to ensure that, if such persons fail to do so, a Collector may recover from them the duty for home consumption payable in respect of the goods.[17][17] Citing Zappia at [46] (Nettle J).(o)The second reading speech supports that interpretation. The provision was seen as an alternative to the provision of security by such a person.[18][18] Citing Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 May 1957 (Frederick Osborne); Pearce v Coynes Freight Management Group Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 540; [2010] FCA 320 at [63]–[68](p)Sections 35A (and s 60 of the Excise Act) have historically been construed in a broad fashion, notwithstanding that the provisions may sometimes produce what might be thought to be unfair results.[19][19] Citing Drew v Dibb (2008) 169 FCR 320; [2008] FCA 1057 at [25] (Finkelstein J).(q)It is established by authority that the obligation to keep goods safely is essentially absolute.[20] The only qualification is that a person is not required to avoid the unavoidable.[20] Citing Caltex at [157]; noting “[t]his passage was obiter dicta but is a useful statement of the principle.”(r)Accordingly, while “fail” in s 35A does not simply mean “does not”, there is almost no scope for a person who does not keep dutiable goods safely to have not “fail[ed]” to keep them safely in the relevant sense.[21][21] Citing cf. Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 25 September 2020 at [52].(s)In the present matter, there is no suggestion that the alcoholic beverages were delivered into home consumption due to an unavoidable occurrence. Consequently, the delivery of them into home consumption without the payment of duty constitutes a “fail[ure]” under s 35A.[22][22] Citing cf. Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 25 September 2020 at [47]–[48].(t)However, LTA was permitted to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the payment of duty pursuant to its PSP. Accordingly, the question that arises is whether there can be a “fail[ure]” by reason of the duty not being paid by the time specified in the PSP.(u)The permission under s 69(5) was subject to conditions set out in the Act, including that, at the time when each return is given to the Collector, the person pay any duty at the rate applicable when the goods were delivered into home consumption.[23][23] Citing the Act s 69(8)(h).(v)The PSP required LTA to pay customs duty in respect of goods delivered into home consumption in the period of seven days commencing each Monday and concluding at the close of business the following Sunday, by 4:00pm on the next business day following that Sunday.(w)The Applicant contends that the PSP operates as an express statutory exception to s 35A(1) relying on s 132AA(4), item 1 of the Act, which confirms that s 69(8)(h) (which provides when duty is payable by the holder of a PSP) is an exception to the general rule that duty is payable when goods are entered for home consumption.[24][24] Citing the Act s 132AA(1).(x)Section 35A(1) does not affect the liability of a person arising under or by virtue of any other provision of the Act or a security given under the Act.[25] Further, s 35A(1) does not impose duty; it imposes an amount equal to the duty that would be payable if the goods were entered for home consumption on the day on which the demand was made.[26][25] The Act s 35A(4)(a).[26] The Act s 35A(1); Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Tony Longo Pty Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 458; [2001] NSWCA 147 at [99] (Heydon JA, Mason P and Rolfe AJA).(y)Therefore, liability under s 35A(1) is collateral and not substitutional for the liability to pay duty that may be incurred under other provisions.[27][27] Citing Southern Shipping at 288 (Dixon CJ, Windeyer J agreed); Caltex at [147] (Sundberg J); Pearce at [171] (Dodds-Streeton J).(z)Accordingly, the PSP is not an express statutory exception to s 35A(1) of the Act. The Act does not state that s 35A(1) does not apply when there is a PSP. Nor does s 132AA(4), item 1 of the Act require that operation. Instead, liability under s 35A(1) is collateral to and not substitutional for the liability to pay duty under other provisions, such as s 132AA(1) of the Act. Put another way, s 35A(1) provides an alternate source of liability.(aa)It would undermine the purpose of s 35A if a person in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of dutiable goods could allow them to be delivered into home consumption and, when duty is not paid, escape liability on the basis that the goods had already been delivered into home consumption when the duty was payable.(bb)LTA had permission to deliver the alcoholic beverages into home consumption without the prior payment of duty on the condition that it would pay the duty by a specific time afterwards. Because LTA did not comply with that condition, the alcoholic beverages found their way into home consumption by “irregular means”, to adopt the language used by Taylor J in Southern Shipping.[28][28] Citing Southern Shipping at 295 (Taylor J).(cc)Accordingly, the purpose of s 35A supports its application to the present circumstances.(dd)In Caltex Sundberg J stated that, on its proper construction, s 60 can be relied upon even where the goods have been delivered for home consumption where such delivery is not accompanied by the payment of duty.[29] Section 60 applied where (1) a person has or has had possession of excisable goods; (2) the excisable goods are subject to the Commissioner’s control (i.e. had not been delivered into home consumption); and (3) there is a failure to keep them safely. Importantly, Sundberg J concluded the second requirement is referrable to the time when the person has possession of the excisable goods, not when the failure occurs.[30][29] Citing Caltex at [148] (Sundberg J).[30] Citing Caltex at [155], [157] (Sundberg J).(ee)It was, accordingly, found, obiter dictum, that Caltex’s delivery into home consumption of the oil without the payment of duty, notwithstanding the permission, was a failure under s 60 of the Excise Act.(ff)Accordingly, “fail[ing to] keep… goods safely” includes failing to prevent the goods being delivered into home consumption without the payment of duty, irrespective of when the duty was payable.(gg)“[F]ail[ing] to keep… goods safely” includes a failure to ensure that duty is paid on goods delivered into home consumption. In circumstances where duty has not been paid when goods are delivered into home consumption, the person must have ensured, come what may, that the duty will be paid.(hh)A related question is whether the dutiable goods must be subject to customs control at the time when there is a failure to keep them safely. The question only arises if the relevant failure occurred when the Applicant was no longer in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. It is while that person is in, or entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods that they must ensure, come what may, that duty will be paid.(ii)In the alternative to [17(hh)], the Respondent contends that a person can fail to keep goods safely under s 35A(1)(a) notwithstanding that the dutiable goods are no longer subject to customs control.(jj)The meaning of “fails to keep those goods safely” in s 35A(1)(a) must be ascertained having regard to its context.[31] That context includes the chapeau in s 35A(1), which required that there be “dutiable goods which are subject to customs control”.[31] Citing as an example SZTAL at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).(kk)“Home consumption” means consumption somewhere in Australia.[32] There is a distinction between the delivery of goods into home consumption (used in s 30(1B)(b)) and the entry of goods for home consumption (used in s 35A(1)).[33] The former refers to the time at which goods are physically released into home consumption,[34] whereas the latter refers to the time at which liability to pay duty crystallises.[35][32] Citing Moama Refinery Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2001) 115 FCR 205; [2001] FCA 1287 at [20] (Ryan J).[33] Citing the Act ss 69(1), 69(5), 99(2), 132AA(4) item 1.[34] Citing the Act ss 30(1)(a)(vi), 30(1B)(b), 69(1), 69(5), 99(2).[35] Citing the Act ss 68(3A), 132(1), 132AA(1) item 1; citing also Drew at [3] (Finkelstein J).(ll)The chapeau in s 35A(1) is followed by two alternatives: (a) “fails to keep those goods safely”; or (b) “when so requested by a Collector, does not account for those goods to the satisfaction of a Collector in accordance with section 37”. In this matter, the Respondent only relies upon the first alternative. If either alternative is present, the Collector may issue a demand in writing to the person.(mm)For two reasons, the Respondent submits there can be a “fail[ure] to keep… goods safely” even if the goods are no longer “subject to customs control”.(i)First, a failure to keep goods safely includes a failure to pay duty on goods delivered into home consumption, irrespective of when that duty was payable. Such a failure occurs after the goods are delivered into home consumption (i.e. after the person ceases to have, or be entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods).(ii)Second, the context of s 35A(1)(a) is inconsistent with such a timing requirement. Instead, a harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires that there is no such timing requirement. The only timing requirement is that the Applicant had possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods at a time when they were subject to customs control. The obligation to ensure the goods do not find their way into home consumption without the payment of duty was placed upon the Applicant at that time.(nn)It would render s 35A(1)(b) virtually meaningless if a Collector had no power to request an account when the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. Instead, the provision must be read as empowering the Collector to request an account even though the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods.(oo)A harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires consistency as to the two alternatives. Because an account under s 35A(1)(b) can be requested after the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods, it follows that a failure to keep goods safely can occur even though the person no longer has, or is no longer entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods. Consequently, a harmonious reading of s 35A(1) requires that there is no timing requirement.(pp)Alternatively, dutiable goods delivered into home consumption pursuant to a PSP continue to be subject to customs control until duty is paid. Accordingly, any person that had, or had been entrusted with, possession, custody or control of the dutiable goods can be issued a demand under s 35A(1) at any time until the duty is paid.(qq)Sub-sections 30(1)(a)(vi) and (1B)(b) of the Act provide to the effect that goods shall be subject to customs control until delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69”. In the present matter, the dutiable goods were not delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69” because LTA did not comply with the condition of the PSP that required the payment of duty.(rr)After imported goods go into circulation, it becomes almost impossible, from a practical perspective, to trace them.[36] Contrary to the Applicant’s contention, it does not follow from the difficulty in tracing goods after they are delivered into home consumption that customs control necessarily ceases. Instead, that difficulty supports a broad reading of s 35A(1). It is only when goods are delivered into home consumption “in accordance with a permission under section 69” that customs control ceases.(ss)This construction of s 30(1B)(b) of the Act is supported by the meaning that is ordinarily given to the expression “in accordance with”, being “in conformity with” or “consistently with”.[37] Dutiable goods do not cease to be under customs control merely because a person with a PSP causes them to be delivered into home consumption. Instead, that delivery into home consumption must be in conformity with, or consistent with, the permission. If the person does not comply with the condition on the permission requiring payment of duty, then there has not been a delivery into home consumption in conformity with, or consistent with, the permission.(tt)Consequently, contrary to the Applicant’s contentions, customs control did not cease merely when the dutiable goods were delivered into home consumption.[36] Citing R v Lyon (1906) 3 CLR 770 at 784 (O’Connor J); Caltex at [143].[37] Citing Walker v Wilson (1991) 172 CLR 195 at 208 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ); Ramsay v Sunbuild Pty Ltd (2014) 221 FCR 315; [2014] FCA at [95] (Reeves J).The Applicant

Decision

Reasons for decision

As also noted above, since the issue of Demand 1, the parties have agreed on the amount now appropriate for that demand.[65] That agreed amended amount is reflected in the decision in relation to that demand below. DECISIONS[65] Statement of agreed facts para 45 (as amended at the hearing).Application 2017/7566 – Demand 1 The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $1,090,499.27 is set aside and in substitution for that decision there is a decision to make demand for payment of an amount of $424,712.30.Application 2017/7050 – Demand 2 The decision of the Collector dated 3 November 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount $83,027.54 is affirmed.Application 2017/7568 – Demand 3 The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $505,374.41 is set aside and in substitution for that decision there is a decision not to make a demand.Application 20177569 – Demand 4 The decision of the Collector dated 13 December 2017 to make demand for payment of an amount of $690,481.38 is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Applicant provided an outline of submissions on 28 May 2021 (AOS) which was to the following effect:(a)The key issue emerges from the ROS. There is a temporal gap between the permitted delivery of the subject goods into home consumption and the obligation to pay the duty “by a specified time afterwards”. Under the PSP, LTA had permission to deliver alcoholic beverages into home consumption without prior payment of duty. The duty was payable by a specific time afterwards.(b)The subsequent failure, by LTA, to pay the duty, does not render the delivery, by LTA, of the goods, “impermissible”. The subsequent temporally distinct failure, by LTA, to pay the duty, is a breach, by LTA, of a condition of the PSP. LTA remains liable to pay.(c)The delivery of the subject goods, by LTA, into home consumption, is not alleged to be an unlawful act or failure, nor is it. That act and fact of delivery of the goods into home consumption is “in accordance with a permission under section 69 …”.(d)The failure subsequently, by LTA, to pay duty, cannot retrospectively render unlawful the prior lawful act and fact of delivery of the goods. The goods didn’t find their way into home consumption by “irregular means”.(e)The present Applications are made by a separate distinct legal person, with separate and distinct, if concurrent, obligations under the Act. The present case requires consideration of how the acts and omissions of LTA, in the context of its breaches of conditions of its PSP, translate into the Respondent’s Decisions with respect to the Applicant.(f)Caltex has useful application to the present case, but the key “timing” issue was not considered at all. Whilst Caltex involved a PSP, the Court was not required to consider the temporal disjunction between “delivery into home consumption” and the obligation to pay the duty.(g)A critical distinguishing factor between Caltex and the present is that Caltex had failed to report the delivery into home consumption of the subject excisable goods, whereas in the present case LTA had so reported. Caltex mistakenly took the view that its use of the residual fuel by-product did not amount to the relevant “delivery into home consumption”.(h)The obiter reasoning in Caltex relates to the characterisation of Caltex’s consumption of its own by-product as constituting the relevant act or event of “delivery” into “home consumption”. (i)Sundberg J clearly expresses the view that the subject goods were delivered into home consumption pursuant to its “PSP equivalent” permissions, despite the subsequent non-payment of duty. Caltex’s subsequent non-payment of duty did not detract from the characterisation of the event of delivery into home consumption as being made pursuant to its Excise Act s 61C permissions.(j)In the present case, LTA did report the delivery into home consumption of the subject excisable goods, pursuant to the Import Nature 30 (N30) Declaration that LTA lodged. There is no debate that the goods were delivered into home consumption in the conventional manner contemplated by the PSP.(k)Caltex does not directly assist in the analysis of the temporal issues. Those issues did not arise for consideration by Sundberg J. Caltex was the owner of the subject goods and Caltex was principally liable to pay any duty in any event. In Caltex there was no “third person”. There was no director of Caltex being pursued under s 35A, unlike the present case. In the present case the holder of the PSP, LTA, is not being pursued at all.(l)The Applicant’s liability turns solely upon the proper application of s 35A(1)(a) of the Act. The sole allegation is that the Applicant failed to keep goods safely, not that he failed to pay duty, unlike Caltex. That makes sense because it was LTA and not the Applicant, which was liable to pay the duty upon the goods delivered into home consumption pursuant to the PSP and the Act. The Respondent’s submission that a “’fail[ure] to keep… goods safely’ includes delivering goods into home consumption but failing to pay duty” is not applicable because the Applicant neither delivered goods into home consumption, nor failed to pay duty on those goods.(m)The failure to pay the duty was a failure by LTA only. The Applicant’s sole obligation was, or rather had been, to keep the goods safely.(n)A person’s obligation, to keep goods safely, is not an absolute obligation.[38] “Fails” in the relevant sense does not mean no more than “does not” keep the goods safely. Section 35A(1)(a) of the Act imposes an obligation which a person must have the capacity to comply with.[39][38] Citing Zappia at [35].[39] Citing Zappia at [36].(o)As soon as the goods are delivered into home consumption, the Applicant cannot by any linguistic gymnastics be in possession, custody or control of those goods. From that moment, the Applicant no longer has capacity to comply with an obligation to keep the goods safely. That moment is the moment at which the Applicant must be adjudged by reference to his obligation to keep the goods safely. If he has kept the goods safely until that moment, then he has kept the goods safely and he is discharged from that moment forth from any further obligation of that kind.(p)At that moment, no duty was payable upon the goods. At that moment, when the Applicant parted with possession, custody or control of the goods, those goods did not enter into home consumption “without the payment of duty”, they simply entered into home consumption. At that moment, those goods ceased to be subject to customs control.[40] The goods are “subject to customs control” from the time of their importation until:[40] Citing the Act ss 30(1)(a)(vi), 30(1B)(b).the excise-equivalent goods are delivered into home consumption in accordance with an authority to deal or in accordance with a permission under section 69, 70 or 162A…(See [6] above.)(q)Once the goods are delivered into home consumption, they are not under “control”. They are in “circulation”. The section expressly refers to the event of “delivery” into home consumption and no reference is made to the event of “payment” of any duty.[41] [41] Citing Sundberg J in Caltex at [155].(r)The critical factor for consideration is not whether the goods are subject to customs control, but rather the terms upon which the Applicant parted with possession, custody or control– if that parting was done without a prior failure to keep those goods safely (including any failure to pay duty prior to that parting), then the Applicant has kept those goods safely.(s)Upon the parting with possession, the capacity to comply with that obligation ceases, or to put the High Court’s view differently, the obligation itself ceases.[42][42] Citing Zappia at [36].(t)The delivery of the goods into home consumption is both the time at which the goods ceased to be subject to customs control and ceased to be within the possession, custody or control of the Applicant. No duty was payable at that time. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Applicant failed to keep those goods safely. The subsequent failure by LTA to pay the duty which subsequently became due and payable by LTA, was not a failure by the Applicant to keep the goods safely.(u)If the PSP is not an “express statutory exception” to s 35A(1)(a), it nevertheless informs and influences the factual basis for the operation of s 35A(1)(a). The PSP regime has the effect of changing when import duty must be paid by LTA. That has a consequential effect upon the application of s 35A(1)(a) to the Applicant.(v)It is not a case of the Applicant “escaping liability, when duty is not paid”– LTA was obliged to pay the duty– the Applicant was obliged to keep the goods safely.(w)Zappia is distinguishable for the present case. In Zappia customs duty was payable on the subject goods by the time those goods were entered for home consumption while in the present case the PSP meant that duty was not payable at that point.(x)A PSP expressly contemplates, in fact authorises, the delivery of goods into home consumption and thereby their release from customs control, before any duty is paid.(y)Section 35A cannot be read as if the statutory PSP regime under s 69 of the Act did not exist. It does exist and its existence informs the meaning and application of other provisions of the Act.(z)Zappia is further distinguishable. At [8] the Court refers to the warehouse licence being subject to conditions, one of which was that “the holder ‘must not permit warehoused goods to be delivered for home consumption’ unless the goods ‘have been entered for home consumption’ and ‘an authority to deal with them is in force”. At [28] the Court also held:The description in s 35A(1) of the Act of “a person who has, or has been entrusted with, the possession, custody or control of dutiable goods which are subject to customs control” must be read in light of the statutory purpose of subjecting dutiable goods to customs control, namely, to ensure that customs duty is paid before delivery of those goods into home consumption. …(aa)Under a PSP that is simply not the case. The PSP expressly contemplates, permits and authorises the delivery of goods for home consumption without entry for home consumption.[43] There was no PSP or equivalent in Zappia.[43] Citing R1, T48/966.(bb)It is incontrovertible that goods cease to be subject to customs control under s 30 of the Act at the time at which those goods are delivered into home consumption.[44](cc)Once that is accepted, it follows that the Applicant, from that time, does not have the degree of power or authority in relation to the dutiable goods which is sufficient to enable that person to meet the affirmative content of the obligation in s 35A(1)(a), within the meaning used by the High Court plurality at [31] of Zappia.(dd)Similarly, the same factual distinction arises in Southern Shipping. At [33] of Zappia, referring to Southern Shipping, the Court observed:There a manufacturer had delivered, to a shipping company, excisable tobacco products which had not been entered for home consumption and which therefore remained “subject to the control of the Customs”(ee)Like Zappia, Southern Shipping considered the effect of materially identical legislative provision, in relation to dutiable goods which had not been entered for home consumption and which therefore remained “subject to the control of customs”.(ff)In the Applicant’s case, the alleged “failure” occurred when the subject goods were not subject to customs control. The subsequent failure by LTA to pay the duty cannot by any stretch of the meaning of the legislative words amount to a failure by the Applicant to keep the goods safely. (gg)The Applicant’s obligation to keep the goods safely was fulfilled if the goods were delivered into home consumption as contemplated, permitted and authorised by the PSP. The goods were, at that point, no longer subject to customs control.(hh)It is not the Applicant’s obligation under section 35A of the Act to subsequently ensure or guarantee that the owner of the goods (LTA) pays the duty payable upon them. [44] Citing ss 30(1)(a)(vi) and 30(1B)(b) of the Act.CONSIDERATION