Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 802

File number: VID 281 of 2015
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 17 July 2017
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – right of entry – Part 3–4 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) – whether s 500 of the FW Act, which requires that a permit holder exercising or seeking to exercise rights in accordance with Part 3–4, contravened – s 500 only engaged where a permit holder is or is seeking to exercise a right conferred by Part 3–4 of the FW Act and not where entry is made in another capacity – where the permit‑holders did not provide notice of entry in accordance with s 487 – where the permit-holders did not produce their entry permits on request in accordance with s 489 – consideration of the meaning of “exercising … rights in accordance with this Part” – the giving of notice under s 487 is a condition of the conferral of a right of entry under Part 3–4 – having not given notice, the permit-holders did not have and could not exercise a Part 3–4 right – whether the permit‑holders were seeking to exercise a right of entry conferred by s 484 – (see below in relation to proper construction of “seeking to exercise rights in accordance with this Part”) – the permit holders were not seeking to exercise a Part 3–4 right – whether entry in disregard of the requirements of ss 487 and 489 amounted to acting in an improper manner – consideration of “otherwise act in an improper manner”

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION –– consideration of the proper construction of “seeking to exercise rights in accordance with this Part” under s 500 of the FW Act – distinction between “seeking” and “purporting” – “in accordance with” means “in conformity with” – the word “seeking” in s 500 connotes a subjective intention to exercise rights and includes the intended but flawed exercise of the right.

INDUSTRIAL LAW – right of entry – FW Act, s 503 – where union permit-holders, in the course of entering premises without any right of entry, made certain statements – whether the act of entering and the statements made amounted to taking action, intentionally or recklessly, to give the impression that the permit–holders were authorised to enter – none of the permit-holders’ conduct evinced an intention to give the impression that they were authorised to enter, nor was it reckless as to whether that intention was given

INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – FW Act, s 340 – where union official, in the course of entering premises without any right of entry, made threats to a site manager to take action to disrupt work – threat capable of constituting adverse action under s 341 – allegation that adverse action taken in response to the site manager’s request under s 489 for the official to produce his permit – whether…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 802
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was a proceeding brought by the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (the Commissioner) against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU). The Commissioner alleged that two permit-holders, MacDonald and Long, had contravened certain sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The Commissioner claimed that MacDonald and Long had entered premises without proper authorisation and made statements that falsely suggested they had the authority to enter. Furthermore, the Commissioner argued that Long had made threats to a site manager, which could constitute adverse action under the FW Act. The legal issues before the court centred on whether the permit-holders had contravened specific sections of the FW Act. The court had to determine if the permit-holders had exercised or sought to exercise their rights in accordance with Part 3–4 of the FW Act without complying with the necessary conditions. This included examining whether the requirement to give notice and produce entry permits was integral to exercising a right of entry under the Act.

The court concluded that the permit-holders had not contravened sections 500, 503, or 340 of the FW Act. The reasoning was based on the interpretation of the terms "exercising" and "seeking to exercise" rights in accordance with Part 3–4. The court found that the permit-holders did not provide the required notice or produce their permits as stipulated by the FW Act, meaning they did not exercise a right of entry under Part 3–4. Additionally, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the permit-holders intended to give the impression they were authorised to enter or acted recklessly in that regard. Concerning the alleged adverse action, the court determined that the threat made by Long did not amount to an action taken in response to a request to produce a permit, as the request itself did not constitute the exercise of a workplace right under the FW Act. Consequently, the Commissioner's application was dismissed, and no liability was established against the CFMEU. The court also reserved the question of costs, pending any application for costs within seven days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The title of the proceeding be amended to show the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner as the applicant.

2. The applicant’s Originating Application dated 29 May 2015 is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The evidence presented to me was relatively uncontroversial, and none of the witnesses who appeared had their credibility put in issue. Neither MacDonald nor Long gave evidence. I have largely accepted the accounts of witnesses of the various entries, as given. Unless it is plain from the language used, my description of events below amounts to my findings as to the facts there described.THE FACTSQanstruct’s Right of Entry policy Prior to about mid-February 2014, Qanstruct had no formal policy to guide the response of site managers to union officials seeking to enter sites. It appears that site managers dealt with entries in their discretion on an ad hoc basis as between individual managers, and as between the particular circumstances of an entry. Andrew Percy (“Percy”), a director of Qanstruct at the time of the impugned entries, gave evidence for the Commissioner. He described there being “ambiguity”, “lack of direction” and “confusion” about how right of entry was handled by managers at the company. I accept, as the Commissioner submitted, that there was no evidence of any standing permission for union officials to enter Qanstruct sites, however it was confirmed by Percy that some site managers were in the practice of allowing entry to a site in the absence of notice following “a chat” with the union official and possibly in the company of a Qanstruct escort. Mr Damien Burns, site manager at the Laverton North Premises (“Burns”), also gave evidence for the Commissioner. Under cross-examination, he confirmed that he had allowed MacDonald on site at the Laverton North Premises before Christmas 2013, before the introduction by Qanstruct of any formal right of entry policy, to hold discussions with the site health and safety representative. Burns confirmed that he allowed that entry in the absence of receiving any advanced notice of it. Burns further described allowing MacDonald on site in late January 2014, again without MacDonald having provided notice. Site manager at the Cheltenham Premises, Mr Dominic Sherlock (“Sherlock”), also gave evidence for the Commissioner. Under cross-examination, Sherlock confirmed that he had allowed Long on site at the Cheltenham Premises on two separate occasions in about November 2013 and in early February 2014 for the purposes of holding discussions with workers. On neither occasion did Long provide notice of entry and on neither occasion did Sherlock request to see his entry permit. Long was accompanied on site on both occasions, first by Sherlock himself, and subsequently by another Qanstruct staff member. It appears that in February 2014, Qanstruct senior staff were trained in a new coordinated approach to union entries onto Qanstruct sites. Evidence was given by Percy that the Qanstruct management staff, together with a representative of the Master Builders Association, met at the Qanstruct head office in Hawthorn to discuss and be trained in Qanstruct’s new right of entry policy contained in a document headed “Qanstruct: Right of Entry”. The policy, as it is contained in the document, summarises some of the key conditions which must be met by a union official in order to enter a Qanstruct site. Those conditions reflected conditions found in Part 3–4 of the FW Act in relation to right of entry, including the requirement to provide 24 hours’ notice and the requirement to produce an entry permit on request. The document concluded with the following summary:Entry – YES or NOYES if the Union official:·Has a valid reason to enter, and·Meets all the requirements for entry ie entry permits, federal permits and has provided 24 hours written notice·You must allow entryNO if the Union official:·Does not have a valid reason to enter, or·Does not meet the associated requirements for entry·You may refuse entry

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As indicated above, I am not satisfied that the evidence negates the real possibility that a substantial and operative reason for the making of the threat was the making of the request for a permit to be produced by Sherlock. In those circumstances I would not have come to the view that the connection between the reason alleged and the impugned conduct was so remote as to be fanciful and, accordingly, I would not have held that Long had discharged the onus that the s 361(1) presumption imposes.CONCLUSION I have found no contravention by either MacDonald or Long of ss 500, 503 or 340. Although the CFMEU admitted that the conduct of MacDonald and Long was conduct taken on its behalf, as the alleged primary contraventions have not been proved, no liability is established against the CFMEU. The application of the Commissioner must therefore be dismissed. I received no submission as to costs and given the high hurdle imposed by s 570 of the FW Act to the award of costs, I presume that no costs are sought. If contrary to that presumption, an application for costs is made within 7 days, short submissions should be filed and exchanged by the parties. If that is done, I will determine the issue on the papers. To that extent I reserve the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established