FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association v Qantas Airways Ltd
[2018] FCA 1065
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1065
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court examined the mandatory requirements of the entry notice under the Fair Work Act. The court found that while the entry notice complied with most of the statutory requirements, it did not specify the particulars of the suspected contravention of certain clauses in the Enterprise Agreement. The court also determined that the suspicion held by the permit holder regarding the contravention of certain clauses was reasonable only in relation to one clause. Moreover, the court held that not all documents sought were directly relevant to the suspected contravention. Ultimately, the court concluded that the permit holder did not have the right to require the respondent to allow inspection of the documents sought, as the absence of this right was more significant than any non-compliance with the notice requirements.
The Federal Court dismissed the amended originating application and the second further amended statement of claim. The proceeding was dismissed, and the relief sought by the applicant was refused. The court ordered that the amended originating application and the second further amended statement of claim be dismissed, and the proceeding be dismissed. The court emphasized that while rights conferred by Part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act must be exercised reasonably, the absence of unnecessary formality should not be imposed on the manner in which these rights are exercised.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Amended Originating Application and the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim are dismissed.
2. The proceeding is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It should finally be noted that these conclusion do not impose unnecessary formality upon the manner in which rights conferred by Part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act are to be exercised. It is to be expected that common sense would prevail on both sides – on both the side of an occupier or employer and on the side of permit holders. Just as an occupier should not construe an Entry Notice with an eye attuned to the detection of an excess of power so as to avoid the need to comply with lawful requests for entry and access, so too should permit holders focus their attention upon that which is truly the subject of justifiable suspicion and justifiable requests for entry and access to documents or records. The right of entry is a right, like all exercises of statutory power, to be exercised reasonably: cf. Darlaston v Parker [2010] FCA 771 at [44], (2010) 189 FCR 1 at 13. The more unreasonable the approach of an occupier in its response to an Entry Notice, the greater may its conduct be exposed to scrutiny; conversely, the more unreasonable the approach of a permit holder, the greater may be the prospect of a conclusion that the powers conferred by Pt 3-4 have been exceeded and the prospect that the balance sought to be struck by the Legislature has been abused. The absence of a declaration A further issue posed for resolution by the Respondents focussed upon s 518(2)(c) of the Fair Work Act and the contention that the Entry Notice did not contain the declaration required by that section. Section 518(2)(c) provides as follows:(2) An entry notice given for an entry under section 481, 483A or 483D must:…(c)for an entry under section 481—contain a declaration by the permit holder for the entry that the permit holder’s organisation is entitled to represent the industrial interests of a member, who performs work on the premises, and:(i) to whom the suspected contravention or contraventions relate; or(ii)who is affected by the suspected contravention or contraventions; and… The submission advanced on behalf of the Respondents was that compliance with s 518(2)(c) required that the Entry Notice specify “a particular member or members”. The 3 June 2016 Entry Notice provided to Qantas stated (in summary form) that: ·the Association was “entitled to represent the industrial interests of a member who performs work at the premises” which had been previously identified in the Notice; and ·the “suspected contravention or contraventions relate to or affect [Association] members”. The submission advanced on behalf of Qantas is rejected. Section 518(2)(c) (or, for that matter, s 518(3)(b)) does not expressly require the naming of “a particular member or members”. Whilst mere formulaic repetition of the terms employed by s 518(2)(c) may not be sufficient, there must be some reason to question why the form of Entry Notice provided is not sufficient by reference to the facts and circumstances of any given case. On the facts of the present case, the Entry Notice:·sets forth the entitlement of the Association to represent the interests of its members who perform work at “the premises”; and ·identifies “the premises” sought to be entered.Although there may be some situations in which s 518(2)(c) may possibly require the identification of a particular “member” by name, on the facts of the present case it is not considered that s 518(2)(c) requires such specificity. There was no dispute that Mr Purvinas was entitled to represent the industrial interests of members of the Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association and that such members “perform[ed] work on the premises” sought to be entered by Mr Purvinas on 7 and 8 June 2016. Different considerations may apply where (for example) there is a genuine dispute as to the entitlement of a permit holder to represent the “industrial interests” of a particular person(s) or where there is a genuine dispute as to whether any such person(s) “perform[ed] work on the premises.”