Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 445

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 445
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v STATE OF VICTORIA
File number: VID 1097 of 2012
Judge: BROMBERG J
Date of judgment: 17 May 2013
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether respondent took adverse action against employees of independent contractor because those employees had a workplace right – whether the employer of the employee’s was an “independent contractor” with whom the respondent was “proposing to enter into a contract for services” within the meaning of Item 4 of s 342(1) – meaning of “independent contractor”, “proposing to enter” and “contract for services” – whether respondent took adverse action by threatening to refuse to engage independent contractor or make use of its services – meaning of “refuse to engage” – meaning of “threatening to take action” in s 342(2)(a) – whether threat capable of being made in the context of an agreed process – whether prohibition imposed by s 340 may be avoided by contract, waiver or estoppel – whether adverse action taken because the employees were entitled to the benefit of an industrial instrument – meaning of “entitled to the benefit” of a workplace instrument – consideration of s 361 and onus of proof.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Melbourne Corporation limitation – whether ss 340-342 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) exceed the Constitutional legislative capacity of the Commonwealth by imposing limitations upon the capacity of a State to select a contractor to provide major infrastructure.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether declaration may be made in the absence of a justiciable controversy.

Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2C(1), 15AA
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1A), 9(1), 132(4), 132A
Constitution ss 51, 51(xxxvii), 109
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 12, 23, Pt 2-4 ss 172(1), 194, Pt 3-1 ss 336, 340, 340(1), 340(1)(a)(i), 341, 341(1), 341(1)(a), 341(1)(c)(ii), 342, 342(1), 342(2), 342(2)(a), 343, 346, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 361(1), Pt 3-2
Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (Vic)
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) ss 4, 11
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1A), 127A, 127A(1), 127B, 127B(1), 127C, 195(1A), 334, 334(2), 334(7A), 336
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth)
Project Development and Construction Management Act 1994 (Vic) s 3
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4(1A), 4(2), Part XA ss 298K, 298K(1), 298K(2), 298L, 298L(1), 298L(1)(c)(i), 298L(1)(m), 298B(5), s356, Pt 10 ss 515(g), 515(h) Pt 16 ss 792, 792(1), 792(5), 793
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth)
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Regulations 2006 (Cth)
Cases cited: Melbourne Corporation…
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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 445
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria involved a dispute between the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and the State of Victoria. The CFMEU alleged that the State took adverse action against employees of an independent contractor, Lend Lease, because those employees had workplace rights under an enterprise agreement. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the actions of the State constituted adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and whether such legislation exceeded the Commonwealth's constitutional legislative capacity.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the State's threat to refuse to engage Lend Lease as a contractor constituted adverse action, and if so, whether this action was taken because the employees were entitled to the benefits of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement. Additionally, the court had to consider whether sections 340-342 of the Fair Work Act exceeded the Commonwealth's legislative capacity under the Melbourne Corporation limitation of the Constitution.

The court found that the State's threat to refuse to engage Lend Lease constituted adverse action, as it was a coercive action that could potentially harm the employees' employment. The court held that the adverse action was likely taken because the employees were entitled to the benefits of the enterprise agreement, as the State did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption created by section 361 of the Fair Work Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that sections 340-342 of the Fair Work Act did not exceed the Commonwealth's legislative capacity under the Melbourne Corporation limitation, as they did not deny the continued existence of independent state governments.

In conclusion, the court ordered that the parties consult and file with the Court minutes of proposed orders addressing the filing and service of outlines of submissions in relation to the applicant's claim for the imposition of a penalty upon the respondent. The matter was listed for further hearing on a date to be fixed.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. On or before 24 May 2013 the parties consult and file with the Court minutes of proposed orders addressing the filing and service of outlines of submissions in relation to the applicant’s claim for the imposition of a penalty upon the respondent.

3. The matter be listed for further hearing on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I should also indicate by way of introduction that this proceeding was listed for hearing as an expedited trial and heard in conjunction with another proceeding which raised similar issues. My reasons for judgment in the related proceeding have also been published today as Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v McCorkell Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 446. Evidence in each matter was received separately. Some of the legal submissions received addressed issues in both matters. These reasons for judgment have been crafted so that they stand alone and need not be read with the reasons for judgment in the other matter. I first reserved my judgment in this matter on 27 March 2013. On 24 April 2013 I granted each of the parties leave to re-open its case to tender further evidence and make additional submissions. The reasons for that will later become apparent. THE FACTSThe Code and Guidelines In 1997, the Commonwealth Government, in conjunction with State and Territory Governments, established the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry (“the National Code”). The National Code was intended to set down general principles that businesses must meet to be eligible for Commonwealth Government funded building and construction work. The National Code expressly sets out “the principles which Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments agree should underpin the future development of the construction industry in Australia”. The National Code acknowledges that the State and Territory Governments will develop their own codes and that the National Code will constitute a set of “core principles” which establish a minimum level of compliance to guide practices and initiatives in each jurisdiction. It was envisaged that State and Territory codes would supplement, but remain consistent with, the core principles set out in the National Code. Relevantly, the industrial relations core principles set down in the National Code include the following:Awards and Legal obligations relating to employmentAll parties must comply with the provisions of applicable:•awards and workplace arrangements which have been certified, registered or otherwise approved under the relevant industrial relations legislation; and• legislative requirements.Workplace ArrangementsWorkplace arrangements which reflect the needs of the enterprise are important elements in achieving continuous improvement and best practice.The content of the workplace arrangements are a matter for the parties to those arrangements, subject to them meeting legislative requirements. However they may encompass:• improved OHS and rehabilitation practices;• training and skill formation strategies;• multi skilling; and• flexible work practices, for example in relation to working time.A party must not, directly or indirectly, pressure or coerce another party to enter into, or to vary or to terminate a workplace arrangement. Nor may they pressure or coerce them about the parties to and/or the contents or the form of their workplace arrangements. This does not prevent action sanctioned by relevant industrial relations legislation.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, as the submissions of the State acknowledge, no attempt was made by the State to discharge the onus. In the circumstances, section 361 operates to create a presumption that the action of the State, namely its threat to refuse to engage or make use of the services of Lend Lease, was taken for reasons including the reason that the employees of Lend Lease were entitled to the benefit of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement. On the basis of that presumption and the findings I have made, and assuming the constitutional validity of ss 340-342 (an issue to which I will next turn), the CFMEU has established that the threat to refuse to engage or use the services of Lend Lease for the Project was adverse action taken against the employees of Lend Lease because those employees had a workplace right to the entitlement of the benefits of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement.DOES THE FAIR WORK ACT EXCEED THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, BY REASON OF THE MELBOURNE CORPORATION LIMITATION? The State contended that if, in selecting the consortium to design, build and operate the New Bendigo Hospital, the State would contravene ss 340-342 of the FW Act, the FW Act (to that extent) exceeds the constitutional legislative capacity of the Commonwealth by reason of the Melbourne Corporation limitation. The Melbourne Corporation limitation has been the subject of consideration by the High Court in a number of judgments dealing with the predecessors to the FW Act including Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188 and State of Victoria v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 187 CLR 416 (“the Industrial Relations Act case”). More recently, the Melbourne Corporation limitation has also been extensively considered in Austin v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 215 CLR 185 and Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (2009) 240 CLR 272. In Austin at [115], Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ observed that the scope and content of the limitation is difficult to articulate other than in negative terms and at a high level of abstraction. With that reservation, their Honours at [115] expressed the limitation as being:[T]hat the Commonwealth’s legislative powers do not extend to making a law which denies one of the fundamental premises of the Constitution, namely, that there will continue to be State governments separately organised. The Melbourne Corporation limitation is an implication drawn from the federal structure of the Constitution. As Hayne J explained in Clarke at [95]:The root of the relevant principle is found in the proposition, often quoted from the reasons of Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation, that "[t]he foundation of the Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State governments separately organised. The Constitution predicates their continued existence as independent entities." This proposition, and particularly the reference to the continued existence of independent polities, must be understood in the context of the reasons as a whole.[Footnote omitted.]