FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 445
Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 445 Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v STATE OF VICTORIA File number: VID 1097 of 2012 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 17 May 2013 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether respondent took adverse action against employees of independent contractor because those employees had a workplace right – whether the employer of the employee’s was an “independent contractor” with whom the respondent was “proposing to enter into a contract for services” within the meaning of Item 4 of s 342(1) – meaning of “independent contractor”, “proposing to enter” and “contract for services” – whether respondent took adverse action by threatening to refuse to engage independent contractor or make use of its services – meaning of “refuse to engage” – meaning of “threatening to take action” in s 342(2)(a) – whether threat capable of being made in the context of an agreed process – whether prohibition imposed by s 340 may be avoided by contract, waiver or estoppel – whether adverse action taken because the employees were entitled to the benefit of an industrial instrument – meaning of “entitled to the benefit” of a workplace instrument – consideration of s 361 and onus of proof.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Melbourne Corporation limitation – whether ss 340-342 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) exceed the Constitutional legislative capacity of the Commonwealth by imposing limitations upon the capacity of a State to select a contractor to provide major infrastructure.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether declaration may be made in the absence of a justiciable controversy.
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2C(1), 15AA
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1A), 9(1), 132(4), 132A
Constitution ss 51, 51(xxxvii), 109
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 12, 23, Pt 2-4 ss 172(1), 194, Pt 3-1 ss 336, 340, 340(1), 340(1)(a)(i), 341, 341(1), 341(1)(a), 341(1)(c)(ii), 342, 342(1), 342(2), 342(2)(a), 343, 346, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 361(1), Pt 3-2
Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (Vic)
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) ss 4, 11
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1A), 127A, 127A(1), 127B, 127B(1), 127C, 195(1A), 334, 334(2), 334(7A), 336
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth)
Project Development and Construction Management Act 1994 (Vic) s 3
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4(1A), 4(2), Part XA ss 298K, 298K(1), 298K(2), 298L, 298L(1), 298L(1)(c)(i), 298L(1)(m), 298B(5), s356, Pt 10 ss 515(g), 515(h) Pt 16 ss 792, 792(1), 792(5), 793
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth)
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Regulations 2006 (Cth)Cases cited: Melbourne Corporation…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 445
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the State's threat to refuse to engage Lend Lease as a contractor constituted adverse action, and if so, whether this action was taken because the employees were entitled to the benefits of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement. Additionally, the court had to consider whether sections 340-342 of the Fair Work Act exceeded the Commonwealth's legislative capacity under the Melbourne Corporation limitation of the Constitution.
The court found that the State's threat to refuse to engage Lend Lease constituted adverse action, as it was a coercive action that could potentially harm the employees' employment. The court held that the adverse action was likely taken because the employees were entitled to the benefits of the enterprise agreement, as the State did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption created by section 361 of the Fair Work Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that sections 340-342 of the Fair Work Act did not exceed the Commonwealth's legislative capacity under the Melbourne Corporation limitation, as they did not deny the continued existence of independent state governments.
In conclusion, the court ordered that the parties consult and file with the Court minutes of proposed orders addressing the filing and service of outlines of submissions in relation to the applicant's claim for the imposition of a penalty upon the respondent. The matter was listed for further hearing on a date to be fixed.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. On or before 24 May 2013 the parties consult and file with the Court minutes of proposed orders addressing the filing and service of outlines of submissions in relation to the applicant’s claim for the imposition of a penalty upon the respondent.
3. The matter be listed for further hearing on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this case, as the submissions of the State acknowledge, no attempt was made by the State to discharge the onus. In the circumstances, section 361 operates to create a presumption that the action of the State, namely its threat to refuse to engage or make use of the services of Lend Lease, was taken for reasons including the reason that the employees of Lend Lease were entitled to the benefit of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement. On the basis of that presumption and the findings I have made, and assuming the constitutional validity of ss 340-342 (an issue to which I will next turn), the CFMEU has established that the threat to refuse to engage or use the services of Lend Lease for the Project was adverse action taken against the employees of Lend Lease because those employees had a workplace right to the entitlement of the benefits of the Lend Lease Enterprise Agreement.DOES THE FAIR WORK ACT EXCEED THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, BY REASON OF THE MELBOURNE CORPORATION LIMITATION? The State contended that if, in selecting the consortium to design, build and operate the New Bendigo Hospital, the State would contravene ss 340-342 of the FW Act, the FW Act (to that extent) exceeds the constitutional legislative capacity of the Commonwealth by reason of the Melbourne Corporation limitation. The Melbourne Corporation limitation has been the subject of consideration by the High Court in a number of judgments dealing with the predecessors to the FW Act including Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188 and State of Victoria v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 187 CLR 416 (“the Industrial Relations Act case”). More recently, the Melbourne Corporation limitation has also been extensively considered in Austin v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 215 CLR 185 and Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (2009) 240 CLR 272. In Austin at [115], Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ observed that the scope and content of the limitation is difficult to articulate other than in negative terms and at a high level of abstraction. With that reservation, their Honours at [115] expressed the limitation as being:[T]hat the Commonwealth’s legislative powers do not extend to making a law which denies one of the fundamental premises of the Constitution, namely, that there will continue to be State governments separately organised. The Melbourne Corporation limitation is an implication drawn from the federal structure of the Constitution. As Hayne J explained in Clarke at [95]:The root of the relevant principle is found in the proposition, often quoted from the reasons of Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation, that "[t]he foundation of the Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State governments separately organised. The Constitution predicates their continued existence as independent entities." This proposition, and particularly the reference to the continued existence of independent polities, must be understood in the context of the reasons as a whole.[Footnote omitted.]