Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Ingham

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Ingham [2020] FCA 1632

File number: QUD 138 of 2019
Judgment of: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 12 November 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – alleged contraventions of s 46 of the Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Act 2016 (Cth) – whether workers engaged in unlawful industrial action – where workers refused to perform work until colleague reinstated – whether workers entitled to not work in any event under relevant award due to inclement weather – whether respondents organised unlawful industrial action – whether respondents were knowingly concerned in unlawful industrial action – contraventions not established

INDUSTRIAL LAW – alleged contraventions of s 348 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether workers engaged in action – where applicant’s pleading relied on higher threshold of “industrial action” – whether applicant should be permitted to rely on lower threshold not pleaded – contraventions not established

Legislation:

Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Act 2016 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 7, 46, 61F, 81, 92, 94 and 95

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1305

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 69, 128 and 140

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 19, 340, 343, 347, 348, 360, 361, 417, 546 and 793

Cases cited:

Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Williams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 131

Anderson v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] 2 Qd R 401

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632

Australian Building and Construction Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union(The Kane Constructions Case) (2017) 268 IR 178

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (The Australian Paper Case) [2017] FCA 167

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (The North Queensland Stadium Case) (2020) 297 IR 151

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union(The Nine Brisbane Sites Appeal) (2019) 269 FCR 262

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (The Bay Street Case) (2018) 260 FCR 564

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining, and Energy Union (2017) 267 IR 130

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 261 FCR 347

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Huddy [2017] FCA 739

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Molina (2020) 295 IR 414

Blatch v Archer (1774) 98 ER 969

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (The Bay Street Appeal) [2020] FCAFC 192

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2007) 164 IR 299

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Robinson (2016) 241 FCR 338

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union (2015) 253 IR 304

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union (2016) 245 FCR 39

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union (2017) 263 CLR 551

Fabre v Arenales

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1632
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Ingham, the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (the Commissioner) brought proceedings against the respondents, Ingham and Desmond, alleging contraventions of sections 46 and 348 of the Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Act 2016 (Cth) (BCI Act) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act), respectively. The Commissioner alleged that the respondents engaged in unlawful industrial action by workers who refused to perform work until a colleague, Mr Stephen, was reinstated. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the workers' actions constituted unlawful industrial action and whether the respondents were knowingly concerned in the taking of such action.

The Court found that the workers did not perform any work on 17, 18, and the morning of 19 October 2017, but this was due to inclement weather and not as part of any industrial action. The workers were entitled to not perform work under the inclement weather provisions in the Award, and their refusal to work was not in breach of any legal obligation. Furthermore, the Court held that the workers' refusal to perform work when they had no legal obligation to do so could not amount to "industrial action" within the meaning of section 7(1)(c)(ii) of the BCI Act. The Court also found that the Commissioner had not proved that the respondents organised or were knowingly concerned in the unlawful industrial action. Consequently, the Court dismissed the proceedings, finding that the Commissioner had not established the alleged contraventions of sections 46 and 348 of the BCI Act and the FW Act.

The Court's reasoning was grounded in the interpretation of "industrial action" under section 7(1)(c)(ii) of the BCI Act, which must be read in light of the FW Act and its provisions regarding awards, enterprise agreements, and the National Employment Standards. The Court concluded that the workers' refusal to perform work during periods of inclement weather, when they had no legal obligation to do so, did not constitute unlawful industrial action. Additionally, the Court held that the Commissioner had not proven that the respondents organised or were knowingly concerned in the unlawful industrial action, leading to the dismissal of the proceedings. The Court's decision was based on the evidence presented, including the rainfall records from the Bureau of Meteorology and the testimonies of the respondents. The Court found that the workers' actions were not part of any organised industrial action but were instead a response to the inclement weather conditions.

In summary, the Court dismissed the proceedings brought by the Commissioner against Ingham and Desmond, finding that the alleged contraventions of sections 46 and 348 of the BCI Act and the FW Act were not established. The Court's decision hinged on the interpretation of "industrial action" and the workers' entitlement to not perform work under the inclement weather provisions in the Award. The Court held that the workers' refusal to perform work when they had no legal obligation to do so could not be considered unlawful industrial action, and the Commissioner had not proven that the respondents were knowingly concerned in any such action. The Court's dismissal of the proceedings reflects its careful consideration of the evidence and legal principles involved in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There are in evidence records of rainfall at the Gold Coast from the Bureau of Meteorology. The rainfall at Broadbeach itself was not recorded. The records are for rainfall recorded at weather stations at other areas of the Gold Coast, including Miami and Burleigh Waters to the south and Southport to the north. The closest station was at Miami, 4.7 km away from the Qube project site. The records show that there was rainfall at Miami of 5.0 mm on 17 October 2017, 5.4 mm on 18 October 2017 and 2.0 mm on 19 October 2017. The times at which the rainfall occurred are not shown. I do not consider that much weight can be placed upon these records in making findings about the level of rainfall at the Qube project site at the relevant times.Analysis of the evidence I have substantial doubts about the accuracy and reliability of aspects of Mr Desmond’s evidence. Mr Stephen gave evidence that as he was driving home from work at about 5 pm on 16 October 2017, he received the text message telling him not to attend work the following day. He then spoke to Mr Desmond by telephone. Mr Desmond says that not long after speaking with Mr Stephen, he received a call from a worker, whose name he cannot recall, and that the worker advised him that the workers would not be working until Mr Stephen was reinstated and that they had no confidence in Mr Kohleis. There are two aspects of implausibility about this part of Mr Desmond’s evidence. First, Mr Desmond’s evidence was that he does not recall the name of the worker who called him, and did not even ask the worker for his name. Given that the call was supposedly conveyed by the workers proposing to take action that might be unlawful industrial action, it concerned a matter of significance to Mr Desmond in his role as a Union organiser. It seems most unlikely that Mr Desmond would not even bother to ask the name of the person who was providing this information. Second, it is quite improbable that, by shortly after 5 pm on 16 October 2017, there could have been any collective decision by the workers that they would not be working until Mr Stephen was reinstated. Mr Stephen had not received the text message until after he left the worksite. Mr Stephen gave no evidence that he telephoned anyone else before or after calling Mr Desmond. The phone call from the unknown worker was supposedly received by Mr Desmond shortly after he finished his call with Mr Stephen. It is very unlikely that there could have been any collective decision by the workers between the time Mr Stephen was notified that he was not to return to the worksite and the worker supposedly telephoning Mr Desmond. I do not accept that Mr Desmond was told that the workers would not be working until Mr Stephen was reinstated. I do not accept that any such call took place. Mr Desmond states that, on 17 October 2017, the workers suggested that, “either [Mr Kohleis] was stood down as well or that [Mr Stephen] was allowed to come back on site, in order to make them feel safe once again”. If the workers were concerned about Mr Stephen being excluded from the site because of safety issues, it would have been quite illogical for them to propose that they would return to work provided that Mr Kohleis (MPG’s health and safety advisor), was also removed from the site. It seems unlikely that the desire for Mr Stephen to be reinstated related to safety concerns. Given that Mr Desmond’s attitude expressed to Mr Xenitopoulos the evening before was that, “if one goes then the other one has to go”, it is likely that the suggestion that either Mr Kohleis be stood down as well or Mr Stephen be allowed to work came from Mr Desmond. It is probable that Mr Desmond has attributed his attitude to the workers and dressed it up as relating to safety concerns.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, as the Commissioner has relied upon “industrial action” within s 7(1)(c) of the BCI Act, but failed to prove that allegation, the allegations of contravention of s 348 of the FW Act cannot succeed.Conclusion For the reasons I have given, I find that the Commissioner has not proved that the respondents contravened s 46 of the BCI Act or s 348 of the FW Act. The proceedings must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I accept that there was “consistent” rainfall on 17, 18 and the morning of 19 October 2017 at the Qube project site, by which I mean that there were intermittent, but frequent, showers of rain, which were heavy.Consideration of alleged contraventions of s 46 of the BCI Act Section 46 of the BCI Act provides that, “A person must not organise or engage in unlawful industrial action”. It is necessary for the Commissioner to prove that:(1)The workers engaged in “unlawful industrial action” at the Qube project on 17, 18 and/or 19 October 2017.(2)Mr Desmond and/or Mr Ingham organised the unlawful industrial action or, alternatively, were knowingly concerned in the taking of the unlawful industrial action by the workers. The Commissioner pleads that the workers took “industrial action” within s 7(1)(c)(ii) of the BCI Act by failing or refusing to perform any building work at all. Although it is pleaded that the employees also failed or refused to attend work, that allegation did not seem to be pressed. I find that the workers attended the Qube project, but refused to perform any work on 17 and 18 and the morning of 19 October 2017. They did so in order to pressure MPG into reinstating Mr Stephen, or into at least also excluding Mr Kohleis. However, the respondents argue that this was not “industrial action” within s 7(1)(c)(ii) because the workers were entitled, under the inclement weather provisions in cl 23 of the Award, to not perform work. They argue that the refusal of the workers to perform work when they had no legal obligation to do so could not amount to “industrial action”. The respondents also assert that the workers were entitled to refuse to perform work because that was permitted under the custom and practice at the site during periods of inclement weather. In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (The North Queensland Stadium Case) (2020) 297 IR 151, I held at [129]–[130]:[129]I accept that there is no “failure or refusal” to “attend work” or “perform any building work at all” within s 7(1)(c)(ii) of the BCI Act where there is no legal obligation on employees to attend or perform work. There are many circumstances in which employees may have no legal obligation to attend or perform work, and indeed have legal authorisation to so refuse. For example, under the National Employment Standards, employees may be entitled to take annual leave, personal/carer’s leave, parental leave, community service leave and long-service leave. Under an award or an enterprise agreement, employees may be entitled to be absent on certain days of the week, or to take certain breaks between, or within, periods of work. They are entitled to refuse to attend work and perform work during such periods. It may be noted that in Adams [v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2017) 258 FCR 257], it was held at [91] that s 19(1)(c) of the FW Act (the equivalent of s 7(1)(c)) applies only to action taken by more than one employee (as it refers to “employees”). Section 7(1)(c) cannot be sensibly interpreted such that employees are taken to have engaged in “industrial action” if they refuse to attend work during periods of leave or breaks they are entitled to take under statute, awards or enterprise agreements, even if they engage with each other in so refusing (I leave aside any potential application of paras (a) or (b) of s 7(1)) in particular circumstances. [130]That is not to construe the provision as requiring that the employees’ conduct must occur within the area of disputation or bargaining, such an approach having been rejected in Adams at [59]. It is a matter of construing s 7(1)(c) of the BCI Act in light of the FW Act, particularly s 45 (a person must not contravene a term of a modern award), s 50 (a person must not contravene a term of an enterprise agreement) and s 61(1) (the National Employment Standards cannot be displaced)… Just as the definition of “industrial action” in s 19 of the FW Act must be read in light of ss 45, 50 and 61(1) of the FW Act, so too must it be intended that the definition of “industrial action” in the BCI Act be read in light of those provisions.