Giorgianni v the Queen

Case [1985] HCA 29


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ.

GUISEPPE GIORGIANNI v. THE QUEEN

(1985) 156 CLR 473

18 April 1985

Criminal Law

Criminal Law—Parties—Culpable driving causing death—Whether person aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring person to drive dangerously guilty of substantive offence—Knowledge of essential facts constituting offence—Wilful blindness—Whether negligence or recklessness sufficient—Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.), ss. 52A, 351.

Decisions


GIBBS C.J. This is an application for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales constituted as the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing the applicant's appeal from his conviction on five charges of culpable driving causing death and one charge of culpable driving causing grievous bodily harm. The charges arose out of an incident that occurred on 18 May 1979 when a truck heavily laden with coal got out of control while descending a steep incline at Mount Ousley and collided with other vehicles, causing the deaths of five persons and serious injury to another. The truck was driven by one Renshaw, an employee of the applicant Giorgianni. The brakes of the coal truck failed as it was making the descent and as it continued down the road at an increasing speed one Fraser, the driver of a Volvo truck, deliberately placed his vehicle in its path in an attempt to stop its progress. The two vehicles collided, but the effect of the collision was to damage the steering of the coal truck, which then careered quite out of control into other cars, some of whose passengers were killed or injured. The applicant was charged under s.52A of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.), as amended ("the Crimes Act"). The Crown case was that the brakes of the coal truck were dangerously defective and that Renshaw, by driving it in that condition, was driving in a manner dangerous to the public. It was not suggested that the applicant was present when Renshaw drove the truck; what was contended on behalf of the Crown was that the applicant procured Renshaw to drive the truck in its defective condition. The applicant was charged by virtue of s.351 of the Crimes Act, which provides as follows:

"Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures, the commission of any misdemeanour, whether the same is a misdemeanour at Common Law or by any statute, may be indicted, convicted, and punished as a principal offender."


2. There was evidence from which it appears that the last occasion on which the applicant had inspected the truck before the accident was during the weekend of 5-6 May 1979 when, together with Renshaw and one Fitzpatrick, he did some work on the vehicle. According to the evidence of Fitzpatrick and the applicant's statement to the jury, the condition of the brakes then appeared satisfactory, but it was open to the jury to infer, from police evidence which detailed the many defects that were apparent in the brakes after the accident, that a person who had worked on the vehicle a…

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Giorgianni v the Queen [1985] HCA 29
Case
[1985] HCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr. Giorgianni against his conviction for culpable driving causing death, a charge brought under section 52A of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.). The central dispute concerned whether Mr. Giorgianni, as a party to the offence by aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the driver, could be found guilty of the substantive offence of culpable driving causing death.

The Court was required to determine whether knowledge of the essential facts constituting the offence of culpable driving was a necessary element for a person to be found guilty as a principal offender under section 351 of the Crimes Act. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether wilful blindness, negligence, or recklessness on the part of the accused was sufficient to establish the requisite mental element for aiding or abetting the commission of the offence.

The High Court reasoned that for a person to be guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of an offence, they must have knowledge of the essential facts that constitute the offence. Mere negligence or recklessness regarding the circumstances of the driving was not sufficient to establish the necessary mens rea for the principal offence. The Court held that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on this point, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, and ordered a new trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for special leave to appeal granted.

Appeal allowed.

Order that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales be set aside. In lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, that the conviction and sentence be set aside and that a new trial be had.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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