BSF Solutions Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BSF Solutions Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] FCAFC 88

Appeal from: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v BSF Solutions Pty Ltd (Liability) [2024] FCA 553
File number: NSD 738 of 2024
Judgment of: ANDERSON, CHEESEMAN AND ROFE JJ
Date of judgment: 10 July 2025
Catchwords:

CONSUMER LAW – appeal from findings of contraventions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 29, 32 – whether first and second appellants were conducting a shared business model – whether fees charged by second appellant were charges made for the provision of credit by the first appellant – whether first and second appellants should be precluded from recovering principal – appeal dismissed

CONSUMER LAW – accessorial liability – whether case of accessorial liability was properly pleaded against directors of first and second appellants – whether primary judge erred in granting leave to file amended concise statement – whether primary judge adopted the correct approach to accessorial liability – whether findings of knowledge of essential facts of primary contraventions were sufficient to establish accessorial liability – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Schedule 1 (National Credit Code)

Cases cited:

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 (2021) 287 FCR 388; [2021] FCAFC 121

Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes (2023) 111 NSWLR 304; [2023] NSWCA 88

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v National Australia Bank (No 2) (2023) 171 ACSR 176; [2023] FCA 1118

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v BHF Solutions Pty Ltd (2022) 293 FCR 330; [2022] FCAFC 108

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 230 FCR 298; [2015] FCAFC 25

Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473

Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2024) 4198 ALR 30; [2024] HCA 27

Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53; [2003] HCA 75

Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 123
Date of hearing: 14 November 2024
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr PD Crutchfield KC with Mr PA Travis and Ms A Zheng
Solicitor for the Appellants: Russells
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr LT Livingston SC with Mr SJ Cleary
Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 738 of 2024
BETWEEN:

BSF SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ACN 648 900 896)

First Appellant

CIGNO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 648 971 626)

Second Appellant

BRENTON JAMES HARRISON (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ANDERSON, CHEESEMAN AND ROFE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BSF Solutions Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the findings of the primary judge concerning alleged contraventions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) sections 29 and 32. The primary judge had found that the first and second appellants were operating under a shared business model and that certain fees charged by the second appellant were in fact charges for the provision of credit by the first appellant. Additionally, the primary judge determined that the directors of the first and second appellants were liable as accessories to the contraventions due to their knowledge of the essential facts. The appellants contested these findings on appeal, arguing that the primary judge had erred in various respects, including in the interpretation of the shared business model, the characterisation of fees as credit-related, and the application of accessorial liability.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly interpreted the shared business model, whether the fees in question were appropriately characterised as credit-related charges, and whether the primary judge had properly applied the principles of accessorial liability. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in concluding that the appellants operated under a shared overarching business model, noting that there was substantial evidence supporting this conclusion. The court also upheld the primary judge's findings that certain fees charged were indeed for the provision of credit. Regarding the directors' liability, the court determined that the primary judge had applied the correct principles and made sufficient findings of knowledge to establish accessorial liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

The court's reasoning centred on the detailed evidence presented, which supported the primary judge's findings regarding the shared business model and the nature of the fees charged. The court found no fault in the primary judge's analysis of the directors' knowledge, affirming that the findings were adequate to establish accessorial liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The stay of proceedings in a related matter was also discharged, and the parties were directed to contact the Associate to the Primary Judge to arrange a case management hearing for the penalty hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

3. The stay of proceeding NSD 1110 of 2023 be discharged.

4. Within 7 days of these orders, the parties contact the Associate to the Primary Judge seeking a case management hearing in relation to the penalty hearing in proceeding NSD 1110 of 2023.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given, grounds of appeal 9 and 10 must be rejected. 5.4 Errors in finding knowledge of the “essential facts” (Grounds 11 and 12) Alternatively to grounds of appeal 9 and 10, the appellants submit that the primary judge erred in finding that each director had knowledge of “sufficient essential facts” to establish accessorial liability for five reasons. First, the appellants submit that the primary judge failed to identify the “essential facts” or how the findings of knowledge at PJ [157]-[159] in respect of Mr Harrison, and at PJ [163]-[166] in respect of Mr Swanepoel, support the conclusions drawn at PJ [160] and [167] that each knew the “essential facts” that led to those conclusions. Second, the appellants submit that to the extent that “essential facts” were the matters relied on to characterise the AKF and CPSF as being “for the provision of credit” (at PJ [110]-[121] in respect of the AKF and at PJ [122]-[127] in respect of the CPSF), the findings of knowledge in respect of the directors (at PJ [157]-[159] and [163]-[166]) do not support the conclusion that each director knew of those matters. In relation to the AKF, the appellants submit that the primary judge characterised the fee as being “for the provision of credit” on the basis that it enabled Cigno to provide pre-contractual services (PJ [113]). The appellants submit that there is no finding that Mr Harrison or Mr Swanepoel actually knew what pre-contractual services were provided, what expenses (if any) was associated with them, or how any expense was funded. The appellants further submit that knowledge of the terms of the Services Agreement does not entail knowledge of any “practical commercial reality” that the AKF defrayed unidentified expenses for pre-contractual services. Additionally, in relation to the AKF, the appellants submit that to the extent the primary judge relied on the fact that the AKF was calculated, in part, as a percentage of the loan amount, there is no evidence that supports the finding that either director knew this fact. The appellants submit that the formula for calculating the AKF was provided through expert evidence and was not set out in the Services Agreement or the Cigno website, and therefore, there is no reason why Mr Harrison would have known that formula and it should not be inferred that Mr Swanepoel did know the formula. Further, in relation to the CPSF, the appellants submit that there is no evidence that either director knew the “practical commercial reality” that the CPSF was paid to extend the repayment period. The appellants submit that there is no evidence that either director knew there was no fee for early repayment under either of the Services Agreement or the Loan Agreement. Third, the appellants submit that the primary judge also erred in relying on inexact proofs or indirect inferences to find that Mr Harrison knew the internal workings of Cigno’s operations, the Services Agreement’s terms, or the workings or wording of Cigno’s websites: PJ [159].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants submit that, in doing so, the primary judge adopted two indeterminate definitions of the model. One definition adopted was submitted to be ASIC’s vague and incomplete definition that made no reference to Cigno websites: PJ [2]. The other definition, it was submitted, extended the model to include “elements” set out “in aspects of the Cigno websites”, without identifying the relevant elements or aspects: PJ [75]. The appellants submit that by adopting ASIC’s broadly articulated model case, the primary judge strayed from the Full Court’s approach in BHF. There, it was submitted that the Full Court factually characterised the relevant fees by contextualising the express and implicit (albeit non-determinative) representations about them in the central agreements. The appellants submit that the Full Court in BHF did not resort to “abstract ‘models’ or other distracting and imprecise glosses on the evidence”. The appellants submit that in contrast to the primary judge’s analysis (at PJ [96]-[97]), the Full Court in BHF did not make the error of relying on a “Continuing Credit Model” or making findings that matters were “pursuant to…the Continuing Credit Model”.Consideration The primary judge did not err in concluding that Cigno and BSF established and implemented an overarching lending business model, being the No Upfront Charge Loan Model. There was ample evidence that it was appropriate to consider and refer to BSF and Cigno having established and implemented the No Upfront Charge Loan Model as a shared overarching business model. The primary judge stepped through this evidence, which is largely unchallenged on appeal, in fair detail in the Primary Judgment, which included consideration of:(a)as noted above, the fact that during the Relevant Period, BSF received referrals of customers from no entity other than Cigno, and Cigno did not refer customers to any lenders other than BSF. Of the 100,583 customers BSF entered into Loan Agreements with, only two entered into Loan Agreements without having been referred to BSF by Cigno;(b)BSF and Cigno’s use of the same service provider to support their information technology systems, including in circumstances where Cigno’s computer system managed loan applications and the loans themselves, while BSF did not have the internal infrastructure to collect the principal amounts which were owed to it: PJ [82]-[83];(c)the automated and integrated manner in which BSF’s and Cigno’s computer systems operated: PJ [84];(d)BSF and Cigno’s engagement of service providers to perform support functions, where those service providers were either related bodies or independent third-party entities: PJ [87]-[91];(e)BSF and Cigno’s common bank account signatories and delegated users: PJ [93]; and(f)Cigno having taken legal advice from Piper Alderman, and “in conjunction with BSF Solutions Pty Ltd, made any necessary changes to its business model to both trade legally and comply with the ASIC Product Intervention Order”: PJ [94].