Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25
Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1291
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 193
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v BHP COAL PTY LTD (ACN 010 595 721)
File number: QUD 123 of 2014
Judges: LOGAN, BROMBERG & KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 6 March 2015
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – claim by respondent that appellant union contravened ss 50, 340, 345, 349 and 417 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by promulgating document(s) containing the union’s overtime policy (“the FW Act”) – whether primary judge erroneously characterised manner of alleged contraventions as promulgation of the policy, rather than promulgation of document(s) containing the policy – whether primary judge was required to identify time of contraventions and whether time was so identified – whether Jones v Dunkel inference could have been drawn and whether it was so drawn – whether primary judge erred in finding that the union had organised industrial action – whether primary judge erred in finding that respondent had a workplace right under enterprise agreement – whether an employer may have a workplace right within the meaning of s 361 of the FW Act – whether primary judge erred in finding that reason for union’s industrial action was because of respondent’s workplace right – whether primary judge erred in finding that union had knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading representations
Legislation: Constitution s 92
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 2C, 13
Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) s 36
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1976 (Cth) s 5
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 251
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 70, 140
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 19, 50, 55, 56, 62, 340, 341, 342, 345, 349, 360, 361, 363, 417, 545, 549, 550, 551, 570
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 4
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 11, O 11 r 2(a)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.02(1)(d)
Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth)
Cases cited: Ambulance Victoria v United Voice [2014] FCA 1119
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640
Australian Industry Group v Fair Work Australia (2012) 205 FCR 339
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v The Age Company Limited, PR946290; [2004] AIRC 445
Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (2010) 189 FCR 356
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) argued that the primary judge had erred in several respects, both in concluding that the CFMEU had contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and in determining the penalty. The case centred on the CFMEU's promulgation of an overtime policy at the Peak Downs mine, which BHP Coal Pty Ltd (BHP) claimed contravened sections 50, 340, 345, 349 and 417 of the FW Act. The primary judge found that the CFMEU had indeed contravened the FW Act by promulgating the policy, organised industrial action in response to the contraventions, and made false or misleading representations.

The central issue before the court was whether the primary judge had correctly identified and characterised the alleged contraventions of the FW Act by the CFMEU. Specifically, the court examined whether the primary judge had properly considered the time of the contraventions, the applicability of the Jones v Dunkel inference, and whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the CFMEU had organised industrial action due to BHP's workplace right under the enterprise agreement. Additionally, the court assessed whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the reason for the CFMEU's industrial action was because of BHP's workplace right and whether the primary judge had correctly determined that the CFMEU had knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading representations.

The court found that the primary judge had indeed erred in several respects. Firstly, the court held that the primary judge had erroneously characterised the manner of the alleged contraventions as the promulgation of the policy rather than the promulgation of the documents containing the policy. Secondly, the court found that the primary judge had not properly identified the time of the contraventions. Thirdly, the court determined that the primary judge had not considered the Jones v Dunkel inference, which could have been drawn from the evidence presented. Moreover, the court found that the primary judge had erred in concluding that the CFMEU had organised industrial action and that the reason for the industrial action was because of BHP's workplace right. Lastly, the court held that the primary judge had erred in finding that the CFMEU had knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading representations.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the declarations and orders made against the CFMEU on 2 December 2013 and 11 March 2014. The court's decision underscores the importance of accurately characterising the nature of the alleged contraventions, properly identifying the time of the contraventions, and considering the applicability of the Jones v Dunkel inference in cases involving alleged contraventions of the FW Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The declarations and orders made against the appellant on 2 December 2013 and 11 March 2014 be set aside.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this appeal the CFMEU argued that the primary judge erred in multiple respects, both in coming to the conclusion that it had contravened the FW Act and in reaching her decision as to penalty. For the following reasons the appeal must be allowed. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND It is useful at this point to refer to some basic, undisputed facts. The Peak Downs mine is a large, open-cut mine which operates continuously, that is to say, seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Most employees of BHP at the mine who are covered by the 2007 Agreement work seven day rosters. Their shifts incorporate rostered overtime, with the result that they regularly work shifts of up to 12½ hours’ duration. From time to time, where other employees are absent from work or when major works take place, they may also be called upon to undertake unrostered overtime. The 2007 Agreement relevantly covered members of the CFMEU who were employed as mineworkers by BHP at seven mines, including Peak Downs. The term of the 2007 Agreement which lies at the heart of the proceeding is cl 19.3. It read:19.3 Reasonable overtimeIn accordance with prevailing arrangements, employees may be required to work reasonable overtime.The Company’s operational requirements continue to be such that overtime will be required on a regular and ongoing basis in accordance with the roster arrangements at the mine.The Company will continue to endeavour to provide notice to employees of its overtime requirements through its rostering arrangements, but may require unrostered overtime to be worked in addition to their rostered overtime, subject to prevailing operational requirements. Evidence was given on behalf of BHP that the phrase “subject to prevailing operational requirements” meant where there was a genuine operational need. Clause 19.3 appeared in the previous workplace agreement, the BHP Coal Workplace Agreement 2004 (“2004 Agreement”), but it differed in its terms. It read merely: 19.3 Reasonable OvertimeAn employee must work reasonable overtime, as required by the Company. Before the 2007 Agreement was negotiated, the CFMEU had a policy limiting the working of overtime. No evidence was apparently called about when the policy was introduced or in what circumstances. The first evidence of the policy appears in the minutes of the District Convention of the CFMEU – Mining and Energy Division in November 1997. A resolution was carried there in the following terms: That the 13 hours per week overtime limit remain as a general policy, however the District Executive is empowered to exempt, either in whole or in part, the Lodges from the operation of the policy based on any special circumstances which exist at a mine; provided adequate control measures are put in place by the Lodge to adequately address Health and Safety concerns; and taking account of the shift systems that are in place at the mine. Documents produced by the Lodge, including minutes of its committee meetings, refer to the Lodge policy of one overtime shift per 16 days (of which eight are working days) for employees on a seven day roster (“the overtime policy” or “policy”). There was no evidence about when this became Lodge policy or how it differed, if at all, from the policy referred to in the minutes of the District Convention. It was common ground that BHP had not authorised either policy. Indeed, the evidence is to the effect that BHP was unaware of the policy until late March 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the documents may have gone to only a small number of employees, they emanated from a governing body of the union. No doubt, union members were expected to comply with union policy and the policy was plainly intended to apply to all union members. To that extent it was authoritative. Furthermore, the policy, as described in all three documents, was couched in authoritative language. That description begins with the emphatic assertion that “there is a limitation placed on the amount of overtime you can work …”. We therefore reject the proposition that the overtime policy was “no more than a paper policy”. Was there evidence to support the finding that employees who were willing to work reasonable unrostered overtime were limited by the overtime policy and declined to do so? Assuming it to be relevant, there was insufficient evidence to support the finding at [109] that employees who were willing to work reasonable unrostered overtime were limited by the overtime policy promulgated by the CFMEU and declined the opportunity to do so where the overtime policy was in danger of breach. In the course of her judgment, the primary judge referred to evidence from two witnesses: Robert McCreadie, who was a former superintendent in the pre-strip area of the mine, and Michael Schafferius, a former CFMEU area delegate in that area. According to her Honour’s summary at [31], Mr McCreadie said that on many occasions workers would state to him that they had already done one shift of overtime and that they could not do another shift of overtime because that was against union policy. Mr McCreadie would typically respond to the employees that they worked for BHP and not the CFMEU. This evidence, which was apparently admitted without objection, would give rise to an inference that the workers to whom Mr McCreadie had spoken knew of the union policy. Without more, however, it does not show that employees who had been asked to work reasonable unrostered overtime refused to do so. It assumes, but does not prove (if it were necessary to do so), that in all or any of these cases it would have been reasonable in the circumstances to require the employees in question (none of whom was identified) to work an additional unrostered overtime shift. The Court was not taken to any evidence from which such an inference could be drawn. In any event, in the absence of any evidence as to when the conversations took place, it was entitled to no weight. In particular, the evidence was insufficient to enable the Court to come to a conclusion about whether the CFMEU had taken any steps to communicate or enforce the policy after 1 July 2009. That is because Mr McCreadie’s evidence was that he worked at the mine from December 2004 until July 2011 and he was never asked, nor did he volunteer, when, during that period, any of these conversations occurred. Mr Schafferius said that the CFMEU’s overtime policy would frequently be discussed at monthly committee meetings of the union at the Peak Downs mine. He also said that the policy discussion “was in the context of the union determining how it would deal with employees who were working too much overtime” and that, as area delegate, the Lodge executive expected him to enforce the overtime policy and require employees who did any extra overtime shift to give the money that they earned to charity. Once again, however, no particulars were given of the occasions upon which the overtime policy was discussed at these meetings. But the major problem with this evidence is that Mr Schafferius left the mine in 2006.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In substance, the case for the union parties was that the contraventions as pleaded proceeded on the mistaken basis that there was one document relating to the amount of overtime that should be worked at the mine, but that in fact there were several documents, the terms of which were not identical; and that BHP had not proved to the requisite standard breach of any of the relevant provisions alleged in its statement of claim, for various reasons, including BHP’s failure to identify the time at which the alleged breaches occurred. THE DECISIONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE In her first judgment (“the liability judgment”) the primary judge held that the CFMEU had an overtime policy limiting the hours of unrostered overtime that its members at the mine could work “referable to their shifts”. She found that the policy was outlined in three documents. One was displayed on a noticeboard in the crib room in the maintenance service bay area at the mine where about 28 employees work (“document 1”). Another was a document entitled “For your information” (“document 2”), sent to new union members under cover of an undated letter from Mr Leggett as Secretary/Treasurer of the Lodge. The third was a document entitled “For your information” (“document 3”), sent to new members under cover of an undated letter from Jim Valery, Queensland District Secretary of the Mining and Energy Division of the union. With the exception of the word “some” in the third last sentence, which does not appear in document 2, and the use of the word “you” instead of “yourself” in the second sentence of document 2, each document contained the following statement:Overtime PolicyThere is a limitation placed on the amount of overtime you can work at Peak Downs. This helps us to get more new employees like yourself a job.5 day roster – no more than 56 hours worked in one week.7 day roster – one overtime shift per 16 day cycle.There are some slight differences in some areas and if in doubt, ask your shift delegate. Each shift should have an OT roster to make sure every member has access to equal OT shifts. For more info see your delegate. The two which were sent as part of the membership pack contained the following additional sentence:If you are found in breech (sic), as per lodge policy, you may be made to donate extra payment to charity and you will be taken out of the OT roster for a set period. All three documents were undated. Her Honour rejected the argument put by the union parties that BHP’s pleading was flawed because it proceeded on the basis of one overtime policy document when there were “clear differences” between the three documents. She provided three reasons for doing so: first, that cl 18 of the statement of claim clearly pleaded that the policy was in three documents; second, that the only difference between the documents was the omission of a sentence in one of the documents; and third, that the omission of that sentence “did not result in either the misdescription by [BHP] of any overtime policy of the [CFMEU]” or a fundamental flaw, as alleged, in BHP’s case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.