Murdock v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Murdock v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 569

File numbers: NSD 349 of 2022
NSD 506 of 2022
Judgment of: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 5 June 2023
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – conduct said to be in breach of various terms of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – alleged steps taken by the respondents in issuing directions that employees receive vaccinations to inoculate them against COVID-19 and subsequent termination of the applicants from their employment as a result of failing to comply with directions

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application for summary dismissal and/or strike-out of pleadings – whether pleadings inadequate – leave granted to re-plead certain claims – certain claims dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for extension of time for filing general protections application – whether only extension of time for adverse action by dismissal required leave or whether leave also required in respect of adverse action by injuring the applicants in their employment, adverse action by discrimination and adverse action by coercion – construction of s 370 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Legislation:

Australian Immunisation Register Act 2015 (Cth) ss 23, 26

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 340, 343, 351, 360, 361, 365, 366, 368, 370, 372-375, 545, 773

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 22, 23, 31A

Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 170EA

Work Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170CK(2)(f)

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) ss 21, 25

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.03, 16.21, 26.01

Cases cited:

Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall [2018] FCAFC 83; 261 FCR 347

Bahonko v Sterjov [2007] FCA 1244; 167 IR 43

Banque Commerciale SA (En Liquidation) v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; 169 CLR 279

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32; 248 CLR 500

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298

Chou v Digital61 Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 640

Clarke v Service to Youth Council Inc [2013] FCA 1018

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd t/as BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance/BMA [2022] FWC 81; 311 IR 304

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Wagstaff Piling Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 87; 203 FCR 371

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25; 230 FCR 298

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 41; 253 CLR 243

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Limited(No 2) [2017] FCA 1046

Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70; 148 CLR 658

Fair Work Ombudsman v Eastern Colour Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 803; 209 IR 263

Kassam v…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 569
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants in Murdock v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (No 2) brought proceedings against the respondents, Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd, Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd, and Qantas Airways Ltd, alleging that the respondents breached various terms of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by issuing directions that employees receive vaccinations to inoculate them against COVID-19 and subsequently terminating the applicants from their employment for failing to comply with those directions. The applicants sought an interlocutory application for summary dismissal and/or strike-out of the pleadings, claiming that the pleadings were inadequate. The court was required to determine whether the pleadings were inadequate, whether leave was required to re-plead certain claims, and whether leave was also required in respect of adverse action by discrimination, coercion, and injuring the applicants in their employment.

The court concluded that numerous paragraphs of the First Amended Statement of Claim (FASC) must be struck out but that the applicants may have liberty to re-plead. The court determined that the entirety of the FASC be struck out, with liberty to the applicants to re-plead, except for the causes of action pleaded in [18]-[20] and [31]-[33], which were dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), with no liberty to re-plead. The court also concluded that the applicants should not be granted the extension sought under s 370 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which meant that the cause of action pleaded in [16] and [17] of the FASC could not be pursued. The court granted leave for the re-pleaded case to be filed as two separate actions, one against Virgin and the other against Jetstar and Qantas (if the applicants pursued their case against Qantas). Finally, the claim brought by Mr Atsas must be dismissed. The court directed the parties to confer and supply agreed draft short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons by 12 June 2023.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the proceedings as against Mr Atsas but granted him liberty to make an application, supported by an affidavit within 14 days, seeking leave to set aside this order should he wish to be heard on the matter. The court also directed that Virgin serve a copy of the order on Mr Atsas. The court made an order under FCR r 1.32 dismissing the proceedings as against Mr Atsas. The court ordered that the parties confer and by 4pm on 12 June 2023 supply to the chambers of Justice Burley an agreed draft short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons, marked up to reflect any points of disagreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties confer and by 4pm on 12 June 2023 supply to the chambers of Justice Burley an agreed draft short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons, marked up to reflect any points of disagreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On that basis, I will make an order under FCR r 1.32 dismissing the proceedings as against Mr Atsas. However, I will grant liberty to Mr Atsas to make an application, supported by an affidavit within 14 days, seeking leave set aside this order should he wish to be heard on the matter. I will direct that Virgin serve a copy of the order on Mr Atsas.8. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION I have concluded that numerous paragraphs of the FASC must be struck out, but that the applicants may have liberty to re-plead. The number of paragraphs that require attention is such that it is appropriate to direct that the entirety of the FASC be struck out, with liberty to the applicants to re-plead, with the exception of the causes of action pleaded in [18]-[20] and [31]-[33] which I have determined must be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act, with no liberty to re-plead. Any draft amended pleading must be served on the respondents within 14 days of orders being made. Separately, I have concluded that the applicants should not be granted the extension sought under s 370 of the FW Act. The consequence is that the cause of action pleaded in [16] and [17] of the FASC may not be pursued. I have also concluded that the case brought in the Murdock action should be separated into two actions, one brought against Virgin and the other against Jetstar and Qantas (should the applicants pursue their case against Qantas). I grant leave for the re-pleaded case to be filed as two separate actions. No additional filing fee should be required, and I will make an order to that effect. Finally the claim brought by Mr Atsas must be dismissed. I will direct the parties to confer and supply agreed draft short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons by 12 June 2023.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Similar allegations are made in relation to the agreements between the Jetstar applicants and Jetstar in [38]-[46].4. CONSIDERATION OF CRITICISMS OF THE PLEADINGS4.1 Workplace rights Commencing with Part B, the asserted workplace rights, it may be seen that the adverse action alleged in [13] and [15] is said to arise because the applicants “had a workplace right not to comply with the direction to receive a Covid-19 vaccine”. The respondents submit that this workplace right has not been adequately pleaded in the earlier paragraphs of the pleading. The “rights under workplace laws” pleaded in [6] and [7] are picked up in [8] with the statement “In the premises”, ie, by reference to [6] and [7], “the Applicants each had a right …”. The respondents submit that in [6] the pleading that the reliance by the applicants on a “correlative workplace right” arising from the work health and safety laws is not properly explained, pleaded or particularised. They refer to the particulars which identify for the first applicant s 25 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic). That section provides, inter alia, that while at work an employee must take reasonable care for his or her own health and safety and take care for the health and safety of persons who may be affected by their actions. I agree with the submission advanced that it is opaque as to how (for instance) s 25 “correlates” to a workplace right, or what that right might be. Nor is it apparent from the pleading how it is said that this right translates from [6] to the right pleaded in [8] being “to refuse to follow any direction or instruction from the Respondents as not being lawful or as not being reasonable” by reason of the matters set out in [6]-[8] (indeed, it is apparent that the FASC is unlikely to be directed broadly to “any direction or instruction” but more specifically to the vaccine direction). Similar criticisms as to the origin of the alleged workplace right may be made of [8] insofar as it relies on the pleading in [7] that the respondents had a duty under workplace laws (for example, s 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic)) to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the applicants’ health and safety while at work. Nowhere do the applicants identify how it is said that this duty translates to a right on the part of the applicants to refuse to follow any direction or instruction from the respondent as not being lawful or reasonable. The respondents level a similar criticism in respect of the pleading of the rights arising under workplace instruments as set out in [11](b)-(d). I accept that submission. Those paragraphs as pleaded are insufficient to enable the respondents to understand the case advanced by the applicants by reference to the origin of the alleged workplace right. A further point is cogently advanced by the respondents in relation to allegations that various acts of the respondents which are pleaded as being “unlawful”. In [8] it is said that the applicants had a right to refuse to follow any direction or instruction from the respondents “as not being lawful”. In [11](b) it is pleaded that the applicants had a correlative right to refuse to follow directions “that were not lawful”. No particulars are supplied to [8]. The particulars to [11] are set out above and amount to no more than assertion, especially [11](b)(i) and (ii) which appear to have the most bearing on the “unlawful” aspect of the allegation. It is opaque as to the basis upon which it is said that the directions given were unlawful. The only direction pleaded are in [1] and [2] where it is said that Virgin and Jetstar gave the vaccine direction, which, it may be assumed is the direction referred to in [8] and [11]. However, it is incumbent upon the applicants properly to plead and particularise the basis upon which it is said that the giving of those (or any other) directions relied upon were “illegal”.