Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND GAGELER JJ

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND
ENERGY UNION  APPELLANT

AND

BHP COAL PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd

[2014] HCA 41

16 October 2014

B23/2014

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

H Borenstein QC with C M Howell for the appellant (instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers)

B W Walker SC with I M Neil SC and R P P Dalton for the respondent (instructed by Ashurst Australia)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ AND KIEFEL J.   This appeal concerns the termination of the employment of an employee of the respondent ("BHP Coal") at the Saraji Mine, and whether that termination was an action taken for a reason which is prohibited by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act").

  2. The employee in question, Mr Doevendans, was a member of the appellant ("the CFMEU"), an industrial association. Some months prior to the termination of his employment he had participated in a protest organised by the CFMEU, which was a lawful activity within the meaning of s 347(b)(iii) of the Act. In the course of that protest he held and waved a sign at passing motorists, which had been supplied by the CFMEU, and which read "No principles SCABS No guts".

  3. The general manager of the Saraji Mine, Mr Brick, gave evidence before the Federal Court of Australia as to why Mr Doevendans' employment had been terminated.  The primary judge in the Federal Court, Jessup J, detailed this evidence in his reasons.  His Honour then made findings, under the heading "The Reasons for Mr Doevendans' Dismissal".  His Honour accepted the reasons given by Mr Brick for his action[1].  Those reasons may be summarised as follows:  the word "scab", which appeared on the sign Mr Doevendans held up and waved, was inappropriate, offensive, humiliating, harassing, intimidating, and flagrantly in violation of BHP Coal's workplace conduct policy (that policy required courtesy and respect to be accorded to fellow employees); Mr Doevendans was well aware of the policy; Mr Doevendans demonstrated arrogance when confronted with the objections to his conduct; and Mr Brick regarded the conduct as not only contrary to the policy, but antagonistic to the culture that Mr Brick was endeavouring to develop at the mine.  His Honour added[2] that the decision to terminate Mr Doevendans' employment was "not a spur-of-the-moment reaction", but one arrived at by Mr Brick over time and after a systematic consideration of the facts.

    [1]Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) (2012) 228 IR 195 at 211 [36], referring to 204 [22], 207-210 [28]-[31].

    [2]Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) (2012) 228 IR 195 at 211 [36].

  4. His Honour did not find that the mere fact that Mr Doevendans had held…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCA 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) against BHP Coal Pty Ltd. The dispute concerned allegations that BHP Coal took adverse action against an employee, Mr Doevendans, because he engaged in industrial activity, specifically by participating in protests and displaying a sign critical of BHP Coal and non-union employees during enterprise agreement negotiations.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether BHP Coal's General Manager, Mr Brick, took adverse action against Mr Doevendans for a prohibited reason, within the meaning of section 346(b) of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth). This section prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee because the employee engages in or has engaged in industrial activity, which includes participating in a lawful activity organised or promoted by an industrial association or advancing the views, claims, or interests of an industrial association.

The Court's reasoning focused on the application of sections 346, 347, 360, and 361 of the *Fair Work Act*. Section 360 provides that action is taken for a particular reason if that reason is included among the reasons for the action, and section 361(1) presumes that adverse action was taken for a prohibited reason unless the employer proves otherwise. The Court affirmed that the question of whether adverse action was taken for a prohibited reason is an issue of fact to be determined on the balance of probabilities, considering all established facts and circumstances. Crucially, the Court noted that while direct testimony from a decision-maker, if accepted as reliable, can be capable of discharging the employer's burden of proof, it does not automatically do so. The trier of fact must weigh all the evidence, including the decision-maker's assertions, to be satisfied that the employer has discharged the statutory onus. In this instance, the trial judge had found that Mr Brick dismissed Mr Doevendans for the reasons he gave in evidence, and that these reasons did not include a prohibited reason under the Act.

The High Court dismissed the CFMEU's appeal, upholding the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court ordered that the appeal to the High Court be dismissed, setting aside the orders of the Full Court and substituting an order dismissing the appeal to that Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

By special leave the CFMEU appeals to this Court. The appeal should be allowed, the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside and the appeal to that Court dismissed.The facts During 2011 and 2012, BHP Coal and its employees were negotiating about a new enterprise agreement to apply to BHP Coal's operations at various mines, including the Saraji mine. For the purpose of supporting or advancing their claims, employees of BHP Coal took protected industrial action[34] in the form of work stoppages and overtime bans. There was a seven-day work stoppage between 15 and 22 February 2012. [34]Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Ch 3, Pt 3‑3, Div 2 (ss 408‑416A). During this stoppage, members of the CFMEU who were employed at the Saraji mine, including Mr Doevendans, participated in protests beside the road leading into the mine property. Standing behind barriers BHP Coal had erected at the side of the road, the protesters held up signs which the CFMEU had provided and waved the signs at those who were driving into the mine. The signs were directly or indirectly critical of BHP Coal and of those who were driving into the mine. On four occasions over three days, Mr Doevendans held up a sign that read: "No principles Scabs No guts" ("the scabs sign"). Some employees of BHP Coal complained to management about the scabs sign. The trial judge described[35] in some detail the steps that were then taken. For present purposes, it is enough to observe that, first, Mr Doevendans was given notice of what was alleged against him and was given opportunities (which he took) to respond to the allegations. Then, the General Manager of the mine, Mr Brick, wrote to Mr Doevendans saying, in effect, that what was alleged was not disputed and that he found Mr Doevendans' conduct to be inconsistent with the applicable workplace conduct policy and charter of values and "unacceptable in the workplace". In his letter, Mr Brick described the conduct as constituting "harassment and/or intimidation" of non‑union employees and employees who chose to attend work during the industrial action, as creating a potential risk to the health and safety of workers who chose to attend work during the industrial action, and as failing to meet BHP Coal's "expectation that each employee will treat others in the workplace with courtesy, dignity and respect". Mr Brick recorded, in his letter, that Mr Doevendans admitted "that use of the word 'scab' at work is not acceptable". The letter required Mr Doevendans, in effect, to show cause why his employment should not be terminated. After further correspondence between the CFMEU and BHP Coal, Mr Brick decided to terminate Mr Doevendans' employment.[35](2012) 228 IR 195 at 201‑209 [13]‑[29]. At trial, there was elaborate examination of, and much debate about, why Mr Brick made that decision. Close consideration was given to whether Mr Brick had acted with some ulterior motive. But the trial judge rejected those arguments and found[36] that Mr Brick dismissed Mr Doevendans for the reasons Mr Brick gave in evidence. [36](2012) 228 IR 195 at 211‑212 [36]‑[41].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ KIEFEL J (dissent) HAYNE J (dissent) CRENNAN J (dissent) GAGELER J
Again, unless some distinction can be drawn between the act of representing or advancing the views or interests of the CFMEU and the manner in which that was done, Mr Doevendans was dismissed for reasons that included his representing or advancing those views. For the reasons given in connection with the application of s 347(b)(iii), no distinction of that kind can be made.Conclusion and orders The appeal to this Court should be allowed. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 13 December 2013 should be set aside and in their place there should be an order that the appeal to that Court is dismissed. The appellant made no application for costs. The issue and the facts in this appeal are set out in the reasons for judgment of Hayne J and will only be repeated here as necessary to explain these reasons. I agree with the orders which his Honour proposes. As to the issue involving ss 346(b), 347(b)(iii) and (v) and 361 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act"), I agree with Hayne J. What follows are brief additional comments concerning what this Court said in Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [No 1][50], added because of the wider implications of misunderstanding Barclay. [50](2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32. Section 346 of the Act protects an employee who engages in "industrial activity"[51], either by participating in a lawful activity organised or promoted by an industrial association[52] (s 347(b)(iii)), or by advancing the views, claims or interests of an industrial association (s 347(b)(v)), from "adverse action"[53] by an employer. Importantly, s 360 provides that, for those purposes, "a person takes action for a particular reason if the reasons for the action include that reason". Under s 361(1) it is presumed that action taken by an employer was taken for a prohibited reason, or reasons which included a prohibited reason, unless the employer establishes otherwise. As recognised in Barclay, the provisions present an issue of fact to be decided on the balance of probabilities in the light of all the established facts and circumstances[54]. The court's task is to ask "why the employer took adverse action against the employee, and to ask whether it was for a prohibited reason or reasons which included a prohibited reason"[55].[51]Act, s 346(b).[52]Defined in s 12 of the Act.[53]Defined in s 342(1) of the Act.[54]Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at 523 [62] per French CJ and Crennan J, 531 [88], 542 [127] per Gummow and Hayne JJ.[55]Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at 506 [5] per French CJ and Crennan J. In Barclay, the primary judge was satisfied that the decision‑maker acted for the reasons she gave. His Honour also accepted her denials that she acted for any reason prohibited under the Act, particularly under s 346(a)[56]. Neither party challenged those findings of fact by the primary judge. In this Court it was acknowledged that direct testimony of a decision‑maker which is accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the burden of proof cast upon an employer[57]. This does not mean that an assertion by a credible decision‑maker that adverse action was not taken because of any prohibited reason will always discharge the statutory onus on an employer to prove that the reasons for taking adverse action did not include a prohibited reason. It is open to a trier of fact to accept as honest and credible a decision‑maker's explanation of his or her decision for taking adverse action, then to weigh all the evidence (including an assertion that the decision‑maker did not act for any prohibited reason) but not be satisfied that an employer has discharged the statutory onus of proving that the reasons did not include any prohibited reason.[56]See Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at 505-506 [4] per French CJ and Crennan J.[57]Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at 521 [54], 523 [62] per French CJ and Crennan J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GAGELER J

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