Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc (No 3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2G 393  

File number(s): MLG 995 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES
Date of judgment: 8 May 2025
Catchwords: FAIR WORK – general protections – where applicant alleges dismissal for a prohibited reason or reasons – complex background narrative – whether applicant possessed or exercised workplace rights – consideration of complaints applicant is able to make – where purported reason for dismissal was redundancy following organisational restructure – where corporate respondent identifies a single decision-maker – consideration of the scope of the corporation’s state of mind - whether other persons contributed to decision-making in a material, substantial or essential manner – whether states of mind of decision-maker or those who contributed infected by prohibited reasons – statutory presumption in favour of prohibited reasons alleged by applicant – whether respondent discharged the statutory onus – lanunae and inconsistencies in the evidence of decision-making processes and reasoning – where court not persuaded that applicant’s exercises of workplace rights did not actuate or influence decision to restructure and terminate – statutory onus to “prove otherwise” not discharged – whether second and third respondents involved in the corporate respondent’s contravention  
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 117, 340, 341, 342, 360, 361, 550, 793
Cases cited:

Alam v National Australia Bank (2021) 288 FCR 301; [2021] FCAFC 178

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall [2018] FCAFC 83; (2018) 261 FCR 347

Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332

Board of Bendigo Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32

Brambles Holdings Ltd v Carey (1976) 12 SASR 270

Cigarette & Gift Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whelan [2019] FCAFC 16; (2019) 268 FCR 46

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 157; (2015) 238 FCR 273

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 41, (2014) 253 CLR 243

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Claremont Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1014; (2015) 253 IR 166

Eckel v Ballarat Community Health Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 890

Elliot v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] FCAFC 1804; (2001) 129 IR 251

Ermel v Dulux Group (Australasia) Pty Ltd (No.2) [2015] FCA 17

Evans v Braddock [2015] NSWSC 249

EZY Accounting 123 Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2018] FCAFC 134

Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Ltd [2014] FCA 1365

Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu [2019] FCAFC 133

Fair Work Ombudsman v South Jin Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1456

General Motors-Holder Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605

Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 3560

Hill v Compass Ten Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 761; (2012) 205 FCR 94

Kaur…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc (No 3), the applicant alleged that she was dismissed for exercising workplace rights. The dispute was heard by the Fair Work Commission, which found in favour of the applicant. The Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc (SMRC) contended that the dismissal was due to organisational restructuring and redundancy. The central legal issues were whether the applicant possessed or exercised workplace rights and if those rights played a substantial role in the decision to terminate her employment. The court needed to determine if the statutory onus of proof was discharged by the respondents, considering the presumption in favour of the applicant’s allegations and the inconsistencies in the evidence.

The court scrutinised the evidence and found it lacking in clarity and contemporaneous documentation. The reasoning provided for the restructuring was broad and appeared tailored to withstand legal challenges, raising suspicions about the true motivations behind the decision. The court was not persuaded that the applicant’s exercises of workplace rights did not influence the decision to restructure and terminate her employment. The inconsistencies and lack of evidence regarding the decision-making process led the court to doubt the claimed independence of the decision-maker. Consequently, the court found that the statutory onus to "prove otherwise" was not discharged, and the applicant’s allegations of prohibited reasons for dismissal were substantiated.

The Fair Work Commission concluded that Ms Shum was subjected to adverse action due to the exercise of her workplace rights. The court did not require Ms Shum to prove that her rights were the sole reason for her dismissal, only that they were a substantial and operative reason. The evidence did not sufficiently support the claim that the restructuring and dismissal were due solely to organisational reasons. The court’s decision reflects a sense of disquiet about the state of the evidence and the lack of clarity in the decision-making process.

The final orders of the Fair Work Commission were that Ms Shum’s dismissal was unlawful and that she was entitled to compensation and reinstatement. The respondents were directed to pay the applicant’s legal costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Where other comments regarding the credit of individual witnesses are warranted, including Mr Heeney, I express my observations throughout the course of these reasons.BACKGROUND FACTS There are few agreed facts in this case. The parties give very different narratives, each representing their own perspective on the same events. There are many factual contests and inconsistencies in the evidence, compounded by fading recollections and a deficit of contemporaneous documentation. In this judgment it is simply not possible to refer to every piece of evidence the parties have relied upon or to address every argument raised by them. The following narrative represents an amalgam of what I understand to be agreed facts, uncontroversial or uncontested evidence and my findings in relation to relevant contested matters. Where it has been necessary to resolve an inconsistency or conflict in the evidence, I will explain how I have done so. SMRC is governed by a board of directors, each of whom is a volunteer. The majority of the Board of 11 is elected by the 200 or so members of SMRC and the constitution makes provision for appointments to the Board. The Board is responsible for the governance of the organisation and the employment of a chief executive who oversees management and operations. In 2017 SMRC had a workforce of about 60 permanent employees and around 150 volunteers who between them spoke more than 60 languages. The organisation provided a range of services to migrants including community support, settlement assistance, aged care services and access to social enterprises and participation. Mr Oates has been the chairman of the board for many years. He is a former trade union official and municipal councillor. Mr Oates first joined the board of SMRC in 1998, the same year he became a member. He was elected as chairman in 2010 and relevantly remained in that position throughout the period of Ms Shum’s employment. Mr Oates gave evidence that the constitution of SMRC was amended in 2014 to introduce a new category of membership: associate member, which included SMRC volunteers and employees. He said that the distinction between financial members and associate members was introduced to ensure there was no real or perceived conflict of interest by preventing employees from being both. Mr Oates also gave evidence about another amendment in 2016 which set limitations on the period for which a person could serve on the board. For the purposes of this judgment the story commences in June 2016, when Ms Shum accepted employment in the position of Team Leader – Finance. She had previously performed some part-time work in a locum capacity at SMRC, but her full-time appointment commenced in June. In her role as Team Leader, she reported to Mr Jacob Lee, the Corporate Services Manager, a long-time employee of SMRC. As team leader, Ms Shum supervised the Assistant Finance Officer, Ms Champa Wattegamage and the Bookkeeper, Ms Perla Mazie. It is not disputed that late 2016 saw a period of significant instability and dysfunction within the governance of SMRC and its workplace. SMRC was riven with conflict and internecine disputes between its Board, its then CEO Ms Jenny Semple and members of executive management.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The reasoning for the decision to restructure was expressed in broad aspirational language. The formal memorandum to the board which accompanied Mr Heeney’s restructuring proposal was an exemplar in corporate speak and showed the hallmarks of careful curation by legal advisers experienced in employment law. The memorandum to the board and the near identical communication which was sent to staff a few days later said all the right things and appeared tailored to pass muster if the redundancies were subsequently challenged in unfair dismissal proceedings. CONCLUSION Ms Shum was subjected to adverse action in her employment, that being the termination of her employment on 19 May 2017. I have found that prior to her dismissal and during the course of her appointment, Ms Shum exercised workplace rights by making complaints and inquiries in relation to her employment and by initiating proceedings in relation to her WorkCover claim and claims of having been bullied (Fair Work Commission proceeding). The respondents admit the majority of (but not all) instances alleged by the Shum to constitute the exercise of workplace rights. It is not necessary for Ms Shum to demonstrate that exercises of workplace rights were the reason for her dismissal. It is enough if they were a substantial and operative reason, even if there were other non-prohibited reasons. I am not satisfied and do not feel a sense of actual persuasion that SMRC has proved on the balance of probabilities that Mr Heeney effected the restructure and dismissal of Ms Shum solely for the reasons claimed. This conclusion reflects my unease as to the state of the evidence which, as I have said, leaves me with a sense that the court has not been presented with the full picture of how and why the decision was made. In TWU v Qantas at first instance, Lee J observed that the evidence exposed a “huge degree of artificiality” about how the decision came about and that the evidence revealed that it was “all reverse engineered”. As I do in this judgment, Justice Lee expressed concern about the absence of contemporaneous records and the absence of evidence which disclosed who said what to whom about the impugned decision. He said the state of the evidence left him with a sense of disquiet such that he did not fully understand the true extent and nature of the dealings between certain people and what was said and to whom and when. I am left with a similar sense of disquiet in this case. After hearing all the evidence I am skeptical about Mr Heeney’s claimed independence from the board and other influential executives within the organisation. I do not accept that he had the knowledge or necessary factual foundation to make a sensibly informed decision about the structure of the organisation without exposing himself to the significant influence and views of others. I find it difficult to accept that he operated as a self-guided executive quarantined from the views of those in his orbit. As to whether others made a significant, material, essential or influential contribution to the decision, I am satisfied they did so by shaping Mr Heeney’s thinking about the form and impact of his restructuring decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established