FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc v Shum (No 3) [2022] FCA 481
Appeal from: Lai Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc & Ors [2020] FCCA 214 File number: VID 127 of 2020 Judgment of: SNADEN J Date of judgment: 4 May 2022 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – employment – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) – adverse action – workplace rights – complaint or inquiry in relation to employment – temporary absence from work due to illness or injury – primary claim against employer respondent – accessorial claim against human respondents – FCCA partially upheld employee’s claims – appeal by those respondents found to have contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) – adverse findings against party witnesses by primary judge – finding of conspiracy to contravene FW Act – whether matters on which adverse findings were based were put to witnesses – rule in Brown v Dunne – matters not put to witnesses – trial judge’s conclusions on primary and accessorial claims affected by error – miscarriage of justice – cross appeal – incorporation of workplace policies into employment contract – National Employment Standards – whether notice of termination of employment validly given – payment in lieu of notice not coincident with notice of termination – contravention of s 117 of FW Act – appeal allowed in part – cross-appeal allowed in part – retrial ordered – scope of remittal confined Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 28A
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 8, 9, 14A
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44, 97, 117, 119, 340, 341, 342, 351, 352, 360, 361, 545, 550
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 28
Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 3.01
Cases cited: Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2017) 269 IR 28
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 261 FCR 347
Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332
Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Brown v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50
Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203
Devries v Australian Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Goldman Sachs JBWere v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361
McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (2016) 92 NSWLR 326
McLoughlin v Randstad Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 160
Neat Holdings Pty…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 481
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The cross-appellant’s application for leave to amend her notice of cross appeal be dismissed.
2. The appeal be allowed in part.
3. The cross-appeal be allowed in part.
4. The notice of contention be dismissed.
5. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and, in lieu thereof—and save insofar as concerns the issues that are to be the subject of the trial referred to in order 6—the further amended application that the respondent lodged in the court below on 20 June 2019 be dismissed.
6. There be a new trial, to be conducted before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2), limited to the following issues, namely:
(a) whether the first appellant terminated its employment of the respondent in contravention of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth);
(b) if it did, whether either of the second and third appellants was (or both of them were), for the purposes of s 550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), involved in that contravention such that he or they might be taken also to have engaged in or committed it;
(c) to the extent that any such contraventions are established, what, if any, relief should be granted in consequence; and
(d) what, if any, relief should be granted in consequence of the first appellant’s having dismissed the respondent contrary to the requirements of s 117(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The hearing was accordingly delayed by nearly two hours in order to allow Ms Shum to attend at her local post office to collect her copy of the appeal book (after she indicated that she was, not unreasonably, uncomfortable proceeding with the hearing without it). She resisted the court’s insistence upon that course on the basis that she could not simply attend the post office “like a lunatic” without a postal collection card. She ultimately agreed to do so and the hearing thereafter proceeded in a more orthodox manner.CONSIDERATION: THE APPEAL It is convenient to address each of the appeal ground groupings that were described earlier.Appeal grounds one to three In the appellants’ written submissions, grounds one to three of the appeal are described, collectively, as the “natural justice error”. As already outlined, the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint expressed in grounds one and two of the appeal is that certain findings were made that should not have been made because, first, the rule in Brown v Dunne was not followed; and, secondly, the judicial obligation to put was not followed (to the extent that it applied). A distinct but related complaint, which finds voice in ground three, is that because the proceeding below involved allegations that, if substantiated, would expose the appellants to penalty, s 140 of the Evidence Act required a quality to the evidence led in proof of those allegations that was ultimately unmet. The appellants’ complaint on this score is that the primary judge failed to consider the quality of the evidence to the standard required by that section and, thereby, erred. In reaching her conclusions, the learned primary judge analysed the budgetary reasons by which Mr Heeney said that his decision to make Ms Shum’s position redundant was animated. Her Honour rejected those reasons, largely by reference to the financial information contained in exhibit 11 (being the note addressed to Mr Heeney about the financial consequences of the proposed restructure and other budgetary documents), which sowed doubt in her Honour’s mind over both the necessity to achieve the anticipated costs savings and whether the proposed restructure would, in fact, bring about that objective. As will shortly be explored, the rejection of that evidence by the primary judge—and, perhaps more importantly, the finding of the existence of an alternative narrative—was ultimately fatal to the appellants’ defence. The appellants assert that it was impermissible for the learned primary judge to reason from a conclusion that Ms Shum’s dismissal was not made for budgetary reasons that it was, instead, made for a reason or reasons proscribed by s 340(1) of the FW Act. There is, of course, no statutory presumption that either Mr Heeney or Mr Oates—whose liability, if there was any, arose under s 550 of the Act—acted for a prohibited reason: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50 [59] (Greenwood, Flick and Rangiah JJ); Australian Red Cross Society & Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2018) 273 FCR 332, 348-349 [97] (Greenwood, Besanko and Rangiah JJ); Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 216 FCR 70, 117 [241] (Murphy J); Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2017) 269 IR 28, 39 [26] (Flick J). That is a matter that must be positively established by evidence, which, the appellants say, did not occur.