Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc v Shum (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc v Shum (No 3) [2022] FCA 481

Appeal from: Lai Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc & Ors [2020] FCCA 214
File number: VID 127 of 2020
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 4 May 2022
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – employment – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) – adverse action – workplace rights – complaint or inquiry in relation to employment – temporary absence from work due to illness or injury – primary claim against employer respondent – accessorial claim against human respondents – FCCA partially upheld employee’s claims – appeal by those respondents found to have contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) – adverse findings against party witnesses by primary judge – finding of conspiracy to contravene FW Act – whether matters on which adverse findings were based were put to witnesses – rule in Brown v Dunne – matters not put to witnesses – trial judge’s conclusions on primary and accessorial claims affected by error – miscarriage of justice – cross appeal – incorporation of workplace policies into employment contract – National Employment Standards – whether notice of termination of employment validly given – payment in lieu of notice not coincident with notice of termination – contravention of s 117 of FW Act – appeal allowed in part – cross-appeal allowed in part – retrial ordered – scope of remittal confined
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 28A

Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 8, 9, 14A

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44, 97, 117, 119, 340, 341, 342, 351, 352, 360, 361, 545, 550

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 28

Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 3.01

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2017) 269 IR 28

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 261 FCR 347

Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 216 FCR 70

Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Brown v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50

Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203

Devries v Australian Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Goldman Sachs JBWere v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129

McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (2016) 92 NSWLR 326

McLoughlin v Randstad Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 160

Neat Holdings Pty…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 481
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by SMRC, Mr Oates, and Mr Heeney against the Federal Circuit Court of Australia’s partial upholding of Ms Shum’s claims that her employment was terminated in breach of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and that Mr Oates and Mr Heeney were accessories to those contraventions. Ms Shum cross-appealed from the adverse findings against her on other claims. The legal issues included whether the trial judge’s findings were affected by an error of law, particularly concerning the rule in Brown v Dunne and the judicial duty to put. The court found that the primary judge’s conclusions on certain claims were indeed affected by errors of law, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, and the cross-appeal was dismissed except for one issue. The court ordered a retrial limited to specific issues concerning the contraventions of the Fair Work Act and the appropriate relief.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The cross-appellant’s application for leave to amend her notice of cross appeal be dismissed.

2. The appeal be allowed in part.

3. The cross-appeal be allowed in part.

4. The notice of contention be dismissed.

5. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and, in lieu thereof—and save insofar as concerns the issues that are to be the subject of the trial referred to in order 6—the further amended application that the respondent lodged in the court below on 20 June 2019 be dismissed.

6. There be a new trial, to be conducted before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2), limited to the following issues, namely:

(a) whether the first appellant terminated its employment of the respondent in contravention of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth);

(b) if it did, whether either of the second and third appellants was (or both of them were), for the purposes of s 550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), involved in that contravention such that he or they might be taken also to have engaged in or committed it;

(c) to the extent that any such contraventions are established, what, if any, relief should be granted in consequence; and

(d) what, if any, relief should be granted in consequence of the first appellant’s having dismissed the respondent contrary to the requirements of s 117(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Also for the reasons set out below, the cross-appeal must (and will) be dismissed, save in respect of one issue. With respect, the primary judge erred by failing to conclude that Ms Shum’s employment was terminated contrary to the requirements of s 117 of the FW Act (and, therefore, in breach of s 44 of the FW Act). The relief that should flow from that contravention should be the subject of further consideration by the FCCA and I will make orders consistent with that course.BACKGROUND SMRC is a not-for-profit incorporated association that provides social support services for migrants and refugees. At times relevant for present purposes, it employed Ms Shum in the position of “Team Leader, Finance”. The dispute arises out of what appears to have been a period of some turmoil within SMRC. The primary judge recorded that there was dysfunction at SMRC, both in the workplace and at board level. It is unnecessary to describe that dysfunction in detail. It is, however, necessary to summarise some factual matters relevant to the grounds that both sides advance. In particular, it is necessary to describe the events that gave rise to Ms Shum’s exercising of “workplace rights” under the FW Act, the circumstances of Mr Heeney’s appointment as interim CEO of SMRC, and the restructure of SMRC that he subsequently propounded (and which was said to have occasioned Ms Shum’s dismissal for reasons of redundancy). On 1 March 2017, Ms Wattegamage (the fifth cross-respondent) made a written complaint to Ms Amandeep Bindra (the sixth cross-respondent) about Ms Shum’s behaviour towards her in the SMRC workplace. It is unnecessary to describe that behaviour. Later that day, Ms Wattegamage spoke to Ms Despina Haralambopoulos (the fourth cross-respondent and then acting CEO) about her written complaint, and made a further oral complaint about separate conduct in which Ms Shum had engaged (and by which she, Ms Wattegamage, felt aggrieved). Ms Shum attended work on 6 March 2017 to meet with Ms Haralambopoulos about what Ms Wattegamage had reported. During that meeting, Ms Haralambopoulos handed Ms Shum a copy of a letter stating, relevantly, that a “disciplinary meeting” with Ms Shum was scheduled for 8 March 2017. Ms Shum told Ms Haralambopoulos that she would not attend any disciplinary meeting and, on 7 March 2017, commenced a period of extended personal leave. Thereafter, no further investigation into Ms Wattegamage’s complaints occurred. On 8 March 2017, Ms Shum lodged a WorkCover claim alleging that she had been subjected to bullying at SMRC and was experiencing stress. Ms Haralambopoulos, in her capacity as acting CEO, was involved in compiling a response to that claim. It was prepared and submitted to SMRC’s insurer, which ultimately rejected the claim. Of relevance to the present dispute, Ms Shum alleged that Ms Haralambopoulos had lied in the response that she (Ms Haralambopoulos) had prepared on SMRC’s behalf. Ms Shum also lodged an application in the Fair Work Commission seeking orders to require that several of the cross-respondents stop bullying her. She remained absent from work from 7 March 2017.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By grounds one to three, the appellants assert that the primary judge’s finding of conspiracy against Mr Oates and Mr Heeney—and, by extension, against SMRC (insofar as concerned its reasons for terminating Ms Shum’s employment)—were not open to be made because:(1)the material facts supporting that finding were not put to either Mr Oates or Mr Heeney in cross-examination;(2)in the alternative, the material facts supporting that finding were not put to either Mr Oates or Mr Heeney by the primary judge, in breach of what was described as the “judicial duty to put”; and(3)the primary judge failed to consider or apply the standard required under s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“Evidence Act”) having regard to the gravity of the facts alleged against Mr Oates and Mr Heeney in the context of allegations involving the breach of a civil penalty provision of the FW Act. By ground four, the appellants assert that the primary judge erred by inferring that SMRC’s decision makers were actuated to dismiss Ms Shum for reasons proscribed by pt 3-1 of the FW Act, as there was “no clear and disclosed factual foundation set out in the reasons from which each inference could be drawn”. By grounds five and six, the appellants assert that the primary judge’s findings that Mr Oates and Mr Heeney were not credible were demonstrably wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony or, alternatively, were glaringly improbable having regard to the evidence in the proceeding. Grounds seven and eight are likewise connected and, on the first day of the hearing, the appellants made an oral application for leave to amend their notice of appeal—namely seeking the addition of grounds eight A and eight B. Ms Shum had been on notice of the proposed amendments for several weeks before the hearing and, although she objected to the application on the basis that she would suffer prejudice by the grant of leave, I was satisfied (for reasons then given) that it was appropriate to permit the agitation of the additional grounds. The substance of them is that:(1)the primary judge erred in finding a contravention of s 352 of the FW Act (that is, by finding that Ms Shum was dismissed because she was “temporarily absent from work because of illness or injury of a kind prescribed by the regulations”) without first having found that Ms Shum was absent from work and that that absence was of a kind prescribed by reg 3.01 of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth); (2)there being no primary liability under s 352 of the FW Act, the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Heeney was accessorially liable for that contravention;(3)the primary judge failed to provide reasons as to how she determined:(a)the duration of Ms Shum’s absence from work of a kind prescribed by the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth); and (b)the facts and circumstances in which Mr Heeney was actuated to contravene s 352 of the FW Act; and(4)there was a failure by Ms Shum and/or the primary judge to put to Mr Heeney that he had been involved in the contravention of s 352 of the FW Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By orders made on 5 February 2020, the FCCA partially upheld Ms Shum’s claims: Shum v Southern Migrant and Refugee Centre Inc & Ors [2020] FCCA 214 (the “Primary Judgment”; Judge Riley). It concluded that Ms Shum’s employment was terminated in breach of s 340 of the FW Act, and that Mr Oates and Mr Heeney were accessories to that contravention. The FCCA also found that SMRC had dismissed Ms Shum in contravention of s 352 of the FW Act and that Mr Heeney was liable as an accessory to (which is to say, was relevantly “involved in”) that contravention. The application was otherwise dismissed. Various forms of declaratory relief were granted and the matter was programmed for further hearing to determine what other relief (presumably relief in the nature of compensation and penalties) should flow in consequence of the court’s conclusions. The appellants are the respondents to the FCCA application against whom Ms Shum succeeded (that is, SMRC, Mr Oates, and Mr Heeney). By leave, they appeal against the entirety of the Primary Judgment. Several grounds of appeal are advanced, all of which are discussed below. Ms Shum cross-appeals from the Primary Judgment in relation to other aspects of her suit—namely, the adverse action and contract claims on which she failed before the FCCA. The cross-respondents are all of the respondents to the FCCA Proceeding. The matter before the FCCA was stayed pending the hearing and determination of this appeal. As it happens (and with respect), that was prudent. For the reasons that follow, the Primary Judgment was a product of error and, for that reason, the appeal should succeed. Regrettably, not all of the errors that attend the Primary Judgment are errors that this court can correct. Instead, the matter must (and will) be remitted for limited retrial, as particularised below. Also for the reasons set out below, the cross-appeal must (and will) be dismissed, save in respect of one issue. With respect, the primary judge erred by failing to conclude that Ms Shum’s employment was terminated contrary to the requirements of s 117 of the FW Act (and, therefore, in breach of s 44 of the FW Act). The relief that should flow from that contravention should be the subject of further consideration by the FCCA and I will make orders consistent with that course.BACKGROUND SMRC is a not-for-profit incorporated association that provides social support services for migrants and refugees. At times relevant for present purposes, it employed Ms Shum in the position of “Team Leader, Finance”. The dispute arises out of what appears to have been a period of some turmoil within SMRC. The primary judge recorded that there was dysfunction at SMRC, both in the workplace and at board level. It is unnecessary to describe that dysfunction in detail. It is, however, necessary to summarise some factual matters relevant to the grounds that both sides advance. In particular, it is necessary to describe the events that gave rise to Ms Shum’s exercising of “workplace rights” under the FW Act, the circumstances of Mr Heeney’s appointment as interim CEO of SMRC, and the restructure of SMRC that he subsequently propounded (and which was said to have occasioned Ms Shum’s dismissal for reasons of redundancy).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The hearing was accordingly delayed by nearly two hours in order to allow Ms Shum to attend at her local post office to collect her copy of the appeal book (after she indicated that she was, not unreasonably, uncomfortable proceeding with the hearing without it). She resisted the court’s insistence upon that course on the basis that she could not simply attend the post office “like a lunatic” without a postal collection card. She ultimately agreed to do so and the hearing thereafter proceeded in a more orthodox manner.CONSIDERATION: THE APPEAL It is convenient to address each of the appeal ground groupings that were described earlier.Appeal grounds one to three In the appellants’ written submissions, grounds one to three of the appeal are described, collectively, as the “natural justice error”. As already outlined, the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint expressed in grounds one and two of the appeal is that certain findings were made that should not have been made because, first, the rule in Brown v Dunne was not followed; and, secondly, the judicial obligation to put was not followed (to the extent that it applied). A distinct but related complaint, which finds voice in ground three, is that because the proceeding below involved allegations that, if substantiated, would expose the appellants to penalty, s 140 of the Evidence Act required a quality to the evidence led in proof of those allegations that was ultimately unmet. The appellants’ complaint on this score is that the primary judge failed to consider the quality of the evidence to the standard required by that section and, thereby, erred. In reaching her conclusions, the learned primary judge analysed the budgetary reasons by which Mr Heeney said that his decision to make Ms Shum’s position redundant was animated. Her Honour rejected those reasons, largely by reference to the financial information contained in exhibit 11 (being the note addressed to Mr Heeney about the financial consequences of the proposed restructure and other budgetary documents), which sowed doubt in her Honour’s mind over both the necessity to achieve the anticipated costs savings and whether the proposed restructure would, in fact, bring about that objective. As will shortly be explored, the rejection of that evidence by the primary judge—and, perhaps more importantly, the finding of the existence of an alternative narrative—was ultimately fatal to the appellants’ defence. The appellants assert that it was impermissible for the learned primary judge to reason from a conclusion that Ms Shum’s dismissal was not made for budgetary reasons that it was, instead, made for a reason or reasons proscribed by s 340(1) of the FW Act. There is, of course, no statutory presumption that either Mr Heeney or Mr Oates—whose liability, if there was any, arose under s 550 of the Act—acted for a prohibited reason: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50 [59] (Greenwood, Flick and Rangiah JJ); Australian Red Cross Society & Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2018) 273 FCR 332, 348-349 [97] (Greenwood, Besanko and Rangiah JJ); Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 216 FCR 70, 117 [241] (Murphy J); Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2017) 269 IR 28, 39 [26] (Flick J). That is a matter that must be positively established by evidence, which, the appellants say, did not occur.