Laing O'Rourke Australia Management Services Pty Ltd v Haley

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Laing O’Rourke Australia Management Services Pty Ltd v Haley [2024] FCA 1323  

Appeal from: Haley v Laing O'Rourke Australia Management Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC2G 286
File number: WAD 86 of 2024
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 15 November 2024
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA) in which primary judge found appellant liable for wrongful termination, adverse action contrary to s 340(1) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) and a contravention of s 117(1) of FW Act – where appellant had summarily terminated employment of respondent for alleged serious misconduct arising from incident at after-hours gathering of work colleagues and subsequent investigation of incident – where primary judge found that appellant had not established serious misconduct on part of respondent – where primary judge found that respondent had exercised certain workplace rights and appellant failed to rebut presumption in s 361 of FW Act that appellant had terminated respondent’s employment “because of” exercise of those rights – where primary judge found that appellant had contravened s 117(1) of FW Act by failing to give respondent notice of termination in authorised manner – consideration of principles of appellate review and remitter – whether primary judge erred in making various findings of fact, including that person identified by appellant as having made decision to dismiss respondent was not, in fact, person who made that decision; and that, where person who primary judge found had made decision to dismiss respondent was not called to give evidence, appellant had failed to rebut presumption in s 361 of FW Act – HELD: majority of alleged factual errors rejected; however, primary judge erred in specified respects; questions as to who was materially involved in decision to terminate respondent’s employment and whether presumption in s 361 of FW Act rebutted to be remitted to different judge of FCFCOA – whether primary judge erred in deciding that respondent had not engaged in serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal – HELD: primary judge did not so err – whether primary judge erred in deciding that appellant took adverse action against respondent because it failed to call as witness person who primary judge determined had made decision to dismiss respondent – HELD: this question to be dealt with on remitter – whether primary judge erred in finding that appellant had contravened s 117(1) in way notice of termination was given to respondent – HELD: primary judge did not err in way contended for by appellant, but serious doubt expressed about correctness of finding of contravention for other reasons not advanced in appeal – whether primary judge denied appellant procedural fairness in proceedings below, including by reason of delay between proceedings and delivery of primary judgment – HELD: no denial of procedural fairness

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where outcome of appeal in large measure turned on forensic choices made by appellant in way it conducted proceedings below and…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1323
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Laing O'Rourke Australia Management Services Pty Ltd (LOR) appeals against a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA) which found it liable for wrongful termination and other breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The appeal focuses on the primary judge's findings that LOR failed to establish serious misconduct by the respondent, Mr Haley, and that his termination was connected to his exercise of workplace rights, contrary to the FW Act. The case concerns the termination of Mr Haley's employment following an incident at an after-hours gathering of colleagues, which LOR investigated and found to involve serious misconduct by Mr Haley. The primary judge, however, disagreed with LOR's findings and concluded that the termination was unlawful.

The legal issues before the court include whether the primary judge erred in various factual findings, such as the identity of the decision-maker and whether the presumption under section 361 of the FW Act was rebutted. Additionally, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in concluding that Mr Haley did not engage in serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal and whether LOR took adverse action against Mr Haley for exercising workplace rights. The court also examined whether the primary judge correctly found that LOR contravened section 117(1) of the FW Act by failing to give proper notice of termination.

In the appeal, the majority of the alleged factual errors were rejected, but certain errors were identified. The court found that questions regarding the identity of the decision-maker and whether the presumption under section 361 of the FW Act was rebutted should be remitted to a different judge of the FCFCOA. The court held that the primary judge did not err in finding that Mr Haley had not engaged in serious misconduct warranting summary dismissal. However, the question of whether LOR took adverse action against Mr Haley was to be addressed on remitter. The court also determined that the primary judge did not err in finding a contravention of section 117(1) of the FW Act, though it expressed doubt about the correctness of this finding for reasons not raised by LOR.

The court rejected LOR's contention that it was denied procedural fairness due to delays in the proceedings. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was fair and did not prejudice LOR's case. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the matter was remitted for redetermination of specific issues.

The court's decision highlights the importance of the forensic choices made by LOR in presenting its case, particularly the failure to call witnesses to testify about the incident in question. Instead, LOR relied heavily on witness accounts and an audio recording, which the court found were not sufficient to establish serious misconduct. The outcome underscores the need for a balanced approach in presenting evidence and the consequences of not adequately addressing key elements of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Declaration 2 made by the primary judge on 28 March 2024 be set aside.

2. The proceedings be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia other than the primary judge for determination in accordance with these reasons and in particular those set out at [277]-[454].

3. The appeal be otherwise dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Browne v Dunn Ground fails.I.3 The Absence of Evidence Ground By this ground, LOR contended that the primary judge acted in the absence of evidence in finding that the Pointons were not entitled to enter the premises during the Incident and that their unlawful entry onto the premises “incited” the Incident. Again, I have already dealt with the subject matter of this ground of appeal above, finding that his Honour did err in finding that the Pointons were not entitled to enter the premises, but that equally the evidence did not establish that they were so entitled. As for the alleged error in finding that their unlawful entry onto the premises “incited” the Incident, for the reasons I have given (including at [534]), I do not consider that the primary judge erred in so finding.J. DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL For all of the foregoing reasons, I will make orders upholding the Seventh and Eighth Alleged Factual Errors, setting aside Declaration 2 made by the primary judge on 28 March 2024 and remitting the matter for redetermination of the matters I have raised above in Part F.7.4(d).

Decision

Reasons for decision

LOR appeals from a number of factual and legal findings made by the primary judge and his Honour’s ultimate conclusions as to liability. The primary judge has since made a determination as to the assessment of damages and compensation, which is now the subject of a separate appeal instituted by LOR: see Haley v Laing O’Rourke Australia Management Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2024] FedCFamC2G 779 (Compensation Judgment). The penalty phase of the proceedings below has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. The primary judgment is lengthy. It considers in detail a vast number of documentary materials, as well as the oral evidence given at trial, resulting in a judgment of 675 paragraphs and over 300 pages in length. Given the grounds of appeal that were advanced by LOR, the hearing and determination of this appeal has involved an extensive review of the evidence in the proceedings below. Regrettably, this has meant that this judgment is also a lengthy one. For the reasons set out below, I have rejected the majority of the grounds of appeal advanced by LOR. Much of LOR’s case below as to Mr Haley’s alleged misconduct rested upon the allegation that during the course of the Incident he had said and directed to the owners of the Pambula Property, Mr and Ms Pointon (the Pointons), the words, “go home you fucking silly old cunt… Go home old man, old lady. Go home, go home, go home, go home”: PJ [142]. LOR ran its case below on the basis that it was the totality of these words which were the “Offensive Words”. The primary judge found, and LOR does not dispute, that the case was never put on the basis that Mr Haley’s conduct in saying the words “Go home old man, old lady. Go home, go home, go home, go home” were sufficient to establish misconduct. LOR’s case in this regard required it to establish that Mr Haley had said the particularly vulgar and profane words “go home you fucking silly old cunt” to and directed them towards the Pointons. The outcome of this appeal does not turn on whether the words “Go home you fucking silly old cunt” were offensive. Rather, in large measure, the outcome of this appeal turns upon whether error has been established based on a real review of the evidence. That evidence needs to be considered in the context of: (a) the specific case advanced by LOR; and (b) the deliberate forensic choices made by LOR in the way it conducted that case. LOR called no evidence from any witness as to the facts of the Incident, including the Pointons. The only testimony given before the primary judge as to the facts of the Incident was that given by Mr Haley. Instead of calling any witnesses of fact as to the Incident, LOR tendered into evidence the accounts given by witnesses during LOR’s internal investigation into the Incident, together with the final Investigation Report. This evidence consisted of the accounts given by other employees of LOR who were present during the Incident (the Witness Accounts) and the accounts given by the Pointons (the Pointons’ Accounts). These documents were admitted into evidence for a non-hearsay purpose, over Mr Haley’s objection (who was self-represented in the proceedings below). Thereafter, both Mr Haley and LOR relied upon those documents for hearsay purposes and the primary judge did likewise in the primary judgment: see PJ [10]. The primary judge found that LOR did not submit that the Witness Accounts should be accorded little or no weight, and made no submission about what credit should be accorded to those statements. It followed that the Witness Accounts were relied upon in the proceedings below as truthful accounts by both LOR and Mr Haley. LOR did not challenge these findings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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