Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1014

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1014
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION and ALAN JOHN SCOTT v CLERMONT COAL PTY LIMITED
File number: QUD 604 of 2014
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 11 September 2015
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – exercise of workplace rights – engagement in industrial activities – redundancy process – whether respondent contravened ss 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where assessment process involved multiple persons – consideration of who made the decision to terminate the employee’s employment – consideration of the reasoning process leading to the dismissal – consideration of whether adverse action was taken for a proscribed reason – whether the proscribed reasons were a substantial and operative reason – whether the respondent has discharged the reverse onus in s 361 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Cases cited: Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32
Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 265
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243; [2014] HCA 41
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 697
Elliott v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd (2001) 129 IR 251, [2001] FCA 1804
General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605
Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Gray J, 21 December 1987)
Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No 2) (2010) 186 FCR 22; [2010] FCA 399
Murrihy v Betezy.com.au Pty Ltd (2013) 238 IR 307; [2013] FCA 908
National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (2013) 234 IR 139; [2013] FCA 451
Shea v TRUenergy Services Pty Ltd (No 6) (2014) 314 ALR 346; [2014] FCA 271
Date of hearing: 10-13, 27 and 31 March, 1 April, 1 and 18 May 2015
Place: Brisbane
Division: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 215
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr B Docking
Solicitor for the Applicants: Maurice Blackburn
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Murdoch QC, Mr S Meehan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ashurst Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

QUD 604 of 2014

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Applicant

ALAN JOHN SCOTT
Second Applicant

AND:

CLERMONT COAL PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE:

11 SEPTEMBER 2015

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. Until November 2014, Mr Alan Scott was employed by Clermont Coal Pty…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1014
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd, the Fair Work Commission considered whether Clermont Coal had contravened sections 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by terminating the employment of Mr Scott, who was a union delegate and office bearer. The Union alleged that the termination was a result of adverse action taken against Mr Scott for his involvement in industrial activities. The court was tasked with determining who made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott, whether the dismissal was for a proscribed reason, and whether Clermont Coal had discharged the reverse onus in section 361 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

The central legal issues in this case were identifying who made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott, determining whether the dismissal was for a proscribed reason, and whether Clermont Coal had satisfied the reverse onus under section 361 of the FWA. The court had to assess the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved in the decision-making process and evaluate the evidence to determine if Mr Scott's termination was influenced by his industrial activities. Additionally, the court needed to establish if the proscribed reasons were a substantial and operative reason for the dismissal.

The Fair Work Commission found that Mr Pretorius, the Operations Manager at the time, was the individual who made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott, and his reasons for the dismissal needed to be assessed. The court concluded that the decision to dismiss Mr Scott was not taken for a proscribed reason, as there was no evidence to suggest that his industrial activities played a part in the decision. Furthermore, the court held that Clermont Coal had discharged the reverse onus in section 361 of the FWA, as they demonstrated that the redundancy process was followed correctly and the decision to dismiss Mr Scott was not influenced by his union activities.

In conclusion, the Fair Work Commission determined that Clermont Coal did not contravene sections 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in terminating Mr Scott's employment. The court found that Mr Pretorius made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott, and the dismissal was not for a proscribed reason. Moreover, Clermont Coal had discharged the reverse onus in section 361 of the FWA, establishing that the redundancy process was followed correctly and the decision was not influenced by Mr Scott's industrial activities.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

About a month after Mr Scott’s termination took effect, the CFMEU commenced this proceeding claiming that Clermont Coal’s decision to declare Mr Scott’s position redundant and to terminate his employment was made in breach of various provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FWA). It sought relief based upon those alleged breaches. A short time later, the CFMEU obtained leave to amend its originating application to add Mr Scott as the second applicant and to add some further claims for relief on his behalf personally, the most significant of which was a claim that Clermont Coal had taken adverse action against him in breach of ss 340 and 346 of the FWA by dismissing him.THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO MR SCOTT’S CLAIMS Before identifying the main issues in this proceeding, it is convenient to outline the factual background to Mr Scott’s claims. In doing so, I make the following findings of fact. I should add that, for ease of reference in these reasons, unless the context requires otherwise, I will refer to the claims of both the CFMEU and Mr Scott as Mr Scott’s claims.The Clermont Mine Clermont is situated in the Bowen Basin in Central Queensland. It is a town of approximately 2,500 people. The Clermont open-cut coal mine (the Mine) is located about 12 kilometres from the township. It is a large-scale open-cut coal mine. Mining operations commenced at the Mine in mid-2008. At that time, it was managed by Rio Tinto Coal Australia Pty Ltd (Rio Tinto Coal) on behalf of Clermont Coal. Prior to the restructuring of the workforce at the Mine in late 2014 (see at [29] below), there were approximately 730 employees and permanent contractors’ employees working there. After the restructuring, that number was reduced to approximately 616. During 2012, Clermont Coal negotiated an enterprise agreement with its employees. That agreement was subsequently adopted. In early December 2012, it was approved by the Fair Work Commission. It came into operation on 12 December 2012. It is referred to throughout these reasons as the 2012 Enterprise Agreement. The 2012 Enterprise Agreement applied to all the Clermont Mine employees who performed production and engineering roles at the Mine. Before the restructuring of the Mine’s workforce mentioned above, it applied to approximately 454 employees and, after the restructuring, that number was reduced to approximately 390. In about October 2013, Rio Tinto Coal announced it intended to sell its interests in the Clermont Mine to Glencore Xstrata Plc and its joint venture partners. Approximately eight months later, in June 2014, the management of the Clermont Mine was transferred from Rio Tinto Coal to Glencore. However, despite this change in the managing corporation, the majority of the Clermont Mine’s management personnel remained the same.Mr Scott’s employment history Mr Scott had been working as an operator in coal mines in Central Queensland for about a decade before his dismissal in November 2014. From about 2004 to about mid-2008, he worked as an operator at the Blair Athol coal mine, which is also located a short distance from Clermont. That mine closed in about March/April 2008, at which time he applied for a position at the Clermont Mine. It was about to commence operations.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not in dispute that Mr Scott was a member and office bearer of the CFMEU and that, after his appointment as a union delegate, he represented employees in that capacity and/or as an employee representative under clause 4.4 of the 2012 Enterprise Agreement. I have already made factual findings in relation to those activities and others at [21]–[26] above. It follows that I consider Mr Scott engaged in that broad range of union activities at the Mine during the period from 2012 until his dismissal in October 2014 and that all of those activities constitute “industrial activity” within the terms of s 346 of the FWA.WHO MADE THE DECISION TO DISMISS MR SCOTT (ISSUE (C) IN [73] ABOVE)?The contentions This is the third issue identified in [73] and [74] above. There is a marked difference between the positions of Mr Scott and Clermont Coal on this issue. Clermont Coal contends that Mr Pretorius alone made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott and it is therefore the reasons that Mr Pretorius had for the dismissal that must be assessed to determine whether the dismissal was made for a proscribed reason, relying on the High Court’s judgment in Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32 (Barclay). Further, it contends the assessment does not involve an objective test, nor one that takes account of any unconscious reasons. It follows, so it contends, that those persons at Clermont Coal other than Mr Pretorius who had input in the reasoning process are not to be characterised as decision-makers because that approach would effectively mean that the reasons that motivated those persons “even if undisclosed” would be imputed to the decision-maker, Mr Pretorius. However, it accepts that Mr Pretorius’ decision was the culmination of a selection process involving the application of the redundancy selection criteria and, accordingly, the Court will examine the evidence about that process to evaluate whether Mr Pretorius’ evidence should be accepted. For his part, Mr Scott contends that it was Clermont Coal, as a corporate employer, that made the decision to dismiss Mr Scott, not Mr Pretorius as one of a number of officers or employees of that corporate employer. In this contention, he relies, in part, on s 793 of the FWA. That section provides:(1) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:(a)by an officer, employee or agent (an official) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority; or(b)by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express or implied) of an official of the body, if the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the official;is taken, for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body.…(2)If, for the purposes of this Act or the procedural rules, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a body corporate in relation to particular conduct, it is enough to show:(a)that the conduct was engaged in by a person referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b); and(b)that the person had that state of mind.…(3) The state of mind of a person includes:(a)the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or purpose of the person; and(b)the person’s reasons for the intention, opinion, belief or purpose.(Emphasis in original)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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