FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1573
Appeal from: Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 449 File number: NSD 509 of 2022 Judgment of: RAPER J Date of judgment: 12 December 2023 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia – where the primary judge found that the employer’s reasons for taking adverse action did not include the fact that the employee had made a complaint – whether the primary judge erred in fact and law in finding that there was only one decision-maker – appeal dismissed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 340(1), 341, 342, 351, 361, 361(1) Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1014; 253 IR 166
Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, Gray J, 21 December 1987)
Ibarra Campoverde v Regional Health Care Group Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 1502
Monash Health v Singh [2023] FCAFC 166
Wong v National Australia Bank Ltd [2022] FCAFC 155; 318 IR 148
Wood v Lord Mayor, Councillors & Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1979) 41 FLR 1
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of last submissions: 27 October 2023 Date of hearing: 12 October 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Prince SC with Ms K Edwards Solicitor for the Appellant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Elliott SC with Mr J Darams SC and Mr C L W Street Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander & Rogers ORDERS
NSD 509 of 2022 BETWEEN: SUET YING (ALICE) EDGAR
Appellant
AND: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RAPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RAPER J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2): Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 449 (J). The appellant, Ms Edgar, was employed by the respondent, NRFA Services, which provides secretarial and administrative services to Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (a legal firm), to undertake online digital marketing work for its marketing team. Ms Edgar made various complaints or inquiries regarding the conduct of her superiors, Messrs Boxsell (head of digital content and campaigns) and Melzer (chief marketing officer) in the period between August 2017 and March 2018. Between late March and early April 2018, Mr Cross, a workplace relations partner in the firm, conducted an investigation into Ms Edgar’s complaints and found them unsubstantiated. NRFA Services terminated Ms Edgar’s employment on 9 May 2018. Ms Edgar alleged that NRFA Services contravened ss 340 and 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1573
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed whether the primary judge erred in finding that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker. It was found that Ms O’Rourke's decision was independent of Mr Cross's investigation findings. The primary judge's detailed findings supported the conclusion that Ms O’Rourke acted on her own reasoning regarding Ms Edgar's unwillingness to work with specific colleagues, as evidenced by her show-cause letter. The court also rejected the argument that Ms O’Rourke's decision was influenced by Mr Cross's report. The primary judge's findings were fortified by Ms Edgar's own admissions about not wanting to work with certain colleagues, which was a key factor in the decision-making process. The appeal court held that the primary judge did not err in finding that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker, and the evidence supported the independence of her decision.
The appeal was ultimately dismissed. The court found no error in the primary judge's determination that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker in the termination of Ms Edgar's employment. The detailed findings regarding Ms Edgar's unwillingness to work with certain colleagues and the independent nature of Ms O’Rourke's decision-making process were upheld. The court's reasoning was based on the evidence presented and the legal principles concerning corporate decision-making processes. The final order of the court was that the appeal be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. Ms Edgar brought proceedings against NRFA Services, alleging wrongful termination. The primary judge found in favour of NRFA Services, concluding that the termination was not due to Ms Edgar’s complaints but rather because of her failure to address certain issues. Ms Edgar appealed this decision to a higher court, arguing that the primary judge erred in fact and law. The appeal was heard, and the higher court ultimately dismissed the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Central to the resolution of this appeal is understanding what the appellant’s claim (as pleaded and/or otherwise argued) was below regarding Mr Cross and what the primary judge found. ConsiderationWhat was alleged below as the basis for Mr Cross being part of the decision-making process? Regardless of any dispute between the parties as to what is required to be alleged by an applicant in order for the statutory presumption to be enlivened (namely whether an applicant is required to identify the individuals said to comprise the corporate state of mind which took the adverse action), the primary judge accepted that Ms Edgar was able to allege that Mr Cross was a decision-maker (despite the absence of any express pleading to this effect). Accordingly, this is not an issue required to be determined on appeal. However, Ms Edgar is not able, on appeal, to allege a case as to why the statutory presumption was not discharged which was not run below. As will be apparent from the foregoing, Ms Edgar made specific allegations as to involvement or contribution by Mr Cross, Mr Boxsell and Mr Melzer in the decision. The primary judge made specific factual findings (all against Ms Edgar) in relation to the impugned conduct of each of those persons. Undertaking a consideration of Ms Edgar’s allegations as they evolved at hearing, together with a review of the primary judge’s extensive findings, provides the relevant context in which to consider the first appeal ground. Ms Edgar’s case proceeded by way of pleadings: Ms Edgar’s statement of claim did not specify any human decision-maker whom she alleged was responsible for the adverse action relating to the termination of her employment. Her third amended statement of claim pleaded that “[t]he First Respondent [NRFA Services] took adverse action against the Applicant … by dismissing the Applicant because she made any one or more of the complaints or inquiries in regard to the Second Respondent and/or the Third Respondent as set out in the four five complaints/inquiries…”. The particulars given referred to a letter of termination provided to Ms Edgar on 9 May 2018 by Ms O’Rourke. In this case, therefore, Ms Edgar identified the “relevant actor” to be NRFA Services as the corporate entity whose state of mind was under challenge. However, Ms Edgar’s pleaded “material facts necessary to establish that a corporation engaged in the relevant conduct and did so with an identified state of mind” (Monash Health v Singh [2023] FCAFC 166 at [116]), were limited to the following: [11] On 9 May 2018, the First Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment. …[20]The First Respondent took adverse action against the Applicant within the meaning of section 342(1) Item 1(a) by dismissing the Applicant because she made any one or more of the complaints or inquiries in regard to the Second Respondent and/or the Third Respondent as set out in the four five complaints/inquiries referred to in paragraphs 12-14 and 17 above.ParticularsThe Applicant was provided with a letter of termination on 9 May 2018 by Ms O’Rourke.