Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1573  

Appeal from: Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 449
File number: NSD 509 of 2022
Judgment of: RAPER J
Date of judgment: 12 December 2023
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia – where the primary judge found that the employer’s reasons for taking adverse action did not include the fact that the employee had made a complaint – whether the primary judge erred in fact and law in finding that there was only one decision-maker – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 340(1), 341, 342, 351, 361, 361(1)
Cases cited:

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1014; 253 IR 166

Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, Gray J, 21 December 1987)

Ibarra Campoverde v Regional Health Care Group Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 1502

Monash Health v Singh [2023] FCAFC 166

Wong v National Australia Bank Ltd [2022] FCAFC 155; 318 IR 148

Wood v Lord Mayor, Councillors & Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1979) 41 FLR 1

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 60
Date of last submissions: 27 October 2023
Date of hearing: 12 October 2023
Counsel for the Appellant:  Mr S Prince SC with Ms K Edwards
Solicitor for the Appellant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr M Elliott SC with Mr J Darams SC and Mr C L W Street
Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander & Rogers

ORDERS

NSD 509 of 2022
BETWEEN:

SUET YING (ALICE) EDGAR

Appellant

AND:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RAPER J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 DECEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RAPER J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2): Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 449 (J). The appellant, Ms Edgar, was employed by the respondent, NRFA Services, which provides secretarial and administrative services to Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (a legal firm), to undertake online digital marketing work for its marketing team. Ms Edgar made various complaints or inquiries regarding the conduct of her superiors, Messrs Boxsell (head of digital content and campaigns) and Melzer (chief marketing officer) in the period between August 2017 and March 2018. Between late March and early April 2018, Mr Cross, a workplace relations partner in the firm, conducted an investigation into Ms Edgar’s complaints and found them unsubstantiated. NRFA Services terminated Ms Edgar’s employment on 9 May 2018. Ms Edgar alleged that NRFA Services contravened ss 340 and 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1573
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Edgar v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd, the dispute revolved around the decision by Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd (NRFA Services) to terminate the employment of Ms Edgar. The primary judge found that the employer's reasons for taking adverse action did not include the fact that Ms Edgar had made complaints about her workplace. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the primary judge had erred in fact and law in concluding that there was only one decision-maker involved in the termination process. The central legal issue was whether the primary judge was correct in finding that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker and whether Mr Cross, who conducted an investigation, was also part of the decision-making process.

The court addressed whether the primary judge erred in finding that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker. It was found that Ms O’Rourke's decision was independent of Mr Cross's investigation findings. The primary judge's detailed findings supported the conclusion that Ms O’Rourke acted on her own reasoning regarding Ms Edgar's unwillingness to work with specific colleagues, as evidenced by her show-cause letter. The court also rejected the argument that Ms O’Rourke's decision was influenced by Mr Cross's report. The primary judge's findings were fortified by Ms Edgar's own admissions about not wanting to work with certain colleagues, which was a key factor in the decision-making process. The appeal court held that the primary judge did not err in finding that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker, and the evidence supported the independence of her decision.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed. The court found no error in the primary judge's determination that Ms O’Rourke was the sole decision-maker in the termination of Ms Edgar's employment. The detailed findings regarding Ms Edgar's unwillingness to work with certain colleagues and the independent nature of Ms O’Rourke's decision-making process were upheld. The court's reasoning was based on the evidence presented and the legal principles concerning corporate decision-making processes. The final order of the court was that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Edgar was an employee of Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Services Pty Ltd (NRFA Services), who was terminated from her employment. Ms Edgar brought proceedings against NRFA Services, alleging that her termination was unlawful because it was due to her making complaints about the workplace and her claimed medical conditions. The primary judge found that the employer’s reasons for taking adverse action did not include the fact that Ms Edgar had made a complaint. The judge held that the decision to terminate Ms Edgar's employment was made by Ms O’Rourke, who acted independently of any influence from Mr Cross, who conducted an investigation into Ms Edgar's complaints. Ms Edgar appealed this decision, arguing that the primary judge erred in finding that there was only one decision-maker and that Mr Cross was not part of the decision-making process.

The case was initially heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. Ms Edgar brought proceedings against NRFA Services, alleging wrongful termination. The primary judge found in favour of NRFA Services, concluding that the termination was not due to Ms Edgar’s complaints but rather because of her failure to address certain issues. Ms Edgar appealed this decision to a higher court, arguing that the primary judge erred in fact and law. The appeal was heard, and the higher court ultimately dismissed the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour thereafter, in an expansive way, makes good this conclusionary finding as to the independence of Ms O’Rourke’s reasoning: Notation is made of the fact that Mr Cross’s conclusions were relevant to Ms Edgar’s dismissal “only to the extent that upon receipt of the investigation report” it was Ms O’Rourke who drew the rational conclusions regarding Ms Edgar not wanting to work with Mr Boxsell or Mr Melzer, highlighting this conclusion in her show cause letter to Ms Edgar and inviting Ms Edgar to show cause as to why her employment should not be brought to an end by reason of its untenability: at J[785]. There is express, repeated acceptance of Ms O’Rourke’s evidence that it was Ms Edgar’s failure to address satisfactorily the issues raised in the show-cause letter that led her to conclude that her employment had to be terminated (referring to Ms Edgar’s response to the same effect). His Honour also expressly rejected that the conclusion was anything other than an independent one, finding that it was independent from any supposed tendentiousness in the findings expressed by Mr Cross in his investigation report: at J[787]. His Honour found that Ms O’Rourke’s reasons were as she had deposed, including her express denial that they were based on Ms Edgar’s complaints about the workplace and her claimed medical conditions: at J[787]. These findings were fortified by the fact that Ms Edgar had made clear, repeatedly, that she did not want to work with Mr Boxsell or Mr Melzer, to which the primary judge made multiple references: at J[786], [788].Did the primary judge err in not finding that Mr Cross was part of the decision-making process? For the following reasons, and those stated above, this ground is not made out, and the primary judge did not err in not finding that Mr Cross was a decision-maker or part of the decision-making process. As is evident from the above, the determination of whether Mr Cross was a decision-maker, or whether his purported affected or infected report formed some integral part in the ultimate decision made by NRFA Services to terminate Ms Edgar’s employment, is a question of fact. There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal principles, most recently elucidated by the Full Court in Wong at [26] per Katzmann, Charlesworth and O’Sullivan JJ. In Wong, the Full Court found that, where a corporate entity is alleged to have taken adverse action against an employee acting on information or advice actuated by a prohibited reason, that may necessitate the conclusion that the entity’s reasons included a prohibited reason, even where the person providing the information or advice does not formally possess the authority or power to make the decision. Ms Wong’s supervisor, Mr Arnott, was found to be a decision-maker. Analogising between this appeal and Wong, Ms Edgar submitted that, without the findings made by Mr Cross in his investigation report on Ms Edgar’s complaints, Ms O’Rourke would never have been called on to make a decision in relation to her ongoing employment. In Ms Edgar’s contention, Mr Cross’s evidence as to the reasons why he made the findings in his report was therefore crucial to NRFA Services discharging the reverse onus. Although the Full Court in Wong had found the employer not to have contravened the Act, that decision was on the basis that the first instance Court had made findings in relation to Mr Arnott’s state of mind assuming that its conclusion that he was not a decision-maker was wrong. The same is not true here, as the primary judge did not make findings in relation to Mr Cross’s state of mind in the context of the reverse onus.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Central to the resolution of this appeal is understanding what the appellant’s claim (as pleaded and/or otherwise argued) was below regarding Mr Cross and what the primary judge found. ConsiderationWhat was alleged below as the basis for Mr Cross being part of the decision-making process? Regardless of any dispute between the parties as to what is required to be alleged by an applicant in order for the statutory presumption to be enlivened (namely whether an applicant is required to identify the individuals said to comprise the corporate state of mind which took the adverse action), the primary judge accepted that Ms Edgar was able to allege that Mr Cross was a decision-maker (despite the absence of any express pleading to this effect). Accordingly, this is not an issue required to be determined on appeal. However, Ms Edgar is not able, on appeal, to allege a case as to why the statutory presumption was not discharged which was not run below. As will be apparent from the foregoing, Ms Edgar made specific allegations as to involvement or contribution by Mr Cross, Mr Boxsell and Mr Melzer in the decision. The primary judge made specific factual findings (all against Ms Edgar) in relation to the impugned conduct of each of those persons. Undertaking a consideration of Ms Edgar’s allegations as they evolved at hearing, together with a review of the primary judge’s extensive findings, provides the relevant context in which to consider the first appeal ground. Ms Edgar’s case proceeded by way of pleadings: Ms Edgar’s statement of claim did not specify any human decision-maker whom she alleged was responsible for the adverse action relating to the termination of her employment. Her third amended statement of claim pleaded that “[t]he First Respondent [NRFA Services] took adverse action against the Applicant … by dismissing the Applicant because she made any one or more of the complaints or inquiries in regard to the Second Respondent and/or the Third Respondent as set out in the four five complaints/inquiries…”. The particulars given referred to a letter of termination provided to Ms Edgar on 9 May 2018 by Ms O’Rourke. In this case, therefore, Ms Edgar identified the “relevant actor” to be NRFA Services as the corporate entity whose state of mind was under challenge. However, Ms Edgar’s pleaded “material facts necessary to establish that a corporation engaged in the relevant conduct and did so with an identified state of mind” (Monash Health v Singh [2023] FCAFC 166 at [116]), were limited to the following: [11] On 9 May 2018, the First Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment. …[20]The First Respondent took adverse action against the Applicant within the meaning of section 342(1) Item 1(a) by dismissing the Applicant because she made any one or more of the complaints or inquiries in regard to the Second Respondent and/or the Third Respondent as set out in the four five complaints/inquiries referred to in paragraphs 12-14 and 17 above.ParticularsThe Applicant was provided with a letter of termination on 9 May 2018 by Ms O’Rourke.