Pilbrow v University of Melbourne

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 2)

Pilbrow v University of Melbourne [2022] FedCFamC2G 1001

File number(s): MLG 3239 of 2020
Judgment of: DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI
Date of judgment: 1 December 2022
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – where respondent agreed that applicant exercised workplace rights and respondent engaged in conduct which amounted to adverse action in four instances – central issues of who the relevant decision-makers were and whether any of the admitted adverse actions were taken for a proscribed reason – finding that termination of employment was natural consequence of redundancy and unsuccessful redeployment – where applicant’s area of research did not fit within future vision for the Department – reverse onus discharged in relation to three of four instances of adverse action – reverse onus not discharged in relation to one instance where relevant advisors not identified – application largely dismissed – further orders made for future programming of matter.
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 340, 341, 360, 361
Cases cited:

Alam v National Australia Bank (2021) 393 ALR 629

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (2015) 238 FCR 273

Ermel v DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 17

Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109

Peters v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1624

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 286
Date of last submission/s: 17 November 2022
Date of hearing: 28-31 March 2022
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Kelly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Avallone and Mr C McDermott
Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander & Rogers

ORDERS

MLG 3239 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

VARSHA PILBROW
Applicant

AND: THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE
Respondent

order made by:

deputy chief JUDGE MERCURI

DATE OF ORDER:

1 December 2022

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The respondent contravened s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by issuing the applicant with a Final Written Warning dated 6 January 2020.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Save for the adverse action claim relating to the issuing of the Final Written Warning, the applicant’s application otherwise be dismissed.

2.The matter be adjourned for directions hearing on 27 February 2023 at 9:30am in relation to the issue of the future progress of the matter in so far as it relates to order 1 of these orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law)…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC2G 1001
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Pilbrow v University of Melbourne, Dr Varsha Pilbrow brought a claim against the University of Melbourne under the Fair Work Act 2009, alleging that the university took adverse action against her because of her exercise of workplace rights. The adverse actions included the declaration of her position as redundant, allegations of serious misconduct, issuance of a final written warning, and ultimately, her dismissal. The university conceded that the actions constituted adverse action and that Dr Pilbrow had exercised her workplace rights by making a protected disclosure and initiating disputes. The central issue before the court was whether the university took these adverse actions for a proscribed reason, specifically due to Dr Pilbrow's exercise of her workplace rights. The court had to determine if the university's actions were motivated by or included the exercise of these rights as a reason.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Fair Work Act, particularly sections 340, 360, and 361, which prohibit adverse action taken for proscribed reasons, define what constitutes adverse action, and establish a presumption that adverse action was taken for a proscribed reason if it would constitute a contravention of the Act. The court also referenced relevant case law that outlined the principles for determining whether a proscribed reason was a substantial and operative reason for the adverse action. The university bore the onus to rebut the presumption established by section 361.

In evaluating the university's actions, the court examined all the evidence presented, including the university's submissions and the factual circumstances surrounding the adverse actions. The court found that the university failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the adverse actions were taken for a proscribed reason. The university's evidence did not convincingly exclude the possibility that Dr Pilbrow's exercise of workplace rights played a role in the decision-making process. Consequently, the court concluded that the university took the adverse actions for a proscribed reason, violating the provisions of the Fair Work Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The key issue for determination in this case is whether any of the admitted adverse actions were taken because of one or more of the workplace rights exercised by the applicant.Factual background The principal facts in this matter are not largely in dispute. Set out below is a summary of the key facts. Unless the context suggests otherwise, by setting out a fact in these reasons without any qualification or comment, I intend to be taken to have made a finding of that fact stated. The applicant was initially employed by the respondent as a casual tutor in 2008.[1] She progressed in her employment with the respondent until she was appointed to the position of Lecturer (Level B) on 1 July 2010, initially on a fixed term basis and then from 1 July 2013 on an ongoing basis.[2] The applicant continued in this role until her employment came to an end on 27 February 2020. At all times the applicant was employed in the Department of Anatomy and Neuroscience (‘the Department’).[3] The Department is in the School of Biomedical Sciences (‘the School’) in the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences (‘the Faculty’) at the University of Melbourne (‘the University’).[1] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at paragraph [7].[2] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at paragraphs [9] to [10].[3] Although initially the Department was called the Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology. As part of her role in the Department, the applicant provided custodianship for the Richard Berry collection and undertook research and supervised post-graduate students in the area of anatomical sciences focussing on topographical anatomy.[4][4] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at paragraph [16]. At all relevant times, the applicant’s employment was subject to an enterprise agreement binding on the respondent – that is, until 26 March 2019, the University of Melbourne Collective Agreement 2013 applied (‘2013 Enterprise Agreement’) and then from 27 March 2019 until 27 February 2020, the University of Melbourne Collective Agreement 2018 applied (‘2018 Enterprise Agreement’). The applicant participated in an annual performance review each year and from 2017 onwards, the University also introduced a triennial performance development review (‘Triennial reviews’).[5] The Academic Productive Framework Guidelines which applied at the relevant time state:4.5 Annual reviews are an opportunity for the staff member and supervisor to:•Discuss the staff member’s performance over the past year;•Discuss the staff member’s overall career development, trajectory and, where applicable, progress towards promotion and/or confirmation;•Identify areas for growth and development, including potential for SSP, and areas of concern;•Agree on key goals and performance expectations for the coming year.[6][5] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at paragraph [19].[6] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at Annexure VP-6.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Moreover, the parties also agreed that in:(a)making the decision to declare Dr Pilbrow’s position redundant (the ‘Redundancy Decision’);(b)making the serious misconduct allegations against Dr Pilbrow (the ‘Serious Misconduct Allegations’);(c)imposing a Final Written Warning (the ‘Final Written Warning’); and(d)terminating Dr Pilbrow’s employment (the ‘Dismissal’)the respondent took adverse action, as defined, against Dr Pilbrow.[108][108] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed on 25 March 2022 at paragraph [2]. The issue before this court, therefore, is whether the respondent took such adverse action for a proscribed reason, namely because Dr Pilbrow had exercised one or more of the identified workplace rights. In particular, the issues for determination in this case are whether:(a)the respondent made the Redundancy Decision because of or for reasons which included that she had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint and/or commencing the PDR Dispute;(b)the respondent made the Serious Misconduct Allegations because of or for reasons which included that she had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint, commencing the PDR dispute and/or initiating the Change Plan Dispute;(c)the respondent issued the Final Written Warning because of or for reasons which included that the applicant had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint, commencing the PDR Dispute and/or initiating the Change Plan Dispute;(d)the respondent terminated Dr Pilbrow’s employment because or for reasons which included that Dr Pilbrow had exercised her workplace rights by making the PDR Complaint and/or commencing the PDR Dispute.Applicable law Section 340 of the FW Act relevantly provides that:(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:(a) because the other person:(i) has a workplace right; or(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or(iii)proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or(b) to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person. Section 341 of the FW Act then defines the term ‘workplace right’ and section 342 defines the term ‘adverse action’. Given the concessions made in this case, it is not necessary to set out either of those provisions in detail. Section 360 of the FW Act also provides that ‘for the purposes of this Part, a person takes action for a particular reason if the reasons for the action include that reason’. Section 361 of the FW Act further provides that:(1) If:(a)in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and(b)taking that action for that reason or with that intent would constitute a contravention of this Part:it is presumed that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise. The application of section 361 to a claim under section 340 of the FW Act is relatively well-settled. As noted by the respondent at paragraph [5] of their Written Closing Submissions, this issue has recently been considered in Alam v National Australia Bank (2021) 393 ALR 629 at paragraph [14] where the court said:14.Several matters bearing upon the application of s 361 in relation to s 340 are settled:(a) …(b) …(c)an employer takes adverse action in contravention of s 340 if a proscribed reason is a ‘substantial and operative’ reason for the action or if the reasons for the action include the proscribed reason: Bendigo v Barclay at [104] (Gummow and Hayne JJ);(d)the discharge of the s 361 onus requires proof on the balance of probabilities and usually requires decision-makers to give direct evidence of their reasons for taking the adverse action: Bendigo v Barclay at [43]-[44];(e)the determination of why an employer took adverse action against an employee requires an inquiry into the actual reason or reasons of the employer and is to be made in the light of all the circumstances established in the proceeding: Bendigo v Barclay at [41], [45] (French CJ and Crennan J); at [101] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 41, (2014) 253 CLR 243 (CFMEU v BHP Coal) at [7] (French CJ and Kiefel J); Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 157, (2015) 238 FCR 273 (CFMEU v Anglo Coal) at [27]; ABCC v Hall at [19];(f)while the evidence of the decision‑maker as to the reasons for the taking of the adverse action may, if accepted by the Court, satisfy the s 361 onus, such evidence is not a necessary pre‑condition: CFMEU v BHP Coal at [192]; Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees [2019] FCAFC 215, 273 FCR 332 at [72];(g)the Court’s rejection of the evidence of the decision-maker as to the reasons for the adverse action will ordinarily be a ‘weighty consideration and often a determinative consideration’ in the determination of whether the reason alleged by the applicant was a substantial and operative reason for the action … but such a rejection does not relieve the Court from considering all the evidence probative of whether the reason asserted by the applicant has been negated … When there is evidence of a broad range of facts and circumstances, which are not dependent on the acceptance of the decision-maker’s evidence about his or her asserted reason for the dismissal, such evidence must be taken into account in assessing whether the reasons asserted by an applicant were a substantial and operative reason for the action …(h)even if the reasons advanced by a respondent as the actual reasons for the decision are accepted, the absence of evidence that there were no additional reasons or that the actual reasons did not include the alleged proscribed reasons, may result in a failure to rebut the resumption …(i)the decision-maker’s knowledge of the circumstances asserted by an applicant to be the reason for the adverse action, and even its consideration, does not require a finding that the action was taken because of that circumstance … Nor does the fact that the adverse action has some association with a matter supporting a proscribed reason …(j)adverse action taken against a person because of conduct resulting from the exercise of workplace rights may not offend the s 340(1) prohibition …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 27 February 2020, Dr Pilbrow’s employment ultimately came to an end after a number of extensions to the termination date.[106][106] Affidavit of Dr Varsha Pilbrow sworn on 7 January 2022 at paragraphs [87] to [88].Issues for consideration Notwithstanding the complexity of the factual matrix in which this claim arises, the issues for determination before this court are relatively confined. It is not in dispute that Dr Pilbrow had a workplace right to make a complaint or inquiry in relation to her employment under section 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FW Act and that she had a workplace right to initiate a process or proceeding under a workplace instrument under section 341(1)(b) of the FW Act. It is also not in dispute that in making the PDR Complaint, the PDR Dispute and the Change Plan Dispute, Dr Pilbrow exercised a workplace right.[107][107] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed on 25 March 2022 at paragraph [5]. Moreover, the parties also agreed that in:(a)making the decision to declare Dr Pilbrow’s position redundant (the ‘Redundancy Decision’);(b)making the serious misconduct allegations against Dr Pilbrow (the ‘Serious Misconduct Allegations’);(c)imposing a Final Written Warning (the ‘Final Written Warning’); and(d)terminating Dr Pilbrow’s employment (the ‘Dismissal’)the respondent took adverse action, as defined, against Dr Pilbrow.[108][108] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed on 25 March 2022 at paragraph [2]. The issue before this court, therefore, is whether the respondent took such adverse action for a proscribed reason, namely because Dr Pilbrow had exercised one or more of the identified workplace rights. In particular, the issues for determination in this case are whether:(a)the respondent made the Redundancy Decision because of or for reasons which included that she had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint and/or commencing the PDR Dispute;(b)the respondent made the Serious Misconduct Allegations because of or for reasons which included that she had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint, commencing the PDR dispute and/or initiating the Change Plan Dispute;(c)the respondent issued the Final Written Warning because of or for reasons which included that the applicant had exercised a workplace right by making the PDR Complaint, commencing the PDR Dispute and/or initiating the Change Plan Dispute;(d)the respondent terminated Dr Pilbrow’s employment because or for reasons which included that Dr Pilbrow had exercised her workplace rights by making the PDR Complaint and/or commencing the PDR Dispute.Applicable law Section 340 of the FW Act relevantly provides that:(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:(a) because the other person:(i) has a workplace right; or(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or(iii)proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or(b) to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.