Pilbrow v University of Melbourne

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pilbrow v University of Melbourne [2024] FCA 1140  

Appeal from: Pilbrow v University of Melbourne [2022] FedCFamC2G 1001
File number: VID 781 of 2022
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 30 September 2024
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – employment – adverse action – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) – where appellant dismissed purportedly for reasons of redundancy – where appellant was separately subjected to allegations of misconduct – whether primary judge erred by concluding that various personnel were not relevantly involved in making various decisions on behalf of the respondent employer – whether primary judge erred by concluding that evidence sufficed to permit identification of decision makers – whether primary judge erred by concluding that respondent employer had rebutted statutory presumption as to its reasons for acting – appeal allowed in part
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 342, 360, 361, 539, 793

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Cases cited:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 253 IR 166

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal (2015) 231 FCR 150

Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421

Elliot v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd (2001) 129 IR 251

Fair Work Ombudsman v Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (The Beams Lift Case) (No 2) [2024] FCA 779

Fair Work Ombudsman v Doll House Training Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 811

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129

Minister for Immigration v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541

Monash Health v Singh (2023) 327 IR 196

Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (2022) 292 FCR 34

Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia (2023) 412 ALR 134

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679

Serpanos v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1226

TechnologyOne Ltd v Roohizadegan (2021) 309 IR 262

Wong v National Australia Bank Ltd (2022) 318 IR 148

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 168
Date of hearing: 17 April 2024
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms J Firkin KC with Ms S Kelly
Solicitor for the Appellant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Avallone with Mr C McDermott
Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander & Rogers

ORDERS

VID 781 of 2022
BETWEEN:

VARSHA PILBROW

Appellant

AND:

THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 SEPTEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Pilbrow v University of Melbourne was brought by Dr Pilbrow against the University of Melbourne, challenging her dismissal and related adverse actions. The case originated from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) and was appealed to a higher court. The central dispute revolved around Dr Pilbrow's dismissal, which she claimed was due to redundancy, and separate allegations of misconduct. Dr Pilbrow argued that these actions were retaliatory, motivated by her exercise of workplace rights, and therefore unlawful.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in identifying the decision-makers for the University, whether there was sufficient evidence to identify these decision-makers, and whether the University successfully rebutted the statutory presumption that the adverse actions were related to the exercise of workplace rights. The court had to determine if the primary judge's conclusions on these points were correct and if the University's reasons for its actions were properly substantiated.

The court found that while the primary judge's identification of decision-makers and the sufficiency of the evidence were correctly determined, there was an error regarding the rebuttal of the statutory presumption. The court held that the evidence provided by the University did not adequately demonstrate that the misconduct allegations were not motivated by Dr Pilbrow's exercise of workplace rights. Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part. The court ordered the primary judge's orders to be set aside, dismissed the adverse action claims except those relating to specific warnings and allegations, and scheduled a directions hearing for the remaining issues.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part.

2. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and, in their place, it be ordered that:

(a) Save for the adverse action claims relating to the issuing of the Final Written Warning and the issuing of the Serious Misconduct Allegations, the applicant’s application otherwise be dismissed.

(b) The matter be adjourned for a directions hearing before the primary judge on a date to be fixed in relation to the issue of the future progress of the matter in so far as it relates to those parts of the applicant’s application that are not dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be allowed in part. Respectfully, I consider that the leaned primary judge erred by concluding that the University had led evidence sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption that arose in connection with the second of the contentions summarised above. In fact, such evidence as there was failed to establish that Dr Pilbrow’s subjection to misconduct allegations was not actuated by her having exercised a workplace right or workplace rights. The appeal should otherwise fail. As is already envisaged, the matter should proceed before the primary judge for the determination of remedial orders, albeit on a basis slightly expanded from that upon which her Honour settled.BACKGROUND FACTS Relevantly for present purposes, there is little in the way of background fact that is controversial. The learned primary judge set out her findings in that regard in a careful and thorough summation within her reasons for judgment: Primary Judgment, [5]-[75]. It suffices to summarise them as follows. Dr Pilbrow commenced her employment with the University in 2008, then as a casual tutor. In 2010, she was appointed to the role of lecturer, initially on a fixed-term basis and then, from July 2013, on an ongoing basis. It was from that role that she was dismissed with effect from 27 February 2020. Dr Pilbrow was engaged within the University’s Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences. As might be appreciated, that faculty (hereafter, the “Faculty”) was comprised of various “schools”, one of which, at relevant times, was the School of Biomedical Sciences. That school (the “School”) was itself comprised of a series of departments, one of which was known as the Department of Anatomy and Neuroscience. It was within that department (the “Department”) that Dr Pilbrow worked as a lecturer. The terms upon which she was employed were subject to statutory instruments that were in force pursuant to the FW Act (or its predecessor): specifically at the time of her dismissal, an enterprise agreement known as the University of Melbourne Collective Agreement 2018 (the “EA”). At the times of relevance to this appeal, Dr Pilbrow reported to the Head of the Department, Prof Jennifer Wilkinson-Berka. Prof Wilkinson-Berka, in turn, reported to the Head of the School, Prof Fabienne Mackay. Prof Mackay was answerable to the Dean of the Faculty, Prof Kapur. As a lecturer within the Department, Dr Pilbrow’s focus (at least at the time that her employment ended) was topographic anatomy. She performed the role of subject coordinator for a single subject known as “Human Locomotor Systems”. Additionally, Dr Pilbrow oversaw what was known as the Richard Berry collection of skeletal remains. In her reasons for judgment, the learned primary judge was astute to set out what presents as Dr Pilbrow’s unfortunate history of disputation or conflict with others within the School. I am fortunate to observe that none of that history bears upon the resolution of the appeal. That being so, it is unnecessary that I should attempt what would surely be the difficult task of improving upon her Honour’s summary.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

By her amended statement of claim dated 25 November 2020, Dr Pilbrow relevantly alleged as follows:30.On 12 August 2019 Dr Pilbrow attended a meeting with Professor Jenny Wilkinson-Berka, the Head of the Department.…31.In that meeting Dr Pilbrow was provided with a document entitled Change Plan.32.Dr Pilbrow was told that [the University] had decided to make her position redundant in accordance with the Change Plan. (Redundancy Decision).…39.On 18 October 2019, Dr Pilbrow attended a meeting with Mr Caswell and Ms Karakiozakis. In that meeting, Mr Caswell:a.alleged that Dr Pilbrow had engaged in serious misconduct (Serious Misconduct Allegation); and……41.On 25 October 2019, Mr Caswell set out the Serious Misconduct Allegation in a letter to Dr Pilbrow.ParticularsThe allegation was that Dr Pilbrow was responsible for deleting digital files, such as teaching materials, practical class notes, assessments and course timetables from the [University’s] Learning Management System (LMS). It was also alleged that she deleted those a second time, after they had been reloaded by the Department to the LMS.46.[The University] extended Dr Pilbrow’s termination date several times in the period 6 September to 24 December 2019.ParticularsOn 6 September 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be terminated on the grounds of redundancy on 1 November 2019.On 15 October 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 14 November 2019.On 5 November 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 29 November 2019.On 28 November 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 6 December 2019.On 6 December 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 13 December 2019.On 13 December 2019 Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 20 December 2019[.]On 18 December [2019] Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would be extended to 24 January 2020[.]Finally, on 24 December 2019, Dr Pilbrow was notified that her employment would again be extended, and she would instead be terminated on the grounds of redundancy on 27 February 2020.47.In accordance with the notice dated 24 December 2019, Dr Pilbrow’s employment was terminated with effect on 27 February 2020 (the Dismissal).…52.The Redundancy Decision [and] the Serious Misconduct Allegation…are each adverse actions within the meaning of section 342(1) of the [FW] Act insofar as they each:a. Injured Dr Pilbrow in her employment; and/orb. Altered the position of Dr Pilbrow to her prejudice.53.The Dismissal was adverse action within the meaning of section 342(1) of the [FW] Act.… By its defence of 9 December 2020, the University admitted all of the allegations extracted above. Elsewhere, Dr Pilbrow’s amended statement of claim sought to establish that she had made various complaints in relation to her employment; and that, by doing so, had exercised what s 341(1) of the FW Act recognises as “workplace right[s]”. Those complaints were assigned defined terms, amongst them “the PDR Complaint”, “the PDR Dispute” and “the Change Plan Dispute” (for present purposes, nothing turns upon their nature).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established