Lee v Lee Hsu v RACQ Insurance Limited Lee v RACQ Insurance Limited
[2019] HCA 28
4 September 2019
B61/2018, B62/2018 & B63/2018
ORDER
Matter No B61/2018
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The third respondent is to pay the appellant's costs.
3. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a)the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed and the orders of the trial judge made on 23 March 2017 are set aside;
(b) judgment for the appellant on his claim against the third respondent in the sum of $3,350,000.00 (clear of rehabilitation expenses by the third respondent pursuant to the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld)), with the date of judgment to take effect pursuant to r 660(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) on 23 March 2017;
(c) the counterclaim of the third respondent against the appellant is dismissed;
(d) the third respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to his claim on the indemnity basis; and
(e) the third respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the third respondent's counterclaim and of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
Matter No B62/2018
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a)the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed;
(b) the orders of the trial judge dated 23 March 2017 are set aside and in lieu thereof judgment for the appellant on the respondent's counterclaim against the appellant;
(c) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the counterclaim on the standard basis; and
(d) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
Matter No B63/2018
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a) the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed;
(b) the orders of the trial judge dated 23 March 2017 are set aside and in lieu thereof judgment for the appellant on the respondent's counterclaim against the appellant;
(c) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the counterclaim on the standard basis; and
(d) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland
Representation
G W Diehm QC with M M…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28
Case
[2019] HCA 28
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard appeals concerning a motor vehicle collision in which the appellant sustained personal injuries. The appellant alleged that his father was driving the vehicle at the time of the collision and that his injuries were caused by his father's negligence. The trial judge found that the appellant was, in fact, driving the vehicle, a conclusion that was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. The central dispute revolved around the trial judge's findings of fact and the adequacy of the Court of Appeal's review of those findings.
The legal issues before the High Court included whether the trial judge's findings of fact were "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences," and whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its review of the evidence. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Court of Appeal had failed to properly assess whether the trial judge had misused their advantage as the primary fact-finder and whether the appellate court had conducted a "real review" of the evidence and the trial judge's reasons. The Court also considered the expert evidence presented regarding the source of blood found on the driver's airbag and the mechanics of the vehicle's safety systems.
The High Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the evidence and the trial judge's findings. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal had not conducted a sufficient review of the evidence and had made errors in its reasoning. Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and substituted its own orders, which included allowing the appeals to the Court of Appeal, setting aside the trial judge's orders, and entering judgment for the appellant against the third respondent for a significant sum, along with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Matter No B61/2018
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The third respondent is to pay the appellant's costs.
3. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a) the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed and the orders of the trial judge made on 23 March 2017 are set aside;
(b) judgment for the appellant on his claim against the third respondent in the sum of $3,350,000.00 (clear of rehabilitation expenses by the third respondent pursuant to the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld)), with the date of judgment to take effect pursuant to r 660(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) on 23 March 2017;
(c) the counterclaim of the third respondent against the appellant is dismissed;
(d) the third respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to his claim on the indemnity basis; and
(e) the third respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the third respondent's counterclaim and of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
Matter No B62/2018
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a) the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed;
(b) the orders of the trial judge dated 23 March 2017 are set aside and in lieu thereof judgment for the appellant on the respondent's counterclaim against the appellant;
(c) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the counterclaim on the standard basis; and
(d) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
Matter No B63/2018
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 1 June 2018 is set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered:
(a) the appeal to the Court of Appeal is allowed;
(b) the orders of the trial judge dated 23 March 2017 are set aside and in lieu thereof judgment for the appellant on the respondent's counterclaim against the appellant;
(c) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the counterclaim on the standard basis; and
(d) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The complaint as to the adequacy of the Court of Appeal's analysis of the inferences to be drawn from the DNA evidence is subsumed by the second ground of appeal, which, for the reasons to be given, must be upheld. A number of factual controversies were resolved by the Court of Appeal and are not in issue in these appeals. It suffices for present purposes to refer to the expert evidence that is the subject of the first ground of appeal.The expert evidenceDr Grigg's evidence Dr Grigg, a mechanical engineer with extensive experience in the investigation of motor vehicle accidents, was called in the appellant's case. Two reports prepared by Dr Grigg were in evidence. In the second report, Dr Grigg described the operation of the airbag and the seatbelts fitted to the front seats in a Toyota Tarago of the same model as the Toyota. Supplemental restraint system (SRS) airbags of the type fitted to the Toyota are deployed when the inflator, a solid chemical gas generator, receives a signal from crash sensors. The sensors detect sudden deceleration and an electrical signal from the diagnostic module causes the gas generator to fire in an explosive manner producing gas, which deploys the airbag. Inflation typically takes about 0.04 seconds and deflation occurs about 0.2 seconds after impact. The ordinary rate of deflation is typically less than 0.2 seconds. The airbags are made from a synthetic material with some form of protective coating, which protects the fabric from scorching from the heat generated during deployment. The front seatbelts in the Toyota were equipped with pre‑tensioners, which are activated by the airbag control module. The pre-tensioners fire when the airbag is deployed. As Dr Grigg explained in his oral evidence, when triggered, the pre-tensioners produce a powerful force pulling the wearer back against the seat. This may be contrasted with conventional, inertia seatbelts that serve merely to prevent forward movement beyond a fixed point. The airbag is housed in the steering-wheel boss. The plastic cover of the boss is designed to break into upper and lower flaps when the airbag is deployed. The lower Y-shaped plastic flap has a tendency to spring back to its original position after deployment pressing on the deflated airbag. When the airbag is inflated the plastic flaps are on the windscreen side of the airbag. The bloodstaining was predominantly on the windscreen side of the airbag (when inflated) on both the left and the right side. There was bloodstaining on the underside of the airbag beneath the lower plastic flap. There were no bloodstains on the central front portion of the airbag, which, when inflated, faced the driver.Dr Robertson's evidence Dr Robertson, whose speciality is in forensic medicine and pathology, was retained by the RACQ to provide an expert opinion on the likely source of the bloodstaining on the airbag. Dr Robertson considered that the appearance of the bloodstaining was consistent with close contact between the airbag and a person with heavily bleeding facial injuries. The staining was not consistent with the deposit of blood by dripping or splatter. Dr Robertson did not examine the airbag. Her opinion was based on photographs of the airbag taken by the police. She could not exclude that the blood may have been deposited by some means other than direct contact with the bleeding source but she considered that the absence of impressions of fingerprints or handprints made the hypothesis of transfer by a third party less likely.
Decision
Reasons for decision
KIEFEL CJ
BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ