Wright (a pseudonym) v Crouch (a pseudonym)
[2025] VCC 666
•16 June 2025
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE COMMON LAW DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
| AISHA WRIGHT (A PSEUDONYM) | Appellant |
| v | |
| RAYMOND CROUCH (A PSEUDONYM) and ADAM NICHOLSON (A PSEUDONYM) | First Respondent Second Respondent |
---
JUDGE: | His Honour Judge Pillay | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 15 May 2025 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 16 June 2025 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Wright (a pseudonym) v Crouch (a pseudonym) & Anor | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VCC 666 | |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
---
Subject:Appeal against family violence intervention order
Catchwords: Family violence intervention order appeal – review of decision of Magistrate – appellant and respondents are self-represented litigants – legal, factual or discretionary error
Legislation Cited: Family Violence Protection Act 2008
Cases Cited:AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors [2023] VSC 13; Matsoukatidou v Yarra Ranges Council (2017) 51 VR 624; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; Byrne v Owners of Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan55597 [2016] WASC 153; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; Priscilla Carroll (a pseudonym) v Marvin Browne (a pseudonym) [2018] VSC 253; Summers (a pseudonym) v McKenzie (a pseudonym) [2015] VCC 2015; Sky (a pseudonym) Sky (a pseudonym) [2018] VCC 417; Hutchinson v Roads and Traffic Authority [2000] NSWCA 332
Judgment: Appeal dismissed
---
APPEARANCES: | |
| For the Appellant | In person |
For the Respondents | In person |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1In this proceeding, the appellant, Ms Wright[1] appeals against the striking out of her applications for a family violence intervention order (“FVIVO”) against the respondents Mr Nicholson[2] and Mr Crouch,[3] and appeals against the granting of an application against her for the protection of Mr Crouch. These decisions were made on 15 July 2024 and 13 December 2024.
[1] A pseudonym.
[2] A pseudonym.
[3] A pseudonym.
2Before the Court are four appeals which were lodged on 18 December 2024:
i.Appeal ending 015 (Ms Wright’s application against Mr Crouch – decision dated 15 July 2024: P12266078);
ii.Appeal ending 041 (Ms Wright’s application against Mr Crouch – decision dated 13 December 2024: Q11853566);
iii.Appeal ending 016 (Mr Crouch’s application against Ms Wright – decision dated 13 December 2024: P11976486);
iv.Appeal ending 017 (Ms Wright’s application against Mr Nicholson – decision dated 13 December 2024: Q12168649).
3The appeals are brought pursuant to the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (“the Act”).
4Ms Wright lodged her grounds of appeal in relation to the above applications on 11 March 2025. No further submissions in support were filed.
5For the reasons which follow, I will dismiss the appeals.
Relevant background
6The factual matters relevant to the context of the appeal can be briefly stated.
7Ms Wright and Mr Crouch are ex-partners. Mr Nicholson is Ms Wright’s brother in law. Ms Wright has alleged that both Mr Nicholson and Mr Crouch have demonstrated behaviour that constitutes family violence toward her warranting her application for a FVIVO.
8Ms Wright’s applications for FVIVO’s against Mr Crouch and Mr Nicholson were struck out and Mr Crouch’s application for a FVIVO against Ms Wright was granted.
9The decision of both Magistrates was determined by Ms Wright’s non-appearance.
10These decisions are the subject of the appeal to this Court.
Proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court
11There were a total of four applications listed in the Magistrates’ Court.
12Appeal ending 015 – Ms Wright was the applicant. She obtained an interim IVO against Mr Crouch. It came on for final hearing on 15 July 2024 before Magistrate Howe. Ms Wright refused to join the audio visual link. No medical certificate was provided to support the reason for her non-attendance. The interim order was discharged. Ms Wright appealed from this dismissal. The appeal is dated 18 December 2024.
13Appeal ending 016 – Mr Crouch was the applicant. He sought a FVIVO against Ms Wright. The matter was heard on 13 December 2024 before Magistrate Starvaggi. The Magistrate granted a 12-month final order that expires 14 July 2025. Ms Wright applied to revoke the IVO against her where she is the respondent. The application was struck out due to her non-attendance. Ms Wright appealed from this striking out. The appeal is dated 18 December 2024.
14Appeal ending 041 – Ms Wright was the applicant applying to revoke the order made against her on 15 July 2024. Mr Crouch was the respondent. This application came on before Magistrate Starvaggi on 13 December 2024. The application was struck out due to her non-attendance. Ms Wright appealed from this striking out. The appeal is dated 18 December 2024.
15Appeal ending 017 – Ms Wright was the applicant and Mr Nicholson was the respondent. This application came on before Magistrate Starvaggi on 13 December 2024. The application was struck out due to her non-attendance. Ms Wright appealed from this striking out. The appeal is dated 18 December 2024.
The hearing of the Appeal in this Court
16The matter was listed for first directions hearing before Judicial Registrar Bales on 6 May 2025. Ms Wright advised the Court that she wanted to withdraw all four appeals in these proceedings and wished to make an application for rehearing in the Magistrates’ Court. The matter was adjourned to 15 May 2025 for further directions hearing. Prior to this date, Ms Wright was required to confirm her position and where necessary, file any applicable notices prior to this hearing.
17In an email to the Court dated 11 May 2025, Ms Wright stated that she held safety concerns regarding her attendance and requested an adjournment of the hearing. She was advised via email on 14 May 2025 that the directions hearing would remain listed on 15 May 2025. She was advised that she will be required to attend the hearing remotely via video link. Both Mr Crouch and Mr Nicholson appeared remotely for the hearing, however, Ms Wright did not appear.
18At the directions hearing on 15 May 2025, Ms Wright was given two weeks to file further submissions of no more than 3 pages supporting her grounds of appeal by 29 May 2025. Any responding materials were due to be filed by 12 June 2025. No further submissions were received. The Court determined to hear the appeal on the papers.
Relevant legal principles
19In the decision of the Honourable John Dixon J in AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors (“AAA”)[4], John Dixon J considered the terminology associated with s 119 and particularly the meaning of the term “rehearing by the County Court” which appears there. In that case, his Honour held that an appeal under s 119 is a broad appeal by way of rehearing. The features of such a broad appeal are the following:
a.that the appeal court will apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal to the facts as it finds them;[5]
b.the powers of the appeal court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate the original decision-maker made some legal, factual, or discretionary error;[6]
c.the appeal may be conducted by reference to the evidence given at the first instance, though with power to receive further evidence;[7]
d.the Court is required to assess and evaluate the evidence for itself.[8]
[4] [2023] VSC 13
[5] Ibid at paragraph [50]
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
20However, his Honour noted that an appeal of this nature did not have an immutable set of characteristics or inflexible boundaries but, ultimately, would be informed by the legislation creating the appeal right, the jurisdiction, the composition and functions of the tribunal from whose decision the appeal lies, and the individual circumstances of the case at hand. [9]
[9] Ibid at paragraph [54]
21As to any evidence which may be permitted at the rehearing, his Honour considered that new evidence could be admitted.[10] He elaborated that the appellate court is not confined to the record of evidence led at the original hearing, and may hear new evidence presented on the appeal. It is then the appeal court’s function to apply the law at the time when the appeal is heard to consider all of the admitted evidence. He summarised this as being an appeal by way of rehearing based upon the evidence given in the court of first instance, supplemented by further evidence.[11]
[10] Ibid at paragraph at [63]
[11] Ibid at paragraph [51(b)] relying on Matsoukatidou v Yarra Ranges Council (2017) 51 VR 624,
645 at [65]
22Broadly, the ratio of that case was that an appellant needs to demonstrate a legal, factual or discretionary error in the Magistrates’ Court’s decision to enliven the jurisdiction of this Court. Such error may be proved after an examination of the transcript in the Magistrates’ Court, to examine the conduct of the proceeding and any reasons for decision.
Errors of law, fact and discretion
23What constitutes an error in any particular case is wholly dependent on the evidence considered in the context of the objective findings of the primary judge.[12] With that said, established legal principles operate to guide the courts through an assessment of claimed errors. I turn now to briefly consider those.
[12] Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Legal error
24A legal error may arise in the way in which a court:
“undertakes its fact-finding, or … in the way in which it construes the statute which it is applying in a particular case, or in some other aspect of its reasoning”. [13]
[13] Byrne v Owners of Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan 55597 [2016] WASC 153 at paragraph [23]
25Appeals operate as a safeguard against these errors, to ensure that courts and tribunals operate within their jurisdiction.[14]
[14] Ibid
Factual error
26A factual error arises when a trial judge’s findings of fact are “glaringly improbable” and “inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence”.[15] A factual error does not arise simply because an appellate court considers that the probabilities of the case are against that finding of fact.[16]
[15] Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at paragraph [479]
[16] Ibid
27The legal principles with respect to factual errors were summarised by Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ in Lee v Lee:[17]
“A court of appeal is bound to conduct a ‘real review’ of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge’s reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge’s findings unless they are ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling inferences’ is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, ‘in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge’.”
[17] (2019) 266 CLR 129 at paragraph [55]
28Similarly, in Blunt v Blunt it was said:
“If it can be shown that the court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or omitted to take into account matters that are relevant, there would, in my opinion, be ground for an appeal.” [18]
[18] [1943] AC 517 at paragraph [526]
Discretionary error
29Where the evidence identifies an error by the trial judge in the exercise of their discretion, the appellate court may then exercise its own discretion on that point.
30The legal principles with respect to discretionary errors were identified by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King: [19]
“It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion to which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.”
[19] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at paragraphs [504-505]
31Having set out those principles, I now turn to the grounds of appeal pressed by Ms Wright.
The grounds of appeal
32Ms Wright filed a statement of grounds of appeal on 11 March 2025 outlining 42 grounds of appeal. The date of the document is 18 December 2024. I note that despite being given the opportunity to file further submissions in support of her grounds of appeal, no further submissions or supporting documents were filed. I will now address each ground of appeal, from each case, before the Court.
Appeal ending 015 – Ms Wright’s FVIVO application against Mr Crouch
33Before I address each ground of appeal, it must be noted that the appeal for case ending 015 is out of time. An application to appeal to the County Court must be filed within 30 days of the magistrate’s decision. There is no provision for an extension of time to appeal, as the Act provides for a “strict mandatory appeal period.” This is a deliberate legislative choice to restrict appeals to within 30 days of an order being made, and to promote the certainty and finality of orders made under the Act. The decision to strike out the FVIVO application by Ms Wright against Mr Crouch was made on 15 July 2024. The notice of appeal was filed on 18 December 2024. The appeal is therefore, out of time. Despite this, I have set out my reasons in respect of each ground of appeal as they overlap significantly with the other appeals.
Ground 1: “Magistrate Starvaggi erred by striking out the FVIO application on non appearance without weighing the applicant’s emergency flight to China on 13 December 2024, despite her adjournment request. This ignored her inability to attend due to travel exigency and my court appointed duty lawyer was not requested, denying procedural fairness and the FVPA’s protective intent.”[20]
[20] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
34The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 2: “Magistrate Starvaggi failed to consider evidence of Crouch’s FV on 13 December 2024 at noon with Adam Nicholson, as alleged. Striking the application without evidence-taking overlooked this incident, breaching the court’s duty to assess FV risk, especially given Crouch’s history (e.g., 11 November FV).”[21]
[21] Ibid
35The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 3: “Magistrate Starvaggi refusal to adjourn breached FVPA s 77(1) and Magistrates’ Court Act s 25, as the applicant’s absence was involuntary (emergency travel) and compounded by Magistrate not calling my duty lawyer. Crouch’s mental health decline (attached) and bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Act s 116(1)(b)) required legal scrutiny, not dismissal.”[22]
[22] Ibid
36The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 4: “Magistrate Starvaggi erred by not exercising FVPA s 57(1)(b) power to make an interim FVIO ex parte, given Crouch’s FV on the hearing date and prior violence (e.g., arm injury). Striking out ignored the applicant’s immediate safety needs as a vulnerable woman of colour.”[23]
[23] Ibid
37The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 5: “Magistrate Howe erred on 15 July 2024 by striking out the FVIO application without sufficient regard for the applicant’s mental health crisis and lack of counsel (VLA’s withdrawal) although Mr Crouch had VLA Counsel (even though he has not lived in this country for 5 years), despite emails citing unsafety and court abuse. A fresh interim FVIO was later issued, proving ongoing risk.”[24]
[24] Ibid
38The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 6: “Magistrate Howe breached FVPA s 77(1) by not adjourning on 15 July 2024 despite the applicant’s distress and Registry contact, finalising matters unopposed. The subsequent interim FVIO underscores the error in dismissing protection.”[25]
[25] Ibid
39The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 7: “The Magistrates committed a jurisdictional error by not recognising that Crouch, as a bankrupt (Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 116(1)(b)) and mentally unstable individual (attached evidence), lacks capacity to oppose an FVIO or hold one as an applicant without Trustee approval, rendering judicial dismissal invalid. The appellant requires an FVIO as Crouch could return or procure others to harm her, heightening her risk.”[26]
[26] Ibid
40The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 8: “The Magistrates issued an FVO that purports to protect someone outside Australia (e.g., a victim who has fled overseas) but fails to issue or enforce an order for someone in Australia facing immediate risk, this could exceed the court’s jurisdictional authority or misapply the law. Courts lack extraterritorial enforcement power unless the perpetrator is within Australia and the order’s terms can be practically applied. When a Magistrate prioritises an offshore individual (e.g., misinterpreting the NDVOS to extend protection abroad) and neglects an applicant in Australia, this constitutes a jurisdictional error or error of law.”[27]
[27] Ibid
41The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 9: “The Magistrate Starvaggi abused discretion by not investigating Crouch’s capacity to oppose, given his bankruptcy (Trustee letter) and mental instability (attached evidence). FVPA s 76 requires assessing parties’ circumstances; dismissing without inquiry was capricious.”[28]
[28] Ibid
42The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 10: “The transcript (13/12/24) omits any mention of the applicant’s assigned duty lawyer, despite her assertion of court appointment, misrepresenting her legal support and compromising procedural fairness. This clerical omission distorts the record of the hearing’s integrity.”[29]
[29] Ibid
43The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 11: “The transcript (13/12/24) inaccurately states the applicant’s adjournment request cited a flight to India. This factual error, uncorrected by evidence (e.g., flight records), suggests racial profiling by presuming an Indian destination based on her identity, breaching fairness.”[30]
[30] Ibid
44The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 12: “Magistrate Starvaggi’s presumption of travel to India reflects racial and sexual discrimination, stereotyping the applicant as a woman of colour likely to travel to her perceived ethnic origin, denying her equal protection under the law and exacerbating her vulnerability as an FV victim.”[31]
[31] Ibid
45The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 13: “The Magistrates granted Crouch a full FVIO despite his non-residency in Australia (not lived here for 5 years), exceeding jurisdictional limits under FVPA s 45, while denying the applicant protection despite her presence and immediate risk in Australia, constituting a discriminatory misapplication of law.”[32]
[32] Ibid
46The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 14: The transcript (15/07/24) notes the applicant’s lack of counsel but shows no court action to remedy this (e.g., adjourn or summon duty lawyer), breaching FVPA s 74(1) and natural justice, particularly given her trauma and Crouch’s representation.”[33]
[33] Ibid
47The appeal is out of time. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Appeal ending 017 – Ms Wright’s FVIVO application against Mr Nicholson
Ground 1: “Magistrate Starvaggi improperly struck out the FVIO application on non-appearance, ignoring the applicant’s emergency flight and request for my duty lawyer by the Magistrate. No discretion was exercised to adjourn despite Nicholson’s alleged FV with Crouch on 13 December 2024, denying fairness and safety.”[34]
[34] Ibid
48I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made.[35] I reject that submission because I find:
a. She was aware of the proceeding at the Magistrates’ Court in advance of the flight.[36]
b. The proceedings were initiated by her applications for FVIVOs against the respondents Mr Nicholson and Mr Crouch.
c. She was given the opportunity to appear remotely and was provided details of the hearing well in advance. It is her responsibility to attend the hearing to have her matter heard.
d. The Magistrate struck out the applications due to her non-appearance.
e. She provided no evidence as to what she terms an “emergency flight” that she put or could have put to the Magistrate to support the adjournment.
f. She provided no evidence as to her request for a “duty lawyer.”
g. She clearly reads and writes English with proficiency. As such, she had a full opportunity to participate in the hearing and put the argument raised here for the first time. She chose not to.
[35] Hutchinson v Roads and Traffic Authority [2000] NSWCA 332 at paragraph [24]
[36] Transcript (“T”) dated 13 December 2024, Line (“L”) 11-16
49Overall, I consider she was afforded an opportunity to attend and put her case, provided no evidence to support any application to adjourn, and has not demonstrated any error in the Magistrate’s decision. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 2: “The strike-out by Magistrate Strarvaggi disregarded Nicholson’s FV on 13 December 2024 and prior acts (e.g., fabricated emails, January 2025), failing to assess his role as Crouch’s collaborator. This factual oversight breached the court’s duty to protect against FV.”[37]
[37] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
50I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [48] and [49]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 3: “Magistrate Strarvaggi’s refusal to adjourn breached FVPA s 77(1) and Magistrates’ Court Act s 25, given the applicant’s unavoidable absence and lack of representation. Nicholson’s instigation of Crouch’s FV (Notice of Appeal) required legal review, not dismissal.”[38]
[38] Ibid
51I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [48] and [49]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 4: “Magistrate Strarvaggi failed to invoke FVPA s 57(1)(b) to issue an ex parte interim FVIO against Nicholson, despite his FV on 13 December 2024 and history of economic abuse (e.g., $20,000 assets withheld). This legal error neglected immediate protection needs.”[39]
[39] Ibid
52I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [48] and [49]. To the extent that this is alleged to be a legal error from the failure to exercise power, I am entirely unclear what this is. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 5: “Magistrate Strarvaggi erred by not recognizing Nicholson’s ongoing FV pattern (e.g., defamation via Facebook, police incitement – with wife), misapplying FVPA s 5(1)(b) (economic abuse) and s 5(1)(e) (psychological harm). Striking out ignored evidence of coordinated harm.”[40]
[40] Ibid
53I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [48] and [49]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 6: “Magistrate Howe’s 15 July 2024 strike-out (related proceedings) ignored the applicant’s mental health and lack of counsel, contributing to a pattern of unfair dismissals. A fresh interim FVIO post-hearing against Crouch (implicating Nicholson’s collusion) highlights ongoing risk from Nicholson.”[41]
[41] Ibid
54I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [48] and [49]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 7: “Magistrate Starvaggi breached FVPA s 76 by not evaluating Nicholson’s circumstances (e.g., instigating Crouch’s FV), invalidating the strike-out given the subsequent interim FVIO proving persistent danger.”[42]
[42] Ibid
55I do not understand this alleged ground. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 8: “Magistrate Starvaggi erred jurisdictionally by not addressing Crouch’s incapacity to oppose an FVIO due to bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 116(1)(b)) and mental instability, which extends to Nicholson as his collaborator. The appellant requires an FVIO as Nicholson could act as Crouch’s proxy to harm her, a risk the court failed to mitigate.”[43]
[43] Ibid
56I do not understand this alleged ground. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 9: “Magistrate Starvaggi overlooked Nicholson’s role in alleged contraventions with his wife for Mr Crouch, lacking evidence. Nicholson collaborated with Crouch to hack the appellant’s emails (reported to police) and send false contravention claims against Crouch and Nicholson’s wife, necessitating an FVIO to curb further FV, ignored by the strike-out.”[44]
[44] Ibid
57I do not understand this alleged ground. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 10: “The transcript (13/12/24) refers to “Adam Nichols” instead of “Adam Nicholson,” potentially a clerical error misidentifying the respondent, undermining the record’s reliability and the court’s duty to accurately address FV parties.”[45]
[45] Ibid
58I interpret this to be an allegation that the Court failed to identify a respondent correctly in a matter. Even assuming this error of naming was made, there is no explanation of how that could rationally effect the outcome.[46] Clearly this was a minor clerical error, there was no doubt who the respondent was. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
[46] Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
Ground 11: “The transcript (13/12/24) omits the applicant’s duty lawyer assignment and full context of the Nicholson application, leaving the strike-out’s basis unclear and compromising procedural transparency.”[47]
[47] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
59I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission because I find that the Magistrate adequately explained the reasons for striking out the application for non-appearance. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 12: “The transcript (13/12/24) inaccurately attributes an India flight to the applicant, suggesting racial profiling by the magistrate and distorting the factual basis for dismissal.”[48]
[48] Ibid
60I interpret this to be an allegation that the Magistrate misinterpreted a flight destination, consequently Ms Wright submits a factual error has been made. I acknowledge that the Magistrate stated she was on a flight to India when she was allegedly on a flight to China. Ms Wright has not explained in any way how the misinterpretation of the flight destination could rationally effect the ultimate decision.[49] I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 13: “Magistrate Starvaggi’s presumption of an India flight reflects racial and sexual discrimination, stereotyping the applicant as a woman of colour, denying her equal protection and exacerbating her FV vulnerability.”[50]
[49] Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
[50] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
61I interpret this to be an allegation that the Magistrate misinterpreted a flight destination, consequently Ms Wright submits a factual error has been made. I refer to paragraph [60]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Appeal ending 016 – Mr Crouch’s FVIO application against Ms Wright
Ground 1: “Magistrate Strarvaggi erred by striking out the revocation application without addressing Crouch’s lack of standing under Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 116(1)(b). As a bankrupt (Trustee letter), he required Trustee approval for P11976486, absent here, voiding its legality under FVPA s 100.”[51]
[51] Ibid
62I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission because I find:
a. She was aware of the proceeding at the Magistrates’ Court in advance of the flight.[52]
b. She was given the opportunity to appear remotely and was provided details of the hearing well in advance. It is her responsibility to attend the hearing to have her matter heard.
c. The Magistrate struck out the application due to her non-appearance.
d. She provided no evidence as to what she terms an “emergency flight” that she put or could have put to the Magistrate to support the adjournment.
e. She provided no evidence as to her request for a “duty lawyer.”
f. She clearly reads and writes English with proficiency. As such, she had a full opportunity to participate in the hearing and put the argument raised here for the first time. She chose not to.
[52] Transcript (“T”) dated 13 December 2024, Line (“L”) 11-16
63Overall, I consider she was afforded an opportunity to attend and put her case, provided no evidence to support any application to adjourn, and has not demonstrated any error in the Magistrate’s decision. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 2: “Magistrate Howe ignored Crouch’s mental decline (attached evidence) and new FV on 13 December 2024, rendering P11976486 unnecessary (FVPA s 99). No evidence of service or FV by the applicant exists, with prior finalisation (15/07/24) unopposed due to her absence.”[53]
[53] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
64I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 3: “The refusal by Magistrate Strarvaggi to adjourn despite emergency absence and the Magistrate not requesting my duty lawyer was an abuse of discretion. Crouch’s FV (e.g., 11/11, 13/12/24) and instability warranted revocation review, not dismissal, breaching FVPA s 74 fairness.”[54]
[54] Ibid
65I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 4: “Magistrate Howe failed to apply FVPA s 65(2), requiring reasonable grounds for FV allegations. P11976486 lacks substantiation (no service proof, no FV evidence), and its retention post-13/12/24 FV by Crouch contravenes FVPA’s protective purpose.”[55]
[55] Ibid
66I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 5: “Magistrate Howe erred on 15 July 2024 by providing an order to Mr Crouch without sufficient regard for the applicant’s mental health crisis and lack of counsel (VLA’s withdrawal) although Mr Crouch had VLA Counsel (even though he has not lived in this country for 5 years), despite emails citing unsafety and court abuse.”[56]
[56] Ibid
67I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 6: “Both Magistrates erred by not revoking P11976486 under FVPA s 101(1)(b) for misuse as coercive control. Crouch’s FV history and bankruptcy fraud (Trustee letter) suggest it’s a retaliatory tool, not a safety measure, invalidating its basis.”[57]
[57] Ibid
68I interpret this to be an allegation that the Magistrate failed to address Mr Crouch’s history, consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 7: “Both Magistrates overlooked Crouch’s FV history of misapplying FVPA s 73. Retaining P11976486 despite his FV pattern and Nicholson’s instigation (Notice of Appeal) was a factual error, protecting the abuser, not the victim.”[58]
[58] Ibid
69I interpret this to be an allegation that the Magistrate failed to address Mr Crouch’s history, consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. Specifically, s73 of the Act refers to expert evidence. However, neither party advanced such evidence and I am uncertain what relevance this section has to the appellant’s ground of appeal. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 8: “Magistrate Starvaggi and Howe committed judicial error by upholding P11976486, as Crouch’s bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 116(1)(b)) and mental instability (attached evidence) divest him of jurisdiction to hold an FVIO as an applicant without Trustee consent. The appellant requires an FVIO against him, as he could return or enlist others to harm her, a risk unaddressed.”[59]
[59] Ibid
70I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 9: “The Magistrates issued an FVO that purports to protect someone outside Australia (e.g., a victim who has fled overseas) but fails to issue or enforce an order for someone in Australia facing immediate risk, this could exceed the court’s jurisdictional authority or misapply the law. Courts lack extraterritorial enforcement power unless the perpetrator is within Australia and the order’s terms can be practically applied. When a Magistrate prioritises an offshore individual (e.g., misinterpreting the NDVOS to extend protection abroad) and neglects an applicant in Australia, this constitutes a jurisdictional error or error of law.”[60]
[60] Ibid
71I interpret this to be an allegation that a jurisdictional error has been made and Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. The decision to dismiss her applications were due to non-appearance. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 10: “Both Magistrates failed to address Crouch hacked the appellant’s emails (reported to police) with Nicholson (and wife) to fabricate contravention claims against Crouch and Nicholson’s wife, a deceitful act unexamined, necessitating revocation.”[61]
[61] Ibid
72I interpret this to be an allegation that she was denied procedural fairness and consequently Ms Wright submits an error of law has been made. Further, I interpret this allegation as being a failure to take into account relevant factual matters. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 11: “The transcript (13/12/24) omits mention of the applicant’s duty lawyer despite her assertion of court appointment, misrepresenting her legal support and undermining the fairness of the revocation dismissal.”[62]
[62] Ibid
73I am uncertain as to what the alleged error is. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 12: “Magistrate Starvaggi’s presumption of an India flight reflects racial and sexual discrimination, stereotyping the applicant as a woman of colour, denying her equal protection and reinforcing Crouch’s coercive FVIO as a tool of oppression.”[63]
[63] Ibid
74I interpret this to be an allegation that the Magistrate misinterpreted a flight destination, consequently Ms Wright submits a factual error has been made. I acknowledge that the Magistrate stated she was on a flight to India when she was allegedly on a flight to China. Ms Wright has not explained in any way how the misinterpretation of the flight destination could rationally effect the ultimate decision.[64] I dismiss this ground of appeal.
[64] Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
Ground 13: “The Magistrates upheld P11976486 for Crouch, a non-resident absent from Australia for 5 years, exceeding FVPA s 45 jurisdiction, while denying the applicant’s revocation despite her presence and risk in Australia, a discriminatory legal error.”[65]
[65] Appellants written submissions dated 18 December 2024
75I interpret this to be an allegation that an error of law has been made. I reject that submission and refer to paragraphs [62] and [63]. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 14: “Both Magistrates erred by not requiring Crouch’s presence at hearings despite knowledge of his complex mental illness (Social Anxiety Disorder, Dysthymia, Borderline Personality Disorder) which underpins coercive nature, unmedicated and not obtaining treatment. This failure breached FVPA s 76, sustaining an invalid order.”[66]
[66] Ibid
76Mr Crouch was present at both hearings. I note he was legally represented on 15 July 2024 and appeared unrepresented on 13 December 2024. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 15: “The Magistrates ignored Crouch’s criminal history (e.g., email hacking) and five-year flight from Australia, known to the court, which should have triggered his attendance to substantiate P11976486. This factual omission protected the perpetrator, breaching FVPA s 73.”[67]
[67] Ibid
77I do not understand what the alleged error is. Further, Mr Crouch’s criminal history is not the subject of the appeal to this Court. Further, I repeat that any appeal arising from the Magistrates’ Court decision on 15 July 2024 is out of time and must be dismissed. I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Conclusion
78For the reasons above, I will dismiss each appeal.
0
13
0