Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (Appeal)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (Appeal) [2025] FCAFC 67

Appeal from: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 41) [2023] FCA 555
File number: NSD 689 of 2023
NSD 690 of 2023
NSD 691 of 2023
Judgment of: PERRAM, KATZMANN AND KENNETT JJ
Date of judgment: 16 May 2025
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – where respondents published articles making imputations that appellant committed serious criminal offences including war crimes while fighting with Australian forces in Afghanistan – where imputations of appellant’s involvement in murders and related matters found to be substantially true – where primary judge upheld defence of contextual truth in relation to other imputations – where alleged inconsistencies in, and other difficulties with, aspects of evidence of respondents’ witnesses, whether evidence as a whole sufficiently cogent to establish substantial truth of imputations – whether primary judge erred by giving insufficient weight to the presumption of innocence – whether “official” records supported appellant’s contention that killings were legitimate – where “official” records indicated killings were legitimate, whether primary judge erred by rejecting those accounts and preferring respondents’ evidence – where primary judge rejected evidence of appellant and his witnesses as untruthful and appellant makes no challenge to adverse credit findings and respondents carried burden of proof, whether adverse credit findings irrelevant – where alternative version of events propounded by appellant found to be fictitious, whether open to appellant to propound alternative hypotheses inconsistent with appellant’s evidence at trial

EVIDENCE – tendency evidence –where no objection taken to evidence of appellant’s conduct during training exercises and no application made to limit its use, whether primary judge erred by relying on it as tendency evidence – whether primary judge engaged in tendency reasoning when taking into account findings concerning the appellant’s conduct on one mission to reject his account of his conduct on a subsequent mission

Legislation:

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 11.2, 268.70

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 94, 97, 99, 136, 140

National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950)

Gageler S, Truth and justice, and sheep, (2018) 46 Australian Bar Review 205 

Pejic J, “Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force” in E Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (OUP, 2012)

Cases cited:

Abalos v Australian Postal Commission [1990] HCA 47; 171 CLR 167

Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Delta Automation Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 880

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794; 160 FCR 321

Bale v Mills [2011] NSWCA 226; 81 NSWLR 498

Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Browne v Dunn [1893] 6 R 67

Channel Seven Sydney Pty…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerns a defamation case brought by a former elite soldier, Ben Roberts-Smith, against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited, the publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. The respondents published articles alleging that Roberts-Smith committed serious criminal offences, including war crimes, while serving with Australian forces in Afghanistan. The primary judge found that imputations regarding Roberts-Smith’s involvement in murders and related matters were substantially true, while upholding the defence of contextual truth for other imputations. Roberts-Smith appealed against the primary judge's findings, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight given to the presumption of innocence.

The legal issues revolved around whether the primary judge correctly assessed the evidence's cogency, applied the correct principles in determining the substantial truth of the imputations, and appropriately considered the presumption of innocence. Roberts-Smith argued that the primary judge failed to apply the principles outlined in s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and did not sufficiently weigh the presumption of innocence. He also contended that the primary judge erred by rejecting official records supporting his account of the killings and by accepting the respondents' evidence over his own. Additionally, Roberts-Smith questioned whether the primary judge erred by considering evidence of his conduct during training exercises as tendency evidence and whether he engaged in tendency reasoning when rejecting his account of a subsequent mission.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had correctly applied the relevant principles and principles of evidence in his assessment. The judge had discussed the principles extensively and considered the seriousness of the allegations, ensuring that the findings were clear and cogent. The Court rejected Roberts-Smith's arguments that the primary judge had failed to give sufficient weight to the presumption of innocence or had incorrectly considered tendency evidence. The Court concluded that the primary judge's findings were correct and that the appeals should be dismissed. Consequently, the Court ordered that Roberts-Smith pay the respondents' costs and imposed restrictions on the publication of the reasons for judgment to protect national security interests.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

3. Pursuant to s 37AF of the of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and on the grounds referred to in s 37AG(1)(b) and (c) of that Act, there be no disclosure, by publication or otherwise, of the reasons for judgment delivered in open court (open court reasons) until either the Commonwealth notifies the Court and the parties that it has no objection to publication of the open court reasons or 4pm on 20 May 2025 (whichever is the earlier).

4. Order 3 does not prevent disclosures of the open court reasons to and between Authorised Persons within the meaning of the orders made by his Honour Justice Besanko on 15 July 2020 (as most recently amended on 26 September 2023) under ss 19(3A) and 38B of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

These principles have effectively been codified in s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). That section requires a Court, when determining whether a party who bears the burden of proof has discharged that burden on the balance of probabilities, to take into account the nature of the cause of action or defence, the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding, and the gravity of the matters alleged. The appellant argued that the primary judge failed to apply these principles and had failed to give weight to the presumption of innocence because he did not explain how he applied the principles and in what way the presumption had affected his view of the evidence. We reject this argument. The primary judge discussed the relevant principles at length in the early part of his reasons and repeatedly reminded himself of them. Section 140 of the Evidence Act, for example, is mentioned nine times in the reasons for judgment, Briginshaw 10 times, Neat Holdings three times and the presumption of innocence seven times. These were no mere ritualistic incantations, as the appellant suggested. It is apparent that his Honour was acutely conscious of the seriousness of the findings the respondents called upon him to make and of the necessity that he be reasonably satisfied that the imputations were substantially true without resorting to inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences. Accordingly, he gave no weight to uncorroborated evidence and largely relied on eyewitness accounts. He expressly adverted to the appellant’s submission concerning the strength of the evidence required to discharge the respondents’ burden and the presumption of innocence (at J[114]). Still, he was satisfied that “the proof [was] clear and cogent” (J[115]). It is manifestly clear from the reasons of the primary judge that, in reaching conclusions about contested facts, his Honour did not engage in any mechanical comparison of probabilities divorced from a belief in the occurrence or existence of the matters in dispute. That is perhaps best illustrated by his unwillingness to find that the imputations concerning the mission to Fasil on 5 November 2012 were substantially true, despite evidence from an SASR member (Person 16), which his Honour accepted in the face of the appellant’s denials, that the appellant had admitted to shooting a young, unarmed Afghan adolescent in the head and gloating about it. His Honour said at J[1686]:Having regard to all the evidence, including the absence of an eyewitness to the alleged execution, and the nature of the allegations, I do not think the respondents’ case can succeed unless the Court is clearly satisfied that the deceased Afghan male shown in exhibit R105 is the young Afghan male detained by Person 16.Exhibit R105 was a photograph of a deceased Afghan male. While Person 16 identified the man in the photograph with “a high degree of confidence” as the man he had detained and the primary judge did not doubt the honesty of Person 16, his Honour did not consider that the identification evidence was “sufficiently clear and cogent” to support a finding that the deceased Afghan male in the photograph was the man detained by Person 16 (at J[1688]‑[1692]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Particular 34 is not made out.Conclusion No error has been established in the primary judge’s treatment of events at Chinartu. Grounds 10 to 13 of the notice of appeal must be rejected.DISPOSITION While we have detected two errors in his Honour’s reasons, those errors are immaterial. They do not affect his Honour’s conclusions on any of the critical questions. We endorse the following observations made by the respondents about his Honour’s judgment. In a long, careful and clear judgment the primary judge correctly identified and applied the relevant legal principles and paid close attention to the serious nature of the allegations and the standard of proof. His Honour repeatedly reminded himself that the respondents bore the onus of proving the substantial truth of the imputations and of the cogency of the evidence necessary to discharge it. The burden of proving that his Honour erred on appeal rested with the appellant. The appellant has not discharged that burden. What is more, we are satisfied that his Honour’s conclusions with respect to the substantial truth of the relevant imputations conveyed by the respondents’ articles were correct. Consequently, the appeals must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established