FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan [2020] FCAFC 204
Appeal from: Keenan v Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2600 File number: VID 254 of 2019 Judgment of: BROMBERG, MORTIMER AND ANASTASSIOU JJ Date of judgment: 24 November 2020 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether respondent was dismissed in contravention of s 340(1) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – whether complaints were made within the meaning of s 341(1)(c)(ii) – whether respondent was “able to make” a complaint or inquiry – assessment of evidence by primary judge in relation to finding of breach of ss 340(1) and 352 of the FW Act – whether primary judge erred in finding that appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in s 361 of the FW Act
INDUSTRIAL LAW – long service leave entitlements under Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) (LSL Act) – whether respondent was “continuously employed” by “one employer” in Victoria while employed by a related entity overseas – whether entitlement to long service leave requires a substantial connection to Victoria at all relevant times – entitlement to long service leave assessed at time of crystallising event – whether entitled to long service leave for an anterior period of time, in which there is no connection to Victoria, by operation of the LSL Act
DISPOSITION – appeal allowed in part in relation to appeal grounds pertaining to ss 340(1) and 352 of FW Act – appeal dismissed in relation to appeal ground pertaining to LSL Act
Legislation: Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (Vic)
Interpretation Act 1897 (NSW)
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)
Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW)
Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic)
Fair Work Bill 2008
Cases cited: APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322
Australian Red Cross v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332
Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Broken Hill South Ltd (Public Officer) v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337
Cigarette & Giftware House Pty Ltd v Whelan (2019) 268 FCR 46
Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 204
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Mr Keenan's complaints were made within the meaning of section 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FW Act and whether he was "able to make" a complaint or inquiry. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the primary judge erred in finding that Cummins had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in section 361 of the FW Act. The court also needed to interpret the LSL Act to determine if Mr Keenan was entitled to long service leave for periods where he had no connection to Victoria and whether a substantial connection to Victoria was required at all relevant times.
The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside certain paragraphs of the Federal Circuit Court's order and referring the matter for urgent mediation. The appeal was dismissed in relation to the calculation of Mr Keenan's long service leave entitlements under the LSL Act. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in characterising Mr Keenan's communication as a complaint and that Cummins had not demonstrated any error in the assessment of evidence. However, the court found errors in the primary judge's approach to the assessment of evidence concerning the contravention of sections 340(1) and 352 of the FW Act. The final orders included allowing the appeal in part, setting aside specific paragraphs of the Federal Circuit Court's order, and referring the matter for mediation. If unresolved, the proceeding was to be listed for a Case Management Hearing.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed in part in respect of appeal grounds 3 – 9 and appeal ground 12.
2. Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 8 March 2019 be set aside.
3. The proceeding be referred for urgent mediation before a Registrar of the Court to be held on a date to be fixed.
4. Should the proceeding not be resolved at mediation, the proceeding be listed for a Case Management Hearing before the presiding judge on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The scheme was modest at the outset. Only three actuating circumstances were specified – membership of a union, the holding of an office in a union, and entitlement to the benefit of an industrial agreement or award: s 9(1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). In 1914, s 9 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended to include an activity as an actuating circumstance. The pre-existing actuating circumstances mentioned above were supplemented with the additional prohibition that an employer shall not take specified action against an employee who “has appeared as a witness, or has given any evidence, in a proceeding under this Act”. By November 1988, when the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act 1988(Cth), there were 11 actuating circumstances specified by the prohibition imposed by s 334(1) of that Act, that an employer shall not dismiss, injure or prejudicially alter the position of an employee “because” of the circumstances listed by that provision. By that time, the actuating circumstances included the protected person’s participation in specified processes as well as involvement in industrial activities such as the seeking of better industrial conditions or the refusal to join in industrial action. A very significant extension of the list of actuating circumstances was introduced in 1996 when the Industrial Relations Act became the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The scope of the scheme was enlarged so as to capture not only conduct of employers against employees but also conduct by employees, independent contractors and industrial associations taken against an employer as well as action taken by an industrial association against employees and against members of the industrial association (see ss 298N, 298P, 298Q and 298R). In relation to employer conduct, the actuating circumstances were listed in s 298L and were described as “prohibited reasons”. By this time there were 14 actuating circumstances listed in relation to employer conduct. Many of those actuating circumstances were replicated in relation to employee or industrial association conduct, but additional actuating circumstances were included in those categories. Broadly speaking and confining the analysis to employer conduct, there was some expansion in relation to activities such as participation in specified processes and, relevantly to the issue I am addressing, the making of an inquiry or complaint by the protected person. The making of inquiries or complaints has its genesis as an actuating circumstance or “prohibited reason” in s 298L of the Workplace Relations Act (although an earlier but somewhat different iteration is found in s 170DF of the Industrial Relations Act). Section 298L(i) provided for the following “prohibited reason”:(i)has made or proposes to make any inquiry or complaint to a person or body having the capacity under an industrial law to seek:(i) compliance with that law; or (ii) the observance of a person’s rights under an industrial instrument