Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan [2020] FCAFC 204

Appeal from:    Keenan v Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2600
File number: VID 254 of 2019
Judgment of: BROMBERG, MORTIMER AND ANASTASSIOU JJ
Date of judgment: 24 November 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether respondent was dismissed in contravention of s 340(1) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – whether complaints were made within the meaning of s 341(1)(c)(ii) – whether respondent was “able to make” a complaint or inquiry – assessment of evidence by primary judge in relation to finding of breach of ss 340(1) and 352 of the FW Act – whether primary judge erred in finding that appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in s 361 of the FW Act

INDUSTRIAL LAW – long service leave entitlements under Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) (LSL Act) – whether respondent was “continuously employed” by “one employer” in Victoria while employed by a related entity overseas – whether entitlement to long service leave requires a substantial connection to Victoria at all relevant times – entitlement to long service leave assessed at time of crystallising event – whether entitled to long service leave for an anterior period of time, in which there is no connection to Victoria, by operation of the LSL Act

DISPOSITION – appeal allowed in part in relation to appeal grounds pertaining to ss 340(1) and 352 of FW Act – appeal dismissed in relation to appeal ground pertaining to LSL Act

Legislation:

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Act 1979 (Vic)

Interpretation Act 1897 (NSW)

Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)

Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW)

Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic)

Fair Work Bill 2008

Cases cited:

APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (The Bay Street Case) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1859

Australian Red Cross v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332

Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424

Broken Hill South Ltd (Public Officer) v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337

Cigarette & Giftware House Pty Ltd v Whelan (2019) 268 FCR 46

Cohen v iSoft Group [2012] FCA 1071

Cohen v iSOFT Group Pty Limited [2013] FCAFC 49

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169

Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (2015) 238 FCR 273

Construction, Forestry,…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 204
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd sought an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, challenging aspects of the decision relating to the dismissal of Mr Keenan and his entitlement to long service leave. The appeal centred on whether Mr Keenan's dismissal was in contravention of section 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), the interpretation of section 341(1)(c)(ii) concerning complaints, and the assessment of evidence by the primary judge in relation to the breach of sections 340(1) and 352 of the FW Act. Additionally, the appeal disputed the calculation of Mr Keenan's long service leave entitlements under the Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) (LSL Act), specifically whether he was "continuously employed" by "one employer" in Victoria while employed overseas.

The court was required to decide whether Mr Keenan's complaints were made within the meaning of section 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FW Act and whether he was "able to make" a complaint or inquiry. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the primary judge erred in finding that Cummins had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in section 361 of the FW Act. The court also needed to interpret the LSL Act to determine if Mr Keenan was entitled to long service leave for periods where he had no connection to Victoria and whether a substantial connection to Victoria was required at all relevant times.

The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside certain paragraphs of the Federal Circuit Court's order and referring the matter for urgent mediation. The appeal was dismissed in relation to the calculation of Mr Keenan's long service leave entitlements under the LSL Act. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in characterising Mr Keenan's communication as a complaint and that Cummins had not demonstrated any error in the assessment of evidence. However, the court found errors in the primary judge's approach to the assessment of evidence concerning the contravention of sections 340(1) and 352 of the FW Act. The final orders included allowing the appeal in part, setting aside specific paragraphs of the Federal Circuit Court's order, and referring the matter for mediation. If unresolved, the proceeding was to be listed for a Case Management Hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part in respect of appeal grounds 3 – 9 and appeal ground 12.

2. Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 8 March 2019 be set aside.

3. The proceeding be referred for urgent mediation before a Registrar of the Court to be held on a date to be fixed.

4. Should the proceeding not be resolved at mediation, the proceeding be listed for a Case Management Hearing before the presiding judge on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Under ground 13 of the appeal, Cummins challenges the calculation of Mr Keenan’s long service leave entitlements under the LSL Act. For convenience, I briefly set out the facts relevant to this ground before referring to the relevant legislative provisions. Factual background In September 1981, Mr Keenan commenced employment with Cummins Darlington, a UK subsidiary of the USA-based Cummins Inc., and remained an employee until February 1995 (a period of approximately 13 years). In February 1995, he accepted a position with Cummins Australia Pty Ltd and moved to Victoria. He remained an employee of Cummins and lived and worked in Victoria until May 2007, a period of approximately 12 years. From May 2007 until December 2013, Mr Keenan worked as an employee of Cummins on “secondment”, at the head office of Cummins Inc. in Indiana, a period of approximately 6 years. In March 2014, Mr Keenan returned to Victoria and worked for Cummins in the role of CBS Regional Leader. His employment was terminated on 25 November 2015.Overview of LSL Act The provisions concerning an employee’s entitlement to long service leave were, at the relevant time of Mr Keenan’s employment, located in Division 6 of Part 5 of the LSL Act. Section 56 of the LSL Act provided for the basic entitlement to long service leave: 56 Basic entitlement to long service leave An employee is entitled to— (a) 13 weeks of long service leave on ordinary pay on completing 15 years of continuous employment with one employer; and (b) 4 1/3 weeks of long service leave on ordinary pay on completing each period of 5 years of continuous employment with that employer after the first 15 years of continuous employment with that employer. Section 57 of the LSL Act was also relevant in circumstances where Mr Keenan’s employment was terminated after more than 15 years continuous employment in Victoria (on any argument):57 Additional entitlement to long service leave if employment stops after 15 years(1) This section only applies if an employee stops working for an employer after completing 15 years of continuous employment with that employer.(2) The employee is entitled to an amount of long service leave equal to 1/60th of the period of his or her continuous employment with that employer since he or she last became entitled to long service leave under section 56.(3) The period of an employee's long service leave that relates to a period of employment before 1 January 1965 and that had not been taken before the commencement of this Division is to be reduced by one quarter. The interpretation of these sections is informed by the surrounding provisions in Division 6 of Part 5. In particular, s 60 of the LSL Act relevantly provides for a number of situations in which an employee is regarded as having been employed by “one employer”, despite having worked over the relevant period for more than one employer in a strict legal sense:60 Meaning of one employer(1) This section sets out several situations in which an employee is to be regarded, for the purposes of this Division, as having been employed by the one employer, even though the employee may have worked over the relevant period of time for more than one employer in a strict legal sense.(2) If an employee is employed by a corporation, he or she is to be regarded as having been employed by that corporation during any period that—(a) he or she was employed by a related body corporate of that corporation (within the meaning of the Corporations Act); or …

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As to the fourth complaint relied upon by Mr Keenan, Cummins contended that this was a communication put forward as an excuse for Mr Keenan’s poor performance with no redress being sought by him. By reference to the Statement of Claim, the primary judge described the fourth complaint as having being made on 29 July 2015 by Mr Keenan when, at a midyear performance appraisal with Ms Beaulieu, Mr Keenan told Ms Beaulieu that he was extremely stressed given the events that had occurred between him, Ms Elderbrant and Ms Baldota. The primary judge accepted that, in that context, Mr Keenan told Ms Beaulieu that he was extremely stressed. His Honour was satisfied that the statement made by Mr Keenan that he was extremely stressed was a “complaint” within the meaning of that expression in s 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FW Act. In doing so, his Honour rejected the contention made by Cummins that the communication was merely an expression of frustration. His Honour did not expressly deal with whether the communication was put forward as an excuse for Mr Keenan’s poor performance or with the question of whether the communication sought redress. It is not clear that those matters were put in issue by Cummins. Assuming they were put in issue, I am not satisfied that, Cummins has demonstrated any error in the primary judge’s characterisation of the communication as a “complaint”. The context in which the communication was made was likely to have been important to its proper characterisation. Again, the context included the prior history of difficulty between Mr Keenan, Ms Baldota and Ms Elderbrant which the reasons of the primary judge record at length, as well as prior calls for redress made by Mr Keenan. WAS THE APPROACH TAKEN TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE ERRONEOUS? The next challenge by Cummins to the findings that it had contravened s 340(1) of the FW Act was raised by appeal grounds 3 – 9. These grounds concerned factual findings made by the primary judge. Appeal ground 12 made a similar challenge to the finding that s 352 of the FW Act was contravened. Before turning to those challenges directly, the following principles are relevant and worthy of being mentioned at the outset. The appeal is in the nature of a rehearing, not a new hearing: Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]–[22] (Allsop J, with Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreeing). Such an appeal requires a court to conduct “a real review” of the trial and the trial judge’s reasons: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ). As Allsop J observed in Branir at [28], appellate judges are required to make up their own minds, that is not done as if they are sitting on the trial. Weight must be given to the views of and advantages enjoyed by the trial judge:[I]f a choice arises between conclusions equally open and finely balanced and where there is, or can be, no preponderance of view, the conclusion of error is not necessarily arrived at merely because of a preference of view of the appeal court for some fact or facts contrary to the view reached by the trial judge.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The scheme was modest at the outset. Only three actuating circumstances were specified – membership of a union, the holding of an office in a union, and entitlement to the benefit of an industrial agreement or award: s 9(1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). In 1914, s 9 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended to include an activity as an actuating circumstance. The pre-existing actuating circumstances mentioned above were supplemented with the additional prohibition that an employer shall not take specified action against an employee who “has appeared as a witness, or has given any evidence, in a proceeding under this Act”. By November 1988, when the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act 1988(Cth), there were 11 actuating circumstances specified by the prohibition imposed by s 334(1) of that Act, that an employer shall not dismiss, injure or prejudicially alter the position of an employee “because” of the circumstances listed by that provision. By that time, the actuating circumstances included the protected person’s participation in specified processes as well as involvement in industrial activities such as the seeking of better industrial conditions or the refusal to join in industrial action. A very significant extension of the list of actuating circumstances was introduced in 1996 when the Industrial Relations Act became the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The scope of the scheme was enlarged so as to capture not only conduct of employers against employees but also conduct by employees, independent contractors and industrial associations taken against an employer as well as action taken by an industrial association against employees and against members of the industrial association (see ss 298N, 298P, 298Q and 298R). In relation to employer conduct, the actuating circumstances were listed in s 298L and were described as “prohibited reasons”. By this time there were 14 actuating circumstances listed in relation to employer conduct. Many of those actuating circumstances were replicated in relation to employee or industrial association conduct, but additional actuating circumstances were included in those categories. Broadly speaking and confining the analysis to employer conduct, there was some expansion in relation to activities such as participation in specified processes and, relevantly to the issue I am addressing, the making of an inquiry or complaint by the protected person. The making of inquiries or complaints has its genesis as an actuating circumstance or “prohibited reason” in s 298L of the Workplace Relations Act (although an earlier but somewhat different iteration is found in s 170DF of the Industrial Relations Act). Section 298L(i) provided for the following “prohibited reason”:(i)has made or proposes to make any inquiry or complaint to a person or body having the capacity under an industrial law to seek:(i) compliance with that law; or (ii) the observance of a person’s rights under an industrial instrument