Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King

Case [1988] HCA 55


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mason C.J., Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.

UNION STEAMSHIP Co. OF AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD. v. KING

(1988) 166 CLR 1

26 October 1988

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws—Compensation of seamen—Laws expressly contemplating coexistence of laws—Whether Commonwealth law covers field—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict c. 12), s.109—Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 (Cth), ss.5(2)(e), 10A—Australia Act 1986 (Cth), s.2(1)—Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), ss.7,46. Constitutional Law—State Parliament—Powers—To make laws for peace, order and good government—Connexion of operation of law with State—Remote or general connexion sufficient—Workers' compensation claimed by crew member of State-registered ship—Whether eligible to claim only under Commonwealth legislation—Registration of ship sufficient connexion with State—Extraterritorial operation. Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Entitlement—Territorial limits of jurisdiction—Compensation under State law unavailable under Commonwealth law—Claim under State law—Whether maintainable—Crew member of State-registered ship.

Decision


MASON C.J., WILSON, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ. This is an appeal against an order of the New South Wales Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal by the appellant employer against an award made by the Compensation Court (Freeman J.) by which that court found that it had jurisdiction to determine a claim brought by the respondent employee for compensation for boilermaker's deafness. One question argued before this Court was whether the relevant provisions of s.46 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.) ("the State Act") were valid laws of the State of New South Wales as laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the State. Another issue argued was whether s.46(1) of the State Act is inoperative, by reason of inconsistency with the provisions of the Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 (Cth) ("the Commonwealth Act").

2. The reason why the validity of the State Act was a critical issue in the Compensation Court is to be found in one fundamental difference in the provisions of the two statutes. The respondent's loss of hearing does not entitle him to claim compensation under the Commonwealth Act because it has not impaired his capacity to earn full wages. Under the State Act impairment of capacity to earn or work is not a condition precedent to a successful claim for workers' compensation.

3. Judge Freeman dealt with the case on a statement of agreed facts which was as follows:
"1. The applicant (respondent) was a worker who was a seaman employed by the respondent (appellant) ... upon a ship which at all material times was registered in New South Wales and was engaged in interstate trade and commerce. 2. The applicant (respondent) alleges he
sustained the condition of Boilermaker's Deafness affecting both ears to an extent yet to be determined. 3. The alleged condition did not disable the
applicant (respondent) from earning full wages. 4. The alleged condition resulted in no
incapacity for work."
In the Court of Appeal, the respondent's certificate of discharge was tendered. It established that he was engaged by the appellant at Sydney on 29 June 1981 to serve on board…

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Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King [1988] HCA 55
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[1988] HCA 55
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King*. The dispute concerned the liability of the appellant, Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd, for injuries sustained by the respondent, Mr. King, who was employed by the appellant as a ship's engineer. Mr. King alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the appellant in failing to provide a safe system of work and a safe ship.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees, specifically the master and officers of the vessel, in failing to ensure the safety of the ship and the system of work. This involved determining the scope of the employer's duty of care and the extent to which an employer could be held responsible for the actions or omissions of its senior employees.

The Court held that an employer owes a direct duty to its employees to take reasonable care for their safety. This duty extends to ensuring that the employer's employees are provided with a safe system of work and a safe ship. The Court affirmed that an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees acting within the scope of their employment. In this instance, the negligence of the master and officers in failing to maintain the ship in a safe condition and to implement a safe system of work was attributable to the appellant. The Court applied the principles of negligence and vicarious liability, finding that the appellant had breached its duty of care to Mr. King.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the lower court in favour of Mr. King.

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