Flageul v WeDrive Pty Ltd

Case [2020] FCA 1666


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Flageul v WeDrive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1666

File number: VID 653 of 2018
Judgment of: STEWARD J
Date of judgment: 18 November 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – termination of employment – where applicant through his company developed ride sharing app – where that company assigned associated intellectual property to newly incorporated first respondent after due diligence conducted by third respondent – where applicant appointed as C.E.O. of first respondent – where minority of shares in first respondent issued to applicant – where majority of shares in first respondent issued to second and third respondents – where first respondent’s financial performance following assignment of intellectual property fell below expectations of second and third respondents – where functionality of app fell below expectations of second and third respondents – where second and third respondents discovered that applicant’s company did not own all intellectual property associated with app before assignment – where applicant subsequently dismissed as C.E.O. – where applicant and second and third respondents each agreed to step down as directors of first respondent and to sell all shares for $1 – where applicant made series of alleged complaints or inquiries to second and third respondents prior to dismissal as C.E.O. – where applicant allegedly worked pursuant to consultancy agreement following dismissal as C.E.O. and end of associated notice period – whether applicant exercised workplace rights – whether applicant made “complaints” or “inquiries” for purposes of s. 341(c)(ii) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.) – whether complaints or inquiries “in relation to” applicant’s employment as C.E.O. for purposes of s. 341(c)(ii) – whether applicant “able” to make complaints or inquiries for purposes of s. 341(c)(ii) – whether adverse action taken “because” of applicant exercising workplace rights – whether s. 358 breached because applicant dismissed in order to be engaged as independent contractor to perform same or substantially same work under contract for services

CORPORATIONS – oppression – whether conduct of respondents oppressive to unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against applicant as member of first respondent whether in that capacity or any other capacity for purposes of s. 232 of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.)

EQUITY – unconscionable conduct – where applicant allegedly subject to special disadvantages including mental health issues – where applicant alleged respondents aware of mental health issues and other special disadvantages – whether conduct of respondents towards applicant unconscionable within meaning of unwritten law for purposes of s. 20 of Australian Consumer Law

COSTS – whether power to award costs under s. 570 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.) should be exercised as against applicant

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.) Sch. 2, s. 20

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.) ss. 9, 202B, 232, 233, 290, 1317AA

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.) ss. 340, 341, 342, 358, 360, 361, 570

Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic.) s. 20

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic.) ss. 21, 25  

Cases cited:

Australian and Consumer Commission v. Quantum Housing Group Pty…

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Details
AGLC
Flageul v WeDrive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1666
Case
[2020] FCA 1666
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Flageul v WeDrive Pty Ltd involved the applicant, who had developed a ride-sharing app through his company, challenging his dismissal from his position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of WeDrive Pty Ltd. The dispute also encompassed claims of oppression, unconscionable conduct, and an alleged breach of workplace rights under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.) and the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.). The applicant, who held a minority share in WeDrive Pty Ltd, argued that his dismissal was wrongful and that he had been subjected to oppressive and unconscionable conduct by the majority shareholders and directors of the company.

The central legal issues addressed by the court were whether the applicant had exercised workplace rights protected under the Fair Work Act, whether his dismissal constituted adverse action taken because of such exercise, and if the dismissal breached the Act by being a pretext for engaging him as an independent contractor. Additionally, the court had to determine if the conduct of the respondents was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the applicant under the Corporations Act and if it amounted to unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.

In its reasoning, the court found that the applicant had not exercised workplace rights that would warrant protection under the Fair Work Act. It determined that the alleged complaints or inquiries made by the applicant did not pertain to his employment as CEO and did not fall within the scope of protected activities. The court further held that the dismissal did not contravene the Act as it was not taken because of the applicant's exercise of any such rights. The court did not find the conduct of the respondents to be oppressive or unconscionable, and it declined to exercise its power to award costs against the applicant under the Fair Work Act.

The court dismissed the proceeding and made no order as to costs, effectively concluding that the applicant's claims were without merit and that the actions of the respondents did not breach the relevant legislative provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Both sides called witnesses to give expert evidence concerning Mr. Flageul’s mental state in 2017. Mr. Flageul relied upon a report of Mr. David Horne (I note that he is a Doctor of Philosophy), a clinical psychologist, whilst the respondents relied upon a report of Professor Peter Doherty, a psychiatrist. Each was cross-examined. For reasons which are set out below, I found neither report to be probative of Mr. Flageul’s mental state in 2017. However, both experts properly discharged their duty to the Court and gave their evidence in an entirely honest and professional way. The Court is grateful to them for what assistance they could give.Agreed Statement of Facts The parties agreed on certain facts. They documented that agreement as follows (I have removed applicable headings):1.On 8 December 2014, WeDrive Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 603 262 675) (“WeDrive Australia”) was incorporated for the purpose of conducting the “WeDrive” business (“Business”).2. The Applicant (“Flageul”) was:(a)a director of WeDrive Australia from 8 to 24 December 2014, and from 10 March 2015 to 22 February 2018; and(b) a shareholder in WeDrive Australia at various times.3.On or about 16 May 2017, a meeting occurred between Flageul, Matthew Barker (a director of MSS Transport Services Pty Ltd (ACN 611 381 607) (“MSST”)) and the Second Respondent (“Mace”) (Executive Chairman and a director of Multi Services Solutions Group Pty Ltd (ACN 602 539 873)) at which Flageul gave a presentation about the Business to Barker and Mace.4.On 25 August 2017, the First Respondent (“WeDrive”) was incorporated, for the purpose of purchasing WeDrive Australia’s assets (including the Application) and its business (as those terms are defined in the document referred to in subparagraph 5(a) below).5.On 31 August 2017, WeDrive acquired WeDrive Australia’s business and assets (as those terms are defined in the document referred to in subparagraph 5(a) below). A suite of documents was executed giving effect to that transaction, including:(a) a “Business and Asset Purchase Agreement “;(b) a “Subscription and Shareholders’ Deed “; and(c) an “Executive Services Agreement” in regard to Flageul.6. As at 1 September 2017, WeDrive’s:(a) shareholders were:(i)Mace Group Pty Ltd, ACN 103 666 235 as trustee of the WeDrive Management Trust: 100 shares (10 per cent); (“Mace Group”)(ii)R E Taylor Pty Ltd, ACN 614 465 717 as trustee of the TF Trust: 190 shares (19 per cent); (“R E Taylor”)(iii)Flageul as trustee of the WeDrive Melbourne Trust: 200 shares (20 per cent);(iv)Mace Group as trustee of the Mace Family Trust: 510 shares (51 per cent);(b)directors were:(i) Flageul;(ii) Mace; and(iii) Taylor.7. Mace Group was, at all times material to this proceeding, controlled by Mace.8. R E Taylor was, at all times material to this proceeding, controlled by Taylor.9.Flageul was employed by WeDrive from around 1 September 2017 to around 22 January 2018, on a full-time basis:(a) in the role of “Chief Executive Officer “; and(b)with a remuneration of $150,000.00 per annum, inclusive of superannuation.10.On 10 November 2017, there was a board meeting of WeDrive at which a proposal for a merger between WeDrive and MSST was presented, with a PowerPoint presentation entitled “MSST_WeDrive Merger Discussion” (“Merger Proposal”), and the board of WeDrive unanimously voted in favour of the merger.11.On 21 December 2017, Flageul was dismissed as an employee of WeDrive with effect from 22 January 2018.12.On 22 December 2017, Flageul signed a document entitled, “Heads of Agreement: Sale of entire issued capital in WeDrive Pty Ltd.”13. On 3 January 2018, Flageul ceased being a director of WeDrive.14. On or about 22 January 2018, Flageul ceased employment with WeDrive.(Footnotes omitted.)The Court is grateful to the parties for their co-operation.The FactsDue Diligence

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

STEWARD J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STEWARD J

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