HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJCOMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA APPELLANT
AND
STEPHEN JOHN BARKER RESPONDENT
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker
[2014] HCA 32
10 September 2014
A1/2014
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside paragraphs 1 (save as to costs) and 2 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 August 2013 and, in their place, order that:
(a) the appeal be allowed; and
(b)paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order that:
(i) judgment be entered for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $11,692.31; and
(ii) the respondent pay the applicant interest in an amount to be determined by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia if not otherwise agreed.
3.Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
B W Walker SC with C D Bleby SC for the appellant (instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers)
R C Kenzie QC with P A Heywood-Smith QC, S J Mitchell and M A Irving for the respondent (instructed by Pace Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Contract – Employment contract – Implied terms – Employee's position made redundant – Employer's conduct denied employee opportunity of redeployment – Whether term of mutual trust and confidence should be implied by law in employment contracts.
Words and phrases – "duty of cooperation", "employment contract", "employment relationship", "necessity", "relational contract", "term of mutual trust and confidence", "terms implied by law", "terms implied in fact".
FRENCH CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ.
Introduction
The employment relationship, in Australia, operates within a legal framework defined by statute and by common law principles, informing the construction and content of the contract of employment. This appeal raises the question whether, under the common law of Australia, there is a term of mutual trust and confidence to be implied by law in all employment contracts. For the reasons that follow, that implication is a step beyond the legitimate law-making function of the courts. It should not be taken. This appeal, against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia[1], which made the implication, should be allowed.
Factual history
The respondent, Mr Stephen Barker, commenced employment with the appellant, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia ("the Bank"), in November 1981. He continued with the Bank until his employment was terminated by reason of redundancy on 9 April 2009. At the time of his dismissal, Mr Barker occupied the position of Executive Manager Adelaide Corporate Banking, Institutional and Business Services, South Australia. His employment at the time was governed by a written agreement…
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- Case
- [2014] HCA 32
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether a term of mutual trust and confidence should be implied by law into employment contracts generally. A secondary issue, raised by Mr Barker, was whether such a term should be implied as a matter of fact into his specific employment agreement. The Court was required to determine the criteria for implying such terms and whether they were met in this instance.
The High Court determined that a term of mutual trust and confidence should not be implied by law into all employment contracts, as it did not meet the criterion of necessity. The Court also rejected the submission that such a term should be implied as a matter of fact into Mr Barker's agreement, as no particular feature of the agreement supported this implication. However, the Court found that there was a conceded entitlement to damages for Mr Barker, amounting to $11,692.31 plus interest, based on a breach of clause 6 of his Employment Agreement as found by the primary judge. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Court were set aside, with judgment entered for Mr Barker in the conceded amount. The appellant was ordered to pay Mr Barker's costs of the appeal and the application for special leave.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside paragraphs 1 (save as to costs) and 2 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 August 2013 and, in their place, order that:
(a) the appeal be allowed; and
(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order that:
(i) judgment be entered for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $11,692.31; and
(ii) the respondent pay the applicant interest in an amount to be determined by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia if not otherwise agreed.
3. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: