Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

STEPHEN JOHN BARKER  RESPONDENT

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker

[2014] HCA 32

10 September 2014

A1/2014

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside paragraphs 1 (save as to costs) and 2 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 August 2013 and, in their place, order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed; and

(b)paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order that:

(i) judgment be entered for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $11,692.31; and

(ii) the respondent pay the applicant interest in an amount to be determined by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia if not otherwise agreed.

3.Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

B W Walker SC with C D Bleby SC for the appellant (instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers)

R C Kenzie QC with P A Heywood-Smith QC, S J Mitchell and M A Irving for the respondent (instructed by Pace Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Contract – Employment contract – Implied terms – Employee's position made redundant – Employer's conduct denied employee opportunity of redeployment – Whether term of mutual trust and confidence should be implied by law in employment contracts.

Words and phrases – "duty of cooperation", "employment contract", "employment relationship", "necessity", "relational contract", "term of mutual trust and confidence", "terms implied by law", "terms implied in fact".

FRENCH CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ.

Introduction

  1. The employment relationship, in Australia, operates within a legal framework defined by statute and by common law principles, informing the construction and content of the contract of employment.  This appeal raises the question whether, under the common law of Australia, there is a term of mutual trust and confidence to be implied by law in all employment contracts.  For the reasons that follow, that implication is a step beyond the legitimate law-making function of the courts.  It should not be taken.  This appeal, against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia[1], which made the implication, should be allowed.

    Factual history

  2. The respondent, Mr Stephen Barker, commenced employment with the appellant, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia ("the Bank"), in November 1981.  He continued with the Bank until his employment was terminated by reason of redundancy on 9 April 2009.  At the time of his dismissal, Mr Barker occupied the position of Executive Manager Adelaide Corporate Banking, Institutional and Business Services, South Australia.  His employment at the time was governed by a written agreement…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the appellant) against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the termination of Mr Barker's (the respondent) employment. Mr Barker had been employed by the Bank for a significant period, and his position was made redundant. The dispute centred on whether the Bank's conduct in denying Mr Barker the opportunity of redeployment constituted a breach of his employment contract, specifically in relation to an alleged implied term of mutual trust and confidence.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether a term of mutual trust and confidence should be implied by law into employment contracts generally. A secondary issue, raised by Mr Barker, was whether such a term should be implied as a matter of fact into his specific employment agreement. The Court was required to determine the criteria for implying such terms and whether they were met in this instance.

The High Court determined that a term of mutual trust and confidence should not be implied by law into all employment contracts, as it did not meet the criterion of necessity. The Court also rejected the submission that such a term should be implied as a matter of fact into Mr Barker's agreement, as no particular feature of the agreement supported this implication. However, the Court found that there was a conceded entitlement to damages for Mr Barker, amounting to $11,692.31 plus interest, based on a breach of clause 6 of his Employment Agreement as found by the primary judge. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Court were set aside, with judgment entered for Mr Barker in the conceded amount. The appellant was ordered to pay Mr Barker's costs of the appeal and the application for special leave.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside paragraphs 1 (save as to costs) and 2 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 August 2013 and, in their place, order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed; and

(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order that:

(i) judgment be entered for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $11,692.31; and

(ii) the respondent pay the applicant interest in an amount to be determined by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia if not otherwise agreed.

3. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ (dissent) KIEFEL J (dissent) GAGELER J (dissent)
Mr Barker also sought to support the decision of the Full Court by way of a notice of contention and the submission that the term of mutual trust and confidence should be implied as a matter of fact in the Agreement. For the reasons already given, the term did not answer the criterion of necessity required to support its implication in law in employment contracts generally. Mr Barker's counsel was unable to point to any particular feature of the Agreement that would support its implication in fact, albeit he referred to Mr Barker's seniority, his long and distinguished career with the Bank, and the silence of the contract on matters of trust and confidence. The submission in support of an implication in fact must be rejected.Conclusion There was a conceded entitlement to damages in favour of Mr Barker of $11,692.31 together with interest based upon a breach of cl 6 of the Agreement found by the primary judge. The Bank gave an undertaking at the special leave hearing that it would pay Mr Barker's costs of the application for special leave and the appeal and not seek costs against him if successful in the appeal, nor would it seek to disturb costs orders made below which were favourable to him. In light of the concession and the undertaking, the following orders should be made: 1. Appeal allowed. 2.Set aside paragraphs 1 (save as to costs) and 2 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 August 2013 and, in their place, order that: (a)the appeal be allowed; and (b)paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order that: (i)judgment be entered for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $11,692.31; and(ii)the respondent pay the applicant interest in an amount to be determined by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia if not otherwise agreed.3.Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal. The question in this case is whether the appellant, the former employer of the respondent, is liable to the respondent for damages in connection with the termination of the respondent's employment. The respondent worked for the appellant from 1981 in various positions. From July 2004, he held the position of Executive Manager, Level Three Corporate Banking, Institutional and Business Services in Adelaide. His position was subsequently changed to Regional Manager and to Regional Executive. Despite some variations to reflect the changes in his role, the terms of the Employment Agreement between the respondent and the appellant dated 10 August 2004 remained the same in relevant respects. Clause 6 of the Employment Agreement provided that it could be terminated by agreement or by four weeks' written notice by either party to the other, except in circumstances of misconduct. As an alternative, the appellant could make a payment of an amount equivalent to four weeks' pay in lieu of notice. No reason for termination was required to be given in either circumstance. Clause 7 provided that, where the appellant initiated termination of employment other than for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, the appellant would pay the respondent compensation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: