CANBERRA, 2 and 3 May 1995
#DATE 11:10:1995

Counsel for the Appellants: B.J. Gross QC and
B.D. Hodgkinson

Solicitors for the Appellants: Carroll and O'Dea

Counsel for the Respondents: D.F. Jackson QC and
F. Parry

Solicitors for the Respondents: Freehill Hollingdale
and Page

Orders

1. Appeal dismissed.
2. (a) Respondent's application for special leave to cross-appeal
granted. Cross-appeal allowed.
(b) Paragraphs one, two, three and four of the order of the Full
Court of the Federal Court set aside.
(c) Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Federal Court for
reconsideration in the light of this Court's reasons for
judgment.
3. No order as to costs.

Decisions

BRENNAN CJ, DAWSON AND TOOHEY JJ. The appellants were employed by the respondent as baggage handlers at Sydney airport. On 28 March 1989, they were dismissed from their employment for pilfering. They sought relief in the Federal Court, claiming that their dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and, for that reason, in breach of cl 11(a) of the Transport Workers (Airlines) Award 1988. That clause provided:

"Termination of employment by an employer shall not be harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
For the purposes of this clause, termination of employment shall include terminations with or without notice."

Each appellant sought an order under s 178 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act") for the imposition of a penalty and an order under s 356 for the payment of the penalty to him. The maximum penalty available in each case was $1,000. Invoking the accrued jurisdiction of the Federal Court, the appellants also sought damages for breach of contract and for breach of statutory duty.

2. The trial judge found that the respondent's conduct in terminating the appellants' employment was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable and dismissed the claims. On appeal, the Full Court found to the contrary, but held that the appellants were not entitled to damages for breach of contract or breach of statutory duty(1). The matters were remitted to the trial judge to deal with the claims in relation to penalty. The appellants now appeal to this Court against the rejection by the Full Court of their claims for damages.

3. The appellants' right to damages for breach of contract arose because, it was said, cl 11(a) became a term of the contract of employment. According to the appellants' argument, this occurred, first, because the provision was "imported" into the contract by force of the award, independently of the intention of the parties. Next, the argument ran, such a term was an implied term of the agreement between parties. Then, it was said, cl 11(a) embodied a "crystallised custom" of the industry in which the parties were engaged and for that reason became a term of the contract. The appellants also claimed damages for breach of a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd

Details

AGLC: Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24
Case: [1995] HCA 24
Decision Date: 3 May 1995

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Byrne and others (the appellants) brought proceedings against Australian Airlines Ltd (the respondent) in the Federal Court of Australia, alleging breaches of their employment contracts and seeking damages for wrongful dismissal. The dispute arose from the respondent's decision to terminate the employment of the appellants, who were baggage handlers at Sydney Airport, following a period of industrial action. The appellants contended that their dismissals were unlawful and constituted a breach of the terms of their employment contracts, which they argued incorporated certain award provisions and implied terms.

The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the respondent's actions in terminating the appellants' employment amounted to a breach of contract. Specifically, the Court considered whether the employment contracts contained an implied term that the employer would not terminate the employment in a manner that was capricious or arbitrary, or whether the employer was bound to follow a particular procedure before dismissing employees. The Court also examined the nature of the employment relationship and the extent to which award provisions could be incorporated into individual contracts of employment.

The High Court, by majority, held that there was no implied term in the employment contracts that prohibited the employer from terminating employment capriciously or arbitrarily, nor was there an implied term requiring the employer to follow a specific procedure before dismissal. The Court reasoned that the express terms of the employment contracts, which allowed for termination on notice, were paramount. While award provisions could be incorporated into employment contracts, they did not, in this instance, impose limitations on the employer's right to terminate employment beyond those expressly stated or necessarily implied by law. The Court distinguished between a breach of contract and a dismissal that might be harsh or unfair in a broader sense, noting that the latter might be a matter for industrial tribunals rather than the courts in a contractual claim.

The appeals were dismissed.

Orders