Moyle v Quarles [No 3]
[2025] WASC 443
•17 OCTOBER 2025
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: MOYLE -v- QUARLES [No 3] [2025] WASC 443
CORAM: LUNDBERG J
HEARD: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 & 18 SEPTEMBER 2025
DELIVERED : 17 OCTOBER 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 1770 of 2016
(Consolidated with CIV 1279 of 2022)
BETWEEN: ALAN LESLIE MOYLE
Plaintiff
AND
ALEXANDER FRANS HENRI QUARLES DE QUARLES as executor of the estate of LESLIE MOYLE
First Defendant
CHERIE PATRICIA CAMPBELL in her own capacity and as trustee for THE TESTAMENTARY TRUST CREATED IN THE WILL OF THE LATE LESLIE MOYLE FOR THE BENEFIT OF JOANNE MARGARET CAMPBELL
Second Defendant
FILE NO/S: CIV 2197 of 2022
BETWEEN: MOYLE HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
ALEXANDER FRANS HENRI QUARLES DE QUARLES
First Defendant
QUARLES PTY LTD
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Estates - Will made by the Deceased included a Hotchpot Adjustment to equalise distributions to the two beneficiaries - Chartered accountant appointed as executor under will - Delays in the administration of the will following numerous requests by plaintiff beneficiary for executor to locate financial documentation - Turns on own facts
Estates - Claim by plaintiff beneficiary against executor for breach of duty in failing to properly administer the Estate - Alleged delays in distributions from the Estate - Relevance of interim distributions - Whether executor acted as an ordinary prudent personal representative
Estates - Claim by plaintiff beneficiary against executor for breach of duty in failing to properly invest the funds of the Estate - Allegation that funds ought to have been invested by executor in Exchange Traded Funds together with term deposits - Allegation that executor retained excess funds of the Estate in low interest bank accounts - Nature of the duty owed by executor - Whether executor a trustee at relevant times
Estates - Claim by plaintiff beneficiary against executor for breach of duty in failing to obtain rental income from residential property held by the Estate
Estates - Claim by plaintiff beneficiary against executor for using funds of the Estate to pay legal fees without seeking direction and without consent - Whether breach of duty - Consideration of nature of the proceedings and whether use of funds prior to determination of proceedings was appropriate - Consideration of executor's indemnity
Estates - Claim by plaintiff beneficiary against executor for using funds of the Estate to pay fees to his accounting firm without seeking direction and without consent - Whether breach of conflict and profit rules - Whether s 98 of Trustees Act 1962 (WA) engaged to authorise payment of fees
Estates - Whether executor ought be exonerated from any breach of duty in accordance with s 75 of the Trustees Act 1962 (WA)
Corporations - Executor appointed himself as director of family company - Claims by plaintiff family company that director breached duties in failing to invest additional funds held by the company - Allegation that funds ought to have been invested by director in Exchange Traded Funds together with term deposits - Allegation that executor retained excess funds of the company in low interest bank accounts
Corporations - Whether director should be excused from any breach in accordance with s 1318 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Contract - Whether accounting firm owed contractual duties to family company concerning investment of funds - Whether inferred contract on pleaded terms demonstrated
Tort - Whether accounting firm owed tortious duty to family company concerning investment of funds - Policy considerations
Expert Evidence - Whether weight should be given to opinions of forensic accountant in relation to matters concerning banking practice, investment strategies and interest rates - No weight accorded to expert in the circumstances
Legislation:
Administration Act 1903 (WA), s 8
Administration Act Amendment Act 1976 (WA), s 3
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9AC, s 180, s 763A, s 766A, s 766C, s 910A, s 911A, s 1311, s 1317E, s 1317H, s 1318
Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 13
Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth), s 85A
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 58
Statute of Distribution 1670, 22 & 23 Car 2, c 10 (UK)
Trustees Act 1962 (WA), s 6, s 17, s 18, s 20, s 26B, s 27, s 71, s 75, s 92, s 98(5)
Result:
Judgment for the plaintiff (Mr Moyle) against the first defendant (Mr Quarles) in action CIV 1770 of 2016 (consolidated with action CIV 1279 of 2022) in terms set out at [834]. Judgment for the plaintiff (Moyle Holdings) against the first defendant (Mr Quarles) in action CIV 2197 of 2022 in terms set out at [834].
Actions otherwise dismissed.
Category: B
Representation:
CIV 1770 of 2016
(Consolidated with CIV 1279 of 2022)
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | S P Tomasich |
| First Defendant | : | S M Standing |
| Second Defendant | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Croftbridge |
| First Defendant | : | Arns & Associates |
| Second Defendant | : | Mossensons |
CIV 2197 of 2022
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | S P Tomasich |
| First Defendant | : | S M Standing |
| Second Defendant | : | T Langdon |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Croftbridge |
| First Defendant | : | Arns & Associates |
| Second Defendant | : | Barry Nilsson Lawyers (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499
Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; (2008) 238 CLR 570
Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1996] 1 WLR 1220
ASIC v Cassimatis [No 8] [2016] FCA 1023
ASIC v Healey [No 2] [2011] FCA 1003
ASIC v Vines [2005] NSWSC 1349
Atkins v Godfrey [2006] WASC 83
Barlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] Ch 515
Blogg v Johnson (1867) L.R. 2 Ch 225; 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 113
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424
Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1996] Ch 1
Brooks v Young [2018] SASCFC 81; (2018) 131 SASR 365
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253
Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co [1991] 3 SCR 534
Cardaci v Cardaci [2023] WASCA 158
Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20; (2019) 268 CLR 524
Cassimatis v ASIC [2020] FCAFC 52
Collett v Knox [2010] QSC 132
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston (1964) 112 CLR 12
Craven-Sands v Koch [2000] NSWSC 374; (2000) 34 ACSR 341
Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1213
Frost v Bovaird [2012] FCAFC 60; (2012) 203 FCR 95
Galea v Camilleri [2023] NSWSC 206
Gonzales v Claridades [2003] NSWSC 508; (2003) 58 NSWLR 188
Halford v Halford [2022] WASCA 1; (2022) 58 WAR 254
Hall v Poolman (2007) 215 FLR 243
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539
Hesse v Hardie [2023] WASC 173
Hourigan v Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd [1934] HCA 25; (1934) 51 CLR 619
Howling v Kristofferson (Unreported, Supreme Court NSW, Cohen J, 14 October 1992)
In re Atkinson (dec) [1971] VicRp 73; [1971] VR 612
In re Ellis; Ellis v Ellis [2015] WASC 77
Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161
Kelly v Connell [2024] WASC 274
Kreketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96
Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44
Lohman v Lohman (as executor of the estate of Lohman) [2024] WASC 35
Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Petar The Diocesan Bishop of The Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand [2008] HCA 42; (2008) 237 CLR 66
Mangraviti v Donato [2009] NSWSC 1258
McFarlane v Smith [2023] WASC 336
Nobarani v Mariconte [No 2] [2018] HCA 49; (2018) 92 ALJR 1031
Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574
O'Brien v Warburton [2012] WASC 82
Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360
Orr v Ford [1989] HCA 4; (1989) 167 CLR 316
Pacella v Sherborne [No 2] [2010] WASC 186
Pacific Current Group v Fitzpatrick [2024] FCA 1480
Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180
Port Sudan Cotton Co v Govindaswamy Chettiar & Sons [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 5
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370
Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541
Rattigan v Hanly [2020] NSWSC 1722
Re Sir Colin and Lady MacKenzie Trust [No 2] [2020] VSC 335
Reeves v Reeves (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 386
Ridley v Mulholland [2022] NZHC 1007
Rocke v Hart (1805) 11 Ves Jr 58, 60; 23 ER 1009
Savage v Lunn [1998] NSWCA 203
Skaftourous v Dimos [2002] VSC 198
Stanojevic v Damnjanovic [2024] VSC 350
Streeter v Western Areas [No 2] [2011] WASCA 17; (2011) 278 ALR 291
Tebbs v Carpenter (1816) 1 Madd 290; 56 ER 107
Tsaknis v Lilburne [2010] WASC 152
Turch v Tripolone [2025] NSWSC 86
Turnbull v Fleming [2024] NSWSC 981
Walker v Walker [2022] NSWSC 1104
Warrington Management v Kingslane Property [2019] WASC 2
Wilks v Groom (1856) 3 Drew 584, 592; 61 ER 1026
Wilson v Arwon Finance Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 137
Wright v Lemon [2024] WASCA 19
Youyang Pty Limited v Minter Ellison [2003] HCA 15; (2003) 212 CLR 484
Zevering v Callaghan [2011] QCA 180
Aldoga Aluminium Pty Ltd v De Silva Starr Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 284
Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (2007) 53 ACSR 300
BBB Constructions Pty Ltd v Frankipile Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 982
CA & Associates Pty Ltd v Fini Group Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 31
Cape Range Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd v Austral Construction Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 304
CBS Commercial Canberra Pty Ltd v Axis Commercial (ACT) Pty Ltd in the matter of CBS Commercial Canberra Pty Ltd [2022] FAC 544
Creata (Aust) Pty Ltd v Faull [2017] NSWCA 300
Createc Pty Ltd v Design Signs Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 85
Dask Entertainment Melbourne Pty Ltd v Aussie Outfits Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 660
Demir Pty Ltd v Graf Plumbing Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 553
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 41; (2008) 237 CLR 473
Diploma Construction (WA) Pty Ltd v KPA Architects Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 91
Downer Utilities Australia Pty Ltd v Alinta Energy Transmission (Chichester) Pty Ltd [No 2] [2023] WASC 1
Elm Financial Services Pty Ltd v MacDougal [2004] NSWSC 560
Energy Equity Corporation Ltd v Sinedie Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 419; (2001) 166 FLR 179
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 675
Grandview Ausbuilder Pty Ltd v Budget Demolition Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 60
Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund [1996] FCA 822; (1996) 70 FCR 452
Greenaways Australia Pty Ltd v CBC Management Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1186
Grocon Constructors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dexus Funds Management Ltd as trustee for the Dexus 480Q Trust (No 2) [2019] FCA 1117
Hoare Bros Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 62 FCR 302
H'Var Steel Services Pty Ltd v TDC Concrete Pty Ltd [2017] WASCA 63
In the matter of Douglas Aerospace Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 167
J Group Constructions Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1607; (2015) 303 FLR 139
Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd v Doric Contractors Pty Ltd [2014] WASC 206
Malec Holdings Pty Ltd v Scotts Agencies Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] VSCA 330
Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 24; (2005) 53 ACSR 229
Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290
MNWA Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCAFC 154
Nepean Conveyors Pty Ltd v Linkforce Industrial Services Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 71
ORH Contracting Pty Ltd v CGS Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 273
Re Modern Wholesale Jewellery Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 236
Re Vortex Communications Australia Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 796
Re Zarzar Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 93
Rohalo Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v R P Scherer SpA & Pharmagel SpA (1994) 15 ACSR 347
Sceam Constructions Pty Ltd v Clyne [2021] VSCA 270
Sovereign Building Company Pty Ltd v Sheehan Group Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 11
Tatlers.com.au Pty Limited v Davis [2006] NSWSC 1055
TR Administration Pty Ltd v Frank Marchetti & Sons Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 70
Table of Contents
A. Introduction
B. The evidence
(1) The will of the late Leslie Moyle
(2) Primary dates and stage of the administration
(3) The assets and accounts of the Estate
(4) The assets and accounts of Moyle Holdings
(5) The shares in, and directorship of, Moyle Holdings
(6) The evidence of Mr Moyle
(7) The evidence of Mr Quarles
(8) The business of QPL
(9) The involvement of solicitors
(10) First stage - November 2014 to February 2016
(11) Second stage - March 2016 to May 2016
(12) Third stage - May 2016 to September 2018
(13) Fourth stage - September 2018 to the present
(14) Distributions made by Mr Quarles from the Estate
C. The expert evidence of Mr Posma
(1) Overview
(2) Special rates and paid rates data
(3) Mr Posma's primary report in the Estate Proceeding
(4) Mr Posma's supplementary report in the Estate Proceeding
(5) Mr Posma's evidence in the Company Proceeding
(6) Criticisms of Mr Posma's evidence
D. Pleaded claims and defences in the Estate Proceeding
(1) Claims in the Estate Proceeding
(2) Delays in the administration of the Estate including the calculation of the Hotchpot Adjustment
(3) Failing to properly invest the funds held by the Estate
(4) Failing to rent the Dianella Property
(5) Wilful default
(6) Payment of legal fees from the Estate's funds
(7) Engagement of QPL by the Estate
(8) Relief claimed
(9)Exoneration pursuant to s 75 of the Trustees Act
E. Pleaded claims and defences in the Company Proceedings
(1) Failing to properly invest the funds held by Moyle Holdings
(2)Exoneration pursuant to s 1318 of the Corporations Act
(3) Claims against QPL
(4) Relief claimed
(5) Claims and defences abandoned
F. Pleading amendments during the trial
G. Issues requiring determination by the Court
H. Legal framework
(1) The office of executor and the office of trustee
(2) The primary duties of an executor
(3) Delays by an executor
(4) Interim distributions
(5) The duty of an executor to lay out the estate and liability for waste
(6) The executor's discretion
(7) Application for directions or judicial advice
(8)Exoneration under the Trustees Act
(9) The office of director
(10) Relief for a director's breaches
(11) Conclusions
I. First issue - the Hotchpot Adjustment
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings - delays
(3) Factual findings - interim distributions
(4) Disposition - breach
(5) Disposition - estoppel, waiver and laches
(6) Relief
J. Second issue - the investment of the Estate's funds
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Disposition - breach
(4) Disposition - estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and laches
(5) Relief
K. Third issue - the Dianella Property
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Disposition - breach
(4) Disposition - estoppel, waiver and laches
(5) Relief
L. Fourth issue - whether the conduct amounts to wilful default
M. Fifth issue - Mr Quarles' payment of legal fees
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Relevant principles
(4) Disposition
(5) Wrongful payment of five invoices by Mr Quarles
N. Sixth issue - Mr Quarles' payment of QPL invoices
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Relevant principles
(4) Disposition - breach
(5) Disposition - estoppel, waiver, laches and limitation period
(6) Relief
O. Seventh issue - whether Mr Quarles should be relieved from personal liability
(1) Overview
(2) Disposition - failure to invest
(3) Disposition - use of Estate funds to pay legal fees
(4) Disposition - use of Estate funds to pay QPL's fees
P. Eighth issue - the investment of the funds of Moyle Holdings and Mr Quarles' liability as a director
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Disposition - breach
(4) Relief
Q. Ninth issue - whether Mr Quarles should be excused from liability as a director
R. Tenth issue - liability of QPL to Moyle Holdings for breach of contract
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Factual findings
(3) Disposition
S. Eleventh issue - liability of QPL to Moyle Holdings for breach of duty
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
(2) Disposition
T. Conclusion and orders
ATTACHMENT A Assets and Liabilities of the Estate as at November 2014
ATTACHMENT B Distributions made from the Estate to the Beneficiaries
ATTACHMENT C Solicitors' invoices paid by the Estate
ATTACHMENT D QPL invoices paid by the Estate
LUNDBERG J:
A. Introduction
The present proceedings are concerned with the estate of the late Mr Leslie Moyle who passed away on 23 July 2014 (the Estate). He was 91 years of age at the time of his death. Early in his life, the Deceased served in the military and later established and operated a successful building company. The operations of that company had ceased by 2012.
The Deceased was generous to his family during his life, distributing large sums of money to his children and grandchildren through a discretionary trust he and his wife had established. Upon his death, the Deceased left an estate worth between $8 million and $9 million in total, with the assets of the Estate held in his own name and also in the company he had established.
The Deceased was survived by his two adult children, Mr Alan Leslie Moyle and Ms Joanne Campbell, who are the only beneficiaries to the Estate. The Deceased's wife, Mrs Patricia Moyle, passed away in January 2012.
Mr Alan Moyle was approaching 78 years of age at the time of trial. He is the plaintiff in these proceedings, in his personal capacity and through his control of the building company formerly owned and controlled by the Deceased, Moyle Holdings Pty Ltd. Ms Campbell is the second defendant in one of the proceedings. Through her trustee, Ms Campbell has given notice she intends to abide the outcome of those proceedings.[1]
[1] Folio 205 (all Folio references are to the Estate Proceeding unless otherwise indicated).
Without intending any disrespect, and to assist in distinguishing between father and son, I will refer in these reasons to the late Leslie Moyle as the Deceased and to his son as Mr Moyle.
The executor named in the Deceased's will, who accepted the appointment and subsequently obtained probate, is Mr Alexander Frans Henri Quarles de Quarles (Mr Quarles). Mr Quarles was an experienced chartered accountant at the time of his appointment, and presently has some 50 years' experience as a certified practising accountant. His accounting firm, Quarles Pty Ltd (QPL), which is the second defendant in one of the proceedings, provided accounting and taxation services to the Deceased prior to, and following, his death.
The course of the administration of the Estate largely ran from October 2014, when probate was granted, through to around December 2018, when the final distributions were made from the Estate. However, Mr Quarles remained as the executor until 23 February 2023. Mr Quarles ceased to be the executor of the Estate at that point, when the grant of probate to Mr Quarles was revoked by consent orders on a 'no admission' basis and Mr Moyle was appointed as administrator of the Estate.
At the time of his death, the Deceased personally held a number of assets, including large sums of cash in various bank accounts and a residential property in Dianella (the Dianella Property). A significant sum of cash was also held through Moyle Holdings. Ultimately, it became evident that the Deceased had established a large number of bank accounts during his life (around 66 different accounts).
The details and value of the cash and property of the Deceased are not in tremendous dispute in these proceedings. As will be seen, though, considerable energy was spent by the parties in the course of the administration of the Estate, particularly on the part of Mr Moyle, to pursue enquiries and investigations to confirm the full extent of the Estate and of the information required for the adjustment calculation in the will, which I will explain in due course.
During the course of the decade since his father's passing, Mr Moyle has ventilated, and pursued, complaints in respect of the conduct of Mr Quarles. The complaints of Mr Moyle have found voice in three proceedings commenced in this Court, the trial of which is the subject of these reasons. The proceedings were ordered to be heard together, with the evidence in one to stand as the evidence in the other.
The first two proceedings, which were consolidated, are those brought by Mr Moyle against Mr Quarles in his capacity as the appointed executor of the Estate, being CIV 1770 of 2016 and CIV 1279 of 2022 (the Estate Proceeding).[2]
[2] Although the plaintiff in each action is different, for convenience I will on occasions refer to the plaintiffs in plural terms.
In the Estate Proceeding, Mr Moyle alleges breaches of duty on the part of Mr Quarles in his conduct of the administration of the Estate, including delays in finalising the distributions to beneficiaries and completing the hotchpot mechanism in the will, failures to properly invest the cash held by the Estate, and a failure to rent out the Dianella Property. Mr Moyle also challenges the conduct of Mr Quarles in causing the Estate to engage his accounting firm and thereby profit from the Estate, and the use by Mr Quarles of the Estate's funds to pay his legal fees, including in relation to the present proceedings.
The second proceeding was brought by Moyle Holdings against Mr Quarles in his capacity as a former director of that entity, and also against QPL. The proceeding is CIV 2197 of 2022 (the Company Proceeding). In the Company Proceeding, Mr Moyle, through Moyle Holdings, alleges that Mr Quarles failed to properly invest the cash held by the company, and alleges breaches of contract and duty on the part of QPL.
The specific pleaded claims in the proceedings and the issues which required determination at trial are outlined under headings D, E, F and G below. The analysis of the issues is contained under heading I to S below, with the applicable legal principles summarised under heading H.
All of the claims against Mr Quarles and QPL have been denied, and were resisted at trial (although certain payments of legal invoices using the Estate's funds were accepted as having been incorrectly paid by Mr Quarles).
The trial of the action was heard over the course of seven days commencing on 8 September 2025. A considerable body of documentary evidence was adduced by the parties at the trial. The trial book was approximately 4,200 pages in length, the contents of which were admitted into evidence.[3] The lay evidence at the trial was given by Mr Moyle and by Mr Quarles, and they were both cross‑examined. Expert evidence was adduced by the plaintiff through Mr Terrence Posma, who is a forensic accountant. Mr Posma was cross-examined and his reports were the subject of an admissibility challenge by the defendants.
[3] The Trial Book is Exhibit P9, but these reasons will refer to documents within the Trial Book as Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2 etc. Further, the parties agreed to exclude Documents 529, 537, 569 (excluding Annexure 3) and 571 (excluding the ASX data) from the Trial Book.
I was considerably assisted by the concise opening[4] and closing[5] written submissions prepared by counsel for each of the parties, and the focused approach taken by all counsel in the presentation of their respective cases. Their submissions and approach to the proceedings have greatly assisted in the efficient preparation of these reasons.
[4] Plaintiffs' opening submissions dated 12 August 2025 (Folio 277), Mr Quarles' opening submissions dated 22 August 2025 (Folio 280), and QPL's opening submissions dated 22 August 2025 (Folio 118 in the Company Proceeding).
[5] Plaintiffs' closing submissions dated 17 September 2025 (Folio 291), Mr Quarles' closing submissions dated 17 September 2025 (Folio 290), and QPL's closing submissions dated 17 September 2025 (Folio 128 in the Company Proceeding).
These are my reasons for decision in relation to the claims. The conclusions I have reached and the orders I propose are summarised under heading T below, at [834] to [836].
B. The evidence
(1) The will of the late Leslie Moyle
The Deceased executed a relatively concise will on 27 February 2014, and passed away on 23 July 2014. The will is only four pages in length and contains four clauses.
On 3 October 2014, probate was granted to Mr Quarles in respect of this will. Mr Quarles engaged the law firm Tolson & Co (Tolsons) to apply for this grant of probate, among other things. Mr Quarles had had a long business association with that law firm.
By cl 2 of the will, the Deceased appointed Mr Quarles to be 'the Executor and Trustee' of his will. The clause declared that the expression 'my Trustee' shall mean and include 'the Executor and Trustee of this my Will whether original additional or substituted'.
By cl 3 of the will, the Deceased divided his estate in two equal shares between Mr Moyle and Ms Campbell (to be held on trust for Ms Campbell's benefit by her daughter, Ms Cherie Campbell).[6] The Deceased included a mechanism in the will by which the gifts to his children were to be 'equalised', referred to by the parties as the Hotchpot Adjustment. This mechanism is also described, incorrectly, in several of the letters sent during the administration of the Estate as the 'Hotchpotch' clause.
[6] On 5 September 2018, the State Administrative Tribunal appointed Ms Cherie Campbell as plenary administrator of her mother's estate.
As will be seen, the operation of this mechanism became the central administrative task of the parties and the primary source of conflict and delays in the administration of the Estate.
The hotchpot rule in succession law is of ancient origin. The rule was originally established by the Statute of Distribution 1670, 22 & 23 Car 2, c 10 (UK), and applied in circumstances of intestacy. The rule allowed for the accounting of earlier inter vivos gifts and other testamentary benefits so that children were equally treated and were not given double portions.[7] The rule has been abolished in England and in a number of Australian States, including in Western Australia.[8]
[7] Burns, F, The Changing Patterns of Total Intestacy Distribution Between Spouses and Children in Australia and England [2013] UNSWLawJl 18; (2013) 36(2) UNSW Law Journal 470.
[8] Administration Act Amendment Act 1976 (WA), s 3.
Pursuant to the bespoke Hotchpot Adjustment mechanism established by the Deceased in his will, the advances that were made to Mr Moyle and Ms Campbell during the Deceased's lifetime were balanced to ensure that the division of the Estate was equal, taking into account those historical advances.
The terms of the will did not define the concept of 'advances', nor did it identify the period in respect of which the 'advances' were to be identified. At least at one point in the chronology of the matter, the lawyers for Mr Quarles flirted with the idea that the clause was invalid for uncertainty, but that idea was not pursued with any vigour.
Pursuant to cl 3(a) of the will, the Deceased bequeathed to Mr Moyle, one half of his net estate:
(a) plus one half of any advances made, adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index applicable at any time that each advance was made, by the Deceased to or for the benefit of Ms Campbell during the Deceased's lifetime; and
(b) less one half of any advances made, adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index applicable at any time that each advance was made, by the Deceased to or for the benefit of Mr Moyle during the Deceased's lifetime.
Pursuant to cl 3(b) of the will, the Deceased bequeathed to Ms Campbell, one half of his net estate:
(a) plus one half of any advances made, adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index applicable at any time that each advance was made, by the Deceased to or for the benefit of Mr Moyle during the Deceased's lifetime; and
(b) less one half of any advances made, adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index applicable at any time that each advance was made, by the Deceased to or for the benefit of Ms Campbell during the Deceased's lifetime.
Mr Moyle explained his understanding of the Hotchpot Adjustment clause in his evidence. He described it, accurately, as requiring that an account be undertaken of the advances (and repayments) that had been made to his sister and to him during the years prior to his father's passing, with the advances (and repayments) being adjusted for inflation, and with an equalisation then being undertaken.[9]
[9] ts 362.
Mr Moyle explained that the Hotchpot Adjustment process required, in general terms, the following steps to be undertaken:[10]
(a)The first step was to identify all the accounts the Deceased had used over the preceding years, not being confined to only the bank accounts in the name of the Deceased.
(b)The second step was to identify the relevant transactions that had taken place within each account, to the extent they evidenced payments made to either Mr Moyle or Ms Campbell.
(c)The third step was to use this information to calculate the Hotchpot Adjustment, so that distributions could be made to Mr Moyle and Ms Campbell by the Estate.
[10] ts 362.
I did not understand Mr Quarles to disagree with the above process, although plainly Mr Moyle had a particularly strong view as to the extent of the enquiries and investigations which were required as part of the first two steps.
As to the identification of the advances made to the beneficiaries by the Deceased, the evidence indicates that there were three primary potential sources of those advances. They may have been made:
(a)by the Deceased; or
(b)by Moyle Holdings; or
(c)through the Moyle Family Trust, being the discretionary trust established by the Deceased, of which the Deceased and his wife had been trustees and, at the time of his death, the Deceased had been a co‑trustee along with Ms Campbell's daughter.
Finally, it should be noted that the Deceased's will established a trust in respect of the specific disposition to Ms Campbell, following the disposition itself, which is evident from cl 3(b). Ms Campbell's daughter Cherie was to take the distribution upon trust for her mother, with an annuity and certain other regular amounts to be paid by the trustee. In this regard, the will further provides in cl 3(d) that the trustee shall utilise the residual capital and income of the trust in her sole discretion, for the sole benefit of Ms Campbell.
Other than the matter just mentioned, the will did not otherwise contain any provisions or directions as to investments by the executor insofar as the distributions to Mr Moyle and Ms Campbell were concerned. The will also did not contain any provisions for the remuneration of the executor.
(2) Primary dates and stage of the administration
It is convenient at the outset to provide an overview of the lengthy administration of this Estate.
Mr Quarles held the appointment as executor from the grant of probate through until 23 February 2023, and he held office as the sole director of Moyle Holdings from 30 October 2014 to 24 July 2019.
Further, it is of some importance to the dispute that Mr Moyle commenced proceedings in this Court on 9 May 2016, seeking orders for the due administration of the Estate. The administration of the Estate from this point must be seen in this context, namely that the matter was under the supervision of the Court from 9 May 2016 onwards.
Although the dispute has continued over the course of a decade, the final distributions from the Estate was, largely, effected in late 2018. So, the focus of Mr Moyle's complaints as to the conduct of Mr Quarles are concentrated on the approximate four‑year period between October 2014 and December 2018.
When examining the chronology of the administration of the Estate, I have approached the analysis by reference to the several stages of the administration. These stages mark the points at which the character of the overall dispute had a particular complexion. The stages are summarised in the table below.
Table 1: Stages of the administration of the Estate
Stage
Description
First Stage
3 October 2014 to 25 February 2016
Period from the grant of probate until the significant meeting between the parties on 25 February 2016.
Second Stage
26 February 2016 to
8 May 2016Period from the meeting between the parties on 25 February 2016 until Mr Moyle commenced the Estate Proceeding.
Third Stage
9 May 2016 to late December 2018
Period from the commencement of the Estate Proceeding until the Court supervised mediation on 21 September 2018 and the sale of the Dianella Property and final distribution of the Estate in December 2018.
Fourth Stage
1 January 2019 to 23 February 2023
Period from the final distribution of the Estate until orders were made by consent to have Mr Quarles removed as the executor of the Estate.
The first stage was between 3 October 2014 and 25 February 2016. Over the course of this period, there were many communications sent by or on behalf of Mr Moyle seeking from Mr Quarles the provision of information and documents relevant to the Hotchpot Adjustment calculation and clarification from Mr Quarles as to what steps he was taking to complete the calculation.
In particular, there were extensive written communications between the parties and steps taken to confirm the number and location of the bank accounts and other potential repositories of financial information relating to the Deceased's Estate, which also included an analysis of the handwritten ledgers maintained by the Deceased for the period until 2011. This process included the pursuit of financial information relating to the Moyle Family Trust and Moyle Holdings.
The calculation of the Hotchpot Adjustment was necessarily going to be informed by the results of the enquiries as to the financial information, especially the advances made by the Deceased during his lifetime. The communications between the parties also addressed the work which was being undertaken by Mr Moyle to progress the Hotchpot Adjustment process.
In general terms, as will be explained, Mr Quarles was quite reactive during this period, and the urgency of Mr Moyle's requests increased as time went on.
On 25 February 2016, the parties met and agreed a way forward, which is carefully set out in a detailed letter from Dwyer Durack dated 4 March 2016.[11] That was already some 16 months into the administration. The agreement reached by the parties as to the way forward may have led to some optimism on the part of Mr Moyle that matters would proceed more smoothly to a final conclusion. Any optimism he felt in this regard was short-lived.
[11] Exhibit 142.
This leads to the second stage of the administration, which was the period between 26 February 2016 and May 2016. As noted above, and will be explained in more detail below, the matter went somewhat awry in March 2016 following the 'communication blackout' between Tolsons and Mr Quarles. This led to an escalation in matters in the correspondence from Mr Moyle's side, with a statement in a letter from Dwyer Durack sent on 21 March 2016, that it had become clear to Mr Moyle that Mr Quarles had 'no intention of administering this Estate' and there was nothing Mr Moyle could do 'without recourse to the Court'.[12]
[12] Exhibit 146.
On 9 May 2016, Mr Moyle brought proceedings in this Court for the due administration of the Estate.
The third stage of the administration ran from 9 May 2016 through to December 2018. During this period, the administration of the Estate was conducted through the proceedings in this Court, with orders being made over this period to require the parties to file affidavits and produce documentation for the purposes of advancing the Hotchpot Adjustment process. Many of the orders made by the Court were consent orders. The proceedings advanced somewhat slowly, through to a mediation before Registrar Whitby (as her Honour then was) in September 2018. During this stage, the parties continued to exchange detailed communications regarding the location of financial documentation and to discuss the Hotchpot Adjustment process.
At the mediation in September 2018, consent orders were agreed for the Dianella Property to be listed for sale, for an interim distribution of the Estate to be made to the beneficiaries, and for the Hotchpot Adjustment amount. The adjustment figure for the purposes of cl 3 of the will was agreed as $174,419.08. I refer to the consent orders made on 21 September 2018.
Following this mediation, it appeared to be accepted by the parties that the issue of the due administration of the Estate had been resolved, subject to the issue of costs being determined. Mr Quarles then made the relevant final distributions from the Estate, in October and December 2018, with the Dianella Property being sold in early November 2018, with settlement on 4 December 2018.
There was then a fourth stage to the matter, which ran from December 2018 through to the date on which consent orders were made for the removal of Mr Quarles as executor. The matter became noticeably more adversarial during this period. In brief terms, during the course of CIV 1770 of 2016, concerns were raised by Mr Moyle in relation to the conduct of Mr Quarles, which then became the focus of the Estate Proceeding, with a detailed statement of claim being filed on 30 July 2019 and the matter being admitted to the CMC List. Moyle Holdings then commenced the Company Proceeding in June 2020, against Mr Quarles and QPL. Fresh proceedings were later commenced against Mr Quarles by Mr Moyle in March 2022, being CIV 1279 of 2022, which were consolidated with the original action by order of Curthoys J on 31 March 2022.[13]
[13] Folio 187.
While the Hotchpot Adjustment process was unfolding, from late 2014, there were some limited communications between the parties as to the investment of the large cash sums held by the Estate and by Moyle Holdings. This issue did not, however, loom large during the administration, but now forms part of the claims advanced by Mr Moyle. Importantly, the correspondence from Mr Moyle during the administration did not urge investment of the cash funds in the stock market.
There were also limited communications, commencing in late 2014, between the parties as to the removal of personal items from the Dianella Property (being personal items of the Deceased, Mr Moyle and Ms Campbell), the repairs and maintenance needed in respect of that property, the intentions of Mr Moyle as to the possible acquisition of the property, and also whether the property might be rented in the meantime. Again, the issue of the rental of the property did not loom large during the administration, but forms part of the case agitated by Mr Moyle.
Finally, there were also communications between the parties as to the status of the shares in Moyle Holdings, as well as the change in officeholders of that company, and related corporate administrative matters.
(3) The assets and accounts of the Estate
It is also convenient to identify at the outset the relevant assets and accounts of the Estate and Moyle Holdings which were the subject of evidence.
I will start with the assets held by the Deceased at the time of his death. It is agreed by the parties that, prior to the grant of probate, the Estate of the Deceased consisted primarily of the following assets:[14]
(a)cash held in three accounts with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, in the amount of $3,274,423.22;
(b)the Dianella Property, valued at $800,000, which was subsequently sold at auction for $655,500; and
(c)the refund due to the Estate in respect of a lease bond paid by the Deceased to the RSL Menora Gardens Aged Care Facility Care, in the sum of $975,000.
[14] Statement of Agreed Facts dated 5 August 2025 ([15] (Exhibit P8)) (SOAF).
The full detail of the assets and liabilities of the Estate is set out in the table in Attachment A to these reasons. The liabilities identified in the table consisted of a loan owed by the Deceased to the Moyle Family Trust.
As to the cash held by the Estate, it is agreed that, as at the date of the Deceased's death, the Deceased held three bank accounts with the Commonwealth Bank. Those accounts were:
(a)a CBA Pensioner Security Account, being Account 6942, which held $384,462 at the time it was closed in November 2014 and transferred to the DIA (which is described below);
(b)a CBA term deposit account identified as Account 1928, which held $1,336,917 at the time it was closed in November 2014 and transferred to the DIA; and
(c)a CBA term deposit account identified as Account 1936, which remained open as an account until March 2018, at which time the sum of $907,979 was held in the account, which was transferred in April 2018 to a fresh term deposit account, being Account 4235, to establish a term deposit in the sum of $1 million.
Further, it is agreed that, on 28 October 2014, Mr Quarles opened a fresh account with the Commonwealth Bank, described as a 'direct investment account' or a DIA. Mr Quarles used the DIA as the principal operating account for the Estate during the administration. The opening balance of the DIA was $1,720,398.52, comprising the funds formerly held in the CBA Pensioner Security Account and the funds in the term deposit Account 1928.
It is agreed that funds could be drawn from the DIA without incurring break costs or other penalties, and that variable interest was payable on the funds in the DIA. The interest payable when the DIA was opened was 2.25%, for balances above $500,000.
In addition to the DIA, it is agreed that, over time, Mr Quarles opened four further accounts with the Commonwealth Bank, all being term deposit accounts.[15]
[15] SOAF [27].
It is also agreed that, in the period that Mr Quarles acted as executor of the Estate, the Estate earned interest on the funds invested with the Commonwealth Bank in the amount of $240,974, on which tax was payable.[16]
[16] SOAF [29].
A detailed spreadsheet was prepared by the plaintiff showing the funds held in the nine bank accounts of the Estate over the period from July 2014 to March 2022.[17] That spreadsheet also showed the movement of funds between the accounts over that period, as Mr Quarles moved funds to establish additional term deposit accounts.
[17] Exhibit P11 (formerly Plaintiff's Trial Aide Memoire 2).
As mentioned above, one of the assets of the Estate was the residential home of the Deceased, being the Dianella Property. The Dianella Property was the former residential home of the Deceased, before it became necessary for him to move into an aged care facility. The Dianella Property had been unoccupied for some time before the Deceased's death. The extent of the repair and maintenance required to the property, and the ability of the property to be made available for rent, were issues in the trial. I will address the evidence on these matters when dealing with the specific claim advanced by Mr Moyle in this regard.
(4) The assets and accounts of Moyle Holdings
Moyle Holdings had conducted a construction business, but was not conducting any business as at the date of death of the Deceased. As noted above, the Deceased held a large sum of cash through his ownership interest in Moyle Holdings.
As at 23 July 2014, it is agreed by the parties that the assets of Moyle Holdings comprised cash at bank in one account, in the sum of $3,948,774, being largely monies which Moyle Holdings had paid to the Deceased, but which were repaid on tax advice.
As at the date of death of the Deceased, Moyle Holdings operated a Premium Business Cheque Account at the Commonwealth Bank (CBA Cheque Account). Variable interest was payable on this account, in the amount of only 1.00% p.a. at the time of the Deceased's death.[18] The interest payable on the account never rose higher than this over the course of the administration of the Estate, and slowly decreased as the amount in the account decreased over time, down to 0.10% p.a.
[18] SOAF [25].
A detailed spreadsheet was prepared by the solicitors for the plaintiffs showing the funds held in the three bank accounts of the Estate over the period from July 2014 to August 2019.[19] That spreadsheet shows the movement of funds between the accounts over that period, as Mr Quarles moved funds to establish additional term deposit accounts, as explained below.
[19] Exhibit P10 (formerly Plaintiff's Trial Aide Memoire 1).
On the date probate was granted, being 3 October 2014, the balance of the CBA Cheque Account had increased to $3,965,824.42.[20] On two occasions, Mr Quarles caused funds from this account to be transferred to term deposit accounts held at the Commonwealth Bank. On both occasions, this was done by Mr Quarles only following the receipt of a letter sent to him in this regard by Mr Moyle's solicitors.
[20] SOAF [42].
The first occasion was on 25 March 2015. On that date, Mr Moyle's solicitors wrote to Mr Quarles' lawyers regarding the funds in the CBA Cheque Account, noting that they were only earning 1.00% p.a.[21] Following that, Mr Quarles caused $3.6 million to be transferred to a fresh term deposit account with the Commonwealth Bank, being Account 7510, which was earning 2.89% p.a.
[21] Exhibit 78.
The second occasion was on 7 July 2017. On that date, Mr Moyle's lawyers again wrote to Mr Quarles' lawyers regarding the amount of the funds in the CBA Cheque Account and the low interest being earned.[22] Following receipt of that letter, Mr Quarles caused $800,000 to be transferred from the CBA Cheque Account to establish a fresh term deposit, being Account 2758, earning 2.70% p.a.
[22] Exhibit 354.
The amounts transferred by Mr Quarles from the CBA Cheque Account are summarised in the table below:[23]
[23] SOAF [45].
Table 2: Term Deposits established for Moyle Holdings
Account
Date opened
Balance
Interest rate
Term / maturity date
CBA Term Deposit Account 7510
16 April 2015
$3,600,000
2.89%
16 April 2016, rolled over yearly
CBA Term Deposit Account 2758
29 Aug 2017
$800,000
2.70%
29 April 2018, rolled over following maturity
The total amount of interest earned from the funds invested with the Commonwealth Bank, on behalf of Moyle Holdings, during the period in which Mr Quarles was a director of Moyle Holdings, was $422,233.[24]
[24] SOAF [47].
It is agreed that Mr Quarles caused the Estate to pay certain taxation liabilities owed by Moyle Holdings to the Australian Taxation Office. Two sums, the first being $5,315 and the second being $5,295, were paid by Mr Quarles on 5 and 6 March 2015 respectively. There is no complaint in these proceedings about these payments.
(5) The shares in, and directorship of, Moyle Holdings
The facts concerning the corporate structure and change in office holders of Moyle Holdings, during the relevant period, were largely agreed by the parties.
At the time of his death, the Deceased held one Class A share in Moyle Holdings (being his founder's share) and one preference share in Moyle Holdings (inherited from his wife - her founder's share having become a preference share upon her death). By these shares, the Deceased had effective control of Moyle Holdings.
Pursuant to cl 5 of the Moyle Holdings Articles of Association, upon the death of a founder, his or her A Class share ceased to be an A Class share and became a preference share. So, upon the death of the Deceased, his founder's share became a preference share and, pursuant to s 8 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA), his two preference shares, upon the grant of probate, passed to and became vested in Mr Quarles effective as from the date of the death of the Deceased.
The Deceased was the sole director of Moyle Holdings prior to his death. On or about 30 October 2014, Mr Quarles lodged with ASIC a notice stating that the Deceased had ceased as director on 23 July 2014 and that Mr Quarles had been appointed a director of Moyle Holdings on that date. There is an issue in the proceedings as to whether Mr Quarles was entitled to appoint himself in this manner. In any event, Mr Quarles remained as the sole director until mid-2019.
It is not in dispute that, in July 2017, Mr Quarles caused his solicitors to send to Mr Moyle's solicitors the executed share transfers and a written notice of Mr Quarles' resignation as a director. These documents were not actioned by Mr Moyle or his solicitors. As will be explained, Mr Quarles' resignation as a director of Moyle Holdings was registered with ASIC only with effect from 24 July 2019, around two years later. Further, Mr Quarles surrendered control of the company accounts to Mr Moyle on Mr Moyle's appointment as the sole director of Moyle Holdings on 24 July 2019.
It is agreed in these proceedings that Mr Quarles did not receive director's fees or any other specific remuneration for his work as a director of Moyle Holdings, although the plaintiffs highlight that QPL itself received remuneration for the work it undertook.
(6) The evidence of Mr Moyle
As I have noted, Mr Moyle gave evidence at trial, and was cross‑examined. His evidence was given entirely viva voce, without the benefit of a witness statement.
Mr Moyle is a retired design engineer, who specialised in port and harbour works during his career. He retired in 2022. He was approaching 78 years of age at the time of trial.
Mr Moyle gave evidence over the course of 10, 11 and 12 September 2025. His evidence was largely consistent with the documentary record. In my assessment, Mr Moyle did his best in his evidence to assist the Court and I accept his evidence as credible on the whole, although given the lapse of time since the events in question it is understandable that Mr Moyle could not recall the precise details of all of the events between 2014 and 2018.
Nonetheless, as I have said, his evidence largely accorded with the written contemporaneous evidence produced by the parties.
On one occasion in cross-examination, Mr Moyle was taken to documentary material which was inconsistent with a recollection he had concerning a meeting on 16 September 2015. He had given evidence that no discussion had occurred at that meeting regarding the calculation of the Hotchpot Adjustment and he had not volunteered to undertake the calculation.
Upon being taken in cross-examination to a contemporaneous letter from his own solicitors which stated otherwise,[25] Mr Moyle was quick to accept his memory must have been incorrect.[26]
[25] Exhibit 116 (letter from Dwyer Durack dated 16 September 2015).
[26] ts 430 - 431.
There was an evident period of estrangement between Mr Moyle and the Deceased prior to his death. The pair were estranged for most of the period between early 2012 and July 2014, when the Deceased passed away. The estrangement occurred following the death of Mr Moyle's mother in early 2012.[27]
[27] ts 362.
This aspect of the matter was emphasised by counsel for Mr Quarles, who pointed to the contents of the detailed correspondence which passed between Mr Moyle and his father in those final two years.[28] It is unnecessary to recount all of the personal details which were included in these items of correspondence. It is clear that the relationship between father and son had become very strained, with the pair rarely seeing each other, despite the Deceased's stated desire to repair the relationship before his death. Mr Moyle did not visit his father when he was in hospital and did not attend his father's 90th birthday celebration. According to his father's correspondence, Mr Moyle 'hardly spoke' to either him or his sister at the funeral of Mr Moyle's mother.
[28] Exhibits 3, 5 to 11, and 585.
Mr Moyle was hurt and angry at his father during this period.[29]
[29] ts 391.
Prior to this estrangement, Mr Moyle had been the named executor in his father's previous will, and he also held a position as a director of Moyle Holdings for a period. A decision was taken by the Deceased prior to his death to change his will, such that the Public Trustee was named as executor in place of Mr Moyle. At a later point, Mr Quarles was then named as the executor of the will.
A decision was also taken by the Deceased to remove Mr Moyle as a director of the company, which Mr Moyle explained in his evidence was a decision which 'bowled' him over as he did not understand why that decision had been made.[30]
[30] ts 391.
The effect of these decisions was that Mr Moyle had less insight into his father's financial affairs prior to his death, and these decisions appear to have caused Mr Moyle a significant degree of anxiety about the management of his father's affairs. These decisions on the part of the Deceased can also be seen as contributing to the relationship of distrust between Mr Moyle and Mr Quarles during the course of the administration.
It is apparent from the correspondence that Mr Moyle retained a strong interest in relation to the financial position of his father, and in the manner in which his father was handling his own affairs. There is no credible suggestion in the evidence that the Deceased was in any way incapable of managing his finances, despite his advanced age. Mr Moyle made some passing references in his evidence to the possibility his father was not in full charge of his faculties at this time, but his evidence in this regard rose no higher than mere speculation.
Mr Moyle's keen interest in his father's financial affairs is explained in the letters to his father sent on 22 July 2012, 4 October 2012, and 14 January 2013. Mr Moyle explains in those letters how he had identified problems in his father's earlier will, which had to be corrected, and emphasises the need for distributions made by his father to family members to be 'fair', and to take into account the time‑value of money. The concept of 'fairness' is littered throughout Mr Moyle's correspondence to his father. Mr Moyle also makes requests to his father for financial documents concerning the family trust, so he can assess the fairness of the distributions which have been made. Mr Moyle expresses concern on one occasion that his father has sold his shares, explaining that the 'share market [was] picking up' and queried whether his father has sought advice from his stockbroker before selling the shares.
Another feature of the correspondence sent by Mr Moyle to his father is his apparent distrust of the financial advice being given to the Deceased by Mr Geoff Aitken, the then accountant who was advising him. Mr Aitken's accounting practice was later acquired by Mr Quarles and QPL. There are eight direct references to Mr Aitken in the letter dated 22 July 2022, four references to him in the letter dated 4 October 2012, and eight references in the letter dated 14 January 2013. In essence, Mr Moyle was demonstrably concerned at the advice being given to his father by Mr Aitken and the lack of information being received from him.
Mr Moyle wrote to his father on 14 January 2013 in the following terms:[31]
You state that Geoff Aitken has advised you that the clause [being cl 7 of the then existing will] 'was not applicable' and that it 'could present problems'. In fact, the clause is applicable and does not present problems. So if Geoff Aitken has advised you otherwise he may have been legally negligent or he may have deliberately misled you.
You state that Geoff Aitken is preparing the 'final distribution figures'. Two months have now elapsed and I have not received anything from either you or Geoff Aitken.
I remain very concerned about the role of Geoff Aitken in all of this. Has he been giving you correct and honest advice? (original emphasis)
[31] Exhibit 10.
That was not the only occasion Mr Moyle questioned the advice given by Mr Aitken. Earlier, in a letter to his father dated 22 July 2012, under the heading 'Why?', Mr Moyle said he could not understand why his father has decided to be 'so deliberately and intentionally unfair' to him. His letter records the following:[32]
What is the reason? I look back over the years and wonder what has happened. I'm your son yet you are trying to screw me! Why?
I question the role of Geoff Aitken in all of this. Has he been giving you correct and honest advice?
[32] Exhibit 3.
There was no argument advanced during the trial that Mr Aitken's advice was anything other than correct and honest, I should note.
The strong interest on the part of Mr Moyle, in relation to his father's finances, continued well after his father's passing. This is readily apparent from the numerous written communications sent to Mr Quarles and his lawyers from Mr Moyle and his lawyers, during the course of the administration of the Estate. Mr Moyle was represented throughout by Dwyer Durack.
As will be seen, these communications evidence the enthusiasm with which Mr Moyle wished to pursue almost every conceivable document and every potential line of investigation, no matter how theoretical or disproportionate, which might shed light on the magnitude of the Estate and the existence of payments to other family members, including to his sister.
Importantly, Mr Moyle did not seek to downplay, in his evidence, his strong desire to ensure that the management and ultimate distribution of his father's Estate was 'fair' to him. He explained that he wished to pursue numerous avenues of investigation to uncover any missing funds or advances to other family members, because he was not aware of the full extent of his father's assets. Mr Moyle's approach in this regard, which I would describe as zealous in nature, extended to demands made of the executor, Mr Quarles, and his solicitors, to pursue lines of enquiry which were little more than theoretical possibilities.
On occasions, Mr Moyle was quite assertive in his evidence as to the degree of frustration he felt towards Mr Quarles' handling of the Estate, and as to the delays he experienced in this regard. Mr Moyle did not attempt to downplay in his evidence that he held these concerns and that he wished to pursue every avenue available to identify additional funds or payments, and I conclude that Mr Moyle honestly believed during the course of the administration that he was acting properly and was justified in his approach. This is so even though Mr Moyle accepted that the further investigations he requested did not uncover any additional monies which had not already been identified by Mr Quarles in his assessment of the Estate.
In his evidence, Mr Moyle variously described his drivers or motivations in pursuing further information as follows:
So essentially what my interest was in being able to trace the quantum of the funds that was involved at each institution and to follow the trail of the money.[33]
I wanted to be comfortable that whatever figure Mr Quarles eventually came up with [for the Hotchpot Adjustment], that it was the correct figure. So I wanted to make my own checks.[34]
Yes, just so I could confirm for myself the trail of all the money, and I could make my own assessment of where it had gone and be in a position to be able to check whatever Mr Quarles eventually came up with.[35]
Again, I just wanted to follow the money trail on what was the selling price of the property, after settlement costs, and then where did that money go to.[36]
[33] ts 363.
[34] ts 364.
[35] ts 366.
[36] ts 425.
Mr Moyle accepted that some of his enquiries, with respect to certain financial transactions and accounts, were almost speculative in nature. He explained his approach in this regard was 'for completeness'[37] and to 'follow the money trail',[38] and further:
They were either transactions that I had questions about, which may or may not have related to the hotchpot calculation, but I couldn't tell until I had more information. So again, I was just trying to clear away any question marks or things that weren't known to get details and then decide whether they were relevant to the hotchpot or not.[39]
[37] ts 425 - 427.
[38] ts 425 - 426.
[39] ts 370.
Mr Moyle had made his intended approach in pursuing financial information quite clear at the outset of the administration of the Estate. So much is clear from the early written communications from Mr Moyle to Mr Quarles in August 2014.[40]
[40] Exhibit 17 (email from Mr Moyle to Mr Quarles sent on 6 August 2014).
Initially, Mr Quarles was concerned as to why Mr Moyle required this information and, at one point, misunderstood the rights of Mr Moyle to access such information.
Following the grant of probate, and some further email exchanges which revealed Mr Moyle's concerns as to Mr Quarles' delays in responding to him, Mr Moyle sent a lengthy email to Mr Quarles on 7 November 2014.[41] That email followed a meeting between Mr Quarles, Mr Moyle, Ms Campbell and her daughter, at which a range of issues were discussed, from the repairs to the swimming pool, the selling of the Dianella Property, location of financial documents, and calculation of the Hotchpot Adjustment.
[41] Exhibit 49 (email from Mr Moyle to Mr Quarles sent on 7 November 2014).
The lengthy email sent by Mr Moyle on 7 November 2014 set out a number of requests for information and documentation concerning the Estate, and explained that Mr Moyle needed to 'familiarise' himself with the operation of his father's accounts during the period they were estranged, being from 1 January 2012.[42] Mr Moyle requested a list of all bank accounts, term deposits and any other accounts where the assets of the Moyle Family Trust, Moyle Holdings, the Deceased, and the Deceased and his wife, were held.
[42] Exhibit 49.
Mr Quarles' responses to the initial requests for information were somewhat on the vague side, forcing Mr Moyle to reiterate those requests through the exchange of several emails.[43] Mr Moyle was 'puzzled' by Mr Quarles' apparent surprise at the nature of his requests.[44] He described Mr Quarles' reluctance to provide the information as giving him 'some concern'.[45]
[43] Exhibits 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57.
[44] Exhibits 55 and 57.
[45] Exhibits 55 and 57.
Mr Moyle wrote his emails to Mr Quarles much the same way he gave his evidence - in a direct and forthright manner. Mr Moyle did not shy away from making the requests by reason of the initial pushback he got from Mr Quarles. In one email, sent on 17 November 2014, Mr Moyle stated:[46]
You have asked me what I'm looking for. Well, I'm not looking for anything. Rather, I'm looking to confirm for myself that my father's accounts have been properly operated from January 2012 to the present. Given the three previous bullet points [which referenced Mr Quarles' indication to Mr Moyle that the standard of the accounting practiced by Mr Aitken 'left a lot to be desire' and that his 'competency was questionable'] it would be remiss of me not to do that. (original emphasis)
[46] Exhibit 55 (email from Mr Moyle to Mr Quarles dated 17 November 2014).
In an earlier email, sent on 11 November 2014, Mr Moyle explained to Mr Quarles that he (that is, Mr Moyle) needed to assure himself that 'all the i's have been dotted and all the t's have been crossed' in respect of the operation of his father's accounts and his parents 'would not wish otherwise' as he had a 'duty to them'.[47]
[47] Exhibit 53 (email from Mr Moyle to Mr Quarles dated 11 November 2014).
Borne out of the delays he experienced in dealing with Mr Quarles, and the mismatch in their approach to the level of financial documentation which needed to be reviewed, it can be inferred that Mr Moyle became frustrated with Mr Quarles in the early part of the administration of the Estate. He simply wanted Mr Quarles to 'get a move on'.[48] Mr Moyle did not accept that Mr Quarles was making 'genuine attempts' to respond to his queries.[49] Mr Moyle testified in the course of cross‑examination that:[50]
STANDING, MR: … Mr Moyle, I put it to you that it was entirely unreasonable to say [in the letter from Dwyer Durack sent on 21 March 2016][51] that Mr Quarles had obstructed efforts by you to deal with the hotchpot clause. We've seen that you've - there has been several meetings between you and Mr Quarles, and you provided worksheets. Mr Quarles has looked at them and commented back to you. That's not - that wasn't obstruction, was it, Mr Moyle?
MOYLE, MR:The obstruction was the lack of documents and statements that Mr Quarles provided. As I've tried to explain before, it took many years. Often the documents provided by Mr Quarles were incomplete. We would go back to him, asking him to provide the outstanding documents. That would take weeks. And often when we got those, they would still be incomplete. That's what I'm referring - well, what the letter is referring to about obstructionism.
[48] ts 432.
[49] ts 430.
[50] ts 443 - 444.
[51] Exhibit 146.
Mr Moyle's answer to the above question reveals his concerns about the process which occurred in 2015 and 2016. Mr Moyle candidly accepted that his enquiries did not reveal any additional information of substance and no missing funds were ultimately identified.[52]
[52] ts 445 - 446.
For example, in a letter from Dwyer Durack sent to Tolsons on 28 October 2016, the solicitors recorded a concern on the part of Mr Moyle that an amount of $1.4 million 'seemed to be unaccounted for and that it could be either an asset of the estate or an advance to [Joanne] to be taken into account when determining the hotchpotch [sic] clause'.[53] In cross‑examination, Mr Moyle indicated he did not know how that figure had been arrived at, but accepted that no such missing amount was identified through the investigations he requested.[54]
[53] Exhibit 268 (letter from Dwyer Durack to Tolsons dated 28 October 2016).
[54] ts 446.
Mr Moyle expressed the view that Mr Quarles had 'hindered' the process and Mr Moyle would 'loved to have got rid of' Mr Quarles as a director, when challenged about the delay in processing the resignation of Mr Quarles as director.[55] The transcript records Mr Moyle's evidence as follows:[56]
STANDING, MR: Were you quite content for Mr Quarles to remain a director of the company at this stage?
MOYLE, MR:No. I mean, I - I would have loved to have got rid of Mr Quarles as director. I had no reason to keep him. He had hindered everything all the - the whole journey. So if he was going to resign, that - that was pretty good … as far as I viewed it.
STANDING, MR: So you can't explain why he - how he came to remain a director for another couple of years?
MOYLE, MR:No.
[55] ts 451.
[56] ts 451.
Mr Moyle had developed, on my assessment, a degree of antagonism and frustration towards Mr Quarles by early 2016, which no doubt contributed to his decision to institute proceedings in this Court. I do not consider that his antagonism and frustration were unreasonable, in the circumstances.
Ms Campbell did not give evidence at trial. The magnitude of her cognitive impairment was not revealed with any detail during the trial, but it was apparent that the Deceased and Mr Moyle both held concerns for her ability to manage her affairs and the need for Ms Campbell to be financially supported. There are express statements in the letters written by Mr Moyle to this effect, but it must be said that this concern was not consistent throughout the evidence. There were plainly occasions where Mr Moyle revealed his feeling that his father had favoured Ms Campbell, and occasions in which Mr Moyle was determined to investigate the existence of potential advances to his sister which needed to be taken into account as part of the final distribution of the Estate.
This attitude was explained by Mr Moyle as consistent with his desire that the management of the Estate be 'fair' to him, but this attitude tends to undercut any suggestion that Mr Moyle was seeking to protect his sister given her circumstances, or that Mr Moyle was displaying a charitable approach towards her interests.
Ultimately, the evidence reveals that the guiding approach adopted by Mr Moyle was to ensure absolute equality between his interests and those of his sister, in the management of the Estate, and in terms of any final distribution.
(7) The evidence of Mr Quarles
Mr Quarles gave evidence at trial, and was cross‑examined. His evidence was given entirely viva voce, without the benefit of a witness statement. Mr Quarles is an experienced accountant. He holds a Bachelor of Business degree. He owns and controls an accounting firm, operated through QPL,[57] which formerly traded as Quarles Business & Financial Strategists.
[57] Mr Quarles is a director and shareholder of Yasmar Pty Ltd, which currently owns 62.5% of the issued shares in QPL.
Mr Quarles wore three hats during the administration:
(a)he was the appointed executor of the Estate;
(b)he was the sole director of Moyle Holdings; and
(c)he was the co-trustee, with Ms Campbell's daughter, of the Moyle Family Trust, having appointed himself to that position on 30 October 2014.
Mr Quarles has some 50 years' experience as a certified practising accountant, meaning he had around 40 years' experience when he accepted the role of executor of this Estate. His lengthy professional experience had been focused on small to medium businesses, giving taxation and accounting advice, and providing advice to clients in relation to personal taxation matters.
Mr Quarles provided accounting advice to the Deceased from around 2013, having inherited him as a client following the acquisition of Mr Aitken's accounting practice. In the course of the administration, Mr Quarles was assisted by a senior accountant within his business, Mr Sean Piek. He was also a certified practicing accountant.[58] Mr Piek was not called to give evidence at trial.
[58] ts 569.
It is significant that Mr Quarles had not typically undertaken work in the area of estate administration. He testified that he had only undertaken work as an executor on two other occasions, one of which was for his parents. Mr Quarles was thus not a professional trustee or executor. This was, with respect, evident from the manner in which he approached the administration and may have contributed to the delays in the administration itself.
Mr Quarles gave evidence on 12 and 15 September 2025. I accept that he gave his evidence in a truthful manner, doing his best to assist the Court to understand the course of events over the period from 2014 to 2023. However, it was quite plain that Mr Quarles did not have a strong recollection of these events and I would not be prepared to accept Mr Quarles' recollection unless supported by contemporaneous documentation, solely from a reliability perspective. There are some exceptions to this I will mention.
Mr Quarles' evidence during the trial was difficult to follow. His answers were not always fulsome and were given in a staccato‑like or disjointed manner on occasions. He was not a strong witness in support of his own cause, with respect.
It was accepted by Mr Quarles during his evidence, and I think is apparent from at least one email authored by Mr Quarles during the course of the administration of the Estate from late 2014, that he was emotionally impacted by this matter. The source of that impact came from the volume and frequency of the communications from Mr Moyle and his solicitors, and the period over which the administration was conducted. Additionally, it can be inferred that the long‑running nature of this litigation, which commenced in May 2016, was taking its toll on him.
In his evidence, Mr Quarles explained that:[59]
… for a number of years and months, I was under a great deal of stress from these proceedings and from the work being done in relation to the estate. And I wasn't sleeping very well. As I said, I was under a great deal of stress…
[59] ts 592. See also ts 581 - 582.
By August 2018, having handled the affairs of the Estate for some years, Mr Quarles was driven to communicate directly with Mr Moyle's solicitors, circumventing his own lawyers. He sent an email to Ms van den Kwast of Dwyer Durack on 13 July 2018.[60] In that email, Mr Quarles stated:
Maree, I feel that somewhere along the line, the issues became bigger and blown out of proportion to the scale of the whole. There are times when I may have been tardy in getting information, but that hasn't always been of my doing.
I am not a wealthy person, so any financial penalty is going to have a major impact on my life. I cannot change what the past has been, but I certainly can contribute to formulating a plan for the future.
…
Nothing I have done has been to diminish the interests of the Estate or the beneficiaries. Steps taken have been, or attempted, to ensure the smooth operation of managing a complex situation. Sure, in hindsight, maybe a few things could have been handled differently, but I am not perfect.
I am more than willing to work with Alan in ensuring the smooth administration of the Estate and welcome his obvious financial expertise.
I would be interested in learning if there is a suitably beneficial arrangement can be met.
[60] Exhibit S19.
Ms van der Kwast quite properly explained in response that her professional obligations precluded her from speaking directly with Mr Quarles, and she forwarded the correspondence to Tolsons.
In his evidence, Mr Quarles explained that he was 'quite distressed' at the time he sent that email, arising from the 'innumerable demands and emails' which had levelled various accusations at him. He was at his 'wits end' at the time and 'just wanted to finish' the dispute sooner, rather than later.[61]
[61] ts 564.
Mr Quarles was represented by Tolsons throughout almost the entirety of the period during which the Estate was being administered. No lawyer from Tolsons was called to give evidence at trial. The Court can infer that Mr Quarles had access to appropriate legal advice throughout the duration of his time as the executor, and while acting as a director of Moyle Holdings, and it is no part of Mr Quarles' case that he was given incorrect legal advice in any respect.
There is one respect in which I do not accept Mr Quarles' direct evidence, which concerns the payment of certain legal fees (which he has since repaid) which Mr Quarles described as an 'oversight'. I have addressed this under heading M(5) below.
(8) The business of QPL
It is an agreed fact that QPL, through Mr Quarles, provided accountancy services to Moyle Holdings and to the Deceased from about September 2013.[62] The plaintiffs' case includes a complaint as to the lack of investment advice given, and the quality of the investment decisions made, by Mr Quarles and QPL. It is therefore relevant to these proceedings to understand the services offered and provided by Mr Quarles, and QPL, in their professional capacities.
[62] SOAF [4], Exhibit P8.
I will address this issue in further detail when dealing with the claims, but the following factual matters which emerged on the evidence should be noted for present purposes:
(a)The letterhead of Mr Quarles' accounting business, QPL, prominently notes that it is a firm of 'Certified Practising Accountants', and also displays the CPA logo. The letterhead also references the tax agent number for the firm.
(b)The core business of QPL was an accounting practice and tax agent. The letterhead does not suggest that the firm provides, or provided, financial services or advice to its clients. I accept that QPL was not an investment manager or investment adviser.
(c)Mr Quarles explained in his evidence that his firm gave only limited financial advice to clients, confined to the conditions attached to the Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) which it held between 6 November 2015 and 16 July 2019.[63] I accept his evidence in this regard which is consistent with the core nature of the QPL business and the evidence as a whole.
[63] Exhibit 565 (ASIC extract in relation to QPL's AFSL).
(d)Prior to 6 November 2015, QPL did not hold an AFSL.[64] Prior to that time, QPL was prohibited by s 911A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) from carrying on a financial services business.
[64] SOAF [6].
(e)The AFSL held by QPL was subject to various conditions, which changed over time.
(f)Initially, the AFSL authorised QPL to provide financial product advice relating to superannuation. Specifically, the AFSL authorised QPL to carry on a financial services business to:
(i)provide financial product advice in relation to certain matters relating to superannuation;
(ii)provide class of financial product advice limited to superannuation;
(iii)deal in a financial product by arranging for another person to issue, apply for, acquire, vary or dispose of a financial product in respect of self-managed superannuation funds, and arranging for another person to apply for, acquire, vary or dispose of financial products in respect of self‑managed superannuation funds.
(g)Later, from 21 July 2016, the conditions attached to the AFSL were altered to include providing 'class of financial product advice' for various other products, including basic deposit products and securities. Specifically, the AFSL authorised QPL to carry on a financial services business to:
(i)provide financial product advice in relation to certain matters relating to superannuation (being the same condition as had previously applied);
(ii)provide class of financial product advice for the following classes of financial products, namely: deposit and payment products limited to basic deposit products, general insurance products, life risk insurance products, simple managed investment schemes, securities, and superannuation (being an expanded condition to that which had previously applied); and
(iii)deal in a financial product by arranging for another person to issue, apply for, acquire, vary or dispose of a financial product in respect of self-managed superannuation funds, and arranging for another person to apply for, acquire, vary or dispose of financial products in respect of self-managed superannuation funds (being the same condition as had previously applied).
(h)It should be noted, as counsel for the second defendant submitted in closing, that there is an exemption in the Corporations Act for the provision of financial advice by a personal representative in relation to a deceased estate. I refer to s 911A(2)(f)(viii) of the Corporations Act. Thus there was no contravention of s 911A by Mr Quarles personally (as distinct from QPL) providing financial services to the Estate.
I have used the term 'class of financial product advice' above. That term is defined in s 910A of the Corporations Act as 'financial product advice about a class of products, but does not include a recommendation about a specific product in that class'. The conditions which were added from 21 July 2016 permitted QPL to 'deal' in financial products, but only in relation to superannuation.
Accordingly, even after 21 July 2016, QPL was prohibited from providing services such as recommending specific financial products and dealing with financial products, other than in relation to superannuation.
(9) The involvement of solicitors
From an early stage, Mr Quarles and Mr Moyle both engaged law firms to act on their respective behalves during the administration.
Mr Quarles engaged Tolsons, as earlier noted, principally using Ms Helen Tolson during the administration and then later Mr Damian McEvoy, another lawyer at the firm, who took over the day‑to‑day running from around 5 July 2016.[65] In general terms, once he took over from Ms Tolson, Mr McEvoy took more of an active role in the management of the matter and in updating Mr Quarles.[66]
[65] Exhibit 157.
[66] ts 608.
Mr Moyle engaged Dwyer Durack, with Ms Maree van der Kwast from that firm acting primarily in the matter. Ms van der Kwast was assisted by Mr Daniel Gill, another lawyer within the firm.
The invoice issued by QPL in February 2014 itemised the work undertaken by QPL for the Deceased and Moyle Holdings, limited to accounting, taxation and administrative tasks.[527]
[527] Exhibit 14.
I accept that it was the Deceased himself who made the decision to hold the funds of the Estate in a cheque account with the Commonwealth Bank. So much may reasonably be inferred from the email sent by Tolsons to Mr Quarles on 25 March 2015.[528] The evidence does not disclose any basis to find that Mr Quarles or QPL gave advice to Mr Moyle about this, or as to how the funds of the Estate might be invested.
[528] Exhibit 78.
It was not in dispute that the Deceased had asked Mr Quarles to be the executor under his will, and that Mr Quarles had explained to the Deceased that he would charge his time through QPL in performing that role.[529] Mr Quarles gave evidence, which I accept, to the effect that the time which was charged to the Estate for work done in relation to Moyle Holdings 'was in relation to the tax work and some accounting work'.[530] I put to one side here the work done to assist Mr Quarles in the litigation.
[529] ts 645 ‑ 646.
[530] ts 643.
More broadly, the evidence discloses that Mr Quarles and Mr Piek charged for their time, through QPL, in administering the Estate. In this regard, Mr Quarles did not draw a clear distinction between his conduct when he was acting as the executor of the Estate and when he was acting as a director of Moyle Holdings. Mr Quarles wore the two hats interchangeably and simultaneously.
Mr Quarles did in fact charge, through QPL, for his work as a director in connection with investments for Moyle Holdings.[531] However, there were only two brief occasions on which charges for such work were recorded by Mr Quarles, being on 17 July 2017 and 22 August 2017. The plaintiffs acknowledge this is a small sample. The work is recorded in timesheets maintained by QPL. The two entries are in the following terms:[532]
17 Jul 2017 0:20 Alexander Quarles Respond to Tolson email regarding interest on deposits
22 Aug 2017 0:34 Alexander Quarles Emailing Bank for interest rate
[531] ts 646 ‑ 649.
[532] TB 2985.
There were some limited occasions in which QPL undertook work for Moyle Holdings beyond tax matters, which are referred to by Moyle Holdings in its opening submissions.[533] Mr Piek assisted with these matters. These instances are as follows:
(a)An email was sent by Mr Piek to Tolsons on 24 February 2016 expressing the view that the shareholders' rights 'need to be addressed before the company is wound up'.[534]
(b)Mr Quarles agreed with the assistance of Tolsons to investigate the share structure of the company. This is recorded in a letter from Dwyer Durack in which Mr Quarles and Tolsons are stated to have agreed to investigate the share structure of Moyle Holdings in order to determine the rights exercised by the shareholders during the running of the company.[535] Mr Piek assisted with this work.
(c)Further, Mr Piek assisted Mr Quarles in placing funds into term deposits.[536]
[533] Plaintiffs' opening submissions [193].
[534] Exhibit 139 (Email from Mr Piek to Tolsons dated 24 February 2016), see TB 866.
[535] Exhibit 142 (Letter from Dwyer Durack dated 4 March 2016).
[536] Exhibit 133 (Email from Mr Quarles to Commonwealth Bank dated 18 January 2016).
There is some additional context to these matters. I will address the context surrounding these matters, and the time entries, below.
(3) Disposition
The evidence relied upon by Moyle Holdings to sustain the conclusion that the pleaded scope of the contract extended to the provision of 'managerial and directorial services' was thin, at best.
At the time at which the contract was formed between QPL and Moyle Holdings, in around September 2013, there is simply nothing apparent in the evidence to indicate that QPL was providing, or that it would provide, any services to the Deceased, or to Moyle Holdings, in connection with 'managerial or directorial services' or relating to investment matters.
At the time the contract was formed, and indeed thereafter, I do not consider that QPL was holding itself out as carrying on any business beyond that of an accountant or tax agent.
In substance, then, Moyle Holdings points to events occurring after the formation of the contract to sustain its contention as to the broader scope of the contractual terms. It is necessary, in light of the nature of the arguments advanced by Moyle Holdings, to address the applicable principles which should be applied in this regard.
It may be accepted that evidence of post-formation conduct is admissible where the issue is not one as to the construction of the contract, but as to the terms of an oral and only partly expressed contract. In that circumstance, a Court may legitimately take into account such conduct as a basis for inferring what was agreed when the contract was made, or as establishing later additions or variations.[537]
[537] Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1213, 1229 (Browne LJ), approved in Port Sudan Cotton Co v Govindaswamy Chettiar & Sons [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 5, 11.
As counsel for the second defendant correctly submitted, evidence of this type may be relevant to determining what the terms of the contract were, but it is not permissible to use this evidence as an aid for questions of construction.[538]
[538] Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 [369]; Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; (2008) 238 CLR 570 [35].
As a matter of principle it is not sufficient that the conduct is merely consistent with the existence of the alleged contract. Rather, the conduct must necessarily lead to the inference that a contract existed on the alleged terms. A number of the applicable authorities on this issue were canvassed by McColl JA in Kreketos v Livschitz.[539] Her Honour endorsed[540] the proposition that the conduct which is relied upon must not only necessarily point to the existence of a contract, it must also point to the existence of a contract in the terms alleged in the proceedings, citing Macfarlan JA's earlier statement in Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd.[541]
[539] Kreketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 (Kreketos).
[540] Kreketos [117].
[541] Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 [5] - [9] (Macfarlan JA, Beazley JA agreeing).
Her Honour also endorsed propositions to the effect that the contract which is inferred from the conduct 'exists independently of and indeed precedes what the parties do', and consequently it is an error 'to suppose that merely because something has been done then there is therefore some contract in existence which has thereby been executed'.[542]
[542] Kreketos [117].
The issue was considered by Sundberg J in Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd,[543] where his Honour observed that:
Where mutual promises are sought to be inferred, the conduct relied upon must, on an objective assessment, evince a tacit agreement with sufficiently clear terms. It is not enough that the conduct is consistent with what are alleged to be the terms of a binding agreement. The evidence must positively indicate that both parties considered themselves bound by that agreement. (emphasis added)
[543] Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499 [39].
The foregoing principles present something of a challenge for the success of the plaintiffs' contention as to the scope of the contract between QPL and Moyle Holdings. The plaintiffs posit a broad scope in this regard, which fundamentally rests on rather limited, and equivocal, conduct which occurred well after the contract was formed.
The following matters demonstrate in my view why the plaintiffs' contention, as to the existence of a contract on the terms alleged, should be rejected.
First, considerable weight should be given to the objective evidence which describes the nature of QPL's business. This can be seen in the manner in which it held itself out in its correspondence and other outward indications of its business, including the fact it did not hold an AFSL until November 2015. Undoubtedly, QPL's core business was that of an accounting practice and tax agent.
Second, it is an agreed fact that QPL provided 'accountancy services' to Moyle Holdings (and to the Deceased) from around September 2013.
Third, as noted above, the fact that QPL did not hold an AFSL until November 2015 is significant. The absence of such a licence does not, on its own, preclude a finding that a particular business was in fact providing financial services advice, even though such advice may only lawfully be given by an entity which holds such a licence.
However, the absence of a licence operates to weaken the likelihood that QPL was providing such advice prior to November 2015 and that the inferred scope of the contract between QPL and Moyle Holdings, commencing in 2013, included the provision of directorial and managerial services such as advice as to the manner in which the investments held by Moyle Holdings would be applied. Similarly, the conditions attached to the AFSL, once it was obtained, weaken the likelihood that QPL was providing advice of the type alleged, contrary to its licence.
The following matters should be noted in this regard:
(a) The provision of 'financial services' within the meaning of s 766A(1) of the Corporations Act extends to providing financial product advice and dealing in a financial product. A term deposit bank account and investment in an ETF would be financial products, having regard to s 766C and s 763A of the Corporations Act.
(b)I therefore accept that, for QPL 'to cause' Moyle Holdings to make an investment, in the manner alleged in the Company ASOC at [24], would be a 'financial service' and would be prohibited by s 911A(1) of the Corporations Act without an AFSL (and would not otherwise be permitted by any of the statutory exceptions).[544]
(c)At the time at which Moyle Holdings engaged QPL, QPL was prohibited from carrying on the business of providing 'financial services', pursuant to s 911A of the Corporations Act. Yet the scope of the contract, as asserted by Moyle Holdings in these proceedings, would extend to include the provision of 'financial services' within the meaning of s 766A(1) of the Corporations Act.
(d)I accept the force of the second defendant's submission in the Company Proceeding that the prohibition in s 911A of the Corporations Act is a 'highly probative consideration when asking the Court to infer that the contract between Quarles Pty Ltd and Moyle Holdings included a term that would have required Quarles Pty Ltd to provide financial services'.[545] The Court should not lightly infer that QPL had a duty to provide advice to Moyle Holdings as to particular investments, which would have involved a contravention of the Corporations Act and, indeed would have amounted to an offence.[546]
(e)Putting this another way, the inference which is advanced by Moyle Holdings rests on a 'very serious allegation',[547] namely that QPL committed an offence by providing financial services to Moyle Holdings that it was not licensed to provide. I consider that cogent evidence would be required to draw an inference of that nature.
[544] QPL opening submissions [39] - [50].
[545] QPL opening submissions [48].
[546] Corporations Act, s 1311(1).
[547] QPL closing submissions [36].
Fourth, the evidence reveals that the work undertaken by QPL was generally confined to the provision of accounting and taxation services, such as preparing financial statements, providing advice on accounting and taxation matters, preparing tax returns, lodging documents with the ATO on behalf of Moyle Holdings, and providing administrative secretarial services, such as the lodgement of annual returns with ASIC and the payment of fees.
Fifth, the evidence relied upon by Moyle Holdings to support a wider scope of the contract is sparse and has limited cogency. In particular, I give little weight to the time entries relied upon by Moyle Holdings, which are limited in number and in their content. I accept it is more likely that these entries were made in error, given the wider circumstances.
There were additional factual matters relied upon by Moyle Holdings in its opening submissions, which were not further developed during the course of the trial and were not the subject of cross‑examination of Mr Quarles. These are the matters referred to in the opening submissions filed by the plaintiffs,[548] which I have referred to above at [801], and in respect of which QPL provided additional context in its opening submissions.[549] That additional context is important. It assists to explain that this work does not evidence the provision of advice or an acceptance of responsibility by QPL for managing the company's investment. The work in question was in truth directed at the affairs and assets of the Estate, and was in the nature of accounting or taxation advice. In my view, it is clear on the evidence that Mr Piek did not assume a role with respect to the investment of funds of Moyle Holdings. Rather, Mr Piek's role was confined to matters of accountancy and taxation, and did not extend to the work of a financial advisor or investment manager.
[548] Plaintiffs' opening submissions [193].
[549] QPL opening submissions [51].
I therefore do not accept that these documents, and the equivocal matters dealt within them, support an inference that QPL was engaged to be responsible for the management of Moyle Holdings or its investments. As with the time entries, I give little weight to these documents.
With respect, it is entirely more plausible, in an objective sense, that the scope of the contract between QPL and Moyle Holdings was limited to the provision of accounting, taxation and administrative services, consistent with the core business of QPL and the manner in which it held itself out generally. It may be accepted that Mr Quarles made investment decisions for Moyle Holdings while he was its sole director, but that is explicable on the basis that he was the director of the company during the relevant period. It does not necessarily point to the existence of a contract in the terms alleged by Moyle Holdings in these proceedings.
Accordingly, I conclude that Moyle Holdings has failed to demonstrate the existence of the inferred contract in the terms pleaded. In light of this conclusion, as to the narrow scope of the inferred contract, no question of breach of the contractual duty arises. Had it been necessary to consider the question of breach, I consider the findings and conclusions I have reached in relation to issue 8, as to the conduct of Mr Quarles, would equally apply to the alleged breach on the part of QPL.
The claim against QPL in this regard must therefore be dismissed.
S. Eleventh issue - liability of QPL to Moyle Holdings for breach of duty
The tortious duty, and the breach of that duty, which are alleged by Moyle Holdings are pleaded in parallel terms to the contractual duty which I have addressed and rejected, above. In the circumstances, it is only necessary to address this aspect of the claim in brief terms.
(1) The pleaded allegations and defences
Moyle Holdings pleads that, by reason of the contractual engagement of QPL, QPL owed a tortious duty of care to Moyle Holdings to exercise the professional care, skill and diligence of an accountant and financial advisor in carrying out or assisting in the directorial and managerial services for the plaintiff.[550]
[550] Company ASOC [23].
Moyle Holdings then pleads that, in the circumstances, this tortious duty required QPL to exercise the professional care, skill and diligence of an accountant and financial advisor in applying Moyle Holdings' property, being its cash at bank, 'to investments for the purposes of maximising the financial returns to the plaintiff from its property'.[551]
[551] Company ASOC [23A].
The breach of the tortious duty is pleaded at [24] of the Company ASOC. Moyle Holdings alleges that QPL breached the duty in two respects. First, by causing Moyle Holdings to 'maintain its funds in low interest rate bank accounts in excess of that which was reasonable or necessary to satisfy expenses'. Second, by 'not causing the plaintiff to invest its cash in a combination of higher interest rate yielding term deposit accounts and exchange traded funds of income yielding shares on the Australian Stock Exchange'.[552] This is, in essence, the same breach alleged against Mr Quarles in his capacity as a director of Moyle Holdings,[553] and the same breach alleged in respect of the contractual claim against QPL.
(2) Disposition
[552] Company ASOC [24].
[553] Plaintiffs' closing submissions [61].
I accept that the tortious duty would only arise if a contract on the terms alleged by Moyle Holdings is found to exist. As I have concluded that no such inferred contract, on the terms pleaded, has been demonstrated, the tortious duty claim must also be rejected.
In any event, I accept that the pleaded duty is somewhat novel, being a claim for pure economic loss in the nature of a loss of opportunity, directed at conduct on the part of QPL by which Moyle Holdings missed the chance to maximise its profits, not merely to avoid a material risk of loss. The existence of such a duty, in a circumstance involving pure economic loss rather than property damage, runs counter to the policy considerations discussed by the High Court in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd.[554] The following observations of McHugh J are pertinent in this regard:[555]
[102]If the policy of the law is that indeterminacy of liability and conduct legitimately protecting or pursuing a person's social or business interests should not give rise to a duty of care, that policy should be translated into forms which can be applied as rules of law. I see no reason why that step should not be taken. However, indeterminacy and conduct legitimately protecting or pursuing a person's social or business interests are merely factors which negative the existence of a duty. That is an important limitation on their utility as a principle for determining whether a duty exists. Recognition of that limitation also answers the criticism that indeterminacy of liability and conduct legitimately protecting or pursuing a person's social or business interests are not useful criteria in determining duty because they are not relevant to all cases of pure economic loss. On the contrary, they are useful because, when they apply, they provide valid reasons for rejecting a duty. It hardly needs to be said that, when they are absent, no duty, or even a prima facie duty, automatically arises.
[103]Nevertheless, when a court is satisfied that the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, that no question of indeterminacy of liability arises and that the defendant was not legitimately protecting or pursuing his or her social or business interests, it will often accord with community standards and the goals of negligence law, as an instrument of corrective justice, to hold that the defendant should have had the plaintiff's interests in mind when engaging or refusing to engage in a particular course of conduct. However, the common law in its desire to give effect to the autonomy of each individual does not generally require a person to act as if he or she were 'my brother's keeper'. That is particularly so when the defendant would have to take affirmative action to save a person from suffering harm.
[104]What is likely to be decisive, and always of relevance, in determining whether a duty of care is owed is the answer to the question, 'How vulnerable was the plaintiff to incurring loss by reason of the defendant's conduct?' So also is the actual knowledge of the defendant concerning that risk and its magnitude. If no question of indeterminate liability is present and the defendant, having no legitimate interest to pursue, is aware that his or her conduct will cause economic loss to persons who are not easily able to protect themselves against that loss, it seems to accord with current community standards in most, if not all, cases to require the defendant to have the interests of those persons in mind before he or she embarks on that conduct.
[105]The principles concerned with reasonable foreseeability of loss, indeterminacy of liability, autonomy of the individual, vulnerability to risk and the defendant's knowledge of the risk and its magnitude are, I think, relevant in determining whether a duty exists in all cases of liability for pure economic loss. In particular cases, other policies and principles may guide and even determine the outcome. But I do not think that a duty can be held to exist in any case of pure economic loss without considering the effect of the application of these general principles.
[554] Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, [25] ‑ [38] (Gaudron J), [101] ‑ [132] (McHugh J), [328] ‑ [329] (Hayne J), [168] ‑ [202] (Gummow J, with Gleeson CJ agreeing), [242] ‑ [288] (Kirby J), and [387] ‑ [406] (Callinan J).
[555] Perre v Apand [102] ‑ [104] (McHugh J).
I do not accept, speaking generally, that a professional in the financial services industry should be held to be burdened by a duty to maximise the profits of a professional client, in the terms alleged by Moyle Holdings. That would be a somewhat far‑reaching duty for the law to impose, particularly in circumstances such as the present in which no actual loss has been suffered by the party; rather, the claim is predicated on a missed opportunity of achieving better returns.
The claim against QPL for breach of tortious duty should accordingly be dismissed.
T. Conclusion and orders
For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that Mr Quarles breached his duties in the following respects and judgment should be entered for Mr Moyle and Moyle Holdings accordingly. I have identified the relief I consider should be granted below.
1.I find that Mr Quarles breached his duties as the executor of the Estate to avoid waste by retaining funds in low (or no) interest rate bank accounts in excess of that which was reasonable or necessary to satisfy expenses. To this extent, the pleaded claim at [32], [34], [35] and [36] of the Estate ASOC has been established by Mr Moyle. I will order an account on a wilful default basis to ascertain the quantum of the loss in accordance with [565] above.
2.I find that Mr Quarles breached his duties as the executor of the Estate in using the funds of the Estate to pay for his own legal fees, for the period from October 2018 through to April 2022.
The quantum of those fees is $254,024.02. This amount is calculated by deducting the sum of $16,320.38 (being the amount repaid by Mr Quarles) from the sum of $270,344.40. That last mentioned sum represents the total of the fees paid to Tolsons for its two December 2018 invoices ($8,340.92), the fees paid to Arns & Associates between February 2019 and June 2022 ($253,203.48) and the single invoice from Barry Nilsson for December 2021 ($8,800).
To this extent, the pleaded claim at [37] and [38] of the Estate ASOC has been established by Mr Moyle.
I consider it will be necessary to hear from the parties further in relation to the relief (if any) to be granted in relation to the breach of duties described above, given my observations at [677] above.
3. I find that Mr Quarles breached his duties as the executor of the Estate in using the funds of the Estate to pay the fees charged by QPL from August 2019 through to February 2021. Those fees are $39,764.29 in total, as itemised at [695] above. To this extent, the pleaded claim at [15(c)], [16], [17(b)] and [18] of the Estate ASOC has been established by Mr Moyle.
I will order that Mr Quarles pay to the beneficiaries of the Estate the sum of $39,764.29.
4. I find that Mr Quarles breached his duties as a director of Moyle Holdings to exercise reasonable skill and care pursuant to s 180(1) of the Corporations Act, by retaining funds in low (or no) interest rate bank accounts in excess of that which was reasonable or necessary to satisfy expenses. To this extent, the pleaded claim at [13] to [16] of the Company ASOC has been established by Moyle Holdings.
I will order an account to ascertain the quantum of the loss in accordance with [565] and [770] above.
The balance of the claims advanced by Mr Moyle in the Estate Proceeding and by Moyle Holdings in the Company Proceeding must be dismissed.
I will hear from the parties as to the final orders which should now be made to reflect these reasons and my conclusions. This will include:
(a)the appropriate orders which should be made in relation to interest including whether the interest should be compounded;
(b)the costs orders which should generally be made in the actions; and
(c)the specific costs orders which are submitted to be appropriate in light of my conclusion on issue 5 above.
ATTACHMENT A
Assets and Liabilities of the Estate as at November 2014
| No. | Description | Amount |
| 1 | Cash held in Commonwealth Bank accounts | $3,274,423.22 |
| 2 | Shares | $20,099.65 |
| 3 | Foresters Friendly Society Bond | $2,800 |
| 4 | Australian Federation of Totally & Permanent Incapacitated Ex Servicemen & Women WA Branch (being an amount owing to the Estate) | $1,000 |
| 5 | Household possessions | $10,000 |
| 6 | Refund of Lease Bond owed by RSL Menora Gardens Aged Care Facility Care | $975,000 |
| 7 | Dianella Property (estimated value) | $800,000 |
| 8 | Two preference shares in Moyle Holdings, noting that the company held $3,965,824.42 in cash in a Commonwealth Bank account when probate was granted | - |
| 9 | Liabilities of the Estate | ($136,594.83) |
ATTACHMENT B
Distributions made from the Estate to the Beneficiaries
| Date of distribution | Recipients (Mr Moyle or Ms Campbell) | Amount |
| March 2015 to Oct 2015 | Both | Monthly distributions of $1,500 to each (being $12,000 to each of them in total) |
| November 2015 | Both | $2,500 to each |
| Dec 2015 to Feb 2016 | Both | Monthly distributions of $5,000 to each (being $15,000 to each of them in total) |
| March 2016 to March 2019 | Both | Monthly distributions of $2,500 to each (being $90,000 to each of them in total) |
| 23 - 27 June 2016 | Both | $50,000 to each (pursuant to par 8 of consent orders made on 21 June 2016) |
| 26 October 2018 | Mr Moyle | $962,112.03 (pursuant to par 2 of consent orders made on 21 September 2018) |
| 26 October 2018 | Ms Campbell | $787,692.95 (pursuant to par 2 of consent orders made on 21 September 2018) |
| 14 December 2018 | Mr Moyle | $450,000 |
| 14 December 2018 | Ms Campbell | $450,000 |
ATTACHMENT C
Solicitors' invoices paid by the Estate
| Invoice Date | Invoice Number | Amount | Date Paid |
| Tolson & Co | |||
| 27 October 2014 | CDT:LAC:27171 | $1,976.00 | 18 Nov 2014 |
| 3 November 2014 | HMT:LAC:27171 | $363.00 | 18 Nov 2014 |
| 17 July 2015 | HMT:27171 | $6,947.90 | 24 July 2015 |
| 4 August 2016 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $11,077.00 | 7 Sept 2016 |
| 28 October 2016 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $18,073.00 | 8 Nov 2016 |
| 31 January 2017 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $5,016.00 | 7 Feb 2017 |
| 28 February 2017 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $3,663.00 | 10 Sept 2018 |
| 27 April 2017 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $4,257.00 | 23 May 2017 |
| 21 September 2017 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $10,483.00 | 11 Sept 2018 |
| 31 July 2018 | DMcE:JBW27171 | $19,514.00 | 12 Sept 2018 |
| 7 September 2018 | Invoice 7964 | $6,582.40 | 23 Oct 2018 |
| 30 September 2018 | Invoice 7963 | $7,535.00 | 23 Oct 2018 |
| 11 December 2018 | Invoice 8095 | $1,047.92 | 11 Jan 2019 |
| 12 December 2018 | Invoice 8094 | $7,293.00 | 11 Jan 2019 |
| SUBTOTAL: | $103,828.22 | ||
| Arns & Associates | |||
| 7 February 2019 | Invoice 55948 | $6,138.00 | 18 Feb 2019 |
| 3 April 2019 | Invoice 56193 | $4,268.00 | 16 April 2019 |
| 6 June 2019 | Invoice 56449 | $2,508.00 | 7 June 2019 |
| 6 August 2019 | Invoice 56690 | $12,452.00 | 19 Aug 2019 |
| 3 October 2019 | Invoice 56848 | $8,683.85 | 16 Oct 2019 |
| 5 November 2019 | Invoice 56932 | $3,168.00 | 9 Dec 2019 |
| 4 December 2019 | Invoice 57063 | $5,489.00 | 9 Dec 2019 |
| 8 January 2020 | Invoice 57166 | $3,371.50 | 20 Jan 2020 |
| 5 February 2020 | Invoice 57232 | $9,086.00 | 10 March 2020 |
| 9 March 2020 | Invoice 57398 | $7,496.50 | 31 March 2020 |
| 3 April 2020 | Invoice 57475 | $6,527.86 | 8 April 2020 |
| 7 May 2020 | Invoice 57632 | $8,712.00 | 13 May 2020 |
| 3 June 2020 | Invoice 57671 | $2,728.00 | 16 June 2020 |
| 7 July 2020 | Invoice 57837 | $7,755.00 | 8 July 2020 |
| 7 July 2020 | Invoice 57836 | $7,562.50 | 8 July 2020 |
| 2 September 2020 | Invoice 58009 | $27,021.50 | 7 Sept 2020 |
| 2 September 2020 | Invoice 58010 | $6,237.00 | 7 Sept 2020 |
| 5 November 2020 | Invoice 58247 | $6,099.50 | 11 Nov 2020 |
| 8 February 2021 | Invoice 58548 | $15,196.50 | 24 Feb 2021 |
| 8 February 2021 | Invoice 58549 | $1,903.00 | 24 Feb 2021 |
| 24 February 2021 | Invoice 58567 | $12,540.00 | 3 March 2021 |
| 10 May 2021 | Invoice 58850 | $16,958.34 | 19 May 2021 |
| 5 July 2021 | Invoice 58996 | $7,128.00 | 12 July 2021 |
| 19 August 2021 | Invoice 59204 | $11,222.92 | 27 Aug 2021 |
| 7 September 2021 | Invoice 59294 | $5,758.50 | 20 Sept 2021 |
| 5 October 2021 | Invoice 59365 | $15,541.20 | 18 Oct 2021 |
| 5 October 2021 | Invoice 59366 | $5,529.38 | 18 Oct 2021 |
| 2 November 2021 | Invoice 59437 | $1,639.00 | 8 Nov 2021 |
| 9 February 2022 | Invoice 59835 | $3,971.00 | 14 Feb 2022 |
| 7 April 2022 & 2 November 2021 | Invoice 59834 & 59438 | $1,369.59 | 20 April 2022 |
| 7 April 2022 | Invoice 60055 | $7,172.00 | 20 April 2022 |
| 7 April 2022 | Invoice 60054 | $621.50 | 20 April 2022 |
| 2 June 2022 | Invoice 60270 | $11,348.34 | Unknown |
| SUBTOTAL: | $253,203.48 | ||
| Barry Nilsson Lawyers | |||
| 17 December 2021 | Invoice 362929 | $8,800.00 | 20 Dec 2021 |
| SUBTOTAL: | $8,800.00 | ||
| Total | |||
| TOTAL: | $365,831.70 | ||
ATTACHMENT D
QPL invoices paid by the Estate
| Invoice date | Invoice Number | Amount | Date paid |
| 31 October 2014 | 2015-000581 | $7,117.83 | 24 Nov 2014 |
| 30 November 2014 | 2015-000705 | $2,249.50 | 11 Dec 2014 |
| 31 March 2015 | 2015-001119 | $3,852.20 | 10 April 2015 |
| 31 May 2015 | 2015-001468 | $2,436.50 | 3 June 2015 |
| 31 July 2015 | 2016-000178 | $2,487.75 | 10 Aug 2015 |
| 31 October 2015 | 2016-000599 | $4,088.90 | 3 Nov 2015 |
| 30 November 2015 | 2016-000768 | $758.00 | 7 Dec 2015 |
| 31 January 2016 | 2016-000955 | $1643.60 | 3 Feb 2016 |
| 29 February 2016 | 2016-001132 | $2,908.50 | 2 March 2016 |
| 31 March 2016 | 2016-001242 | $1,759.00 | 8 April 2016 |
| 29 April 2016 | 2016-001374 | $685.40 | 5 May 2016 |
| 30 June 2016 | 2016-001775 | $1,772.87 | 4 July 2016 |
| 5 July 2016 | 2017-000018 | $474.10 | 12 July 2016 |
| 31 July 2016 | 2017-000088 | $2,798.50 | 5 Aug 2016 |
| 31 August 2016 | 2017-000267 | $828.40 | 5 Sept 2016 |
| 30 September 2016 | 2017-000460 | $1,698.50 | 6 Oct 2016 |
| 31 October 2016 | 2017-000586 | $3,346.20 | 9 Nov 2016 |
| 30 November 2016 | 2017-000765 | $3,032.70 | 5 Dec 2016 |
| 31 December 2016 | 2017-000893 | $336.93 | 6 Jan 2017 |
| 31 January 2017 | I000095 | $859.19 | 7 Feb 2017 |
| 28 February 2017 | I000235 | $2,468.58 | 20 March 2017 |
| 31 March 2017 | I000309 | $4,863.65 | 6 April 2017 |
| 3 April 2017 | I000434 | $1,890.64 | 4 May 2017 |
| 31 May 2017 | I000652 | $1631.67 | 9 June 2017 |
| 30 June 2017 | I000773 | $131.67 | 6 July 2017 |
| 31 August 2017 | I001090 | $2,901.66 | 7 Sept 2017 |
| 31 October 2017 | I001472 | $2,181.24 | 6 Nov 2017 |
| 30 November 2017 | I001594 | $3,101.31 | 11 Dec 2017 |
| 22 December 2017 | I001702 | $1,183.93 | 8 Jan 2018 |
| 31 January 2018 | I001798 | $2,077.50 | 6 Feb 2018 |
| 28 February 2018 | I001904 | $3,322.11 | 6 March 2018 |
| 31 March 2018 | I002017 | $2,897.25 | 6 April 2018 |
| 30 April 2018 | I002122 | $806.04 | 7 May 2018 |
| 31 May 2018 | I002315 | $618.23 | 7 June 2018 |
| 31 August 2018 | I002674 | $2,970.19 | 10 Sept 2018 |
| 30 September 2018 | I002797 | $1,349.26 | 8 Oct 2018 |
| 31 October 2018 | I002985 | $699.60 | 9 Nov 2018 |
| 30 November 2018 | I003094 | $6,543.34 | 7 Jan 2019 |
| 30 November 2018 | I003095 | $2,880.90 | 7 Dec 2018 |
| 31 December 2018 | I003189 | $412.50 | 11 Jan 2019 |
| 31 December 2018 | I003191 | $411.82 | 11 Jan 2019 |
| 31 January 2019 | I003319 | $350.72 | 7 Feb 2019 |
| 31 January 2019 | I003320 | $963.96 | 7 Feb 2019 |
| 31 January 2019 | I003321 | $1,319.56 | 7 Feb 2019 |
| 28 February 2019 | I003414 | $125.40 | 5 March 2019 |
| 28 February 2019 | I003415 | $455.76 | 5 March 2019 |
| 31 May 2019 | I003862 | $191.40 | 7 June 2019 |
| 31 May 2019 | I003863 | $897.60 | 7 June 2019 |
| 31 July 2019 | I004057 | $1,837.95 | 5 Aug 2019 |
| 30 August 2019 | I004211 | $292.16 | 6 Sept 2019 |
| 31 August 2019 | I004212 | $348.63 | 6 Sept 2019 |
| 30 November 2019 | I004640 | $7,166.12 | 9 Dec 2019 |
| 31 January 2020 | I004843 | $3,827.89 | 5 Feb 2020 |
| 28 February 2020 | I004954 | $6,198.02 | 10 March 2020 |
| 1 April 2020 | I005073 | $799.44 | 8 April 2020 |
| 30 April 2020 | I005268 | $493.01 | 13 May 2020 |
| 30 June 2020 | I005580 | $760.39 | 8 July 2020 |
| 30 June 2020 | I005583 | $147.84 | 8 July 2020 |
| 31 July 2020 | I005709 | $2,122.55 | 10 Aug 2020 |
| 31 October 2020 | I006112 | $199.38 | 11 Nov 2020 |
| 8 December 2020 | I006204 | $5,911.22 | 14 Dec 2020 |
| 31 December 2020 | I006279 | $556.16 | 12 Jan 2021 |
| 28 February 2021 | I006432 | $1,839.67 | 15 March 2021 |
| TOTAL: | $127,282.49 |
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
IR
Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg
17 OCTOBER 2025
0
7
9