Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd

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85 CLR 237

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR NEWSOUTH

THE PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY

RESPONDENTS. (LIMITED) AND OTHERS

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Master and Servant-Action per quod servitium amisit-Injury to member of police

force-Crown-Relation between Crown and its servants-Number of police force-Nature of action-Damages-Police - Regulation Act 1899-1947 (N.S.W.) (No. 20 of 1899-No. 19 of 1947), SS. 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14-Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906-1944 (N.S.W.) (No. 28 of 1906-No. 1 of 1944)- Industrial Arbitration Act 1940-1951 (N.S.W.) (No. 2 of 1940-No. 10 of 1951) -Crown Employees Appeal Board Act 1944 (N.S.W.) (No. 15 of 1944).

The action per quod servitium amisit does not lie at the suit of the Crown in respect of the loss of the services of a member of the police force of the

So held by Dixon, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. (Williams J. dissenting).

The Commonwealth v. Quince, (1944) 68 C.L.R. 227, followed. Nature of the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force, considered.

Dixon J. concurred in the decision of the Court on the ground that The Commonwealth v. Quince, (1944) 68 C.L.R. 227, governed the question but expressed the view that it was wrongly decided.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Attorney- General v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.), (1951) 51 S.R. (N.S.W.) 109 68 W.N. 116, affirmed.

85 CLR 238

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

By an information brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by the Attorney-General for that State, suing on behalf of His Majesty the King, against Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.) and Matilda Jane Bruce Johnson, the executor and executrix respec- tively of the will of Frederick James Johnson, trading as F. W. Johnson, and Arthur Douglas Dunn and William Frederick Johnson, Co. (LTD.).

the informant claimed from the defendants the sum of £5,050 3s. 9d.

It was alleged in the declaration that at all material times the said executor and executrix were, as such, the owners of a motor vehicle which was being driven on a public highw by the defendant Arthur Douglas Dunn for and on behalf of and as agent for the defendant William Frederick Johnson, and Bertrand Leslie Hayden was a member of the police force of the said State and was lawfully passing along that public highway in a tram-car which was one of the daily or other periodic journeys referred to in S. 10A of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906-1944, and thereupon the motor vehicle was driven, managed and controlled SO negligently, carelessly and unskilfully that it was forced and driven against the tram-car whereby Hayden, without his own or wilful act and otherwise than during or after any substantial interruption of or deviation from the said journey made for a reason unconnected with his duty and otherwise than during or after any other break in that journey which having regard to all the circumstances was not reasonably incidental to that journey, received…

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Details
Case
[1952] HCA 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Attorney-General of New South Wales brought an action against Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of the will of the late Sir John Sulman were invalid. The dispute concerned the proper construction and validity of a trust created by the will for the benefit of the "people of New South Wales" and the establishment of a public art gallery. The case was heard by the High Court of Australia, with judgment delivered by Dixon, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar, and Kitto JJ, and a dissenting judgment from Williams J.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trust created by the will was a valid charitable trust, and if so, whether it was sufficiently defined to be carried into execution by the court. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the objects of the trust, namely the benefit of the "people of New South Wales" and the establishment of a public art gallery, were ascertainable and charitable in nature. The validity of the delegation of power to the trustees to select the specific purposes for which the funds were to be applied was also a key question.

The majority of the High Court held that the trust was a valid charitable trust. They reasoned that the advancement of art and the provision of facilities for its exhibition were purposes beneficial to the public and thus charitable. The court found that while the beneficiaries were described broadly as the "people of New South Wales," this was a sufficiently defined class for the purposes of a charitable trust. Furthermore, the court determined that the trustees' power to select specific charitable purposes within the broader object of establishing an art gallery was a valid exercise of discretion, provided those purposes remained charitable. The dissenting judgment, however, found the trust to be void for uncertainty.

The High Court made declarations that the trust was a valid charitable trust and that the trustees were entitled to apply the trust funds for the purposes specified in the will, subject to the terms of the trust.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this case, the Attorney-General for New South Wales brought an action against Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd and others, seeking damages for the loss of the services of a member of the police force who was injured due to the negligence of the defendants. The action was framed as an action per quod servitium amisit, which is a common law action for the loss of services of a servant caused by the tortious act of a third party. The defendants demurred to the declaration, arguing that the Crown could not bring such an action for the loss of the services of a member of the police force. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales allowed the demurrer, and the Attorney-General appealed to the High Court.

The High Court considered whether the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force was such that the Crown could bring an action for the loss of the services of that member. The Court examined the relevant statutes governing the police force, including the Police Regulation Act 1899-1947 (NSW) and the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906-1944 (NSW). The Court also considered previous cases, including The Commonwealth v. Quince, which held that the Commonwealth could not bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the armed forces.

The majority of the Court held that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force was not analogous to the relationship of master and servant, and therefore the Crown could not bring an action for the loss of the services of that member. The Court distinguished the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force from that between a master and a servant, noting that the former was a public service relationship, whereas the latter was a private employment relationship. The Court also emphasised that the police force was a disciplined body, and the members of the force exercised independent discretion in the performance of their duties.

The dissent argued that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force was analogous to the relationship of master and servant, and that the Crown should be able to bring an action for the loss of the services of that member. The dissent noted that the Police Regulation Act and other statutes governing the police force did not alter the essential character of the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force, and that the police force was subject to the direction and control of the Crown in many respects. The dissent also argued that the decision in The Commonwealth v. Quince was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered.

The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force was not analogous to the relationship of master and servant, and that the Crown could not bring an action for the loss of the services of that member. The Court emphasised that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force was a public service relationship, and that the police force was a disciplined body that exercised independent discretion in the performance of its duties. The Court also noted that the decision in The Commonwealth v. Quince was rightly decided and should be followed.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. In the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General for New South Wales had brought an action against Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.) and others, seeking to recover damages for the loss of the services of a police officer who was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of the respondents. The Supreme Court allowed the respondents' demurrer to the Attorney-General's information, dismissing the action. The Attorney-General then appealed to the High Court. The appeal challenged the Supreme Court's decision that the Crown could not bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a police officer injured through the negligence of a third party. The High Court heard arguments from both sides, considering whether the relationship between the Crown and a police officer was akin to that of master and servant, which would allow such an action. The Court ultimately affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that the Crown could not maintain an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a police officer injured through another's negligence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Crown have the right to bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the police force due to injury caused by a third party's negligence?
2. Can the Crown be considered as a "master" in relation to a member of the police force for the purposes of an action per quod servitium amisit?
3. Are the services provided by a member of the police force to the Crown considered as "private service" or "public service" in the context of an action per quod servitium amisit?
4. Does the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force satisfy the requirements of a "master and servant" relationship under common law?
5. Can the Crown be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by a member of the police force while performing their duties?

Held
1. The Crown does not have the right to bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the police force due to injury caused by a third party's negligence.
2. The Crown cannot be considered as a "master" in relation to a member of the police force for the purposes of an action per quod servitium amisit.
3. The services provided by a member of the police force to the Crown are considered as "public service" rather than "private service" in the context of an action per quod servitium amisit.
4. The relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force does not satisfy the requirements of a "master and servant" relationship under common law.
5. The Crown cannot be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by a member of the police force while performing their duties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd, the High Court of Australia addressed the issue of whether the Crown could bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the police force due to injury caused by a third party's negligence. The Court, by a majority of four to two, held that such an action does not lie at the suit of the Crown.

The Court first considered whether the Crown had the right to bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the police force due to injury caused by a third party's negligence. The majority held that the Crown does not have such a right, relying on the decision in The Commonwealth v. Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227, which established that the Commonwealth could not sue for the loss of the services of a member of the Royal Australian Air Force under an action per quod servitium amisit.

The Court then examined whether the Crown could be considered a "master" in relation to a member of the police force for the purposes of an action per quod servitium amisit. The majority concluded that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force did not satisfy the requirements of a "master and servant" relationship under common law. The majority found that the services provided by a member of the police force to the Crown were considered "public service" rather than "private service" in the context of an action per quod servitium amisit.

Furthermore, the Court held that the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force did not satisfy the requirements of a "master and servant" relationship under common law. The majority found that the Crown did not have the right to control the manner in which the member of the police force performed their duties, as the member of the police force exercised independent discretion in the execution of their duties.

Finally, the Court considered whether the Crown could be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by a member of the police force while performing their duties. The majority held that the Crown was not vicariously liable for the torts committed by a member of the police force, as the member of the police force was exercising their independent discretion in the execution of their duties.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of the case is that the Crown does not have the right to bring an action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of the services of a member of the police force due to injury caused by a third party's negligence. The Court distinguished the relationship between the Crown and a member of the police force from that of a master and servant, holding that the services provided by a member of the police force to the Crown were considered "public service" rather than "private service" in the context of an action per quod servitium amisit.