TransAdelaide v Evans

Case [2005] SASC 175

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

TRANSADELAIDE v EVANS

Judgment of The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle

18 May 2005

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION

An appeal against a preliminary finding in the District Court - in the District Court the respondent is claiming damages from the appellant for liability in negligence - the appellant, a statutory authority, claims that s 54(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 precludes the common law action - issues for this appeal - consideration of 'employer' for the purposes of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1986 and application to the Crown and its various statutory authorities and instrumentalities - discussion of the concepts of indivisibility and divisibility of the Crown - discussion of the individual corporate status and identity of statutory authorities and Crown instrumentalities - appeal dismissed.

TransAdelaide (Corporate Structure) Act 1998 (SA) ss 4, 5; Public Corporations Act 1993 (SA); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) ss 54(1), 51, 52, 58B, 61; Police Act 1998 (SA) ss 21, 4; Police Regulations 1999 (SA); Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA); Crown Proceedings Act 1992 (SA) s 4(1), referred to.
Sutherland v Federal Airports Corporation (1998) 72 SASR 356; Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969; Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 113; Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462; Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1; Commonwealth v Western Australia (1999) 196 CLR 392; Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW) Ex Parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410, considered.

TRANSADELAIDE v EVANS
[2005] SASC 175

Civil

  1. DOYLE CJ:          This is an appeal by leave against a decision by a Judge of the District Court on a question argued as a preliminary point in an action in the District Court.

  2. Mr Evans claims damages for personal injuries suffered by him while on premises occupied by TransAdelaide.  He claims that the injury he suffered is due to the negligence of TransAdelaide in its capacity as occupier of the premises. 

  3. TransAdelaide is, by s 4 and s 5 of the TransAdelaide (Corporate Structure) Act 1998 (SA) a body corporate and a statutory corporation to which the provisions of the Public Corporations Act 1993 (SA) apply. Although disputed at an earlier stage, on appeal it was accepted that TransAdelaide was the occupier of the premises in question.

  4. TransAdelaide denied liability. In particular it pleaded that by virtue of s 54(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (“the WRC Act”) no liability attached to it. That plea is the basis of the preliminary point that the Judge determined.

  5. After hearing submissions the Judge ruled that s 54(1) of the WRC Act did not protect TransAdelaide. The ruling was drawn up as an interlocutory judgment. Although the point was not raised on appeal, I doubt whether it was correct to do so. It is simply…

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AGLC
TransAdelaide v Evans [2005] SASC 175
Case
[2005] SASC 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of TransAdelaide v Evans, the appellant, a statutory authority, sought to defend against a negligence claim brought by the respondent by invoking Section 54(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986. The District Court ruled against the appellant's claim that the statutory section precluded the common law action, leading to this appeal. The central issue in the appeal was the interpretation of the term "employer" as it appears in the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1986 and its applicability to the Crown and its various statutory authorities and instrumentalities. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the statutory authority in question, TransAdelaide, could be considered the employer under the circumstances of the case.

The court examined the statutory framework and the broader legal principles concerning the Crown's indivisibility and the individual corporate status of statutory authorities. It considered whether the statutory authority could be deemed the employer for the purposes of the Act, and if the Crown's immunity from common law actions extended to statutory authorities in this context. The court concluded that the interpretation of "employer" in Section 54(1) of the Act should be confined to the entity with whom the worker has a direct contract of service. Extending this term to include the Crown in all its forms would render critical provisions of the Act unworkable. Therefore, the court held that Section 54(1) did not provide a defence to TransAdelaide in this instance.

As a result of the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed, and the earlier decision of the District Court was upheld. The court did not find it necessary to address other issues presented in the appeal, as the central question regarding the applicability of Section 54(1) had been resolved. The court's decision clarifies the scope of "employer" under the Act and reaffirms that statutory authorities such as TransAdelaide can be held liable in negligence claims, notwithstanding the protections afforded to the Crown under workers' compensation legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

I agree with the Judge’s decision that s 54(1) of the WRC Act does not provide, in the circumstances, that no liability attaches to TransAdelaide. Paragraph 6A of the Defence should be struck out. As will appear, it is neither necessary nor desirable to decide some of the other issues decided by the Judge.Facts Certain facts were agreed by the parties for the purposes of the preliminary point. In particular, the parties agreed that Mr Evans is a constable of police appointed by the Commissioner of Police under s 21 of the Police Act 1998 (SA). The parties also agreed that Mr Evans has claimed and has received payments of compensation under the WRC Act in respect of the injury, the subject of the proceedings. The legal basis for the payment was not explained. The parties agreed that those payments were made by South Australia Police. By s 4 of the Police Act 1998 (SA) South Australia Police is said to consist of the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners and the other officers and members appointed by the Commissioner. As I understand the Police Act 1998 (SA), South Australia Police is simply a convenient term to refer collectively to those persons who are appointed under the Police Act 1998 (SA) for the purposes specified by s 5 of the Act, and to exercise the powers and functions conferred by that Act and other Acts applying to members of South Australia Police. It may not be correct to say that the payments of workers compensation were made by South Australia Police, but for present purposes nothing turns on that point. Apart from these few facts, the preliminary point appears to have been dealt with on the basis of a number of propositions (mainly of law, but perhaps sometimes also of fact) drawn from the provisions of the Police Act 1998 (SA), the Police Regulations 1999 (SA), the TransAdelaide (Corporate Structure) Act 1998 (SA), the Public Corporations Act 1993 (SA) and the Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA). Because of the approach that I take to the resolution of this matter it is not necessary to go into these matters in detail. However, it seems to me that the preliminary point has proceeded on a slightly uncertain basis because the parties have not clearly identified the basis upon which it is to be decided. However, I am of the view that it is possible to dispose of the matter, despite these difficulties.The preliminary point The central provision is s 54(1) of the WRC Act. It provides:54(1)Subject to subsection (2), no liability attaches to an employer in respect of a compensable disability arising from employment by that employer except –(a) a liability under this Act;…Although it was not agreed, the parties have agreed the case on the basis that Mr Evans claims damages for an injury that is a compensable disability arising from his employment as a police constable. For convenience here I also set out the relevant provisions of s 61 of the WRC Act, which are as follows:61The Crown and certain agencies to be exempt employers(1) Subjection to subsection (2), the Crown and any agency or instrumentality of the Crown shall be deemed to be registered as exempt employers.(2) The Governor may, by proclamation, declare that an agency or instrumentality of the Crown is not to be regarded as an exempt employer, and in that event the agency or instrumentality shall not be regarded as an exempt employer.There is no relevant proclamation.The Judge’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

For the purpose of disposing of the appeal, I am prepared to assume that propositions (1) - (3), and (5) are correct. However, it should be noted that propositions (1) and (2) raise some significant issues. Decisions of the High Court in Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969 and in Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Limited (1952) 85 CLR 237, and the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Limited (1955) 92 CLR 113 have been understood to decide that a police constable is a public officer who is not an employee of the Crown. It may be, as some have argued, that those decisions are authority for narrower propositions related to the vicarious liability of the Crown for the acts of police constables, and the ability of the Crown to claim damages for the loss of the services of a police constable caused by the negligent act of another. It also may be that statutory and other changes have undermined the basis of those decisions. However, these are matters for consideration by the High Court, not by me. It might also be that there are indications in the WRC Act that a police constable is a worker for the purposes of the Act, but, once again, whether that conclusion is open having regard to the decisions referred to might be doubted. It is for those reasons in brief that I simply assume, for present purposes, that somehow or other propositions (1) and (2) can be made good. It is not necessary to do any more than that.Conclusion Even if propositions (1) – (3), and (5) are correct, s 54(1) does not apply to TransAdelaide so as to give it a defence. A consideration of the WRC Act as a whole indicates that the reference to an “employer” in s 54(1) is to the person or entity with whom the worker has a contract of service, and at whose direction (ultimately) the worker performs work under the contract of service. To give a meaning to “employer” that would embrace the Crown (a term of uncertain scope) in all its forms or emanations would render certain key provisions of the WRC Act unworkable. Section 51(1) is a central provision of the WRC Act. It requires a worker who suffers a compensable disability and who is employed to give notice of the disability to the employer: s 51(1)(a). The notice is deemed to have been given to an employer if given to the employer “at any place of business of the employer”, if “served by post on the employer” or if given to certain specified persons: s 51(4). If the submission by TransAdelaide is correct, it would follow that Mr Evans could have given notice of his claim to any agency or instrumentality of the Crown in right of the State of South Australia, or to any emanation of that Crown. Section 52(4) requires a claim for compensation to be given to “the employer”. The same comment applies. Section 58B imposes a duty on an employer to provide “suitable employment” for a worker who has been incapacitated but is able to return to work. On the basis of the argument advanced by TransAdelaide, were Mr Evans to invoke that section the onus would fall on the Crown (presumably) to demonstrate that there is no suitable employment available for Mr Evans at any emanation of the State Crown, not just in South Australia Police.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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